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ON KILLING AND ALLOWING TO STARVE TO DEATH

Dr. G. Sogolo

The killing/letting die distinction has been used in a variety of issues that have to do with human life.[1] In his 'Killing and Starving to Death',[2] James Rachels discusses the morality of affluent societies letting people in poor countries die of starvation. He argues for the position that 'our "negative duty" not to do harm' is of equal moral weight as 'our "positive duty" to give aid', and therefore cannot see how the 'intuitively' held view that killing people is morally worse than letting them die of starvation can be sustained. This can only be so, according to him, if there are morally relevant differences between killing and letting die. Rachels thinks there are no such differences (i.e. to say, there are no reasons to show that 'one course is intrinsically preferable to the other').

Rachels thus formulates his 'Equivalence Thesis' to read:

(i) If there are the same reasons for or against A as for or against B, then the reasons in favour of A are neither stronger nor weaker than the reasons in favour of B; and so A and B are morally equivalent - neither is preferable to the other.

(ii) There are the same reasons for and against letting die as for and against killing.

And if this is true, we get the conclusion:

(iii) Therefore, killing and letting die are morally equivalent - neither is preferable to the other.[3]

If Rachels is right, the implication in practical morality will be that an affluent man who can, but refuses to send food or money to starving people in India and Africa ought to feel the same weight of moral guilt as the man who without any genuine cause shoots his neighbour and kills him. This is what Rachels tries to establish in his paper.

Undoubtedly, this equivalence thesis seems valid insofar as we accept the claim of the author that there are no morally relevant distinctions between killing and allowing to starve to death. Rachels has lucidly argued for this with examples of cases of letting die that are morally worse than cases of killing or vice versa. He also tries to dismiss all possible objections to his thesis. The possible objection, for instance, that it is logically absurd to evaluate inaction flies in the face of commonsense, according to Rachels. 'Tax fraud', 'not feeding the child', and 'not responding to greetings', etc. involve inaction and yet they then are subject to all kinds of moral assessment. But because Rachels only uses this broad comparison between 'positive' and 'negative' duties to

establish the moral gravity of starving to death vis-a-vis killing, I intend not to question his thesis on the level of the action-inaction distinction. However, I want to argue first on a general basis that not every case of starving to death is one of letting die and secondly that Rachels's specific example of affluent nations, allowing people in India and Africa to starve to death is not a case of letting die and therefore not morally equivalent to killing.

Letting die, refraining from saving and not saving

There is a sense in which letting someone die is synonymous with refraining from saving that person. Jonathan Bennett makes this obvious:

> When I say 'he let her die', I mean only that he knowingly refrains from preventing her death which he alone could prevent, and he cannot say that her survival is in a general way 'none of my business' or 'not [even prima facie] (prima facie italicized) my concern.[4]'

I shall return shortly to the general conditions defining a situation in which X can be said to let Y die. But the point here is that letting die and refraining from saving carry almost the same meaning as distinct from not merely saving.

P. J. Fitzgerald, using Bennett's example of Joe letting his calf die, illustrates how this is different from the case of merely not saving:

> Joe's calf is dying for want of food. Joe does nothing about this. Neither does Bill, who owns the adjoining farm and who could, if he wishes come and feed the calf... in this example it is only Joe who let the calf die. Bill does not let the calf die; he merely does nothing to save it.[5]

Only Joe and not Bill could also be said to have refrained from saving the calf. Bill merely does nothing to save it. The reason for this distinction, explains Fitzgerald, is simply that letting die and refraining from saving imply some kind of "duty to". By virtue of the relationship between Joe and the calf, namely that Joe is the owner of the calf, he owes the calf the obligation to feed it. Bill does not.

A slightly different situation will illustrate this distinction. A highway patrolman vested with the duty of checking excessive speed saw a driver exceeding the speed limit. He could follow this driver, necessarily at a greater speed to warn or stop him. He did not. The driver eventually ended up killed in an accident resulting from excessive speed. Such a highway patrolman could be said to have let the driver die through dereliction of his duty. But supposing the patrolman explained that, as a matter of fact, he realized it was his duty to follow the driver, but that he thought the risk of so doing was even greater to himelf. This explanation, perhaps would alter our assessment of the situation. We could say, well, he probably just did not save the driver. The reason for this change is simply that the patrolman's duty to save his own life was thought to be greater than that of saving the driver. Now, take the case of another road

user who was in the same position as the patrolman (except that speed-checking was not his duty). He could not be said to have refrained from saving or to have let the driver die. He merely did nothing to save him.

It could be argued that the prima facie distinction we are seeking to establish between letting die or refraining from saving and doing nothing to save, is not proved by the above examples. Bill could be said to owe the general duty to save the lives of animals and the road user that of saving human life, in which case their doing nothing to save could be interpreted to mean letting die or refraining from saving. What this means, however, is that letting die or refraining from saving is a species of not saving, the former being qualified by some conditions such as the presence of duty. And once this is accepted, a prima facie moral distinction has been established between the two types of inaction.

Our problem immediately follows. How are we to know when duty is involved in order to separate cases of letting die from those of merely doing nothing to save. One possible suggestion is that we know when a duty is involved when the object to whom such duty is owed can be identified. Going by this, anyone refusing to conceive children will not be violating any duty since such children are non-existent and hence unidentifiable. And this will make 'not conceiving' fall into the same genus as 'not saving', unless the additional point is made that the woman who refuses to conceive children violates her duty to society, e.g. the duty to procreate. But it is always a point of dispute whether or not such duties actually do exist. This dispute involves a high degree of arbitrariness and arguments for and against stand almost at par.

Perhaps, factors other than the presence or absence of duty need to come in to be able to make a distinction between letting die and not saving. Daniel Dinello's analysis of what it means to let die reads as follows:

X let Y die if:

(a) there are conditions affecting Y, such that if they are not altered, Y will die:

(b) X has reasons to believe that the performance of certain movements will alter conditions affecting Y, such that Y will not die;

(c) X is in a position to perform such movements;

(d) X fails to perform these movements.[6]

By what has been said so far, Dinello's conditions seem only to point to a case of not saving. It will be one of letting die if an additional factor is brought in, such as

(e) X owes and knows that he owes a duty to save Y.

Even with this, one could still bring further modifications to Dinello's conditions to make them constitute a case of letting die. To say as condition (d) does, that 'X fails to perform the movements' per se, is to rule out possible

mitigating circumstances under which X's failure to act to save Y could be morally excusable. Supposing, for instance, that X is in a position to act to save Y (and X has every good intention of doing so), but forgets to act at the material moment, will X still be morally held responsible for 'letting Y die'? Forgetfulness being an unconscious 'act' for which there can be no moral culpability, the situation seems to be altered. A case of letting die will only arise if, other things being equal, X *intentionally* fails to act to save Y. The point is that there could be several other influencing factors (X's ability to act apart) which could change what appears to be a case of letting die to one of merely not saving.

Two additional factors have now been introduced into what it means to let die. It has been said that merely not saving is not morally culpable because it involves no violation of duty. The other factor which seems to be derived from a general motivist ethical stand is that for X to have let Y die, X must have entertained some intention in that direction. The validity of what now follows will to a great extent depend on these two factors although I have not made any efforts to defend the wider principles upon which they rest.

The moral dictum that every human being owes a duty to save other fellow humans from starving to death, is not one that is commonly refuted. Rachels is therefore right to think that Jack Palance who refuses to give a sandwich to a starving child should see himself as a 'moral monster'.[7] Palance's guilt is one of wanton indifference to the duty which he owes humanity. It is not exactly that his inaction is a result of malice (e.g. the child being the daughter of an enemy for which this is a revenge). Motives of this kind or any other were not at least imputed to Palance, going by Rachels's description. One is therefore tempted to view the Palance child case from a different perspective. What Palance ought to have done was to *save* the child by giving her the sandwich. What he did was *not saving* the child by not giving her the sandwich. By this reasoning, although Palance has a duty to save the child from starving to death, he still has not *let the child die*, for that does not meet the demands of our modifications of Dinello's conditions. For X to let Y die, among other things, X must intentionally fail to act to save Y. This is to say that the outcome of X's inaction must have been intended by X. This does not apply to Palance merely does not save the child. He does not let the child die.

Since Rachels has made the point that most of the time intuition and tradition rather than logic back our moral positions, it appears no amount of logical manouvre can rescue Jack Palance from accepting moral guilt. But Palance's fictitions situation is only a way of Rachels pointing out that affluent nations letting poor ones die of starvation when they can afford to save them, are in a similar situation. It is unnecessary to rehearse the author's arguments for this further equivalence thesis between Jack Palance's situation and that of affluent nations. Let us directly consider the case of the rich nations versus the

poor ones.

We may start once more from the same basic premise that every human being has a duty to save another human being, if he can, from starving to death. From this, it follows (or does it not?) that affluent nations, if they can, ought to save poor ones from starving to death. Duties, unlike laws, when stated in this way often lead to peculiarly awkward situations, not just because one duty could conflict with another (laws too do) and there is no clear-cut way of arranging them in some hierarchical order; duties could be so elastic that their boundaries are not easily assertainable.

R.L. Trammell[8] and Rachels[9] himself point out one of the possible consequences of people clinging unconditionally to duties. This example brings out their point, Mr. Affluent Americana wants to buy a colour television purely for his own enjoyment when a representative of the Red Cross informs him that one Mr. Poor Africana is on the verge of starving to death. Now, because Mr. Americana thinks he ought to rescue a man dying of starvation, he offers his money and suspends his television plan. He however intends to buy it when he saves from his next salary. On his pay day, the Red Cross representative calls again. This time Mr. Pauper Indiana is about to die of starvation. Americana obliges and postpones further his television plan. The visits become more and more regular - on each occasion Mr. Americana wants to buy his television set someone is on the verge of starving to death and that person has to be saved and the purchase of television postponed. The bizarre conclusion, according to Trammell, is that it now becomes immoral to buy colour televisions, cars, toys fancy clothes and any other such items that are not directly functional to bare human survival. The crucial question is this: is buying luxury goods an arm of letting die if the buyer is aware that not buying will save a human life.

Rachels thinks that this reasoning reduces the whole discussion to a trivial level even though he still would want it to be part of his thesis that "we are morally wrong to spend money on inessentials when the money could go to feed the starving...[10] His reaction therefore against Trammell's point that Mr. Americana is involved in a "nondischargeable duty" since he alone cannot save everyone who is dying of starvation, is that he is morally bound to save those he can. My point against this is that there must be some limit, a point at which Mr. Americana is morally excused from saving a life at the expense of something else he personally values. To say that Mr. Americana must discharge this duty until his pool of personal preferences directly unconnected with saving human life is empty, is to preach moral tyranny.

Even our initial assumption that human life has a value that supercedes every other thing is as arbitrary as the position of a pet lover who thinks that the comfort of his cat overrides that of a distant cousin. But our concern here is not one of setting values in some hierarchical order but merely that of questioning

what Rachels thinks is the weight of moral guilt that not saving a starving man carries. It was argued earlier that there is a distinctions between not saving and letting die. The absence of presence of duty was used as the main criterion for distinguishing one from the other. We have assumed in the case of Mr. Americana that he has a duty, namely to save life. But does his nonperformance of this duty make him guilty of letting die?

Now, each time Americana discharges his duty he saves a life. If he does not, he does not save a life. As it was argued earlier in the case of Palance and the child, for Americana to be charged with letting Africana or Indiana die, some other considerations need to come in (i.e. in addition to duty). Americana cannot be said to let die if his reasons for refusing to act have nothing to do with the victim, or the possible consequences that might follow from his not acting. His mere preference for a colour television has no link with either. But if Americana explains his decline to help by saying that the unfortunate people are responsible for their own plight and it is therefore none of his business or if his reason is simply that the people themselves are not charitable and so deserve whatever predicament they face, then the charge of letting die will make sense.

One may even set aside all considerations about duty or motive and settle the score with the very meaning of the verb "to let." Ordinarily, letting a thing occur is taken to be an act rather than inaction. You let the ball go if you loose grip of it; you let a prisoner go when you remove constraints binding him, etc. In other words, letting an event occur is simply removing obstacles from the moral course of that event. Not letting it occur is to leave obstacles in the way of that event or simply to put in some where there has been none. Now, to say that Palance let the child die is to imply that he removed some obstacles from the process of the child starving to death. Palance did not do this. Nor can Americana be said to remove some obstacles from the 'natural' process of Africana or Indiana starving to death. He cannot therefore be said to have let them die. For Palance not to have let the child die he has to put some obstacle, namely the sandwich in the way of the child starving to death. So also would Americana have put in some obstacles in the way of Africana or Indiana starving to death if he was not to let any of them die. The point is that neither Palance nor Americana interfered either by way of putting or removing obstacles from the deaths in question. They cannot therefore be said to have let them die.

There is the tendency to miss Rachels's thesis by overemphasizing the weight of this conceptual analysis. Rachels is proposing a purely normative thesis, namely that affluent people who can but do not save starving people from dying are letting them die. They ought to wear as grave a sense of moral guilt as

people who kill other human beings. I have tried to argue against this thesis by pointing out that not all cases of not saving are cases of letting die. Not saving generally refers to a class of inaction under which a variety of sub-species are subsumed. Letting die is that version of not saving describing a situation in which 'duty' and 'intentionality' play essential roles. I have not questioned Rachels's "Equivalence Thesis" between killing and letting die. I hold that killing people is morally wrong; so also is letting people die. But merely not saving is neither the one nor the other. Affluent nations who can but do not send food to people starving to death in India and Africa do not let them die. They simply do not save them.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The distinction has been applied in discussions concerning, e.g. euthanasia, abortion, infanticide and a host of other moral problems in medical practice. See Natalie Abrams's 'Active and Passive Euthanasia'. *Philosophy* Vol. 53, No. 204 (April 1978), pp. 257-63; 'Active and Passive Euthanasia' by J. Rachels, *New England Journal of Medicine* (January 9 1975), pp. 78-80; Jonathan Bennett's "Whatever the Consequences" in *Analysis*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (January 1966), pp. 83-102; Daniel Dinello's 'On Killing and Letting Die', *Analysis*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (January 1971), pp. 83-86; and also Richard Trammell's 'Saving Life and Taking Life' *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXX11, No. 5, (March, 1975), pp. 131-137.
2. *Philosophy*, Vol. 54, No. 208, (April 1979), pp. 159-171.
3. James Rachel 'Killing and Starving to Death', op.cit., p. 165.
4. Jonathan Bennett 'Whatever the Consequences', op.cit., p. 93
5. P.J. Fitzgerald, 'Acting and Refraining', *Analysis*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (March 1967), p. 134.
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7. J. Rachels 'Killing and Starving to Death', op.cit p. 163.
8. R.L. Trammell 'Saving Life and Taking Life', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXX11, No. 5, (March 1975), p. 134.
9. J. Rachels 'Killing and Starving to Death', op.cit., p. 168.
10. J. Rachels 'Killing and Starving to Death', op.cit., p. 169.

MODERN THEORIES IN AN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

Dr. C. S. Momoh

The title of this paper "Modern Theories in An African Philosophy" boldly assumes that there are pre-modern theories or aspects of African Philosophy, and that African Philosophy itself exists. The second conjunct of these titular assumptions will not be explicitly and grandly argued for here. I hope, however, that if the treatment of the topic turns out to be sensible and intelligible, the tenability of the second conjunct will become obvious or, at any rate, shall not be hotly contested.

There are many modern theories in African Philosophy; some of them spinned by indigenous African Philosophers, others by alien scholars interested in African studies. Some of these theories are: Abraham's *Cultural Essentialism*. Idoniboye's Theory of *African Metaphysics*. Hallen's *Cultural Thematics*. Levy-Bruhl's *Mystico-Logical Theory*. Tempels's *Life Force*. and my own theory: The *Doctrine of Universal Gratitude*. The other theories in African Philosophy by Professor Bodunrin, Professor Wiredu, Robin Horton, and Professor Odera Oruka all display the same intellectual animus, and so are classified under the *Neo-positivist Theories* in African Philosophy.

For the immediate purposes of this paper two theories will be discussed as a representative sample. They are Abraham's *Cultural Essentialism* and Hallen's *Cultural Thematics*. Abraham's theory is metaphysico-political, and Hellen's is metaphysico-linguistic. What these and other modern theories in African Philosophy have in common is that they are based on the ancient metaphysics of some African peoples whose societies the philosophers in question used as paradigms.[2] Thus Abraham's theory is based on the Akan metaphysics, and Hallen's on the Yoruba people's metaphysics.

Now I proceed to discuss matters under three heads. The first head reconstitutes African Philosophy into three periods - Ancient, Transitional and Modern. The aim here is to show how it is now possible to talk of Modern African Philosophy; two theories, as has been indicated, will be discussed in this period and each will occupy a head.

1. A RECONSTITUTION OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

Scholars are becoming increasingly aware that African pneumatological beliefs, metaphysical views, moral doctrines, political and social principles, epistemology, logic, science and the scholars' own theories and extractions from all of these, should not be indiscriminately labelled 'African Traditional

Thought." This gamut of African knowledge is not traditional, first, because the word 'traditional' drips with impressions of naivete, low intellect, stagnation, and crudity; second, because the word 'traditional carries the implication, in the words of Professor Wiredu, 'that modern Africans have not been trying, or worse still, ought not to try, to philosophize." It is also not "thought" because comprising this gamut of knowledge is African science-physical, chemical, and biological. To the extent that in ancient times there was no rigid division between Snow's two cultures, to that extent this gamut of African knowledge cannot be labelled African Traditional Thought.

The attempt to establish African Philosophy as a respectable discipline has been impaired by this thought that it is traditional thought. Yet the many doctrines that can be extracted from African knowledge in its ancient settings represent the strenuous attempts of African elders to ponder over the mysteries of the universe, the hostility of the environment, the difficulties of living with fellow beings - human and non-human, alive or ancestral, the desire to establish and live in a stable society, the necessity to communicate freely with others and to know and master the environment either through co-operation or by conquest. These strenous attempts led to asking metaphysical, moral, social and political, logical and epistemological questions. African elders came up with answers to such questions although, admittedly, their answers may not be the most sophisticated in the world. But these questions were fundamental questions and, as we are told by Reichenbach, "the discovery of fundamental questions is in itself an essential contribution to intellectual progress, and when the history of philosophy is conceived as a history of questions, it offers a much more fruitful aspect than when it is regarded as a history of systems."[3] Reichenbach goes on to add that philosophers should be judged by the questions they asked, and not by the answers they proffered.

In what I designate as Ancient African Philosophy I hold that African elders asked fundamental questions about the universe. These fundamental questions need not be unique. Nor should their originality be impugned because others may have asked similar questions. For when beings are subjected to similar experiences and situations, it is not unusual to have reactions that differ only in degree. The Pre-Socratics, for instance, asked what element constitutes the basic stuff of the universe while the African practising metaphysician is concerned with what element is the most effective *contact agent* in the universe: Is it Air, Earth or Water? Both concerns are legitimate and centuries of advancement in science and knowledge have not answered any of them to the satisfaction of all.

Going by the logic of the case the content of Ancient African Philosophy must, and in fact does differ from people to people. Where a staple plant or food is dominant in the lives of an African people, much of their philosophising

will be found or be centred around such a staple item. If they are mainly or even avocationally hunters, their metaphysical and moral doctrines will be found to accommodate much of the animal world. Sometimes an animal that is very common in the surroundings becomes the staple of their philosophical activity. If they are an African people in riverine areas, or a people who settled near rivers, their ontology will sparkle with aquarian beings. Should they be a people who depend on herding for their livelihood, domesticated animals will feature a lot not only in their social arrangements but in their phlosophizing. But whatever is the staple or secondary item in any ancient African Philosophy, it never forgets to make allowance for human, spiritual, and ancestral beings.

It is not every African, not even every Tom, Dick and Harry African elder, who possesses a knowledge of what William Abraham,[4] in his new classic work *Mind of Africa*, designates as the public aspect of African Philosophy. The elders who do are few, and fewer still are those of them who draw their independent morals from the community's public or communal mind. This is why we now hold that it is not just enough to document the 'beliefs' of an African community. The names of the elders who discussed these 'beliefs' must be given and their views credited to them. This procedure completes the second arm of Abraham's distinction between the public and private aspects of African Philosophy.

The period I designate as the Transitional Period in African Philosophy marks the entry of scholars from different disciplines into African studies. But before I delve into this topic, it is very necessary to clear what has become the "Egyptian Question " in African Philosophy.

What, to my mind, is ultimately a denial of the existence of African Philosophy is the conflation and reduction of Black African Philosophy to Ancient Egyptian Philosophy. Scholars belonging to this school of thought assert, first, that African Philosophy exists: second, that this African Philosophy is ancient Egyptian Philosophy; third, that there could not have been Greek Philosophy were it not for the existence of this ancient Egyptian Philosophy. One aspect of the overall contention, then, is that there could not have been Greek Philosophy without African Philosophy.[5]

It is indeed true that ancient Egypt hosted an advanced civilization - scientific, technological, educational, artistic, mystical and philosophical. But it was also, above all, a civilization with a written language. This issue of a written language is the big question mark on all academic attempts to trace Black African origins, culture and learning to ancient Egypt. If, as could be argued, none of our ancestors who emigrated from ancient Egypt belonged to the literati, then we have it that our forefathers were the peons and scum of the ancient Egyptian society, an admission which will dampen the enthusiasm of desiring to identify with an advanced ancient civilization.

Africa is said to be the cradle of two things in history: civilization and mankind; the civilization applies to Egypt and the mankind applies to Black Africa. As regards the second ascription I just want to point out that Africa is the easiest place in the world to dig for archaelogical finds without monumental costs, threats of lawsuits, and requests for land compensation. The insinuation underlying this ascription, however, is what I find objectionable: the cradle of mankind has not really gone beyond the cradle of intellectual development. For a people have to be intellectually developed before they can be said to be philosophically minded. Edward Tylor gave explicit scholarly comfort to this type of insinuation when he wrote:[6] "... There is this plain difference between low and high races of men that the dull-minded barbarian has not power of thought enough to come up to the civilized man's best moral standard." Supercilious opinions of this sort are ultimately aided by the attempts to trace everything creditable in the African to ancient Egyptian culture.

Professor Wiredu spoke of the nudgings of Black Americans to be shown an African Philosophy. I might add that they want an African Philosophy with roots in a famous ancient civilization. But Professor Saburi Biobaku has shown that there were indigenous people in the Yoruba country when the Oduduwa group were supposed to have decided to settle there. Assuming that the 'natives' were not intellectually acute enough to be philosophical, should we also say that the immigrants were so intellectually supine as not to have changed their philosophy in the course of centuries of emigration, different environment, and different experiences? All this notwithstanding, the onus of showing why our ancient Egyptian ancestors did not bring the art of writing with them lies with the Egyptologists.

Lacinay Keita divided African Philosophy into the following three periods: The classical African Thought of Ancient Egypt, African Thought in Medieval Africa, and Philosophy in contemporary Africa.[7] His principal opinion is that African Philosophy is the philosophy contained in the *Corpus Hermeticum* of ancient Egypt. Consequently his idea of African Philosophy in medieval Africa is still the one contained in the *Corpus Hermeticum* excepting that during this period it was expressed, with no appreciable improvement, through the medium of the Arabic language and carried through the Sahara southwards. He also opines that the situation was not different in Medieval Europe. The illusory difference was in the medium of communication, in this case Latin, but European medieval Philosophy is the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle cast in theological guises. Since, however, Plato and Aristotle themselves owe their philosophies to the *Corpus Hermeticum*, philosophy in Medieval Europe is the philosophy of ancient Egypt.

Arguments of this sort commit their authors far beyond the horizons they imagined. Ancient Egypt indeed had famous and reputable centres of learning

which, naturally, attracted scholars from all over the then known world. But history is replete with instances where a scholar not only made use of what he learnt in his own original way but also outgrew his alma mater. And once a centre of learning had been so famous and international in outlook, it becomes petty for a national group, except for the fact of geographical location and initial establishment, to claim the credit exclusively.

Since 1614 the Hermetic writings have been shown, at any rate, not to be ancient Egyptian at all. According to Isaac Causabon, the writings were not authored by a very ancient Egyptian priest but by post-christian writers.[8] The name of the supposed all knowing ancient Egyptian priest was Hermes Trismegistus Eminent theologians had lent their weight to the reality of Trismegistus and the Renaissance went along. But it was, in fact a mythical name, and very probably a christian forgery. The hermetic writings could not, therefore, be the source from whence Plato and the Greeks had derived the best they knew. To think otherwise, as some people like Keita and Fudd before him are want to do, is to get involved in perpetrating what is, in the words of Yates, a "huge historical error" dating back to the Renaissance.[9]

Keita's contention is that the founding fathers of Greek Philosophy used the *Corpus Hermeticum* as a textbook. And Causabon, who says that the Hermetic writings were authored by post-Christian writers, does not deny the fact that the writings contained the fragmentary core of ancient Egyptian intellectual culture. Nor does he deny the fact that Plato was tutored in ancient Egyptian centres of learning which were the custodians of the 'Hermetic' intellectual tradition. We all know, for instance, that Plato's dialogues in their documented form were not put together by Plato. Can we say, on that account, that Aristotle, who was a pupil in Plato's Academy at the time his master's philosophy was undocumented, cannot be said to have been nourished in Plato's Philosophy? It follows, then, that Keita's error, and it is really a huge historical one, lies in his thinking that the *Corpus Hermeticum* existed as a documented textbook in the time of Plato.

Whether at home or abroad, the education of the African is Western-oriented. The libraries of the universities in Africa are stocked with Western books, most of them written by Western authors, in Western style. Thousands of Africans are educated in the West. What people like Keita are really saying is that educated Africans cannot be original in their own way without being reminded of their intellectual indebtedness to the West, or worse still without being accused of plagiarizing the West. The reason Keita and the Egyptologists are oozing with anger is that Plato and Aristotle are said to have failed to acknowledge their indebtedness to ancient Egypt.

But my central point of disagreement is with Keita's assumption that there was no indigenous philosophy in Ancient or Medieval Africa. It is

preposterous, absolutely and beyond question, to assume that there were no aboriginals in Sudanese Africa, before the coming of aliens from the Lower Nile. If there were indigenes in Sudanese Africa, as Biobaku's works has shown for some regions, they had a philosophy. Nor will it do to say that such a philosophy was probably irrational. Professor E. R. Dodds, in his book *The Greeks and The Irrational*, has shown that the public aspects of any peoples' philosophy is often irrational. What matters is that there are individuals in any culture who rationally examine the irrational or weave the irrational into a rational system.[10] We hold that in some African communities there are such individuals.[11]

Ancient African Philosophy should be seen to stretch into the medieval period in African history in the sense that even at this time African elders were still largely outside the influence of the so-called Arab civilization. Arabic civilization was embraced predominantly by the royal courts for the primary reason that it encouraged centralization of authority. African elders were largely unaffected by it, and together with the specialists they opposed its introduction even though might ultimately triumphed.[12]

Strictly speaking, African Philosophy should be divided into two periods: Ancient and Modern. But I designate a Transitional Period to highlight the era when scholars from various disciplines dipped into the gamut of ancient African knowledge to pick out what they wanted. The fact that the knowledge of ancient Africa has something to offer to the theologian, the scientist, the philosopher, the culturalist, the political and social theorist is itself a testimony to its intellectual worth.

African Philosophy is now witnessing emergence of theories which are intended primarily as philosophical, and this I designate as the Modern period in African Philosophy. The two theories to be discussed in the following sections illustrate the fact that even within the context of African philosophy there are different areas that can be profitably tapped - the political, the spiritual and the linguistic using the ancient metaphysics of an African people as a paradigmatic base.

2. ABRAHAM'S THEORY OF CULTURAL ESSENTIALISM

Professor Abraham's Theory of Cultural Essentialism takes account of the historical fact that Africa, Sudanese Africa, had been exposed to influences from the West and the Middle East. The problem facing African leaders therefore comes down to one of retention, modification and rejection of, on the one hand, some items in traditional African culture and, on the other, items in alien culture. In this regard, African leaders have a clear choice before them:[13]

Because the vast majority of our people are still traditional, politicians

> and statesmen of Africa have a clear choice before them; whether to be as alien to their own people as the colonial government has been, to compiete the deculturization which set in and substitute in Africa some new effective culture which has no roots in Africa, or whether to pose problems, formulate ideals and national objectives meaningfully in terms of the cultures in Africa, which have in fact continued to be in force.

In deciding what to retain, modify or reject, it is important to be congnizant of the nature of culture as an integrative enterprise. The fact that culture plays an integrative role is true of all societies even though Sartrean existentialism and the scientific view of man would, ultimately, not be conducive to this integrative role of culture: On a first impression Sartrean existentialism would appear to be essentialist but its essentialism is mainly negative.[14] Essentialism, in its positive aspects, is conducive to reinforcing the integrative role of culture. Both the positive and the negative aspects of essentialism would agree that "there is a constant element in man which is irreduccible, and this is the essence of being a man."[15] Both would agree that this essence consists in man's freedom of action but the destructive element in Sartrean existentialism is its further contention that man is free to act without reason or motivation. Thus Sartrean existentialism would enthrone cultural mannerisms which are not linked to any particular general cultural values. There would then be no world-view (except individualism and irrationalism) to which all other central concepts can be related. The private aspect of culture takes precedence over the public aspect which is normally more vigorous. For culture itself the net result will be an idealization of eccentricity; for a nation a brewing of anarchy and political and economic individualism. The final result will be the disintegration of culture.

Opposed to Sartrean negative essentialism is the scientific view of man which aims at changing not only man's physical environment but also his nature. Its purpose for aiming at this is for "the prediction of human reaction with completeness, and of planning it."[16] But this will result, ultimately, in the political and moral coercion of man with three undesirable consequences. First the basis of democracy will be undermined. Secondly, the positive essentialism of man, which is rationality, will be destroyed. Finally, and very ominously, in place of the first role of culture which "is an instrument for making the sufferance and co-operation of others natural", we will have painful coercion and manipulation.

We should reject, says Professor Abraham, Sartrean negative essentialism and also scientific determinism. The conventional thought that they are exhaustive alternatives stems from the belief that freedom and determinism are irreconcilable:[17]

> One consequence of this kind of belief is that the reasonable man becomes a slave of his reason, that the pursuit and execution of

> reasonable acts is so far from representing an enlightened freedom that it is condemnation to slavery. But if the possession of reason is part of our nature, then we cannot be enslaved by our nature, for there are no bonds between us and our nature which might be broken. Where there are no bonds, there can be no slavery. Nevertheless, in order that there should be reasonable acts, some form of determinism must be correct. The possibility of planning and producing results depends on the actuality of determinism, on there being sufficient conditions for occurrences.

We should reject both Sartrean negative essentialism and scientific determinism because of the various implications each will have, as a Hobson's choice, on the aspects of culture. A vast portion of the life of the people is not subject to state intervention. But this vast portion has an overall effect on the well-being of the state. It is desirable therefore that neither Sartrean individualism nor scientific determinism hold reign, because either way culture, as the common life of the poeple and as a bridle on individualism, will be underexamined. Similarly the role of culture as a controller of change will assume disastrous dimensions if individualism or coercion and manipulation are left unchecked.

Professor Abraham confirms that there is a wealth of traditional general ideas in Africa. And in times of national problems and crises, there is a "repertoire of ideas and techniques, and attitudes which culture provides"[17] and these can help in the solution of these problems and crises. To this extent the value facet of the role of culture as a controller of change comes to be useful. This value facet includes ethics, religion, literature and art to the extent that these include aspirations and value judgements. This value facet of culture as a controller of change will discourage the insistence of individual rights over duties, and this will help the government to resolve conflicts of duties rather than concentrate on the reconciliation and defence of multiple rights. The promotion of a sense of community duties will engender a spirit of concern of what one can do for one's country and fellow beings. This will help to restore the traditional extended family system instead of the present gradual introduction of the nuclear family of wife, man, and children.[18] Furthermore this value facet of culture should stem the tide of revolution by improving on the traditional system of ranking which allows for upward mobility to positions of leadership and authority based on experience, knowledge and wisdom, and not on birth or traditional status.

However, the task of nation-building requires that tribal sentiments, which are a strong feature of traditional cultures, should not be a dominant streak in modern African culture. One prominent and enviable item introduced by alien cultures is the investment in human resources and formal education. African

leaders should retain but modify this such that it discourages the greed for money,[19] and encourages the traditional African spirit for a welfare type of society.[20]

Professor Abraham's Cultural Essentialism is concerned with the present and the future: "It helps importantly in solving the question not what Africans were like, but how we can make the best of our present human resources, which are largely traditional". Archaelogists and historians have, undeniably, carried out invaluable studies and excavations into Africa's past. But Africa, Abraham thinks, cannot afford to spend the rest of its precious present and invaluable future in sweet and idle reminiscences about the past. Most of what we need for a great leap into the future is now there in our traditional African culture which should, Abrahm holds, be the measure of all things to be retained, modified or rejected.

The merit of the theory of Cultural Essentialism lies in its recognition, on the one hand, of the fact of foreign influences which have left their marks on African culture, and, on the other hand, its insistence that the value facet of traditional African cultures should be the measure of all things. The objectivity of this Theory is simply beyond question. It serves as a sober reminder to mean ultra-nationalists in Africa who think that colonization has been a total disaster. It highlights one prominent feature which I think is universal to all African societies, that performance of community duties comes before an insistence on individual rights. It is unfortunate that the missionaries and colonial masters did not come to Africa to learn anything from her, for this is one good lesson worth learning and certainly worth preserving.

Professor Abraham used the Akan culture of Ghana as a paradigm. In this regard his theory is universal only to the extent to which there are universal cultural features. Beyond this Abraham does not make any claims. He notes, correctly, that each culture has its dominant streak be it economic political or rationalist metaphysical. The dominant streak in Akan culture is rationalist metaphysical and from this flows the value facet as controller of change which regulates all other central concepts - institutional, material, economic, political or technological. That the value facet regulates technology does not mean that Africa should seek to solve technological problems by metaphysical means. Nor have Africans ever done so. What it means is that technological invention and innovation should be such as not to disrupt the traditional values of society, undermine the rationality of man as a free agent, and enthrone individualism, irrationality and anarchy over community duties and man's concern for the welfare of his fellow being.

It is not a matter for joy that no African philosopher before now has seen it fit to discuss Abraham's theory of Cultural Essentialism. Instead we have had the practice of scholars who deny the existence of an African Philosophy. Since

such scholars deny the existence of an African Philosophy it is only logical that they debunk any work claiming to be philosophical within the African context. The tactic is either to ignore what is positively philosophical in an African philosopher's works and dissipate energy instead on periphrals, or designate two levels of philosophy - one lower and one upper, and insist that works by African writers claiming to be philosophical belong to the lower level. Professor Odera Oruka is guilty of the first charge and Professor Bodunrin is adept at the second. But I will concentrate on Oruka's views because they touch directly on Abraham's writings.

Oruka holds that mythologies should not be presented as African Philosophy.[21] If there are any scholars who baldly present myths as philosophy they indeed need to be reminded that myth is not philosophy. However, when one is writing about the public aspect of African Philosophy,it can seem that myths are being presented as philosophy until one actually holds discussions with an elder. When this is done we will be confronted with myth-in-use, and find that myths are used only as a ladder to climb to the higher realms of philosphy.

Oruka's article is of interest because of the distinction he made as regards the uniqueness question in African Philosophy. But his errors were firmly planted when he distinguished two exhaustive senses of "universal philosophy.[22] Oruka's main purpose is to show that "the universalist thesis is not inconsistent with a concern for African Philosophy." The first thesis is that any subject matter of philosophy will be seen to be a topic for all the philosophers in general, regardless of their national or racial affiliations. Oruka prefers the preceding first thesis to the following second thesis: "that the truths of philosophy can be proved by methods which are independent of any personal, national or racial values and feelings."[23] Having claimed that these two senses exhaust what 'universalist can m Oruka walked himself into a culdesac when it came to finding a place for African Philosophy in the first sense of the universalist thesis. This led him to make the distinction between a *unique* and a *simple* philosophy.

A philosophy is unique when it can be produced only by a certain species of philosophers, and a philosophy is simple when it is not the monopoly of any species of philosophers. But Oruka's attempt to give an example of a unique philosophy in his sense turned out to be a failure. He quotes the Yoruba concept of cause in a formulation which he attributes to Professor Sodipo:

> Even if a general law says that only one person out of a hundred passengers in a lorry involved in an accident would be saved the Yoruba believe that the gods, not chance, decide who the lucky one shall be and it is certainly worth trying to make oneself the lucky one ... through necessary sacrifices to some gods.

and says that this indicates the sense of unique philosophy he is talking about.[25] The Yoruba concept of cause is a communal belief among the Yoruba people, not a private philosophy. Oruka's notion of unique philosophy, however, refers to the philosophy of individuals, not to that of a group. Even allowing this inconsistency to pass it simply is not true that this kind of belief is unique to the Yoruba; While in the United States I had personally been the recipient of unsolicited correspondence in which the writer has claimed to have a formula that will make me a winner in an entry of millions!

Oruka attained his peak of inconsistency, misinterpretation and misunderstanding when he listed Professor Abraham as one of the African Philosophers who "have fallen into the pitfall of considering African philosophy only in the unique and debased sense." Somewhere along the line Oruka had smuggled in the word "debased" as equivalent to unique.[26] The important point now is that there is nowhere in Professor Abraham's writing where African Philosophy is offered as unique. In fact Abraham specifically warns against arguing that African Philosophy is unique.[27]

> The question of the existence of African Philosophy is not a uniqueness question. There is no reason why, in order that there should be an African Philosophy, it has to be different from every other philosophy. It is sufficient that philosophy should occur in Africa much that it is not derived from outside Africa.

It is doubtful if there is any unique philosophy in the sense that it can be done only by a species of philosophers. Even though propositions of philosophy claim timelessness and universality, they do have roots, and these roots are often psychological, cultural, political or experiential. And I think this is the main thesis of Professor William Albert Levi in his book, **Philosophy as Social Expression.**

A philosophy can be unique only to the extent to which its root is unique. Every other thing, otherwise, is a function of the personal style of the philosopher, his intellectual predilection, his logical and eruditional perception of the roots of his philosophy. The roots of Abraham's Theory of Cultural Essentialism are Akan metaphysics, and Africa's colonial and exposural experience, the latter of which is not unique to Akan people. Nor is the issue of experience *per se* in all its ramification unique to Africa and Africans. If there is nothing novel in the roots of African Philosophy there can be nothing unique about it. The Theory of Cultural Essentialism is a profound logical and metaphysical perception of Africa's experience and a recommendation on how best to harmonise and manage this experience for the present and future advancement of our people.

3. HALLEN'S THEORY OF CULTURAL THEMATICS

The programme of linguistic analysis in Western Philosophy concerned itself with piecemeal analysis - the analysis of atomic sentences out of all content whether historical or cultural. The practice was to find philosophy in the atomic expressions in ordinary language, and common sense *usage*. Naturally, then, the question of stretching expressions in natural language to other than what they obviously are could not arise.

The programme of the linguistic philosophy is recommendable in African Philosophy. This is because what the linguistic analysts anchored their philosophy upon are in fact what are communal expressions, words, or concepts which, within the African context, will include proverbs and wise sayings. Their mistake, though consistent with their metaphysics, was their refusal to see beyond the surface of some of the expressions and words. If they did they would have discovered that there is a core of fundamental expressions and concepts. These are different from, on the one hand, common sense beliefs and, on the other hand, ordinary language expressions. They are substantive concepts which go back to the metaphysical and moral foundations of the community. For African Philosophy which deals with a people who have no documented ancient Philosophy, an investigation and analysis of this core of fundamental expressions and concepts will be found profitable.

A recent theory on ancient African Philosophy under which synthetizable core words, concepts, and expressions can be discussed is Dr. Hallen's *Theory of Cultural Thematics*.[28] Hallen does not think that the method of "contemporary Language philosophy" is adequate for African Philosophy. He is opposed to a wholesale reliance on ordinary language analysis because this would exclude holding "discussions" and "dialogues" with elders in African communities whom he regards "more as colleagues capable of the generalized discussions of certain concepts and topics rather than essentially only as sources of oral tradition."[29] But under his theory of Cultural Thematics concepts will not be ossified and treated as neutral independent "things." They will have to be discussed and investigaged within the complex totality of culture.

The theory of Cultural Thematics is rooted in phenomenology which has from its inception claimed to do nothing more than describe experience. Hallen identifies completely with this descriptive streak in phenomenology. What he rejects is the further but independent claim of a description of *"universal experience."* Hallen is a cultural relativist even though he later claims that the theory of Cultural Thematics[30] can "produce a novel and potentially valuable approach to the exposition of African traditional thought, and indeed all human beliefs,"[31] If there are no universal cultural items it is difficult to see how

an approach which is suited only to the exposition of a unique culture can be applicable to all human beliefs.

Hallen's theory of Cultural Thematics seeks to make the anthropologist's distinction between the "real" and "spiritual" elements in traditional thought unnecessary. According to him, the unfortunate consequence of this habit of the anthropologist "is that the system of ideas are rarely presented as the lived, interrelated whole it is for the poeple themselves."[32] But with this theory what is now important is whether something, be it spiritual or empirical, is experienced as a reality by members of the culture concerned. The theory of Cultural Thematics will not provide an explanation external to the terms of reference of the system itself. To this extent it is concerned with what significance a particular spiritual being, for instance, has for a person from that culture and the functions it performs for him. "Themes", for Hallen, are just shortened, descriptive terms of reference that attempt to convey the significance of certain beliefs for the life-style of a particular culture. The sources of information for these "must be the people themselves who are the ultimate authorities on the cultural world they experience and constitute."

Hallen's idea of "people" is limited to a few selected elders and practising metaphysicians. To him belongs the distinction, as far as I can determine, of regarding and referring to these people as "colleagues." He did not, however, identify them by name. And this is one of the significant flaws in his investigation of the Yoruba concept of *ori*. In effect what we have is that the private views of some elders are given as the communal philosophy of the Yoroba people. Dr. Hallen's declared intention is a non-reliance on common usage as far as core concepts are concerned. He also thinks that the method of the anthropologist is inadequate because his "informant" is often not on elder, and the description of a ceremony or ritual from an observer or from a participant is not really getting the information from an authoritative source. In his review of published sources on "The Yoruba Concept of Person", Dr. Hallen also disagrees with the practice of scholars, especially those of Yoruba origin, who discuss this concept without holding dialogues with elders. In view of all this one would then have expected Hallen to identify his colleagues by name. That he did not is not accidental. Hallen believes in the communality of African Philosophy. The implication of this is that even though individuals may be interviewed the tendency is to seek for a uniformity of views.

Now it simply is impossible to find a uniformity of views when individuals are asked to discuss a concept. If the concept is in use, as the Yoruba concept of *ori* is the more likely place to find a uniformity is in common usage. The metaphysico-moral meaning of the concept can be explained by elders but there cannot be uniformity in this. In its common usage, the Yoruba concept of

Ori, according to Adegbola, means head.[33] It is one of the three entities into which the Yoruba divide the person. The other two are *ese* - legs, and *okan* stomach. The latter includes the chest which houses the soul - *emi*.

Although it is one of the three entities, *ori* is the most important part of the person. To this extent the Yoruba mythical story of creation relates only to the head. It is taken to represent the person and there is a cult in his name which suggests that the head determines a man's circumstances or fortunes in life. Sacrifices are offered to the head. It is spoken of as an avenger spirit, a saviour, and a guiding spirit in human actions and in human relationships.[34]

So far there is essentially an agreement between the common usage and the following account of Dr. Hallen's: The Yoruba person, he says, feels that he has an *ori*, as spiritual personality component sometimes loosely referred to as "destiny." Each individual chooses his *ori* before coming to the world. It is sometimes referred to as a kind of spiritual path-finder - one who goes ahead and and chooses the way the individual will eventually take. The *ori* "is addressed by the individual in times of danger or need as if it were a separate, spiritual personality that attends, listens, and responds."[35]

Hallen's original puzzle is: "if the *ori* is a spiritual element but not part of the individual's personal consciousness, one wonders on what evidential basis it is said to play so crucial a role or to exist at all."[36] The answer to this puzzle is provided by the common usage account of *ori*, and partially by Dr. Hallen himself elsewhere in his writings. *Ori* is not really part of the person as such. It is, like the Uchi concept of *eshi*, more of a metaphysico-moral postulate which leads the individual to believe that there is a guardian spirit somewhere who will protect him if he is a good man. Hallen talked of a like postulate but in another plane - the spiritual-scientific plane. This is the Yoruba concept of *orisa* which Hallen says the *practising metaphysician* postulates to make his clients believe that his medicines had been divinely endorsed, and so are bound to be efficacious.[37] In truth, the reality or otherwise of the existence of *orisa* has nothing to do with the potency of herbal preparations.

According to Adegbola, the Yoruba people observe some important taboes of the head which are moral in character. And Hallen says, "For *ori* is, in a sense my meaning - is what I shall become while I am in the world this time. It limits my possibilities and provides me with a course to follow. Although I am not conscious of it and that to where it will lead me in an immediate manner, I can learn something of it through divination and other means."

It is, partly, through this divination that *ori* will be seen as a moral postulate. For as Adegbola points out, the diviner frequently uses his common sense when a child is to be told the message of his *ori:* The diviner has a knowledge of the ancestry of the child, with particular reference to the moral weakness of his

ancestors. A simple moral code of behaviour is drawn up for the child and imposed on him on the authority of his head. Some have been told that their heads do not approve of "danger, theft, pride, jealousy, rivalry, or even polygamy."[38] In common usage the Yoruba people distinguish between the physical head, and the inner head, which is character. *Ori dara Iwa Loku* "As for the head, it is good, what remains is character." In the final analysis, it is asserted that a man's circumstances in life depend on his character.[39]

From the foregoing discussion of Hallen's theory of Cultural Thematics as it applies to the Yoruba metaphysico-moral postulate of *ori*, it is evident that an appeal to common usage can throw some light on core concepts in the ordinary language of a society. A synthesis of this core concepts with other aspects of a people's moral and metaphysical beliefs can be quite revealing even without one holding dialogues with elders. But when discussions are held with elders the thread which is now emerging in African Philosophy is that the names of such elders be given, and their views credited to them.

FOOTNOTES

1. A discussion of Neo-positivist theories in African Philosophy is contained in my forthcoming paper "The Logic" Question In An African Philosophy." For a treatment of the other theories not discussed in the present paper see: C.S. Momoh, *An African Conception of Being and the Traditional Problem of Freedom and Determinism* (Bloomington: Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1979), chapters 1-3.
2. My own theory of the Doctrine of Universal Gratitude, which is metaphysico-ethical, is based on the ancient metaphysics of the Uchi people who are a sub-group of the Edo people of the Bendel State of Nigeria.
3. Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p.25.
4. William Abraham has directed, guided, and inspired the present writer in his research on African Philosophy.
5. Yosef A.A. Ben-Jochannan, *Black Man of the Nile and His Family* (Alkebu-Lan Books Association, New York, 1978), p.318.
6. *Anthropology*. (New York: Appleton - Century-Crofts, 1897), p.407
7. Richard A. Wright, ed. *African Philosophy: An Introduction* (Washington, D.C. Univ. Press of America, 1977) pp.41-61.
8. Frances A. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p.398.
9. Ibid, p.6.

10. Plato was one of such individuals in the case of the Greeks. Professor Dodds refers to passages in the *Laws* which read like tracts from Levey-Bruhl's Anthroploogical works on 'primitive' communities: "In the *Laws*, not only are the stars described as the gods in heaven,' the sun and moon as 'great gods,' but Plato insists that prayer and sacrifice shall be made to them by all." (p.221)
11. C.S. Momoh, "Eldership in African Marriage" *African Insight*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Spring 1978), p.42. One other obvious but important point highlighted in this article is that traditional societies are still well dotted here and there in many parts of Africa. *Also in my An African Conception of Being* I used the views of two Uchi elders - Aliu Oshiothenua and Saliu Ikharo to illustrate major philosophical issues. I argued that even though these elders live in the present their philosophical position are anchored mainly on ancient African 'beliefs' irrespective of the traces of the adjustment in philosophical positions as a result of new social-cultural and historical experiences.
12. J. Spencer Triningham, *A History of Islam in West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). p.150; p.29.
13. W. E. Abraham. *The Mind of Africa* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962) p.38.
14. It has to be pointed out that Satrean exstentialism is negative depending on the historical experience a society is passing through. It will be remembered that the psychological base of Satre's philosophy is not unrelated to certain historical events. There was the humiliating defeat which Paris suffered at the hands of the German Army. The German Army later constituted itself into an occupationist force. Satre himself was imprisoned by the German and set free only because of his continually failing eye-sight. Many Parisians found it easier to surrender to the occupation rather than fight to liberate their city. In such circumstances a philosophy that was fashioned to convince the individual that human freedom and the being of consciousness consist in its activity (perhaps an activity that could rightly have been geared towards ending the German occupation), is positive. Human freedom, in such circumstances, could indeed be viewed, as Satre viewed it in his play *The Flies*, as the ability to will what one can do. It is obvious that, in the absence of foreign domination, this way of viewing human freedom simply has to be cushioned.
15. Abraham, p.20.
16. Ibid., p.24.
17. Ibid., p.28.

18. Ibid., p.32
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p.134
21. H. Odera Oruka, "The Fundamental Principles in the Question of 'African Philosophy." *Second Order* IV (No. 1, 1975), p.44.
22. Ibid., pp.45-46.
23. Ibid., p.47.
24. Clearly the contention that "Philosophy is universal" has a third sense: that every individual, every national or racial group, every profession and every class has a philosophy. The first sense of the universalist thesis, which Oruka prefers, can lead to misleading consequences; what does the phrase "any subject-matter of Philosophy" mean? This sort of unclarified expression can lead one to deny the existence of African Philosophy because, it will be argued, the topics African Philosophy concerns itself with do not constitute the subject-matter of philosophy.
25. *Second Order*, p.49.
26. Sometimes Oruka uses the two words - "unique" and "debased" interchangeably. In other places, he wants to keep the two words separate but nowhere did he give any explanation for his inconsistent use of the two words.
27. Abraham, p.104.
28. Barry Hallen, "Phenomenology and the Exposition of African Traditional Thought" *Second Order* VI (1, 1976), pp.45-65.
29. Barry Hallen, "*ENIA:* The Yoruba concept of Person" Paper read at the 1st Nigeria Philosophical Conference, 1975. A revised version of this paper is the immediately preceding footnote.
30. The idea of a theory of "Cultural Themes", although not acknowledged by Hallen, was also proposed by Professor Morris Opler as far back as 1946. The idea was to investigate themes of a culture which are the broadly generalized propositions held by its members as to the nature of things and to what is qualitatively desirable and undesirable. See E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p.13.
31. *Second Order*, pp.46-47.
32. Ibid., p.55.
33. E. E. Adegbola, "The Theological Bases of Ethics" in *Biblical Revelations and African Beliefs*, ed., Kwesi A. Dickson and Paul Ellingsworth (New York: Orbis Books, 1969), p.121.
34. Ibid., pp.122-23.
35. Barry Hallen, *Second Order*, p.59.
36. Hallen, "*ENIA*. p.24.

37. Barry Hallen "Robin Horton on Critical Philosophy and Traditional Thought", *Second Order* VI. (1. 1977) pp.84-85.
38. Adegbola. "The Theological Basis of Ethics." p.122.
39. Ibid.

NOTES ON THE CHARACTER OF SENSE-EXPERIENCE IN HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND

Dr. I. C. Onyewuenyi

INTRODUCTION

Before attempting an explication of the character of sense-experience in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, it will be useful to review briefly what Hegel meant by philosophy and what he expected philosophy to accomplish as a form of human experience. J.B. Baille testifies that "On Hegel's view the object of philosophy is described in general terms as the whole, the Absolute, or God1. In this Hegel is very much influenced by Eleaticism for which "being is One. Only the One is. The many is not"2.

The medium used by Hegel to achieve the objective of philosophy is notion which is the principle controlling and penetrating all thought wherever it appears, whether in sensation, perception, or abstract reflexion. It is the organic unity of universality and particularity.

The method used by Hegel to arrive at the Absolute thought in the four branches or stages of the philosophy of mind3, is the development of notion in terms of the elements contained in it either implicitly or explicitly. Hegel sees coherence of elements in a notion and he tries to relate one element to another with an intent to unfold the notion as an explicit concrete unity of all its elements.

"From this point of view the development of the notion is described by Hegel as a process of the notion from abstract to concrete. The notion itself determines these stages; it is these stages, and it is the process of removing the one sidedness of each till the unity of the whole is completely realised"4.

The phenomenology of Mind is that part of Hegel's system of philosóphy which treats of the development of the notion, applied by the mind when it regards the universe as a world of appearance. It is different from Logic which deals only with pure thoughts; it is also different from History of Philosophy which explains the temporal and coherent events of the Absolute.

Sense-experience is the first stage in the logical sequence of the development of the world of appearance. It is the first abstract element in the development of the identity between the conscious Ego and the object in nature within their difference. The initial level of knowledge is known as consciousness as distinct from perception, understanding and reasoning.

THE SOUL AS CONTAINING ALL KNOWLEDGE

Tracing the process of knowledge, Hegel notes that the soul as a pure being contains subjectively all its sensations, impressions and feelings. This view is evidently an influence of the Platonic theory of recollection: "Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been many times, and has seen all things both here and in the other world, has learned everything that is. So we need not be surprised if it can recall the knowledge of virtue or anything else which, as we see, it once possessed"5.

When the soul wakes up from its subjective slumber, it sees that there are objects around and external to it. It begins to feel some duality in its purity or unity. It becomes conscious of itself and other; of subject and object; of an Ego and an external world. It begins to realise that sensations and feelings, although modes of its own life, were, after all, something other to it. This externalization of itself in the realm of the world of appearance is the phase of consciousness. "The object has now emerged from the recesses of the subject and taken up an independent position contronting it"6.

THE IMMEDIACY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS

Hegel starts with what is immediately given - the Ego and the object, the first thing the "I" knows about an object that is immediately before it is that the object IS. Just the bare "ISNESS" without any reflection of what it is, "free from conceptual comprehension"7. Hegel regards this "ISNESS" of the object, this 'prime facie' appearance, as the richest kind of knowledge because it is the hinge on which the unfathomable wealth of knowledge arising from the different manifestations of notion depends. It is the alpha, so to speak, of all levels of knowledge in its process from experience to perception, understanding and reasoning.

On the part of the "I" who knows it is the pure "I", "I" without any reflexion on time and place or condition. The object is related to the conscious "I" immediately as a "This" or "That" and a "There". There is no mediating and intervening link between the object and the "I", as happens when the "I" thinks of the existence of the object. "Neither the "I" nor the thing has here the meaning of a manifold relation with a variety of other things, of mediation in a variety of ways. The "I" does not contain or imply a manifold of ideas, the "I" does not THINK; nor does the thing mean what has a multiplicity of qualities ..... Consciousness is I - nothing more, a pure *this;* the individual consciousness knows a pure *this;* or knows what is individual"8. All that sense-experience knows about its object is that IT IS; it has a being and nothing more. We must note that Hegel in his philosophy makes a distinction between *being* and

existence. "To say of anything that 'it is' is not the same as saying that 'it exists'. 'It is' is an incomplete proposition a proposition with no predicate. On hearing it we demand a predicate; we ask 'what is it'? But 'it exists' is a complete proposition. It contains an implied predicate, namely, 'in relation to other things'."[9] In other words the object which exists is a part of the universe.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE "THISNESS" OF EGO AND OBJECT

The two "THISES" of sense-experience, namely the Ego and the object are characterised in an undetermined manner by "Here" and "Now".

1. THE "NOW" AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE "THIS".

The "Now" here implied must be devoid of the idea and connotation of time. The conscious "Ego" who knows "this" object, is the "I" of "Now"; it is not the "I" who knows at this night-time or day-time. It is not even the same "I" that will look at "that" object tomorrow. The "now" of sense-experience in terms of Ego and object, maintains itself negatively by not being day' or hour or minutes or seconds. Its "duration" (if I may be permitted to use the word) is over and done with before it is articulated. Language cannot describe this "Now" because language would give it a designation which would deny its immediacy and raise it to the level of sense-perception. It is not possible at all for us even to express in words any sensuous existence which we 'mean'[10].

Both for the "I" and the object, the "Now" of sense-experience is not affected by otherness. The characteristic 'Now' of sense-experience has the same sense as the "IT IS" or being of Hegel's philosophy - namely it is an incomplete proposition. It is a universal, an abstraction. It is in need of designation, hence it is a character of the poorest kind of knowledge. The 'Now' itself no doubt maintains itself, but as what is *not* right; similarly in its relation to the day which the 'Now' is at present, it maintains itself as something that is also not day or as altogether something negative ..... Thereby it is just as much as ever it was before, Now, and in being this simple fact, it is indifferent to what is still associated with it.[11]

2. THE "HERE" AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE "THIS"

The "Here" of both the "I" and the object is also a universal 'Here'. The "Here" ego who is conscious of this "Here" tree, disappears when another "Here" ego becomesconscious of this "Here" table. The 'Here' is constant but

he "I" and the object disappear. The 'Here' of sense-experience is indifferent to he Ego who knows and the object that is 'Here' known. The 'Here' itself does ot disappear; it IS and remains in the disappearance of the house, tree and so n, and is indifferently house, tree12. The being (as distinct from existence) of go and the object is made out by the negation of others. The essential reality of ense-experience is not the "I" and the 'object' but the identity of both in their niversal characters of IS, THIS, HERE and NOW which are determined by egation and abstraction13.

THE TRUTH OF SENSE-EXPERIENCE: THE IDENTITY OF EGO AND OBJECT

"Its truth stands fast as a self-identical relation making no distinction of essential and non-essential, between I and object, and into which, therefore, in general, no distinction can find its way"14. The 'I' knows by intuition. This means that there is no reasoning or reflection involved to cause a distinction between the 'I' and the object. The "Here" and "Now" of the object are the same with the 'Here' and 'Now' of the conscious 'I'. Since there is no reflection involved, it follows that the 'Here' and 'Now' of both 'I' and object merge into one, and since we have shown elsewhere that these characteristics are universals, it also follows that the truth of sense-experience is nothing but the relation existing between the "Now and Here" of the Ego and the "Now and Here" of the object. "I am directly conscious I intuit and nothing more, I am pure intuition"15.

The 'Here' and 'Now' that are involved in the immediate relation which is the truth of sense-experience, have no qualifications as 'this now' or 'this here' otherwise we would be in the realm of existence, whereas the 'pure Here' and 'pure Now' are being. Now IS, HERE IS. The 'Now IS' and the "Here IS" of the Ego identify with the 'Now IS' and the "Here IS" of the object, and this identity is made known by intuition to the conscious 'I' without reflection of the "I" who knows and the object known. "Consciousness knows that it is, and knows no more about it. It is thus the crude sensation, the raw material which has as yet no shape and no form. Such a state of mind does not exist in man as a separate state. It is a mere abstraction"16.

NOTES

1. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p.21.
2. W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955) p.4.
3. Hegel dealt with four parts or stages in the philosophy of mind (i) the Phenomenology of Mind i.e. mind as creating "experience"; (ii) Philosophy of Law i.e. mind as "objective", as the source of social and moral activity; (iii) Aesthetic i.e. mind as expressing itself in the realm of art; (iv) Philosophy of Religion i.e. mind as realised in the life of religion. (confer Phenomenology of Mind, p.29).
4. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* p.23.
5. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato* (New York: Bollinger Foundation, 1966), p.364.
6. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p.341.
7. G.W.F. Hegel, op. cit. p.149.
8. Ibid, p.150.
9. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p.138.
10. G.W.F. Hegel, op. cit., p.152.
11. Ibid., p.152
12. Ibid., p.153
13. I am indebted to Professor H. Maschner's lectures given at Duquesne University Pittsburgh, Pa for ideas expressed on identity and negation.
14. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* p.155.
15. Ibid., p. 155.
16. W.T. Stace, op. cit. p.342.

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN JOHN LOCKE'S PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING

T.D.P. BAH

JOHN LOCKE (1632/1704) was the apostle of the English Revolution of 1688 which, according to history, resulted from the attempt made by James II to establish a sort of despotism in alliance with France and Rome. Then both textually and contextually, Locke may be regarded as an 'ad hoc' theorist of that revolution in view of his attempt to justify the innovations of 1688.

Locke wrote his two Treatises on Government in the years 1689 and 1690. The First Treatise is regarded as a reply to Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha or The Natural Power of Kings. There he criticised the Doctrine of the Divine Rights of Kings. Filmer derived political power, not from any conception of contract, nor from any consideration of the public interest according to Locke, but solely and entirely from the authority of a father over his children. He argued that "the source of legal authority is the [implicit and factual] subjection of children to parents;... the patriarchs in Genesis were monarchs;... Kings are the heirs of Adam... the natural rights of a king are the same as those of a father) To a modern mind, as Russell observes, the whole theory looks so fantastic that it is difficult to believe that it was upheld for we are not bent on accepting that political power and rights could be traced back and based on the 'story' of Adam and Eve.

Locke's success in refuting Filmer's theory derived from factors like the diversity of religious creeds and the struggle for power between the monarchy, the aristocracy and the so-called higher bourgeoisie of that time in England. In the First Treatise Locke tried to show that inheritance cannot be accepted as a legitimate foundation of political power; and in the Second Treatise he sought a more defensible basis.

I shall be dealing with the Second Treatise in order to examine some of the problems that confronted Locke when he took the voice of the 'majority' as the principle for public decision-making. From the start I must say that Locke's principle led to serious criticisms for generally two main reasons:

1. By its very nature, the principle is arbitrary in the sense that it assumes that the majority (in contradistinction to the minority) is right in public decision-making. From an epistemological point of view, it may be said that Locke and his followers took the principle for granted... Perhaps here lies the greatest issue of democracy! For from an ethical point of view, the principle appears to be taken, in the final analysis, only for convenience for arriving at decisions, and as such it may be at the expense of the minority which - even though liable to error- might "see" more or less "clearly" than those favoured by the principle.

2. Any philosopher in any of the branches of philosophy is always faced with linguistic problems; and Locke is not an exception.

On the second point, Locke is generally regarded as an ambiguous, if not very obsecure, philosopher. This is reflected in his epitemological and metaphysical writings (of. his notion of 'idea' in his *AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING)* as well as in his political thinking (of his *OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT).* His Language lends to many interpretations and this has led scholars to disagree as to how to interpret his political theory. From his main political work, one may ask a number of questions;

(a) Did Locke believe in the egoistic nature of man (If man has a nature as abstract as that may be!) or in other words was Locke disguised Hobbesian?
(b) Did Locke dismiss the epistemological and ethical problems involved in identifying the common good and consequently held strongly to the absolute subordination of the minority to the majority?
(c) If Locke took the problems in (b) above into consideration was that stand to lead him to anarchism? If yes, was he then defending the 1688 English Revolution?
(d) In view of his defence of property rights, how was Locke to reconcile his notion of the commonwealth with capitalism (as a product of private property)? etc.

To take only one example amongst his interpreters, Leo Strauss makes striking remarks about Locke's theory, namely,

1. Locke is not a natural law theorist
2. He is a Hobbesian
3. His egoism is conspicuous in his account of property rights2.

In view of the title of this paper, I shall not answer all the questions I raised above. I shall rather deal with (b) whereby I will present and assess Locke's ideas as they relate to the majority principle. Thus from his *OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT* I will look at two aspects of his political theory, namely,

I. His conception of the State of Nature
II. His Social Compact (contract).

I will conclude this paper by focusing attention on how compatible the principle is with the notion of popular sovereignity and the preservation of individual rights. I must hasten to say that I do not believe that the problems arising here are solvable from either a linguistic or practical points of view. My contribution then may be only to clarify some points and raise questions.

I. THE STATE OF NATURE

The notion of public decision making is relevant and appropriate to deal with only in civil society, but Locke treats important ideas in his conception of the state of nature. So it is as well relevant and appropriate to look at his main ideas and arguments at this stage.

Locke opens his Second Treatise on Government with the aim to set forth what he conceives to be the true origin of government. We noted above that he has argued against and discarded the conception that government authority can be likened to that of a father over his children.

He begins by positing what he calls a "state of nature" antecedent to all human governments. This state embodies a *law of nature* consisting of divine commands expressing *"natural rights"*. As we shall see these rights are not imposed by any legislator (if we do not regard God as a legislator) and that they must be viewed from an ethical point of view3. Despite this ethical perspective, Locke *seems* to have regarded this state of nature not just as a mere illustrative hypothesis but as a human historical stage just like the emergence of the social contract.

What Locke says about the state of nature and natural laws (the rights and duties) is neither original nor final. Before him the medieval scholastics and Hobbes (among the modern Philosophers) had dealt with them, and after him Rousseau was a strong apostle of the notion of state of nature. Yet Locke differs from all, but in view of the scope of this paper, suffice it to note briefly that:

(a) Locke did not believe men to be in a state of war whereas Hobbes held the opposite and rejected the idea of natural rights and property in such a state.

(b Unlike Hobbes who held men to be 'brutish' and Rousseau who (later) maintained the Innocent nature of 'L'homme sauvage", Locke strongly upheld the rational nature of man despite that state. Perhaps one ought to see here at least partly the ethical foundation of Locke's natural laws.

Locke's "state of nature" is characterised by two features which he conceived thus:

(1) "it is a state of *perfect freedom* to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons, within the bounds of the law of nature without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man"4.

(2) this state of nature is one of *equality* "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another"5.

If one accepts the fact that nature by itself did not make men equal (either physically or mentally) it becomes apparent that Locke makes ethical assumptions for the aim he has in establishing a legitimate government and for the purpose of upholding (later) the equality among men and consequently the necessity to have their consent in order to rule them.

According to Locke, though the state of nature is that of "perfect freedom" he qualifies that state by arguing that it is not a state of licence,[6] because there exists a rational law of nature deriving from God according to which men must be able to live with one another without any common judge or superior to settle their differences. This equality is Locke's own ethical conception, and rationality, it should be noted, is not equally distributed.

The need for a government will arise from these defects; for in that state everybody is his own judge and will decide (according to his own reason) the extent of injuries he may suffer from an offender and the penalties he himself ought to inflict. This is to say that he is expected to act according to his own conscience and judgement so that he will use his physical force only to protect his life and property and receive reparations for damages suffered from other people's actions.[7]

We have to bear in mind then that equality is ethically conceived by Locke who admits as well that reason varies according to individual men. Equality as a normative principle is that "every man hath to his natural freedom without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man"[8]. Locke believes however that the imperfection of that rationality is not so great as to make life unbearable because despite their differences in natural attributes they will accommodate each other's weaknesses - Locke was more optimistic than Hobbes and Rousseau - for all being "creatures of the same species and rank promiscously born to the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, [they] should also be equal one amongst another without subordination..."[9].

Locke's use and insistance on "same advantages," 'same faculties", "equal one amongst another," and "all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal" shows his concern for a more defensible theory for government and represent his indictment against Filmer's Patriacha. For by these claims he means that neither birth (or hereditary claim) nor force (once "all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal") can lead to subordination to anybody (in the state of nature) or government (in civil society) without the mutual agreement of the parties concerned.

Reason, Locke held, "teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being equal and independent, no one ought to harm one another in his life, health, liberty and possessions."[10] To him, as we noted above, this fundamental law is given to men by God - not through the Scriptures though, unlike what William Paley would believe.

I believe - as I have already hinted above - that Locke should not be taken by the letter when he talks of "all mankind..." since he himself admits the factual inequality of attributes among men. Locke's claims could have been better understood and accepted if for example he had simply said "all sane and mature men..." for the only idea that helps him get out of the illogical implications of his universal quantifier "all" is the addition of "...who will but consult it..." because with this, it is to be understood that the question whether children and mentally deficient men will consult reason does not arise, and consequently whether they should be condemned from an ethical point of view should they fail to act rationally.

From Locke's postulation of the foundamental national law, there are a number of theses which will be reflected either implicitly or explicitly when it is interpreted in civil society in the form of civil laws. For example Locke believes that:

(1) Once everybody seeks to preserve himself and his possessions, he ought, as much as he can, when he is not competing with another, to preserve the rest of mankind and their property.[11]

Two weaknesses arise from this thesis owing to the fact that Locke is not clear about "to preserve the rest of mankind". For "as much as he can" does not set a standard for any action in that respect, and on the other hand, it may be argued against Locke that, in one way or the other man will always be in a state of competition in their struggle to satisfy their needs unless it is assumed - and there is no ground for such assumption - that nature will provide every need. This being the case, the use of reason and the maintenance of equality through the preservation of the life, liberty, wealth, etc. are at stake.

(2) While abiding by the law of nature (with all its prescriptions) such individual has the right to execute it[12] since there is no common superior yet. However Locke still faces problems; for even though its execution does not mean arbitrary power to punish a transgressor, since there can be only individual cases of violation of the law, there are no criteria by which Locke can argue that reparations sought for are proportionately squared with the inflicted damages. It is not setting a standard by simply stating that reason must prevail in such a situation so much that no similar offence would occur again; for, as Locke himself saw, two individuals applying their own reason to an offence may well have different views about its gravity and in this context for example passion and self-interest could easily lead to inflict more punishment that it deserved.[13] As I hinted above a common superior will be provided in the form of civil government (acting through majority rule to make decisions) in order to remedy inconveniences (as those above) arising in the state of nature.

Locke argues further that the natural law is plainer than the positive laws.[14] It may be the case that positive laws will turn out more difficult to intterpret, since they themselves are interpretations of the fundamental natural Law; but as I have observed above this very law may be different interpreted and applied by different individuals in the state of nature owing to the fact that reason itself is not as "plain" as Locke must have believed. "Plainer" in this respect is problematic, for not only does Locke postulate 'reason' but what he takes reason to teach is to be viewed from an ethical point of view; it could be asked for example what Locke means by "equality" "independence", "ought not to harm", and though he may explain these (as he did), since by their very nature they imply values, the disagreements they lead to point to the fact that the natural law is not as "plain" as he claims. Locke was well aware of what would lead to the misinterpretation of positive laws which he related to self interest but he could as well have been influenced by such human frailties. Yet, I would believe that Locke was rather concerned about the consequences of the misinterpretation and application. In the state of nature an individual's error would be less harmful (since it would affect less people) then the same case occuring in civil society where more people would suffer from the error of a single individual applying a positive law.

The difficulty in interpreting the natural law can be seen in Locke's argument on such issues as "Killing a thief, 'Slavery', "a lawful-conquerror", "state of war". I do not need to go into the details of these issues in view of the scope of this paper. I only ought to stress that considering the objections that may be raised against Locke's arguments it may be concluded that his claim about the plain character of the law finds little logical as well as factual support.

So far then, concerning the state of nature, Locke has argued:

1. All men are born equal (which is a clear objection to Filmer's Patriacha).
2. In the state of nature, there is no common superior and this fact puts everybody in a position to judge and not accordingly.
3. Despite the fact that there is no common superior, the state of nature is not irrational or "brutish". To Locke men are predominantly rational because they have received a rational law from God. Yet men are free either to abide by it or to violate it. But should they choose to violate it they would be quitting the very principle of human nature (according to Locke) which allows them to live (relatively in harmony.)
4. Parental power cannot be equated with political power (of. II. The Social compact). For the latter to be legitimate the parties concerned ought to come to an agreement or compromise.
5. Slavery arises out of conquest or a state of war. Though history recorded it, it is not justifable.

Despite Locke's belief that men are predominantly rational, it seems that he

was much aware of the harmful effects of failure to apply reason systematically and objectively. This led him to identify three weeknesses of the state of nature. The latter lacked:

(a) "an established, settled, known law"15. The law of nature is wanting because of two main reason; on the one hand, it is not binding, and on the other, it is vague and there is no common superior to implement it.

(b "A known and indifferent judge with authority to determine all differences according to the established law"16. The absence of this judge puts all of Locke's natural rights at stake.

(c) "A power to back and support the sentence when right, and give it due execution"17.

It is essentially these three limitations in the state of nature that will drive man - feeling the insecurity of their rights - into civil society which will guarantee and protect those rights through the voice of the majority. The issues in this principle will be treated in the next section.

II. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (COMPACT)

I hinted earlier the philosopher's problems in relation to his use of language. Locke is faced here with his notion of compact. In his *History of Political Thought* Sabine observes that the difficulty with Locke's theory of compact is that he is not clear anywhere as to what precisely arises by the original compact. Is it society itself or only government? The two are indeed different - even though they may not be self-execlusive - and Locke himself is aware of this because he stresses that a revolution can dissolve only a government but not civil society. Yet Sabine could have seen from Locke's earlier argument about the need of a common supeior that both civil society and government arise from the compact; for we are no longer dealing with the Greek city states where all the 'demos' assembled and took unanimous decisions. Locke's argument is that since the society as a whole cannot practically act as Sovereign (i.e. capable of making laws) it will delegate its powers to two bodies: One will represent the people to make laws - it is the Legislature and the other will execute the laws - it is the Executive or Government.

In all, what concerns us here is the nature of political power arising from the social contract. If for example we define politics in terms of power relationships or public decision-making, our concern will amount to asking and answering: *who should rule whom and how?* Locke's answer to this question is twofold:

(a) Those who should rule are those who have political power and those who should be ruled are those who accept or agree with that

political power.

(b) Political power is not arbitrary - Filmer's Patriarcha is the target of attack - but derives from the will of the society which, owing to the size of the latter, is objectified in the laws made by the body chosen to make them.

But since it is not likely that the body politic - I mean here the legislature and not the society as a whole - take unamimous decisions, political power rests on the majority. The serious issue is to what extent the rule of the majority is right. I shall come back to this issue later in this paper. Suffice it for the time being to deal with the nature of political power.

Political society exists when men give up their natural power to execute the law of nature to the whole society. "There, and there only is political society where every one of the members hath quitted the natural power, resigned it to the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it."[18]

Locke defines political power as "a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating, preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this for the public good."[19] Political power, according the above definition, is vested in the hands of the makers of the laws, i.e. the Legislature, and the executioners, i.e. the Executive or Government. Yet it should be born in mind that Locke - despite his apparently authoriterian conception of power - insists throughout his work that political power is *only delegated* to the two bodies; indeed what justifies the dissolution of government by a revolution is failure to see political power in that light so as to misuse it at the expense of the community: this, in fact, is clear from Locke's insistence on "and all this for public good." What is the public good and how it is determined relates to the role of the majority; and as I hinted, these issues are not easily settled, if they can be settled at all.[20]

In Locke's conception of the compact then, what defines a political society are:

(a) men uniting into one body to take care of their (former) natural rights (i.e. life, liberty, property, etc.) and

(b) "a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between members and punish offenders."[21]

This "common established law" exhibits three main features:

(1) it makes the body politic

(2) it implies that no single individual can pass his own judgement and act accordingly when the whole community may be affected

(3) the exception to (2) arises however when time does not allow to appeal to the established authority; this is the case when one individual's rights are threatened (i.e. his life by a killer or his property by a robber). The criticism raised against Locke's claim about the plain nature of the Law of nature is pertinently illustrated in this case because we have no criteria by which the individual can protect his threatened rights in political society when there is no possibility of appealing to any authority.

If we leave aside the above exception, it may be said that Locke discarded (once the pact is formed) the idea of individual rights *qua* individual rights; this follows from the principle that in giving up their own judgements (in joining the community) to form a body politic, every member consents to submit to the determinations of the vote of the majority.[22] It is on the basis of this majority principle that Locke held that the community's established laws may legitimately be regarded as the individual's own laws since every member participates in making them - either directly (as a member of the legislature) or indirectly (through representatives).[23] Again in attributing the laws to the individual's own making (whether directly or indirectly) Locke still faces the problems of showing that:

(a) the legislature is right in assessin the public good before passing a law.
(b) a represented member would agree with the majority's decision.
(c) the minority (or a member of the opposition) is mistaken in thinking the public good to be other than what the majority takes it to be.

If in the final analysis, it is not possible to overcome the above obstacles, Locke's ethical conception of 'equality' will be thwarted whereby subordination will ensue (i.e. there will be subordinators under the cost of the majority and subordinated members essentially captioned 'minority'(. I would believe that this case will prevail, for Locke maintains that 'no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it."[24]

Despite Locke's approval of a "right of revolution" when majorities grow tyrannical,[25] the (above) absolute stand makes it impossible to call Locke "the principle of individualists." What Locke and Kandell failed to see is that in relation to minorities, majorities can grow tyrannical and continue to rule and their number gives no room for a right of revolution. It is rather the opposite that often happens, i.e. when minorities - and here all oligarchies are concerned - grow tyrannical, it is possible for majorities to resort to revolution. Minorities can resort only to rebellion which majorities can crush with the force of the community at their disposal. However it may be conceded that if the minority feels the tyranny of the majority it can resort to a section of the society which it represents in the legislature. But this is a practical issue and does not affect the principle of taking decisions by majority vote. Practically then what the minority can achieve is at best to win the support of the majority of the

represented members which can ultimately lead to a revolution; but clearly this starts with a rebellion against the established principle, i.e., the voice of the majority, and that rebellion arises from the fact that the very principle gives room for tyranny in the process of making and executing the laws.

Thus far, on the nature of political power, it has been argued that:

(1) It derives from political society which results from men contracting because they wish to overcome the inconveniences of the state of nature.

(2) The aim is the preservation of individual rights (i.e. life, liberty, property, etc.)

(3) Political power is defined in terms of both making and executing laws for the public good.

(4) Political power rests in the hands of the community as a whole, but for convenience, the laws can be made by chosen representatives and executed by magistrates.

(5) Rebellion or Revolution is justified wherever the rights of the community are tampered with.

(6) No one can be exempted from the laws because, *at least in principle,* they express the public good by the very principle by which they are made, i.e. the majority - principle.

Now that we have dealt with the nature of political power we shall look more closely at its underlying principle as Locke conceived it.

When men consent to units, argued Locke, "they are thereby presently incorporated, and, make one body politic, wherein the majority may have the right to conclude the rest."[25]

To Locke once the contract is undertaken, if the body politic is to continue to function for the public good, there is only one way out, that is, it must subscribe to the principle of majority-rule. And he justifies himself by arguing that "if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual, nothing but the consent of every individual can make anything to be the act of the whole."[26]

Locke's own language: "may have" and "...not in reason be received as the act of the whole ..." in the above quotations suggest that he is not certain of the principle. What he does in actual fact is to exort us to accept it as the best means since unanimity cannot be taken as the principle for public decision-making. The ideal, we agree, is unanimity or "the consent of every individual," but this can only be dreamed of; for various reasons, e.g. the size of the community and the variety of opinions, it has to be set aside. So Locke holds strongly to this principle, unless "they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority."[27] We shall see in the conclusion that Locke is not clear about this notion of "majority."

Locke's argument that the majority should conclude the rest of the community rests on his belief that the majority *wills* the public good which it knows or, at least, ought to know. But this is only an assumption. Moreover

this belief in the principle presupposes that the public good exists such that it is identifiable and that majority-rule is the safest means for identifying it. Yet it is not contradictory to say that the majority is capable of error and that the public interest (or good) may be overridden by factional interests that can arise within both the legislature and the executive (i.e. the two Powers of the state). As I observed earlier, it may then be said that the will of the majority cannot be said to be expressing the will of the rest unless it be shown that the rest or the minority is mistaken in its assessment. Consequently the preservation of individual rights by laws can only be hoped for but not unequivocally guaranted via Locke's Legislative and executive powers. I would, however, agree to some extent that in practical terms majority-rule stands as the safest means for arriving at public decisions. But whether those decisions (in the forms of laws) are right in expressing the public good is quite a different issue. This is to say that the fallibility of the principle in practical matters leaves one to grant only the fact that for those who agree with the voice of the majority, in principle, their individual rights are protected by the laws.

CONCLUSION

From our previous discussion, we saw that Locke took the preservation of individual rights to rest on reason which grasps the law of nature (in the state of nature) and on the laws enacted by the majority (in political society). Since the aim of this paper is to examine some issues arising from Locke's principle of public decision-making, apart from what I said in the section "The State of Nature" I shall leave aside the question whether individual rights can be preserved from the conception of the Law of Nature. I shall focuss on whether in political society the principle is likely to work so as to give the needed protection of rights.

Unanimity is possible and necessary only for the social pact. To Locke, in political society, though, it is ideal, it is neither possible nor necessary. Consequently, subsequent decisions to the social pact should only require the approval of the majority. However there are varying degrees of majorities since majority simply means any number greater than 50% and less than 100%, the latter being unanimity. It appears that according to the Lockean principle the democratic procedure consists in the majority of the people choosing the legislature as a representative law-making body. In his work *OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT*, he offers three types of Law-making bodies:

(1) when the body consists of popularly elected representatives of the people, the government is called *democratic;*
(2) when it consists of few men it is an *oligarchy* (and the law is the expressed will of the majority of those few men);
(3) when it consists of a single individual, a monarchy is established either as hereditary or elective and the law is the will of the monarch

Locke's doctrine involves a number of conflicts: e.g. conflict between one's rights and one's duties in community life; between individual consent and subjection to the will of the majority. It does not sound right to hold that Locke was not aware of these conflicts; rather it seems that it was his serious concern about them and the almost impossible task to resolve them which led him to uphold his principle. From his entire majority-rule doctrine it is tempting to believe that he was really a democrat. It is clear enough that in essence his doctrine was more or less democratic but the democratic element withers away by both the view (implied rather than expressed) that the propertiless are not to express their voices (i.e. not to be reckoned as citizens)[29] and the exclusion of women in the whole process of public decision-making.

As I previously said in another form Locke must have regarded majority-rule as conveniently simple and took it for granted that it could solve some vital problems in politics. However it appears now from the discussion that the principle is not as convenient and simple as Locke thought. As Kendall observes, this principle is a mere rule which a given group may adopt for decision-making; the rule does not tell us anything about:

(1) the qualification for membership, for competence;
(2) the machinery for voting;
(3) the nature of the questions to be submitted for law enactment. Yet the principle should embody the nature and form of election (e.g. Universal suffrage, popular sovereignty and consultation).[30]

Locke's principle then raises issues that can be analysed in terms of (A) Sovereignty, (B) the validity of the laws.

(A) According to the principle, as we saw above, democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic governments could arise. This is to say that the sovereignty of the people in Locke's political philosophy is compatible, in principle, with any kind of institution so long as it is defensible that the rulers are the trustees of the people (i.e., they delegated their sovereign power to those rulers - law-makers and executive magistrates). However, it may be concluded from Locke's arguments that he did not believe that the best form of government was either monarchy or oligarchy. This does not mean that he rejected Kingship, but he would rather prefer a parliamentary (like the English type) to an absolute monarchy. But even with regard to democratic government Locke was not categorical; he must have viewed it, at least from his experience in England, as a simple academic question or exercise. This may be due to the fact that he saw that, despite the so-called English Revolution, there was no violent split from the tradition of English government. It is no surprise then that Sabine regarded him (the philosophical exponent of the Revolution) as "the most conservative of revolutionists."[31]

It seems to me that Locke was battling with a desire to reconcile his principle which called for a defence of the sovereignty of the people and his conservatism which he could not avoid owing to contextual politics. On the one hand he argued that this legislative power is not only the supreme power of the community, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it;[32] and on the other hand he maintained that the rulers are bound by the obligation to act only for the people's good, which is the end of the trust.[33] If the power is unalterable as stated above then the rulers have a free hand on what is good for the people who, consequently, have lost their sovereignty.

Given these weaknesses arising from his principle, Locke could be regarded as a majority-rule democrat only if "democracy" is redefined and not taken etymologically (as the voice of the 'demos' - or poeple). For instance Schumpeter says:

> Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political - legislative and administrative - decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions. And this must be the starting of any attempt at defining it.[34]

Seen in the light of this definition, even though it seems to agree with Locke's principle - we noted above that it is simple and convenient for decision-making - it appears that Locke's weak democratic stand derives from two conceptions he made about his own society, namely, differential rights - for despite his (ethical) conception of natural equality, he seems to have allowed property rights to disquality certain members from citizenship - and differential rationality. This latter conception may be regarded as Locke's greatest obstacle for defending his principele as well as for establishing the validity of the Laws.

(B) We noted above the three different types of governments that are likely to arise from Locke's principle. The problem, then, is whether the will of the majority of the popularly elected representatives, or the majority of few men, or that will of a single man (monarch or King) can adequately represent or express the will of the body politic as a whole. Indeed one can talk of the "will of the people" only on the assumption that they have a "common good", otherwise one ought to talk of the "wills of individuals." This is to say that in order to accept the will of the majority as the "will" of the people, the common good must exist and ought to be objectively identified by the people. Unfortunately, Schumpeter observes, there is no such thing upon which everybody agrees, and one problem of democracy is to find and found that common good, if at all possible.[35]

From Schumpeter's observation there is one obvious sense in which the voice of the majority cannot represent the "wills" of the people, that is, when each member of the society is said to have his own will. If two members share the same opinion, this cannot be explained by any necessity but only as a coincidence since they do not have to have the same opinion; if they had to - as a logical necessity - there would be no conflicts of interests or problem of preserving individual rights.

Problems will still arise even when it is agreed that there is a common good which Locke would identify as the preservation or protection of rights. For then the essential and difficult issue is how to translate that common good into concrete positive laws. According to Locke, laws can preserve rights if:

(a) the individual is protected, e.g. his life is not at stake.
(b) The individual is free, i.e. not subjected to any arbitrary power
(c) The individual's estate is secure and safe, i.e. no one can take it away without his consent.

Now, if we consider Locke's conception of rights i.e., life, liberty, estate, we may argue that the legislature cannot after final answers to all individual issues concerning:

(a) How to use the force of the community in order to protect the lives of individual members
(b) How justice should be administered in order to guarantee their rights
(c) How property (or estate) should be regulated so as to give to each what he ought to have.

Concerning (c) we say above that Locke was so much unclear about property that it led him to a situation where some propertiless members could be denied their right of citizenship. The opposite of this weakness is that Locke's arguments on the acquisition of property could allow industrious citizens to accumulate limitless property; and the outcome of this is that such people will have the advantage of expressing better their wills and influence others.

According to Locke, "Law is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free intelligent agent to his proper interest and prescribes no father than is for the general good under the law."[36] A number of ideas may be deduced from this notion of law:

(1) Every member of the community - excluding children and mentally unfit members like idiots - is endowed with a certain degree of rationality which makes him "a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest." It is that rationality that justifies Locke to expect a certain degree of order and harmony in the state of nature but,

paradoxically, it is this very differential rationality which is responsible for the egoistic tendency in a free agent to seek his private and sole interest and for the impossibility of identifying the common good by either the majority or the minority.

(2) Positive laws are normative, prescribing rules of behaviour to rational individuals. Yet these laws are supposed to leave a sphere of individual freedom since they "prescribe no father than is for the general good..." The obvious weakness here is that the sphere of non-interference may be very controversial.

(3) The prescription of rules to rational beings suggests their differential or imperfect rationality.

(4) From (2) and (3) it may be concluded that majorities determine the actions of individual members without any guarantee that they are correct and/or that individual wills do not conflict in the process.

Locke's belief and argument that the majority's will represents the people's will derives from a double abstraction: an abstraction of the individual wills of the members of the legislature and an abstraction of the idnvidual wills of the individual members of the community as a whole. Unfortunately when it comes to practical matters this abstraction of wills does not work. This does not mean however that Locke was not concerned about the practical protection of individual rights. This may be seen in his conception of a "perceptive" executive to which he gave the prerogative to adapt or modify laws to suit individual and concrete cases.

What may be concluded with regard to Locke's principle is that majority rule cannot guarantee the preservation of individual rights. For only unanimous decisions can be said to reflect truly the "will of the people". In actual fact, even when the laws are enacted by a unanimous vote, it cannot be said that individual rights are secure because nothing guarantees an effective implementation of those laws. Perhaps what is needed for any guarantee is perfect rationality shared by all members of the community. But since that is only an ideal, one can only hope and look for the best alternative to keep the society together. This is what Locke sought from his dectrine of majority rule. This alternative, however, means that some people - the minority - will often (if not always) feel their rights at stake. The preservation of individual rights will then be relative to the size of the legislature: the greater the number of representatives the greater the chance that the will of their majority will come to reflect that of the people and then the safer will be the preservation of their rights; the smaller the number of legislators the father the will of the majority will be from that of the people and so the narrower their chance of preserving their rights.

In order to appreciate Locke's contribution to political thought, it seems that one ought to view it from his own context and identify his influence down to our own days. It is a great issue whether Locke should be blamed or pitied for the problems he faced which still stand as the haunting dilemmas of modern democratic governments. On the whole his doctrine appeared to be adequate and useful until the industrial revolution. Since then it has been increasingly unfit in communities regarded as, and claiming to be, democratic.

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DETERMINING THE IMPOSSIBLE

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To assert that a phenomenon is impossible is necessarily to presuppose a criterion or set of criteria by reference to which the possibility or impossibility of a phenomenon can be determined. The problem, however, is that while it is generally assumed that there is only one set of criteria[1] by reference to which the possibility or impossibility of any phenomenon is to be determined, some philosophers[2] have argued to the effect that the criteria by means of which we judge a phenomenon possible or impossible must be such as are peculiar to the thought-sytstem in which claims about the phenomenon are made. I shall in this paper be rejecting this latter claim while pointing to the limitations of the supposedly objective criteria which often inform claims that particular phenomena are impossible.

It is perhaps helpful to identify those phenomena which are often considered impossible. These are:

1. the various phenomena described as 'supernatural phenomena' but which I shall henceforth refer to as 'magical phenomena' - events attributed to witchcraft action, the mechanism of magic medicine and divination, and the causal activities of the numerous spiritual agents;
2. miracles - in the "Judaico-Christian" sense of the term and
3. the various phenomena collectively labelled 'Paranormal' - Telepathy, Clairvoyance, Pre-cognition, etc.

Apart from the common fact of their 'impossibility', these phenomena relate to each other in the following ways: "Magical phenomena" invariably presuppose the existence of supernatural agents just as miracles involve the notion of a God or spiritual agent who interposes in the world to bring miracles about; some magical phenomena like paranormal phenomena also involve psychic powers. As Huxley suggests, wherever one finds divination, sorcery and the belief that man can enter into contact with the world of spirits, one finds belief in psychic phenomena. Evans-Pritchard[4] has explicitly described witchcraft action as psychic phenomenon. Paranormal phenomena differ from the others in virtue of the fact that they involve no reference to supernatural agents. The most important point to note, however, is that these phenomena are considered impossible, for the simple reason that they cannot be fitted into the framework of science.

II

It is generally known that people in magico-religious cultures believe in the influence of witchcraft, the efficacy of magic medicine and the role of oracles in

revealing what is going to happen. These phenomena involve causal and cognitive processes which cannot easily, if at all, be explained in scientific terms. Reaction, by scientifically-oriented observers, to beliefs specifying the possible occurrence of these phenomena is usually of two kinds: either the beliefs are taken literally - that is, are taken as assertions of ontological truth - and then dismissed as false (because the phenomena they describe cannot possibly occur) or they are re-interpreted in such a way that they are emasculated of any pretention to factual status. Evans-Pritchard's treatment of Zande witchcraft represents the first approach,[5] while Leach's treatment of 'Kachin' 'nats' exemplifies the second.[6]

Evans-Pritchard's position is that the various magical phenomena elucidated in Zande beliefs are illusory. He argues that witches cannot possibly exist because the powers and qualities attributed to witches are simply unscientific - or as he puts it, do not accord with "objective reality".

Evans-Pritchard does not explicity equate scientific notions with "objective reality". In fact, scientific notions are defined as those which accord with "objective reality", which indicates that "objective reality", whatever that is, is something independent of scientific notions or any other notions for that matter. But unfortunately, Evans-Pritchard does not define "objective reality" independently of the scientific notions which derive their scientificness from conformity to it. Consequently one is left to extract a trivial definition according to which scientific notions are those which accord with "objective reality" while "objective reality" is the sole check of that which is scientific. It is not, in other words, clear whether what Evans-Pritchard calls "objective reality" is anything more than the totality of scientific notions or is some extra-scientific framework or set of criteria. To say that it is the totality of 'scientific notions' will be to beg the question since it is only by reference to "objective reality" that we know a notion to be scientific or otherwise. This leaves us to speculate as to how an extra-scientific check of scientificness could have been arrived at in the first place.

Whatever its origin, we can assume with Evans-Pritchard that there is something in the nature of an "objective reality" which is outside all forms of reasoning, and which helps to sift claims which are of a scientific nature from those which are not. Beliefs about witchcraft, magic, medicine etc., do not accord with this objective check and therefore cannot be said to have any empirical truth whatsoever.

Interestingly, it is, according to Evans-Pritchard, not the scientifically-oriented observer alone who sees a distinction between magical notions and "objective reality"; those who have belief in magical phenomena are also aware of a disjunction between these notions and what empirical observation shows to be the case. As Evans-Pritchard shows, the Azande "do not profess to

understand witchcraft"[7] and although they take the existence of witches for granted they are by no means sure of the manner in which witchcraft works:

> 'They (the Azande) feel out of depth in trying to describe the way in which withcraft accomplishes its ends. That it kills people is obvious, but how it kills them cannot be known precisely. They tell you that perhaps if you were to ask an older man or a witch-doctor he might give more information. But the older man and the witchdoctors can tell you little more than youth and laymen. They only know what the others know: that the soul of witchcraft goes by night and devours the soul of its victim. Only the witches themselves understand the matter fully'.[8]

What emerges from the passage above is that witchcraft action is really never observed and worse still, not even understood. To the "Azande" as much as to the Western observer, witchcraft action is mysterious: it violates the normal processes of causation, which the Azande experience in their everyday life. But contrary to Evans-Pritchard's stance, the mysterious nature of witchcraft action is not taken by the Azande as pointing to the non-existence of witches. For Evans-Pritchard, witchcraft action is mysterious and unscientific, therefore witches cannot exist; for the Azande witchcraft action is mysterious but witches exist for it is part of the essence of witchcraft that its action be mysterious. How may this conflict be resolved?

One way of doing this is to deny that there is a conflict. This is what Leach[9] does. As Leach argues, talk about the existence or non-existence of witches is misguided. To ask whether witches exist or not is like making a 'Kachin' who kills a pig, and says he is giving it to the 'nats' 'whether 'nats' have legs, eat flesh or live in the sky".[10] For Leach, "it is nonsense to ask such questions",[11] for the Kachin is not referring to some beings existing in some other world, rather he is merely 'extending the human class hierarchy to a higher level'[12]

> "In the nat world, as in the human world (writes Leach), there are chiefs, aristocrats, commoners and slaves. The commoners of the 'nat' world are simply the deceased ancestors of the commoners of the human world; the aristocrats of the 'nat' world are deceased human chiefs. In order to obtain concessions from a human superior, a man starts proceedings by making a gift which thereby puts the superior person in his debt. To obtain concessions from the spirits one does like-wise - one 'gives them honour' ... which, in this case, means making a sacrifice".[13]

Thus in sacrificing to the 'nats', the 'Kachin' is making a symbolic representation of the hierarchical set-up in his society. Indeed, all references to supernatural or superhuman agents are to be understood in the same way, that is, as symbolic representations of some concept or other. Seen in this way, the

causal mystery surrounding witchcraft action dissolves; for witches rather than being causal agents are merely elements in a system of symbolism.

Leach's position, paradoxically, involves him in embracing the sort of view of magical phenomena which he wishes to deny: It involves the assumption that witches, 'nats' and such supernatural agents are unreal. It is because these agents do not exist that we have to make sense of reference to them by treating such references as symbolic representations. Leach is therefore in the same 'metaphysical camp' - to borrow one of Winch's more flamboyant expressions - as Evans-Pritchard. Both deny the reality of supernatural beings - although in the case of Leach such a denial is implicit. If, indeed, Leach were to be pressed to give his reason for treating supernatural beings the way he does, he would surely have to point to something in the nature of Evans-Pritchard's 'objective reality' - something, that is, which rules out the possible existence of supernatural beings.

III

We find that implicit in any attempt to treat magico-religious beliefs as something other than putative factual assertions is the assumption that when they are treated as such (as putative factual assertions), they are simply seen to be false - that the phenomena which they describe are impossible and the beings, whose existence they affirm, illusory. As Leach informs us, "nats" are not existent beings, it is nonsense to think of them as such. He would, I think, have justified this by saying that, of course, 'nats' are not part of the universe, hence his call that we make sense of reference to such beings as 'nats' by treating such references as symbolic expressions. Leach, in other words, already assumes a knowledge of what can be considered as part of the furniture of the universe and what cannot.

But whether Leach accepts it or not, the "Kachin" believe in the reality of "nats" in the same way as the "Azande" believe in the existence of witches. It is because such assertions as the "Kachin" make about the reality of "nats" or the "Azande" about the existence of witches are descriptions of reality that such assertions are in direct conflict with the position of the empirically-minded observer who denies the reality of these beings or treats them as symbolic elements.

Winch,[14] like Leach, rejects the idea that magico-religious beliefs are quasi-scientific hypotheses, and he argues to the effect that there can be no such thing as a conflict between the natives' beliefs and that of the scientifically-oriented observer. To argue otherwise, Winch points out, is to suggest that there are independent criteria by reference to which such assessment can be done, when there are, infact, no such criteria. And writing on the question of the reality of 'Azande' witches, he makes the general point that what is real and what is

unreal shows itself in the sense that language has.[15] In other words, every conceptual system or form of life has its distinction between the real and the unreal and it is only within the context of this distinction that a thing can be shown to be real or otherwise. Consequently, one cannot determine whether or not a thing exists in one system by means of criteria taken from another, or completely independent of any particular system:

> 'We may ask whether a particular scientific hypothesis agrees with reality and test this by observation and experiment. Given the experimental methods, and the established use of the theoretical terms entering into the hypothesis, then the question whether it holds or not is settled by reference to something independent of what I, or anybody else, cares to think. But the general nature of the date revealed by the experiment can only be specified in terms of criteria built into the methods of experiment employed and these, in turn, make sense only to someone who is conversant with the kind of scientific activity within which they are employed'.[16]

The message in this passage is that it is, in principle, mistaken to deny the reality of "Zande" witches or any such beliefs by reference to criteria of judgement which are not derived from "Zande" thought. Indeed, the point is that it is misguided to make such a judgement. We can have no criteria for doing so. There is consequently no way in which we can check which of the claims about witches - Evans-Pritchard's or the Azande's - is right.

Winch's position departs from his conception of the "Zande" thought system and science as two distinct 'forms of life'; so that when the "Zande" talk about witches, they are not to be seen as doing the same things as the scientist who affirms that "there are electrons". T he "Azande" and the scientist are engaged in two different activities; they are playing two different language-games.

But contrary to Winch's position, to understand Zande witch-beliefs in 'Zande' terms is to find that the Azande are doing exactly the same thing as the scientist - attempting to explain reality. This means that in "Zande" beliefs and science we are not exactly confronted with two incommensurable thought systems but only two different ways - incompatible ones at that - of looking at the same thing. When we view "Zande" beliefs in this way, what we find is that their references to the supernatural are not unlike reference to theoretical entities in science. Both kinds of reference, as Horton has consistently argued[17] are made in the course of attempts to explain puzzling phenomena - they are, to use a Wittgensteinian parlance aspects of the same 'language-game'. Consequently, the one who affirms the existence of witches and the one who denies their existence are talking at the same theoretical level; they are

indeed contradicting each other: Each is saying something that he, or the group to which he belongs, believes to be true of the world. Only one of these claims can possibly be right: And the only way we can determine which of them is, is by referring to some independent criteron or set of criteria. For Evans-Pritchard, such criteria are embodied in what he describes as "objective reality".

The point being made is that witch beliefs are claims about the world. They can in consequence either be true or false, independently, that is, of what those who hold such beliefs think. For Evans-Pritchard, there is no question about these beliefs being true: Put against what he describes as "objective reality", they simply turn out to be false, hence his claim that witches do not exist.

I have already indicated that the only sure thing about what Evans-Pritchard calls "objective reality" is that it is not a kind of scientific principle or law - all scientific notions, in fact, derive their "scientific-ness" from it - it is something beyond individual scientific principles or laws, it is an extra-scientific 'principle' or body of principles if we may so describe it. But it is safe to suggest that it is nevertheless arrived at in a scientific manner, that is to say, through experience. This is why it will be correct to define "objective reality" as the sum total of our experience regarding matters of fact. Consequently, when Evans-Pritchard says that witchcraft beliefs do not conform with objective reality, he is to be understood as saying no more than that such beliefs cash with what experience shows to be the case. It is in this context that one sees the continuity between Evans-Pritchard's denial of the reality of "Azande" witches and Hume's argument for the impossibility of miracles. Just as for Hume, miracles cannot possibly exist because the evidence against their occurrence - evidence gathered through experience and synthesized in the laws of nature - is so massively overwhelming, so also for Evans-Pritchard witches cannot exist because beliefs to the effect that witches exist clash with or are discordant with "objective reality" which may be defined as a synthensis of human experience occupying a higher level of certainty than the laws of nature.

IV

What is contained in the notion of *'objective reality'* is spelt out in greater detail by Broad.[18] According to Broad there are certain principles which are (commonly accepted either as self-evident or as established by overwhelming and uniformly empirical evidence)[19] as defining the frontier of physical reality or delimiting the possible from the impossible. Broad classifies these principles into four categories:

The first category consists of principles which together define the realtions

between cause and effect and the general mechanism of causation - Broad calls them, 'General Principles of Causation'. The individual Principles making up this category may be stated as follows:

(a) no event can begin to have an effect or effects before it has occurred;

(b) no event which ends at a certain date can be the cause of an event occurring at a later date unless the period between the two date is occupied by

(i) a process of change initiated by the event which continues throughout the period and at the end contributes to initiate the later event or

(ii) the earlier event indicates some modification which contributes to the occurrence of the later event;

(c) no event happening at a certain place and date can produce an effect at a later place and date unless a finite time elapses and there is a spatially continuous chain of events.

Principles 'b' and 'c' can be understood as specifying that there can be no action-at-a-distance.

The second category consists of one principle which specifies the limits of the relationship between Mind and Matter. It asserts that an event in a person's mind cannot produce directly any change in the material world except changes in that person's brain. Thus the only changes which the mind can produce is indirectly in the body (through changes in the brain) on which it is parasitic. As Broad points out, although a person may feel that his volitions directly lead to changes in his body, that is not really the case. In so far as volitions lead to changes in the body, they do so through changes in the brain; it is these brain-changes which are the immediate consequences of his volitions[20] of these brain-changes.

The third category consists, again, of only one principle which specifies the relationship between the Mind and the Brain. It asserts that a necessary precondition of a mental event is the occurrence of an event in the brain. Each mental event, on this principle, is conditioned by an event in the brain, with each different mental event conditioned by a different brain-event. Thus, qualitatively dissimilar mental events are immediately conditioned by qualitatively dissimilar events in the brain. If, therefore, two mental events are the experiences of two different persons (however similar the mental events are the experiences of two different persons (however similar the mental events may be) they must have been conditioned by brain-events occurring in different brains.

The fourth set of principles concerns the possible ways in which knowledge can be acquired. They are as follows:

(a) a person cannot perceive a physical object except by means of sensations which that object produces in his mind. The object is formed in the percipient's mind via a receptor organ which is connected to the brain by a number of nerves, the immediate cause of this being an event occurring in the percipient's brain;

(b) the content of another person's mind cannot be known unless that person gives information as to the content of his mind which some other person, hears, sees or reads;

(c) a person cannot predict a future event except by inference from present date together with knowledge of past events except through memory, records or testimonies of reliable informants or by retrodiction based on extant data together with natural laws.

These principles, in one way or another, exclude the possibility of all reported biblical miracles, such as the turning of water into wine, and make nonsense of the predictions of the coming of Christ and such other biblica prophesie, as well as claims associated with magical phenomena (witchcraft, sorcery, magic medicine, etc.), for all these involve processes of causation and of cognition which these principles explicitly disavow. To say this, however, is to assume that these principles have an absolute validity. It is to assume that the conditions stipulated in these principles are once and for all true and irrevocable. Assuming that they are, on what grounds are we to accept them as so?

As I have already indicated, these principles are no arbitrary postulates. Rather they are the end-product of the synthesis of the laws of nature. They are, in this respect, extrapolations from our direct experience which experience finds expression in what we call laws of nature; hence the claim that laws of nature are "truths conclusively established by induction from what can actually be verified by observation".[22] We know, of course, following Hume, that the conception of laws of nature as truths constitutes an exaggeration of their real nature. Laws are never certain or decisively demonstrated, they are only more or less probable and consequently liable to drastic revision. Margenau makes this point when he remarks that 'the whole business of science is in a flux: science is a progressive, self-corrective dynamic enterprise which subjects itself in response to the ever-present threat of falsification to reflected changes, and revisions of its fundamental tenets. To put it bluntly, science no longer contains absolute truths'.[23]

If laws of nature are only more or less probable, it would seem to follow that any postulates extrapolated from such laws would have the same status - that is to say, would be more or less probable. But what we find is that the Basic Limiting Principles are treated[24] as if they have a greater certainty than the laws from which they are extrapolated. It is not clear, however, how this greater certainty accrues to these principles.

One possible suggestion is the fact that these principles are immune from the fortunes of individual laws so that even if one or more of the laws of nature were to be falsified, these principles or the principle relating to that law will not necessarily be undermined or overthrown. But this will only be true of the lesser kinds of laws and not of laws of the more general kind - the Inverse Square Law, for instance. It is unlikely, for example, that we would still be able to hold that action cannot take place at a distance if it were to be shown that the Inverse Square Law was no longer valid. Thus, to the extent to which these laws only have a degree of probability, we must say that the principles which derive from such laws can only have the same status. (I am here working on the assumption that the more general laws - e.g. the Law of Conservation of Energy - are the more direct constituents of the Basic Limiting Principles.) If this is the case, it might be safely assumed that were one of these laws to be falsified, the Basic Limiting Principles or at least one of them would have to be abandoned or drastically revised.

One other case which may be made for the greater certainty of these Principles is that they are interrelated in such a way as to form a coherent whole in a way in which the laws of nature are not. But even if we allow this fact, nothing will be seen to follow from it. Coherence by no means ensures certainty. We find, for example, that "Azande" witch-beliefs and beliefs related to poison-oracles, the powers of witch-doctors and such other beliefs are inter-related in a way resembling a coherent belief-system, but we do and can not by virtue of this hold the one or the other to be true.

If we allow that the 'Basic Limiting Principles' are not more than a dignified way of describing the convergence of the more general laws of nature, it is altogether unclear why faith in the validity of the claims contained in these principles should exceed faith in the laws on which they are founded. Indeed, to postulate a greater certainty for the Basic Limiting Principles than the one allowed for the constituent Laws is to miss the relationship between the two. Since there is agreement that laws of nature are only, to varying degrees, probable, to understand and accept the relationship between the Laws and the Principles is to see that these principles are themselves only more or less so.

It has of course been argued[25] that the Basic Limiting Principles are different in kind from Laws of Nature. These principles, as the argument goes, are not physical postulates, rather they are metaphysical assumptions and consequently have no rigid hold; that is to say, they can be reformulated at random if and when the evidence suggests that they can no longer be maintained in their present form. If by metaphysical, it is meant that these Limiting Principles have no foundation in fact, there can hardly be any justification for the universal validity which they are believed to have. Besides, it is not clear why it should not be possible to dislodge these principles by adducing empirical facts which

contradict their claims if these claims can be shown to constitute descriptions of empirical facts. It is, I think, the fact that these principles are based on empirical data that such data, where they are decisive enough, can be used to overthrow them.

If one thinks of the 'Basic Limiting Principles' in historical terms, one would come to see that they must have evolved in that period when science was at the height of its success, when Newtonian mechanics was generally regarded as providing a framework through which the universe can be totally understood. The success of science did breed arrogance and exaggerated, if not false, claims about the scope of physical explanations. As Heywood [26] records, an eminent chemist, Marcellim Barthelot, was in 1887 making the claim that there was no longer any mystery left in the universe. Physics, it was believed, could explain all events and only those which were, in any case, impossible were beyond the scope of physical explanations. These ambitious claims went hand in hand with the conception of the universe as a gigantic machine in which human beings are minor parts of the clockwork. The cloud on the horizon of this conception of the world - the human mind, was swept away by the assumption that the mind was no more than the brain at work; the brain itself being merely something of a mechanical apparatus for recording and processing information in the fashion of the electronic brain - the computer.[27]

Advances in Physics, particularly the emergence of Quantum Physics, have, however, thrown a great dealof doubt onthe supposed absolutism of Laws of Mechanics. Quantum theorists point to the fact that at the sub-microscopic level, strict determinism cannot be substantiated, hence the suggestion that physics could not be pledged to a scheme of deterministic order. As Eddington remarked (in the early years of Quantum Physics) "Determinism has dropped out altogether in the latest formulation of theoretical physics and it is at least open to doubt whether it will ever be brought back".[28] Very much the same point is made by Planck: "... development in physics (he writes) has shown that... the law of causality could not possibly be applied in the customary classical form, since its application to the world of atoms had proved a definite failure".[29]

The failure Planck had in mind is spelt out in greater detail by Nagel as follows:

> 'It is in principle impossible to ascertain with unlimited precision the simultaneous position and momentum of elementary particles ... the sharply delimited spatial location is incompatible with a sharply delimited velocity for the particle. The equation of quantum mechanics, cannot, therefore establish a unique correspondence

> between precise positions and momentas at other times. Nevertheless, quantum theory is capable of calculating the probability with which a particle has a specified momentum when it has a given position and vice versa. Accordingly, quantum theory is not deterministic in its structure, but is inherently statistical in its content, and the unquestionably great successes of the theory must be taken as an indication that the principle of causality is inappropriate in the domain of sub-atomic processes.'[30]

The case for Indeterminism, as it is obvious from this passage, rests on the impossibility of strictly predicting the behaviour of sub-atomic processes; the assumption being that all determined systems are strictly predictable. As Planck explains, 'an event is causally-conditioned if it can be foretold with certainty (the possibility of correctly fore-telling)'.[31] Feigl echoes this point when he argues "that the classified (purified) concept of causation is defined in terms of predictability according to a law (or more adequately to a set of laws)".[32] One finds the equation of Determinism with predicability in Popper's refutation of the suggestion that every event is determined, his argument being that even at the macroscopic level, strict predictability is impossible. It is therefore obvious that the supposed refutation of Determinism holds only to the extent to which the equation of Determinism with predictability is valid. As Bunge[33] suggests, only the erroneous equation of causality or determinism with predictability can justify the claim for indeterminism.

Bunge's case is clearly that uncertainty about the behaviour of sub-atomic processes is far from being the unequivocal sign of physical indeterminism. His reason for this position is that it is essentially impossible to predict (even observables) with certainty what values a given variable will assume upon measurement. But the uncertainty, he argued, is merely an empirical one presupposing empirical indeterminism but in no way providing a valid jump to ontological indeterminism.

Moreover, as Bunge and O'Connor[34] have separately argued, predictability is a human ability, it is an epistemological concept - a consequence of the existence and awareness of laws of any kind. Determinism on the other hand is an ontological concept which defines the extent to which events are causally interrelated. Since prediction is a 'fallible and perfectible activity'[35] failure of prediction cannot entail ontological indeterminism. In consequence, determinism cannot be defined in terms of predictability or equated with it. One could therefore consistently hold that sub-atomic processes are unpredictable yet determined.

If we accept this point, then we see that an essential plank in the argument for the primacy of mechanistic explanations remains undisturbed. No longer can we claim that there are events which are not determined; only that there are

events which are not strictly-speaking predictable.

But even if we agree that determinism is true at all levels, we must concede the fact that its truth is relative to the evidence which has accrued to us via experience. It is only because events have always been observed to have been preceded by other events that we come to the conclusion that all events must be so preceded. Thus, we have only our experience to turn to in support of the belief that natural explanations (where these stand for causal explanations) will always be found for any and all events we may happen to observe; whatever the degree of probability that this will be the case, we can never have certainty or a definitive proof that it will always be so.

We can, in consequence, understand the 'Basic Limiting Principles' as saying no more than that it is extremely unlikely for any empirical event not to have taken place in conformity with one or more of the postulates therein. But that is all these principles enables one to say, they can not in fact justify the categorical rejection of any putative empirical phenomenon if contrary to the postulates in these principles, we were faced with a large number of evidence or a decisive kind of evidence in support of such a phenomenon. If, for example, as Flew points out, evidence were to be found 'suggesting that one or several of the animal species at present rated as higher ... had not, in fact, evolved from any lower species, but had simply appeared in geological times millions of years too soon'[3] or if human skeletons kept turning up in coal seams or other still earlier strata in which they had no business to be', we would have to admit that the framework of biological science could no longer hold. The interesting point about these examples is that they suggest that the evidence needed to overthrow our theoretical assumptions need not, as Hume would have it, be numerically superior to those on which those assumptions are based. One piece of evidence may, in fact, suffice. One agrees, of course, that in the absence of such decisive evidence, an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence which could not be explained in terms compatible with these principles will be required to give the phenomenon in question any chance of acceptance.

Stipulating the amount of evidence which may be considered overwhelming, however, is problematic. I have indicated one sense in which one piece of evidence is obvious and decisive enough to challenge and dispel the antecedent prejudices against the phenomenon in question. Unfortunately none of the evidence which have been adduced in support of magical, supernatural or paranormal phenomena can be said to be of the decisive kind. It has of course been argued that the numerical strength of the evidence for paranormal phenomena can be considered sufficient in some cases of paranormal phenomena - particularly telepathy - to justify their acceptance into whatever we mean when we talk of a natural framework. We know, however, that the greater part of scientific opinion remains opposed to the claims of

Parapsychology, that telepathy is no more accepted any more than magic is; yet it is obvious that the evidence in "favour of magic - if any at all - is, in numerical terms, nowhere near that which countless experimental researches have provided in support of telepathic occurrences. That telepathic occurrences continue to be viewed with cynicism inspite of scientific attempts to prove that they occur is due, in no small measure, to the suffocating embrace by the Scientific Community of the tenets of the Basic Limiting Principles.

FOOTNOTES

1. I am referring here to what Broad calls 'The Basic Limiting Principles'.
2. See, for instance, P. Winch." *Understanding A Primitive Society" .. also W. D. Hudson, Rationality and Religious Beliefs, Second Order, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1973. p.3-11.*
3. *F. Huxley, "Anthropology and ESP", in* **Science & ESP,** *ed., J. Smythies, London, 1971, R.K.P. p.281-302.*
4. *E. E. Evans Pritchard.,* **'Witchcraft Among the Azande'.** Oxford U.P., 1937. p.79-82.
5. Evans-Pritchard, op. cit.
6. E. Leach., *'Political System of Highland Burma', London, 1954, Bell & Sons. 7. p.14*
7. *Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p.81.*
8. *Ibid, p.81.*
9. *E. Leach, op. cit. p.14*
10. *Ibid. p.14.*
11. *Ibid., p.14.*
12. *Ibid., p.173.*
13. *Ibid., p.173.*
14. *P. Winch: "Understanding A Primitive Society", in* **Rationality** *(e.d) B.H. Wilson, London, 1970, Blackwell p.78-111.*
15. *Ibid., p.82.*
16. *Ibid., op. cit., p.82.*
17. *R. Horton, "African Traditional Thought & Western Science,"* **Africa** 37, 1969. also in *Rationality* (ed.) Q. R. Wilson, London, Blackwell, 1970, p.131-171.
18. C. D. Broad, *'Religion, Philosophy and Physical Research'*, London, 1953, Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 8 & 9.
19. Ibid., p.9.
20. Broad, op. cit., p.9.
21. Ibid., p.9.

32. H. Margenau: "ESP in the Framework of Modern Science" in *Science & ESP*, ed., Smythies, J., London, 1971, Routledge & Kegan Paul. p.209-224.

33. Ibid., p. 213.

34. See Hansel's criticism of ESP, 'ESP: A Scientific Evaluation', N.Y., 1966, Charles Scribner. pp. 43–48.

35. This argument can be found in Burt, C., "Psychology and Parapsychology", in *Science & ESP* (ed. Smythies) and also in Scriven, M. 'The Frontier of Psychology' in *The Frontier of Science and Philosophy* (ed.) Colodny, R.), University of Pittsburg Press, 1962, p.72-93.

36. R. Heywood: "Notes on Changing Mental Climate and Research" *into ESP*, in *'Science and ESP*, op. cit. pp.47-60.

37. C.E.M. Hansel: *'Experience in Telepathy'*, Brit. Journal of Stat. Psychology, Vol. XIII, 1960, p.14.

Mace, C., 'Physicalism'; *Proc. of the Aristoteliah Society*, 37, 1936-7.

38. A. Edington: *The Nature of the Physical Universe*, Cantab. Press, 1928, p.294.

39. M. Planck: *The Philosophy of Physics*, London, 1936, George Allen & Unwin, p.45.

40. E. Nagel: *'The Structure of Science'*, London, 1961, Routledge, p.295.

41. M. Planck: Op. cit., p.45.

42. H. Feigl: "Notes on Causality"; in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, eds. Feigl, H. & Co., 1953, New York; Appleton, p.411.

43. M. Bunge: *'Causality;* 1959, Harvard U. Press, Cambridge, Mass, p.328.

44. D'Conner: "Determinism", *Brit. Jour. for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. II, 1956-57, pp.310-15.

45. Bunge, op. cit., p.330.

46. A.N. Flew: *A New Approach to Psychical Research*, London, 1953, C. A. Gatts, p.72.

THE IDEOLOGICAL OVERTONE OF KARL POPPER'S ANTI-HISTORICISM

Dr. E. Kola Ogundewole

In "The Poverty of Historicism", Karl Popper, it seems is in search of a "technological" social science, or to be more exact, he is in search of a so-called technological methodology which aims at the former. In the process Popper declares war on Historicism as an approach in the study of societal life.

Popper's main contention is that since historicism is interested in the development, not of aspects of social life, but of "society as a whole"[1], as an opposition to it, therefore there is the need to conceive of a methodology which aims at a "technological social engineering", the prime motive of which will be the study of the general laws of social life with the aim of finding facts which would be indispensable as a basis for everyone seeking to reform social institutions.[2] That is to say, the technological social engineering approach" is necessary to aid those seeking piecemeal solution to social problems in order to maintain the status quo, and retain the static feature of society, in opposition to the historical approach which is fundamentally essential for everyone seeking wholesale and wholesome transformation of society. For there are neither laws of succession nor laws of evolution.[3] The argument here, according to Popper, is that there are no universal historical laws governing the development of human society and as such the wholesale transformation of society is impossible.

Further, Popper holds that we cannot speak of changes or development in the social sciences without presupposing an unchanging essence. He illustrates that thus: a naturalistic description of contemporary institutions of government in Britain, for example, might have to present them as entirely different from what they were four centuries ago. Yet we can say, in so far as there is a government, it is essentially the same, even though it may have changed considerably. Its function within modern society is essentially analogous to the function it then fulfilled. Though hardly any describable features have remained the same, Karl Popper concedes, the essential identity of the institution is preserved, permitting us to regard one institution as a changed form of another.[4] Whereas, one would add, in accordance with Popper's logic of reasoning in essence there is no change in actual fact, no progress. Because, according to him "history ... simply does not exist,"[5] it has no meaning and does not progress. In fact, "there is no history of mankind."[6] "If we think that history progresses, or that we are bound to progress", - he

further writes, - "then we commit the same mistake as those who believe that history has a meaning that can be discovered in it and need not be given to it." [7] Finally, "although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and although history has no meaning, we can give it a meaning." [8] We can make history "our fight for the open society and against its enemies (...) and we can interpret it accordingly." [9]

It is pertinent to observe that Karl Popper accused Hegel of dishonesty in his philosophical endeavour and that his philosophical reasoning was motivated by ulterior motives. [10] Whether this accusation is true or false is not of immediate interest to us here now. What is important at the moment is that just as Karl Popper accused Hegel of having been inspired by ulterior motives in his philosophical enterprise so also is Karl Popper himself not immune from this illness, if it can be called illness. So, it is illegitimate for Popper to criticize Hegel on that issue. The final point raised above about his contention exhibits beyond any possible doubt all the hum-bug associated with Popper's philosophy of history or rather his socio-political philosophising, his attempt to negate historicity both as a principle and and as a mode of inquiry; so also his noise about the impossibility of a wholesale transformation of society, and that the piecemeal "social engineering" method is the best for the study of human societal ills. Hardly can one doubt the fact that Popper is in fact motivated by political consideration and ideological prejudice rather than logico-methodological consideration. He writes: "Holistic ... social engineering as opposed to piecemeal social engineering, is never of a 'private' but always of 'public' character. It aims at seizing the key positions ... at controlling from these 'key positions' the historical forces that mould the future of the developing society." [11] This situation made it to escape Popper's mind that the only permanent feature, the unchanging essence of the life of society is *change*. A fact recognised several centuries ago by an ancient philosopher Heraclitus who developed the theory of eternal flux. Karl Popper denies change in societal life because he is overwhelmed by subjective political considerations.

Whence, apparently, Popper tries to negate the fact that history has meaning and definite ends. [12] And in consonance with his political ideological orientation he proclaims: "although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it", "we can give it a meaning by making history "our fight for the open society and against its enemies" [13] and can interpret it accordingly.

It seems that the main quarrel of Karl Popper here circles around the 'public' and 'private'; the 'collectivistic' and the 'individualistic'. The precise problem and his concern seems to be: who seizes the key positions and as such controls the historical forces that gives meaning to the future history of the developing society or in his own words, "that mould the future of the developing society"?

Karl Raimund Popper's apparent recognition of the fact that the developing society be given orientation, be directed, be sharpened i.e. be moulded conflicts with his own personal initial position and further exposes his double standard scholarship of the "open society" type. An essential feature of the "the "social engineering" method as he elaborates in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* is that since history has no meaning history can be interpreted from the point of view of the fight for the "open society", and that the protagonists of the "open society" can train themselves to use their language as an instrument not of self-expression but of rational communication, so they can impose certain ends of theirs upon history.[14]

The author of *The Open Society and Its Enemies* seems to think he could arrogate to himself alone the right to interpret history in his own prejudiced subjective way with no one else having similar right or capability to do the same. The obvious implication is, at best, the propagation of relativism and, at worst, the pretension that bourgeois view of the world is alone scientific. The question therefore, is, is there no basis or base for objective study of societal life and history? Having argued, elsewhere, that the fact that historicity demands that man be transformed too as society "removes any possibility of testing the success or failure"[15] of the end result, Karl Popper made a round-about turn to tell us that he and his likes fighting to retain the capitalist mode of societal organisation, which he calls the "open society" can (although "history has no meaning") give meaning to history from their own point of view of the 'fight for the open society". At the same time, the author of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* Karl Popper, wants us to believe that there is an unprejudiced base, in contrast to, and better than, that of historicity, for an objective test of whatever conclusion his "open society" logic leads him to.

R.M. Herbenick in "Some unholy Remarks on Holistic Empiricism" makes some observations two of which are very appropriate here.

1. That any research divised under the direction of some world-view *would be consonant* with it necessarily.

2. - No research divised under some world-view guidance *could* deviate substantially from what the world-view potentially prescribes.[16] Admittedly, this may not be true in all cases. Especially in the case of a world-view which by its very nature is objective in form and scientific in content. But it is certainly true of every prejudiced conservative anti-scientific world-view.

Karl Raimund Popper's attempted criticism of historicity as a principle and mode of inquiry, contained in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* and *The Poverty of Historicism* is prejudiced. It is imbued with his "open society" instinct and from his "open society" world-view. As such it cannot be said to contain in itself any shade of objectivity. For his attempted criticism and his research in its entirety cannot deviate substantially from what suits his "open society" world-view and piece-meal logic.

The following question, therefore, becomes necessary, is Popper like many traditionists of the "open society" type so blind to the irrationalities of the society they seek to rationalize that in an attempt to eternalise its existence he found himself inventing several fanciful 'theories', myths and 'method' which are not rooted in real socio-historical experience of mankind, but only in his own imagination?

I share the view of R.L. Heilbroner that "it is one of the disconcerting facts of an open society that it offers so many opportunities for facile generalisation and so little sure ground for generally valid ones.[17] The poverty of Popperean piecemeal "social engineering" approach, therefore is the poverty of "sure ground for generally valid" rational insight into the complex nature of societal life.

To Karl Popper, the wholesale transformation of society is an impossibility. But the instances of such wholesale transformation in the social structure of Russia and China today are living socio-historical facts. Yet through his "open society" mode of reasoning Popper continues to deny the existence of this socio-historical reality. In fact he says, it is impossible. One can scarcely fail to be struck by the general poverty of this type of reasoning.

In fact Popper's philosophy is the philosophy of the justification of injustice, of the morality of exploitation and oppression. He describes as a dubious morality that man must get reward for work done.[18] He writes: "Our ethical education must" be to work for the sake of work, but not to wait for, expect or ask for reward". And such an ethics has been taught by Christianity, at least in its beginnings. We need not invent one. All we need is to uphold it. Such ethics "is again, taught by the industrial ... co-operation of our own day".[19] Yes, such ethics is upheld and taught in our own day by industrial exploiters in a bid for conducive industrial atmosphere which guarantees maximum profit via unprotested exploitative working conditions!

The above quotations fully express the politico-ideological overtone of Karl Popper's anti-historicity and his proclaimation of a so-called piecemeal social engineering as the only true scientific method. He believes that the method can aid the social researcher "to search for and fight against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society", such as "definite wrongs", "concrete forms of injustice or exploitation",[20] instead of fighting for some ultimate good for the generality of the masses.

Thus, the Popperean style of the struggle against injustice and exploitation in "open" (capitalist) society is to teach people to do their work, make sacrifice, for the sake of this work, and not for praise, or to look for reward now, but, presumably as Christians preach, wait for the reward in Heaven. The ethics of the Popperean "open society", therefore, is a highly dubious ethics. The idea that the so-called piecemeal social engineering method alone is sufficient to understand the complex statistical nature of societal life and that the method

alone could form an effective instrument for bringing about meaningful changes that would eliminate the greatest and urgent evils of society rather than to employ all available methods including the principle of historicity, in a combined form, is not only trivial demagogy but the highest level betrayal of scholarly conscience.

I agree with Karl Popper in his contention that "there are indeed countless possibilities in our search for the true conditions of a trend."[21] Truely, one may choose to study shrewdly facts concerning real life of society, while some (Popper inclusive) simply imagine conditions, having no bearing whatever on the real life of man and his environment. In this sense, if, according to Popper, the "poverty of historicism ... is a poverty of imagination",[21] I would say, in the reverse, that the wealth of historicity as a principle and mode of inquiry is realism in abundance, an objective one for that matter. This principle is in opposition to the narrow-minded subjective piece-meal "social engineering" conservative method which Popper tries, unsuccessfully though, to rationalize.

Buried in his prejudice of "open society", Popper lost all capacity of reasoning and found himself making contradictory statements here and there. To Karl Popper, history has no meaning. In fact, it does not exist. Yet he conceded that history can or ought to have meaning. True, he chooses to make the fight for "open society" the meaning of history. This is practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting historicity, while denying it before the world. For whether it is the "full development of the personality, moulding or remoulding the people with the intent to making them adaptable to the new societal set up, or the historical mission of the proletariat, what we have or are doing here is nothing, but giving meaning to history. Because "men make their own history ... in that each person follows his own consciously desired end, and it is precisely the resultant of these many wills operating in different directions and their manifold effects upon the outer world that constitute history."[23]

According to Popper the demand that people be moulded in order to fit properly into a new society is a demand that aims at destroying knowledge; it is also an admission of failure by the enuciator or the proposer of such a new society even before it becomes a reality.[24] It seems to escape Karl Popper that to try to control and stereotype interests and beliefs through education and by any other means at its disposal or simply expressed in another way, to set up an "acceptable" standard code of behaviour and norms for the control of and regulating interactions and inter-relations of people within its system is a natural and essential function of any society whether in antiquity or in the contemporary period. Every human society performs this essential function, and rigidly too, whether in a covert or overt manner. Herbert Marcuse in his *One-Dimensional Man* demonstrates how contemporary advanced society (be it of the USSR or the "open society" of the USA) manipulates and controls the

individual mind, how, in fact, with the aid of mass media and mass culture the society impels the individual to think along a certain pattern of reasoning and not the other. Popper himself is a victim of that situation. In other words, the workings of society is such that it tries to impose on the individual 'what to think'. The question is not whether it is desirable or not, but that it is an essential function of any society to mould people. To postulate a destruction of knowledge as a result, is a sign of inability to penetrate into the intricacy and dialectics of socio-historical and socio-cultural processes, especially as a wholesale unidirectional process. The ancient Greek society which under the influence of myths and religion produced a seemingly uniform belief system was not hampered from equally producing the first philosophers. This shows that whatever attempt is made to tame common interest and establish uniform belief system for a people in order to ensure greater coherence in a society, the instinctive drive of people to attain objective true knowledge of the universe is never really inhibited. Society has a definite in-built regulatory system of control which guarantees, rapid or slow, but steady growth of knowledge. Even in the medieval Europe when Catholicism held sway over peoples' minds nothing could really suppress, in absolute terms, such minds like those of Leonardo da Vinci, Giordano Bruno, Nikolai Copernicus from flowering let alone to talk of total destruction of knowledge as the apostle of "social engineering" would want us to believe. In fact without such obstacles, if they could be called obstacles at all, the essence of true objective knowledge would not have been appreciated.

There is yet another ground by which Popper's contention becomes invalidated. Lets take, for example, an aeroplane designer, who worried about the safety and comfort of air-travellers consequently designed a new plane with a lot of innovations particularly many new devices that not only improve safety standard but which make air-travel a more pleasant experience. At the manufacture of this new plane, the designer gives series of instructions which a pilot (experienced or not) must undergo so that he can successfully fly the new plane. Could it be said to be valid, the claim, that since the designer recommends that it is necessary to re-train pilots so that they can successfully fly the new plane that means an admission of failure on the part of the designer even before he launches the new plane? Furthermore, does the fact that the designer recommends special training for any pilot intending to fly the new plane in any way remove the possibility of testing the success or failure of the new plane? It very much seems to me that the ability of the designer to determine the condition and quality, in terms of skill, required of a pilot who will successfully fly the plane makes the whole exercise and the method involved in designing the new plane, in essence, scientific. Thus, the all-embracing dialectical historical historical approach to the study of societal

phenomena which led to the evolving of a new society and a recommendation for remoulding people so that they can fit properly into such a new society is equally truly scientific.

Finally, Popper thinks, the worthy aim of educational system is "give the young what they most urgently need, in order to become independent of us, and to be able to choose for themselves", rather than insisting on seeking for higher aims "such as the full development of the personality."[25]

Education in the Popperean sense, therefore, is instruction, the imparting of imformation; training. This is a false understanding of education. For it presupposes that we know what sort of a being each person ought to be and what he most urgently needs to prepare him to discharge a certain function in society (to fight for the "open society", for instance). Personal life, however, does not consist of the performance of functions. As such, "education is not preparation for the world, for the world demands a great deal that it ought not demand and we need people whose very nature will change the world and its demands."[26]

So, contrary to Popper's opinion, the full development of the personality is indeed not nonsensical, but rather should be the task of any worthy system of education and it aims at increasing the integrity of the personal life. This is not the same thing as developing the person as an individual based on an exaggerated and superficial notion of individuality. Individuality is what distinguishes, or isolates and separates a man as social being from every other. But as an essentially social being, man exists as a person only in so far as he is related to other persons. One must take cognisance of that in clarifying the difference between personality and individuality. While individuality lingers toward isolationism; personality exists in relationship. Whereas personality is other-centred individuality can be totally self-centred. Personality is centred in the other persons of one's society. As a social being, "a person grows in maturity in so far as the significance of his life is derived from his enjoyment of other people and his relatedness with them."[27] So as a social being man becomes a person in the full sense of the word through all the sensitive, tender, responsive relationship he has with the other members of a society. A full development of the personality is possible if during the educational process we keep every form of vocational training (whether it is the learning of a language or Music or Science or even brick-laying 'in short',a wide range of experience) within a personal framework. It is in this sense, I believe, that Marx talks of a person acting as the Chairman of a Planning Committee in the afternoon; a fisherman in the evening and yet having worked as a tractor-driver in the morning.

The full development of the personality is socially meaningful, and surely is full of sense. Karl Popper might wish to argue that that is a pure Jack-of-all-

trade who is a master of none. But that is the effect of his poor understanding of the operation of human intellect. The human intellect is fed by the whole of man's psyche. Hence, all the ingenuity of a person is a bubbling up from the deeper centres of his personal life. As such we must nourish every centre in the mind from which energy and stimulus might come, keep every sense and every kind of perception at its sharpest. That is what full development of personality means.

If anything is nonsensical, it is the Popperean narrow conception of education which will necessarily breed the kind of individual whom Herbert Marcuse would like to call "one-dimensional man". How can one become independent of others and be able to choose for oneself if one is not a fully developed person? For freedom in our own understanding is nothing, but the cognition of necessity. In other words, the full development of the body, the mind, spirit, is an essential pre-requisite for the achievement of genuine freedom of a person from the hidden forces of nature society, and of superstitious beliefs about the nature of physical world and the nature of human relationship in society. This is the way a true freedom of choice can be guaranteed. If the worthy aim of educational system is to give the young what they most urgently need in order to become independent of us and to be able to choose for themselves, an important question is, who determines what the young most urgently need? Another is, could Popper ascertain that by giving to the young what he thinks the young most urgently need, he can thereby ensure the young independent life and freedom of choice? Karl Popper appears too shallow in his approach to, and too naive in his analysis of social phenomena, and his understanding of societal life is unphilosophical, it is based on political ideological consideration and is full of contradictions.

On one hand, Popper denies there are laws of socio-historical development, of general laws of succession; on the other hand he concedes that there are general laws of social life the study of which shall be the prime motive of "technological social engineering".[28] What Popper would not like to agree with (and this is in accordance with his political outlook) is that the aim of the study of these laws should be to transform the social life. Instead, the aim should be "finding facts which would be indispensable as a basis for everyone seeking to reform social institutions,"[29] everyone seeking piecemeal solution to social problems while keeping intact the status quo. This is a dubious pattern of reasoning.

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13. Ibid.
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16. R.M. Herbenick "Some unholy Remarks on Holistic Empirisim" - *Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy* Sofia 1973 Vol.I p.52. It is pertinent to remark that Karl Popper himself recognises this fact (of, Poverty of Historicism pp.134-135) but for political ideological consideration, presumably, he refuses to practice it.
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PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY

"One word of truth outweights the whole world" (popular Russian proverb).

"The purpose of the study of philosophy is not to learn what others have thought, but to learn how the truth of things stand" (St. Thomas Aquinas).

Dr. J. J. White

It has been said that the quality young people of today yearn for most is authenticity. Only the person who is true to himself can win their admiration. This explains the popularity of plays such as Robert Bolt's *A Man for All Seasons* and Arthur Miller's *The Crucible,* two historical dramas whose heroes prefer to die rather than compromise their integrity. This explains also why in today's confused and largely materialistic world the voice of a man like Alexander Solzhenitsyn is listened to with such respect: he speaks harshly of our contemporary civilization[1] - both east and west of the Iron Curtain - but he speaks with sincerity and truth, and with the authority of one who has suffered in the cause of truth.

There is no doubt that the need to live in an environment where truth is respected is part of man's psychological make-up, and when that environment is missing we necessarily suffer. And if it is true, as Solzhenitsyn claims, that such an environment is no longer to be found either in the Communist world or in the so called 'free' world of the West, then it would seem that respect for the truth is not something any society can take for granted. Indeed history shows that in general men are guided more by expediency than by moral principles, since the former is easier. And yet there is an intimate link between respect for truth and the capacity to be free, and likewise between respect for truth and the capacity to be united with others. A society, in which truth and objectivity are taken lightly, whether on the theoretical or on the practical level, cannot hope to build up amongst its members that mutual trust and confidence which is the foundation of unity, and where there is no unity there can hardly be real freedom. Thus in a discussion of a topic such as *Philosophy and Society* there can hardly be a more vital question to address ourselves to than this: what are philosophers doing to help create an intellectual environment in which truth is respected?

It may be objected that such a question has much greater relevance to the situation in highly developed societies such as those of Europe, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. - where ideological questions are important - than to developing societies such as those of Africa where the principal problems seem not

ideological but economic. A little reflection, however, is sufficient to see that at whatever level of economic development a society might be it always remains necessary for the leaders to have a clear idea of what development is for, and in particular of what education is for.[2] And these are essentially philosophical questions. Indeed it is worth stressing that unless they are taken for what they really are, that is philosophical questions, there is the danger that they be dragged down to the level of ideology, that is, to the level of competing party political programmes, which often ignore the real nature of a question in preference for concentrating on some superficial aspect politically marketable. A study of both Western and Russian society in the last few decades could well serve as an object lesson in the fatal consequences of subordinating education to short-term political and economic goals in the name of ideologies such as 'liberal democracy' or Marxist socialism.[3]

However, my intention is not primarily to make the perhaps obvious point that philosophers have a valuable role to play in society precisely by helping policy-makers to appreciate the deeper aspect of problems of development - constantly reminding them, for instance, of the true nature and dignity of society's greatest asset, namely man himself, and of his essential orientation to a goal above and beyond the state - but rather to remind philosophers themselves of the true nature of philosophy, in the conviction that philosophy can be of service to society *only* if it is first of all true to itself.

In particular one would say that it is only by retaining a firm attachment to metaphysics that philosophers will be able to prevent the intellectual and also practical disorders which the Western world has suffered in recent times, from recurring. There is a special danger, for instance, in today's world that we let ourselves become the slaves of economics, as Schumacher has so eloquently pointed out in his book *Small is Beautiful*. Of course we need economic development plans: that is not in question. But those plans, just as educational development plans also, have to take into account certain basic principles which are not derived from the science of economics or from some ideologybut from metaphysics, which is the science of first principles. There is an order in knowledge, and it is precisely one of the functions of metaphysics to provide that order, not an arbitrary order, but "the order which springs from eternity',[4] that is, an objective order based on the nature of things. The function of metaphysics in this respect is to "maintain justice in the universe of knowledge, making clear the natural limits, the harmony and subordination of the various sciences". In so doing, metaphysics at the same time reveals to man "the hierarchy of authentic values through all the extent of being" and "gives a centre to his ethics".[5] There are no mean services to man and society, and in today's world of confused moral values and of both theoretical and practical moral relativism the importance of such services can hardly be exaggerated.

Another reason for believing it is good for philosophers now - and indeed constantly to reflect on the precise nature of their profession or calling - to use an expression that Socrates would have approved - is my suspicion that the low regard in which philosophy is generally held in so many developing countries is due not only to an understandable public ignorance of what philosophy is, but also to the fact that philosophers themselves are suffering from a crisis, and precisely a crisis of identity. And this is due, I would suggest, not so much to the fact that in traditional African society there was no exact equivalent of the modern university professional philosopher - and this is true of most traditional societies - but rather to the very impoverished notion of (professional) philosophy which seems prevalent in most philosophy departments whose inspiration or predominant influence is either the Anglo-Saxon analytical tradition or one of the several modern traditions whose roots go no deeper than Kant and Descartes.

The conception of philosophy for instance, which philosophers in England of the generation of Austin, A.J. Ayer, Hampshire and Ryle, seem to have bequeathed to many English university philosophy departments is so modest that one wonders how students can believe it worthwhile to study philosophy at all. The prospectus of one such department deliberately warns the prospective student that "the popular view of a philosopher as a man who has or pretends to have a special knowledge of and insight into the 'great problems' of mankind and of 'the meaning of life' is *entirely false*,"[6] and goes on to state that philosophy deals merely with those problems 'left over' when 'the methods of science' have been applied.

One is also struck by the number of philosophy departments whose chief source of pride is their ability to offer a wide range of courses in a variety of different philosophical traditions, as if philosophical training consisted chiefly in the accumulation of philosophical information. Such an approach suggests from the start a tendency to eclecticism and relativism, usually a symptom of philosophical decadence. And one cannot help wondering whether the net effect of such an approach and such a conception of philosophy may not be to corrode the natural and healthy ideals of those young people who are exposed to them.[7] For if philosophy is considered to be no more than "a branch of philology or even of anthropology, the study of the linguistic habits of philosophers, scientists and ordinary men",[8] as not few contemporary philosophers, at least in England, seem to believe, it follows that the very notion of truth is no more than a word, and we are back again with the nominalism of the decadent scholastics.

My contention then is this: that if philosophy is going to exercize a healthy influence on the future development of society - in the first place by helping create that much-needed environment of respect for truth, - it must first of all recover its own true identity. For it would be a pity if philosophers were to have

applied to them that popular Russian saying (as expressed by Tolstoy): "Every one thinks of changing the world, but no one thinks of changing himself"! The task of recovering or rediscovering philosophy's true identity consists principally, I would suggest, in seeking to re-live the insights into reality gained by those thinkers who belong to the tradition of what Leibniz and others have called the 'philosophia perennis'.[9] This is a tradition which strictly speaking belongs to no particular culture or period, for in its deepest insights it transcends all spatial and temporal boundaries, belonging to the common heritage of all mankind. It is also a tradition which, "inasmuch as it develops and brings to perfection what is most deeply and genuinely natural in our intellect alike in its elementary apprehensions and in its native tendency towards truth, "[10] serves as an ever-active stimulant to thinkers of whatever culture to go deeper in their explorations of the manifold levels and dimensions of reality.

One might remark that precisely one of the most hopeful signs of the times is the fact that at least in several countries the contemporary reaction against modern philosophy (1600-1900 roughly)[11] has taken the form of a going back to seek inspiration from the great thinkers of earlier times. In his book on *Contemporary European Philosophy* (p.32-33) Bochenski makes the interesting point that "if philosophy ascends to higher levels it does so in spiral fashion," and goes on to say that nowadays - meaning the second quarter of the twentieth century - philosophy "is closer to Greek and scholastic thought than to any thought of the past hundred years, so far as its fundamental questions are concerned. Plato has been reborn in Whitehead; Aristotle in Driesch, Hartmann, and the Thomists; Plotinus in certain existentialists; Thomas Aquinas in the school named after him; the later scholastics in phenomenology and neo-positivism; Leibniz in Bertrand Russell".

However, in order to relive the insights into reality of the great thinkers of the past and to benefit from sharing in the inspirations which are to be found in the 'philosophia perennis'[12] there is no doubt that a certain disposition of soul is required on the part of the aspirant, a certain sympathy of mind and spirit. And this implies sharing a similar conception of what philosophy is and what it is for. My aim then, is the limited but I think valuable one of trying to outline a few of what seem to be the most basic characteristics of that disposition of soul and of that particular understading of philosophy necessary for entering into communion with the tradition of the 'philosophia perennis'. There may be the risk of repeating what are commonplaces, but it seems to me that a truly philosophical disposition is much less common nowadays than it used to be, and instead what is common is what I would call a positivist and pragmatist disposition.

I would begin by re-affirming the well-known but often forgotten truth that

The beginning of philosophy is wonder. Not so much wonder *how* things happen, but primarily wonder *at* things being as they are, and indeed at things being at all. This sense of wonder - so vital to the philosopher that it can never be a waste of time to recall what it is and what it implies.

As for what it is, perhaps no explanation can surpass Chesterton's poem "A Second Childhood":

When all my days are ending
And I have no sing to sing,
I think I shall not be too old
To stare at everything;
As I stared once at a nursery door
Or a tall tree and a swing.....
Men grow too old for love, my love,
Men grow too old for lies;
But I shall not grow too old to see
Enormous night arise,
A cloud that is larger than the world
And a monster made of eyes.....
Men grow too old to woo, my love,
Men grow too old to wed:
But I shall not grow too old to see
Hung crazily overhead
Incredible rafters when I wake
And find I am not dead.....
Strange crawling carpets of the grass,
Wide windows of the sky:
So is this perilous grace of God
With all my sins go I:
And things grow now though I grow old,
Though I grow old and die.

To my mind, as well as constituting a living expression of the sense of wonder, this poem also bears witness to at least two of its implications. The first implication is that man by nature is a realist. He wonders first at things, not at ideas. Ideas arise only as a result of his first knowing things. What a child knows absolutely first - however vaguely - is that this concrete object in front of him, a table, a chair, 'a nursery door", *is*, that it *exists*. In other words, being comes before knowing, metaphysics before epistemology; being is the absolute and infallible norm of all knowledge. The great error of all idealism is to assume, arbitrarily, that knowledge begins with ideas - 'cogito, ergo sum' - when ordinary experience shows that the opposite is the case - I can think because I exist. Indeed one could not begin to doubt unless one first had

knowledge of some existing thing knowledge of which could be doubted. Knowing and thinking are modalities of being and not vice-versa. There are indeed many degrees of knowledge - whose explanation belongs to epistemology - but we cannot doubt that we have some kind of knowledge of the real external world: for the existence of the real is a basic datum of human experience, as it were, imposed upon us.

Much could be said on this topic, considering how deeply the idealist error - with its inevitable tendency to scepticism, to the dissolving of all objective truths - has sunken into so many of even the most brilliant minds, including thinkers like Russell and Whitehead who certainly started out with the desire to be realist philosophers. However, this is not a treatise on epistemology.[13] My purpose is simply to recall that a predominant feature of the 'philosophia perennis', as well as of the ordinary man, is realism, and to stress that realism is the only approach for a philosopher who hopes to understand something of the nature of reality without subjectivity, without distortion, and indeed without despair.[14]

The second implication of Chesterton's poem is that a true philosopher, like a child, is aware that existence is much greater than he is, indeed it is essentially a mystery- as Heidegger has said, a mystery why something exists rather than nothing - and at the same time he is conscious of a desire not only to know all things but also to become all things.[15] He is not satisfied with some partial knowledge, he wants an answer to everything. This combination of an attitude of reverence, of astonishment[16] before the mystery of existence and of a desire somehow to become all things is essentially the attitude of a contemplative. Such an attitude is as necessary to the philosopher as it is to the religious, since things do not yield up their inner secrets except to him who respects each distinct nature for what it is.[17] There must exist in the philosopher a basic 'openness' of soul towards reality, a basic receptivity so as to be able to 'listen to the essence of things', as Heraclitus put it. Indeed it is this opening of the soul - in Bergson's phrase - to the order of being that enables the philosopher to pass on beyond things themselves and to penetrate to their ground and origin, namely to divine being experienced intellectually as transcendent.[18]

This openness to the whole of reality may certainly be described as an essentially religious attitude. But such an attitude is characteristic not only - as one would expect - of the great medieval Christian and Islamic philosophers - but also of the pagan Greeks such as Plato and Aristotle. Even down-to-down Aristotle speaks quite naturally (in his *ethics)* of there being in man's divine principle'.[19] It would seem that in contrast to most modern philosophers, that is, rationalist philosophers, the medieval and ancient philosophers appreciated well that the mind has a contemplative as well as a reasoning function; it is intellectus' as well as *'ratio'*. The *'ratio'* is "the power of discursive logical

thought, of searching and of examination, of abstraction, of definition and drawing conclusions. '*Intellectus*', on the other hand, is the name for the understanding in so far as it is the capacity of *simplex intuitus*, of that simple vision to which truth offers itself like a language to the eye." [20] Rationalism's exaggerated emphasis on 'ratio' has been responsible for the neglect of the mind's twofold function by so many modern and contemporary philosophers and the resulting drastic impoverishment of the mental life of vast sectors of the contemporary world,[21] for whom for instance, the notion of any type of transcendent being or of transcendent values is quite incomprehensible.[22]

It is surely an irony that in a continent like Africa, whose peoples are for the most part of a very religious disposition, and many of whose leaders have frequently warned of the corrosive effects of importing wholesale an alien technology, there should be so little awareness of the agnostic, and even atheistic tendencies of so much modern and contemporary Western philosophy, due principally to its Cartesian and Kantian epistemology with its basic incapacity, indeed unwillingness, to accept anything that is not the result of a process of logical reasoning. Thus one of the great advantages of returning to the tradition of the 'philosophia perennis' is to rediscover an intellectual world in which the mind can move freely, that is spontaneously, without arbitrary artificial restrictions, and in particular without stumbling against artificial barriers erected between science and religion or between science and philosophy.

Many Africanist scholars have pointed out that in most traditional African cultures the world was seen as a whole. Distinctions were of course recognized, some clearly, others obscurely, but in general the world was seen as a unity, all things being in some kind of harmony, even if that harmony might sometimes be disturbed. This was more of a religious than a philosophical view of things, since no one felt any need to try and justify it in purely rational terms. However, in modern times the advent of modern science obviously threatens any view of things which does not defend itself on scientific grounds, since science has so brilliantly demonstrated its capacity firstly to explain many of the operational laws of nature and secondly to manipulate them to human advantage. And to the modern mind what is useful tends to be more attractive than what is true.

Unfortunately, although there was no necessity for such a development, in Europe modern science grew up practically in opposition to philosophy and theology - in the mistaken belief that they were rivals in the same field - and in consequence the contemporary world has inherited a legacy of often bitter hostilities between the natural sciences on the one hand and philosophy and theology on the other. The most extreme example is the communist one, where 'scientific socialism', as it is termed, or scientific atheism, declares religion to be

the principal obstacle to human progress. In the best medieval philosophy, however, the proper distinction between theology and philosophy and between first philosophy (metaphysics) and the particular sciences was recognized - and one should not forget A. N. Whitehead's remark that modern science owes its original inspiration and faith in the powers of human reason to scholastic philosophy[23] - and in consequence the modern conflict between the different types and levels of knowledge was avoided. This was because, employing the mind in both its contemplative and reasoning capacities, the medieval philosopher-theologian could think metaphysically and - starting from his intellectual intuition into the analogous nature of being - could put order into his knowledge. His vision of reality, therefore, was a harmonious one, and also one which in a certain way was potentially total. Not total in an exhaustive sense obviously, but total in the sense that it is proper of a spiritual soul '*convenire cum omni ente*'[24], that is, to enter into a relationship with the totality of whatever has being. This is the common teaching of Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas, over a period of some 1500 years.

And at the peak of metaphysical knowledge was, and is, natural theology, that branch of first philosophy dedicated to the study of the Supreme Being, or *Ipsum esse subsistens*, whose essence is precisely to be. At this level the philosopher is more than ever conscious of the limitations of finite human knowledge. Nonetheless he knows also that there can be great wisdom in having a precise knowledge of the extent of one's ignorance. And this is one of the reasons why the natural theology of the 'philosophia perennis' is a true gateway to that higher knowledge which, because it is supernatural, surpasses the limits of the unaided human reason.

Metaphysics is necessary therefore, and indeed indispensable, as an instrument of unity: unity between the different branches of knowledge, unity between the different levels of knowledge, unity between man and the reality of which he is a party, unity also between man's theoretical knowledge of principles in the speculative order and his actions in the practical order. It is only the metaphysics of the 'philosophia perennis' which clearly explains the relationship between *being, truth,* and *goodness,* showing the two latter to be modes of the first, and the first to be not a concept at all, strictly speaking, but a transcendental. In so doing the metaphysics of being *qua* being is able to safeguard the notion of objective knowledge and of objective morality - upon which depend the health of our minds and the correct orientation of our wills. In the natural order, one might say finally, no philosophy has been able to express with such precision the nature of happiness - which all of us by nature necessarily desire.[25]

For these, and many other reasons too lengthy to mention here, the metaphysics of the 'philosophia perennis' surely merits close attention. It is the

only form of natural knowledge which may legitimately be called wisdom - and wisdom is more essential to progress and to civilization than anything else: without wisdom, for instance, social justice would not be possible. And yet, let us not forget, metaphysics is useless, "it serves no purpose, it is above all gratuitous," being good in itself and by itself. On the other hand, "nothing is more necessary to man than this useless thing. What we need is not truths which will serve us, but a truth which we may serve."[26]

If then philosophers would wish to be faithful to their profession at its highest, and at the same time to their membership in a particular human society, surely they can do no better than to strive to restore to philosophy that authenticity which made Justin the Martyr in the second century exclaim:

> Philosophy is, in fact, the greatest posession and most honourable before God, to whom it leads us and alone commends us, and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy.[27]

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for instance, Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Warning to the Western World* (London: The Bodley Head and the B.B.C., 1976) and his 1970 Nobel Speech on Literature *One Word of Truth* (The Bodley Head, London, 1972).
2. It is distressing to observe now little thought is generally given to the meaning of education nowadays. As Christopher Dawson commented at the beginning of the 1960s in his provocative book *The Crisis of Western Education (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963, p.119), the result of replacing the old aristocratic and humanist ideal of education, based on an integral study of the civilization of ancient Greece and Rome, with the democratic utilitarianism of compulsory state education, on the one hand, and the ideal of scientific specialization on the other, has been an intellectual anarchy imperfectly controlled by the crude methods of the examination system and of payment by results. The mind of the student is overwhelmed and dazed by the volume of new knowledge which is being accumulated by the labor of specialists, while the necessity for using education as a stepping-stone to a profitable career leaves him little time to stop and think. And the same is true of the teacher, who has become a kind of civil servant tied to a routine over which he can have little control.*
3. See, for instance, *Dawson*, **op. cit.**, also the chapter entitled 'The Greatest Resource-Education' in E. F. Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful (London: Blond Briggs, 1973).*
4. *Jacques Maritain*, **The Degrees of Knowledge** (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1937), p.5.
5. *Ibid.*, p.3.

6. *My underlining.*
7. *When visiting the Philosophy Department of an English provincial university last long vacation I happened to have a conversation with the Department's secretary, an intelligent middle-aged lady who, though without any formal training in philosophy, obviously had a strong interest in it and was even contemplating enrolling in a part-time course. However, when I remarked that this should be very easy for her in her position, she replied that she was hestating since she could not but notice that the students studying philosophy in the Department never seemed very happy, - and she wondered whether that had something to do with* ***the*** *kind of philosophy taught! In fact, according to the prospectus,* ***practically*** *the entire teaching staff is specialized in one or other aspect of modern philosophy.*
8. *E. L. Mascall,* **Words and Images: a Study in the Possibility of Religious Discourse** (London: Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd., first published in 1957, this Libra, edition, 1968, p.67). Mascall is referring principally to the conception of philosophy held by the logical positivists.
9. This is an expression made popular by Leibniz. He was referring to that common heritage of truth to which every philosopher of worth had in some way contributed.
10. See Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1930), pp.99-100).
11. Descartes had very little use for tradition, likewise Hobbes, Marx and many other modern thinkers.
12. "...if we consult the ancients it is to recover a freshness of observation which today is lost... None of the treasures of experience, none of the advantages and graces of the latter [i.e. modern] age of thought, can replace the rightful grace of its youth, that virginity of observation, that intuitive uprush of the intelligence as yet unwearied by the spiced novelties of the real." Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, p.XV.
13. A good summary of the approach of realism - or of what is called in technical language 'moderate realism' - is to be found in E. A. Ruch's useful work *The Ways of Knowing and Thinking* (National University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho, 1977), Part III, ch. 4. For more detailed studies see E. Gilson's *Le Realisme Methodique* and Maritain's work already cited *The Degrees of Knowledge.*
14. *Gilson has often stressed: "Starting from being, one can have knowledge; on the contrary, if one decides to start from the act of cognition of the knowing subject considered as an absolute point of departure, one will never succeed in attaining being".* **(Elements of Christian Philosophy** (New York, Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1960), p.239.

15. Hence Aristotle's statement: "The soul is fundamentally the whole of existence" (De Anima 3, 8(43Ib), which the Medievals translated as: "anima est quodammodo omnia" ("the soul is in some way all things").
16. When Goethe reached the age of seventy he concluded one of his poems with the line: "In order to be amazed do I exist", and when he became eighty he wrote: "The highest point a man can arrive at is amazement."
17. Bernard of Clairvaux once defined a wiseman as "one who savours all things as they really are," while Goethe insisted that "in our doing and acting everything depends on this, that we comprehend objects clearly and treat them according to their nature." See Joseph Pieper's *Reality and the Good* (Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1967), opening page.
18. See Eric Voegelin's *Science, Politics and Ghosticism* (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1968), p.18.
19. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (Everyman Edition), Book X, 117/b.
20. Joseph Pieper, *Leisure the Basis of Culture* (London: Faber, 1952), p.34.
21. See Mascall, op. cit., p.65. The entire chapter entitled "Two Ideals of Knowledge" is eminently readable.
22. This, it may be said, is ultimately due to the failure of modern philosophers to appreciate the essentially analogous nature of being. For them 'being' is a univocal concept. Thus even so brilliant a metaphysician as A. N. Whitehead finds himself led to posit a finite god and a god, like the rest of the universe, subject to evolution.
23. See A. N. Whitehead's *The Origins of Modern Science* (Mac-Millan, 1967), p.14.
24. St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, I, I.
25. For a most penetrating discussion of this question, see Joseph Pieper's *Happiness and Contemplation.*
26. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp.4-5. The most accurate translation, incidentally, of the original French title would be: "Distinguish in order to Unite."
27. *Dialogue with Trypho.* For more details see Gilson's *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London, Sheed & Ward, 1955, pp.11-14.

CLASHES BETWEEN PARADIGMS FOR LOGIC

Professor John Tucker

In this paper I defend Logic conceived of as the logic of enquiry against Logic conceived of as a linguistic investigation. That is my adopted paradigm. I in defence of a logic of enquiry against the family of linguistic paradigms. I reject the linguistic paradigms conceived of as the ultimate termini of investigations called Logic. Against these paradigms I argue that the ultimate terminus can only be our actual procedures of investigation, and that it is these that are to be made explicit by the logic of enquiry. I defend my choice of paradigm against the family of linguistic paradigms and also against rival versions of the logic of enquiry.

I am concerned here with the paradigms adopted for Logic and the clashes between them. Ideally I should give a survey of the history of Logic and trace the growth of the various families of paradigms, but for the purposes of this paper I select two broad families, namely, the linguistic paradigms and the paradigms of logics of enquiry. An account of the development of the various paradigms for Logic cannot in the nature of the case be tidy since it is an evolutionary account, and any attempt to make it tidy must lead to gross distortions. It is essential to bear in mind that each and every label to be used applies to a family of resembling cases. With this precaution in mind I pick out these paradigms.

This use of the word 'paradigm' does not commit me to whatever Kuhn says. Lakatos's 'research programme' would serve equally well, again without committing me to whatever Lakatos says. Just as my use of 'family resemblance" does not commit me to whatever Wittgenstein says, nor my use of 'logic of enquiry' to whatever Dewey says. I take these expressions and use them in my own way.

Again, in pointing out that a variety of paradigms has been adopted for Logic I am not thereby committed to some form of relativism. On the contrary I am myself adopting a paradigm and defending it by argument against rival paradigms. Clearly, the overall paradigm of argument is presupposed in any case. I am putting forward a new variant on the old theme of logic of enquiry, a theme that has persisted and evolved since the logic of enquiry of Aristotle. Having adopted this paradigm, and having given reasons for rejecting the linguistic paradigms, it is imperative to see that we nevertheless cannot just ignore language. Language must remain a central concern for the simple reason that in a logic of enquiry we are concerned with making explicit our actual procedures, and language is a ubiquitous component of those procedures. Any logic of enquiry which, like Popper's, tries to ignore language is doomed to founder.

My concern here is with the reasons given in defence of the adoption of some given paradigm rather than with the details of the working out of the consequences of such adoptions. Once a paradigm has been adopted then the details of the working out of the consequences of its adoption assume their own internal importance. But their importance is merely internal to those who are preoccupied with the given paradigms, they have no external importance of their own. My concern here is with the reasons for adopting the paradigm in the first place rather than with these detailed consequences. If there are no sound reasons for adopting the paradigm the detailed consequences lost all their interest.

1. Popper's critique of the linguistic paradigms and its inadequacy

Popper rightly identifies the family of linguistic paradigms as the appeals to mathematical logic and to ordinary language. He puts these together as the work of 'language analysts' and rejects both in favour of his own adopted paradigm. His double target is both informal and formal analysis of language. He rejects these linguistic paradigms on the grounds that 'words do not matter', a view that he reiterates throughout his work. Yet, as might be expected, his own views show over and over again that words do matter, and in particular to his own views. His own views about how language works, in fact, determine the shape taken by his views about the logic of enquiry. It is fatal to any logic of enquiry to even try to ignore words simply because they are such a prominent part of our actual procedures.

I take first Popper's reasons for rejecting the mathematical paradigm. He is attacking those who, like Carnap, have adopted it as the paradigm for the logic of enquiry. Popper rejects the mathematical paradigm as intrinsically incapable of dealing with the problem of making explicit the growth of knowledge. He rightly points out that the so called models of the language of science based upon this paradigm have nothing to do with the actual language of science. He rightly maintains that there is no such thing as the *sui generis* 'language of science'. Those who have already adopted the mathematical paradigm will naturally try to manufacture one, and will naturally fail in this enterprise. But although Popper says that there is no *sui generis* language of science, he does not prove it. Nevertheless it can be proved.

The proof that there is no identifiable sui generis language of science is briefly as follows. Our actual procedures for identifying a given assertion as scientific do not, as a matter of fact, consist in the scrutiny of its linguistic features. What we do, in our actual practice, is to identify the given assertion as already being a part of a procedure which has itself already been identified as part of a science. We first identify the entire procedure as 'scientific' on grounds which are not themselves linguistic. Then and only then do we begin to identify the assertions which are associated with the procedure as 'scientific'. We do not identify them as 'scientific' on account of some sui generis linguistic features.

It is not difficult to show that Popper's slogan 'words do not matter' rebounds upon his own views.

(i) His early concern with falsification, following Herschel's, depended upon the view that the logic of enquiry is concerned exclusively with assertions of the sort 'All so and so's are such and such', where the word 'all' was given a referential interpretation. It is this interpretation of the word 'all' which gave rise to the thesis that assertions which make use of it over a large enough range cannot be verified but can be falsified. The point is not whether this is an adequate account of the logic of enquiry; the point is that this is a view about how the word 'all' works. It is a view about a word which determined the direction of Popper's thought.

This appeal to the referential use of 'all' is an appeal of long standing in the logic of enquiry, dating as it does from Aristotle. It was a prominent aspect of the Aristotelian logic of enquiry. Those who take universals to be the goal of the logic of enquiry will naturally be preoccupied with the word 'all'. For this reason Aristotle took generalisations to be the paradigm of explanation, the goal of all enquiry. It is essential to see this concern with 'all' within the context of Aristotle's logic of enquiry as a whole, since it is only within that context that it has any point. When taken out of context his appeal to 'all' is open to the ancient charges of circularity and triviality which Mill revived.

I reject this venerable paradigm of explanation, and is rejecting it I am rejecting the concern with 'all' in the referenctial sense. In discovering that whales are mammals, in asserting on proper grounds that whales are mammals, we are not *obliged* to think of ourselves as *referring to all the whales that there ever were, are, and will be. It is only if we do* **choose** to think of it in this way that we find ourselves falling short of a standard of verification that we cannot in the nature of the case live up to. But we ought not to be even *trying* to live up to this impossible standard. *Since it is an impossible standard it is not a standard at all. Let us get back, instead, to our actual standard, one that we can live up to. When we discover and assert that whales are mammals we do not, in our actual procedures, make use of 'all' in the referential sense We fully* **expect** other whales to resemble the whales already examined *in important ways* (and that is an essential qualification) but we are not actually engaged in referring to all whales. The idea that we must be doing this is no more than a referentialist myth.

(ii) Popper's view that all general words are dispositional is clearly a view about words. It is a view about the way in which words work derived from the tradition of Empiricism, and one which is central to Popper's logic of enquiry.

(iii) The propensity view of probability is a view about the way in which the word 'probability' works, namely, as a dispositional term.

(iv) Popper's view that 'Almost every statement that we make transcends experience,' that words like 'swan' 'go beyond experience', is clearly a view

about the way in which words work.

(v) Popper's strategy for dealing with a given view, in accordance with his slogan 'words do not matter' is: if the given view is not already put forward in a meaningful way, then reformulate it in such a way that it is meaningful. So for example he translates the Mind-Brain identify thesis into Parallelism. But this policy can be carried out only by those who are already in possession of a criterion for distinguishing between what is and what is not meaningful, and this presupposes that the very linguistic programme which Popper rejects has already been successfully carried out. He is trading upon the very thing that he is rejecting. Once again, Popper's policy of re-formulation demonstrates that words do matter, and that they matter to him.

(vi) Popper rightly distinguishes between the paradoxes proper, as merely linguistic, and the 'philosophical' paradoxes which are substantive. But this distinction again depends upon an investigation of how certain words work, an investigation which leads him to the correct conclusion that the linguistic paradoxes are trivial by comparison with the 'philosophical' ones.

(vii) Popper takes the incompleteness theorems of Godel and Tarski as showing that a universal language for science is not possible, that is, as telling us something of importance to the logic of enquiry. But once again this is trading upon results derived within the mathematical paradigm which he is concerned to reject.

(viii) And so on. Popper's work abounds with refutations of his own thesis about words. These views about the ways in which words work determined the form taken by his account of the logic of enquiry. They gave rise to his view that we can never conclusively verify assertions and so to the conclusion that we are always theorising. His account of the logic of science arises out of his view about how language works.

2. Critique of the linguistic paradigms

By the linguistic paradigms I mean the appeals to natural language or to formalised languages, so called, as ultimate courts of appeal. In every case the reason given for the adoption of a linguistic paradigm is clarification. The linguistic paradigms are clarificatory paradigms. The linguistic paradigms are grouped together in this way by people of quite different persuasions. Popper for example groups them together in this way only to reject both of them, while Dummett does so in the course of arguing for the adoption of formalised languages as a paradigm. Any such appeal to linguistic paradigms of either the informal or the formal sort takes the form of a programme of clarification. In either case, the appeal to a standard of clarity presupposes already identified confusion. What must be asked of any proposed paradigm of the clarificatory sort is: what is the evidence for the existence of the alleged confusion the

removal of which is the *raison d'etre* of the proposed research programme? Without this evidence we have no good reason for adopting the proposed programme. But whatever is offered as evidence must not presuppose that the paradigm in question has already been adopted. If it is to count as evidence it must be identified in a manner which does not beg the question. If the alleged confusion cannot be identified except by those who have already adopted the given paradigm then instead of genuine evidence all that we have is the reiteration of the paradigm; and that cannot be a good reason for adopting it.

I argue against the adoption of the linguistic paradigms, first, that no good reasons were given in support of the adoption of either the formalised or informal versions and second, that no good reasons could be given.

3. No good reasons were given for the adoption of formalised languages as paradigms

My concern here is with the reasons given in support of the adoption of any of the family of linguistic paradigms, formal or informal. Where a formal paradigm is adopted I am concerned, not with the mathematical model as such, but solely with the reasons given for selecting it as a paradigm. It is open to us to make mathematical models of those aspects of the world that interest us, those aspects of the world which turn out to be amenable to investigation by this means. This includes the making of mathematical models of our institution of assertion, and other linguistic procedures. These mathematical models are not the issue, only the reasons given for taking them to be ultimate courts of appeal.

In arguing that no good reasons were given in support of formalised languages as paradigms I have to be selective. I take some prominent cases.

(i) Russell's paradigm

Russell urged the adoption of mathematical logic as the paradigm for the solution of all of the problems of Philosophy in his manifesto 'Our Knowledge of the External World'. Having adopted this paradigm and made it influential, Russell later discarded it. Whereas in the manifesto he held that Logic is 'the essence of Philosophy', in 'Human Knowledge' he announced that Logic is not even a part of Philosophy. All this without a word of recantation. This is a strange episode in the history of paradigm adoption and rejection, comparable only to Wittgenstein's adoption and rejection of linguistic paradigms.

What Russell's manifesto amounts to is an eloquent piece of propaganda for his proposed paradigm. He held that by means of it he could investigate the ultimate simples of which the world is composed and so arrive at cosmological conclusions. Whatever he rejected as a part of the world was called a 'logical fiction'. It turns out, however, that it is his simples which are the fictions and his 'Logical fictions' which are genuine components of the world.

The main defect in Russell's 'research programme' is that he did not follow it. Russell never made good his claim that at last Philosophy was on the sure and progressive path of the sciences. His own practice did not bear out this claim. He did not, in practice, even follow his own official paradigm, except in *Principia* and one or two early papers. His work is for the most part in English prose. The bits and pieces of his views were not in fact obtained by, nor even translated into, the paradigm advocated in his manifesto.

(ii) Carnap's paradigm

It is clear that Carnap adopted a linguistic paradigm. His discussion of the relation between exact and inexact concepts is couched unmistakably in linguistic terms. He discusses the relation between 'salt' in ordinary language and in the language of chemistry, the relation between 'fish' in ordinary language and in the language of Zoology, and so forth. His theme is language and his thesis a thesis about language. Now Carnap's paradigm is of the clarificatory sort, in line of descent from Russell's clarificatory paradigm. It presupposes, like all such paradigms, already identified confusions waiting to be clarified. It presupposes this linguistic process as a terminus. In Carnap the Russellian programme is called the programme of explication.

But when Carnap says that 'Piscis' is the explicatum of the prescientific word 'fish' he is giving a false account of the development of the terminology of Zoology. He is begging the question in favour of his own adopted paradigm by describing what happened in this way. What actually happened was that, during the development of Zoology, a much wider and more careful, thorough, description of marine organisms was carried out. Much of this was carried out in pre-evolutionary 'Platonist' times. In the light of these wider, more detailed observations, and also in the light of the view that the observed organisms are related by descent there were re-groupings and continue to be re-groupings of these organisms. But none of these actual procedures bear any relation to Carnap's concern with the relation between exact and inexact concepts. The concepts actually used in systematic Zoology are used *in the same way* as the word 'fish' is used in ordinary life. The fact that much more is known about marine organisms, and that much more can be said about them and their history in no way affects *the ways* in which those organisms are named and grouped. Our actual procedures in extending our terminology within the experimental sciences give no support to Carnap's programme of explication. The ways in which we make use of words in connection with the procedures of the experimental sciences do not differ in kind from the ways in which we use them elsewhere. There is no *sui generis* 'language of science'. Yet the whole of Carnap's programme for explication rests on this false assumption about language.

(iii) Tarski's paradigm

Tarski's reasons for the adoption of a formalised linguistic paradigm are to be found in the first section of 'The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages'. Tarski was, like Carnap, concerned with a linguistic issue, and like him deals with it in terms of a linguistic paradigm. Like Carnap, he rejects the natural languages as unsuitable for scientific purposes. He too puts forward a programme of the clarificatory sort. Tarski's programme suffers from the defects inherent in all such programmes and in addition from defects of its own, in particular the view that natural languages are unsuitable for scientific purposes because they allow of the Liar paradox. This is all remote from our actual procedures.

(iv) Dummett's paradigm

Dummett, like Popper, groups together the formal and informal programmes of clarification as 'linguistic Philosophy'. In his view, Frege brought about a revolution in Philosophy by bringing in a new paradigm, namely, the Theory of Meaning. But this view that there is such a thing as the foundation for all Philosophy and that it is the Theory of Meaning depends upon the adoption of a linguistic paradigm. If there can be no such thing as a self-authenticating appeal to language as paradigm, then there can be no such thing as a linguistic foundation for Philosophy and, incidentally, no revolution in Philosophy of the sort prescribed by Dummett.

4. No good reasons were given for the adoption of natural language as a paradigm

The preoccupation with natural language as a paradigm evolved out of Moore's clarificatory programme. Like all growing and evolving movements it presents a family of resembling cases. Moore put forward a programme of the clarificatory sort in reaction to the prevailing Hegelian extravagances. His standard of clarity, his paradigm, was what he called an appeal to Common Sense. But what he counted as the deliverances of Common Sense was a mixed bag of beliefs, some of them straightforward appeals to paradigm cases, some of them the result of scientific investigation. His paradigm was not a coherently identifiable standard. Moore's insistence on an answer to the question 'What does this mean?', asked of an assertion made by a philosopher, leads easily to the habit of contrasting what philosophers assert with what non-thinkers asset. It leads easily to Ryle's habitual drawing of this contrast. It leads to the view that there has been a Fall but only among thinkers. Non-thinkers are Noble

Savages. Austin offered a Burkean defence of his preoccupation with natural language, its history and intricacy. He contrasted the inherent wisdom of natural language with the superficiality of what can be thought up of an afternoon. This is clearly, an attempt at a Burkean defence of the contrast between what 'theorists' say and what non-thinkers say.

Among the chameleonic moves made by the later Wittgenstein we find the contrast between language games in their intact form and the subtle unnoticed deviations from them which give rise to 'language on holiday'. This too is a way of drawing the distinction between what philosophers say and what non-thinkers say. But no good reasons were given in support of this contrast. It was merely adopted as a paradigm and pursued in considerable detail. Having adopted natural language as a paradigm, Ryle maintained that the formal logician and the practitioner of the informal logic of natural language are engaged in two different tasks which are not in competition with each other. But what are these two allegedly distinct tasks that Ryle talks of? All that we are told is that the formal logician is engaged in weapon drill, while the practitioner of informal logic is engaged in the real struggle. But this gives us no positive idea of what the formal logician is supposed to be doing, of why his weapon drill is called for. This leaves Ryle's position of tolerance between the two paradigms entirely unexplained. There is the same unexplained tolerance in Strawson's account of Logic.

5. Why no good reasons could be given for the adoption of the linguistic paradigms

Our linguistic practices, whether informal or formalised, are a prominent part, yet only a part, of our actual procedures. To appeal to them as a terminus of investigation, as an ultimate court of appeal, is to try to make what are only a part of our procedures into the paradigm for the whole of them. On the other hand, ignoring our linguistic procedures altogether, as Popper tries to do, is to fall into the trap of ignoring a prominent part of our actual procedures while trying to make our actual procedures explicit.

The entire Parmenidean tradition of appeal to Pure Reason was itself a case of the adoption of a linguistic paradigm. But inferences are in the nature of the case secondary to assertions, so that inferences can never occupy a primary place among our actual procedures. Their actual place is a secondary one, relative to the primary place occupied by the institution of making assertions. Since inference cannot be a primary activity it cannot be set up as the primary standard in the Parmenidean fashion. It follows that none of our activities admits of a logical foundation, since a logical foundation would be a particular case of the adoption of Pure Reason as a paradigm. It follows also that no assertions about what there is in the world can be derived from Pure Reason, and that no questions of Ontology can be resolved by Logic.

6. In defence of 'anthropologism' in the logic of enquiry

I am arguing against the linguistic paradigms and in defence of a logic of enquiry. Now one of the standard charges against the adoption of a logic of enquiry which is genetic and evolutionary is that of 'psychologism' or 'anthropologism'. This charge was brought against evolutionary logics by, *inter alia*, Frege, Husserl, and Carnap. Frege and Husserl repudiated the paradigm of their time in these terms. I argue that the charge of 'anthropologism' can be brought only by those who are Platonists, that Platonism is incoherent, and moreover that Platonism is a crypto-linguistic paradigm. For this reason the charge is itself incoherent.

In rejecting the genetic accounts of their predecessors in these terms, Frege and Husserl were rejecting a family of resembling cases. Boole's view of the genetic basis of Logic is quite different from that of Mill, and so are his supporting arguments. Yet both would count as 'anthropologistic' accounts on the grounds that both are explicitly concerned with giving a genetic account of the laws of thought. But sorting out the confusions within the philosophies of mind adopted by Boole and Mill is one thing, rejecting Logic as a humanly based activity quite another.

The shortest defence of the logic of enquiry against the charge of anthropologism is the appeal to *onus probandi*. It is the anti-anthropologisticians who must prove their case, not we who point out the obvious fact that a logic of enquiry is a human enterprise. It is the Platonists who must prove their case. But this appeal to *onus* is made with full confidence that they cannot prove their case. So called anthropologism can be rejected only by those who appeal to some basis for Logic which lies beyond our procedures, that is, only by those who accept this legacy from Plato.

The incoherence of Platonism is well brought out in Godel's attempt to defend it by means of a comparison with the Representative Theory of Perception. The incoherence of the Representative Theory does in fact illustrate that of Platonism.

Now Platonism does not, on the fact of it, look like the adoption of a linguistic paradigm, given the Platonist's thesis that there are, without fail, extra-linguistic reference whenever there is meaningful utterance. It is nevertheless a crypto-linguistic paradigm. The Platonist first adopts a view about how language works and then draws his characteristic conclusions. But his view about the way in which language works cannot in the nature of the case be established *any* procedures. That is what is wrong with it.

7. The homeostatic account of our consistency-conserving procedures

The point of a logic of enquiry is to make explicit our actual procedures of investigation, our actual transactions with the world. And so, in the important case of our striving for consistency, it is our consistency-conserving procedures that are to be made explicit. Why do we strive for consistency? We do so on account of the central place occupied by the institution of assertion among our actual procedures. Since assertion has this fundamental place then so does consistency among our various assertions, since the appearance of an inconsistency between them merely cancels out our efforts to make assertions. So it follows from the nature of language, seen as a component of our actual procedures, that we should strive for consistency. Our consistency-conserving procedures are part of an ongoing process of continual readjustment to our surroundings. Whenever those surroundings force us into making contradictory assertions we readjust our procedures. Like all successful organisms, we react homeostatically. This is the place of consistency among our actual procedures. The striving for consistency is a powerful evolutionary drive. Philosophy is a part of this overall drive towards homeostatic equilibrium.

The Popperian contrast between blueprints and piecemeal engineering applies here. The blueprint approach to the issue of consistency, as in Hilbert's axiomatic approach, is entirely out of touch with our actual procedures. It is millenial. Any sound logic of enquiry must involve an evolutionary epistemology, must embrace anthropologism.

It is clear that the problem of consistency is the problem of continually re-adjusting our language, conceived of as a part of our actual procedures, to the challenges continually presented by the world. But it is our actual procedures, not language alone, which are the ultimate court of appeal. This can be seen in the case of our actual procedures of negating and denying, without which the entire issue of consistency could not even be raised. The activity of denying, negating, must be a secondary activity essentially dependent upon the primary activity of making assertions. Consistency is not a positive property of these procedures. The word 'consistent', in spite of its positive look, does negative work. It merely indicates an absence, the absence of the positive item which is a contradiction; and a contradiction clearly involves the activity of negating. In describing the activity, the procedure, of negating, we have reached a terminus of investigation. It cannot in the nature of the case be 'derived' or 'justified' or 'clarified'. All that can be done about it is to describe it in a manner which is free of inherited incoherences. Negating is one of our procedures. It is a way of rejecting, a linguistic way of rejecting. It falls within the area of our ways of rejecting things. That is its actual place among our procedures.

8. Why the paradoxes are of no importance

I am giving a deflationary account of the paradoxes. The overwhelming majority of people have lived, and continue to live, by means of world views which incorporation inconsistencies. Yet these widespread and substantial inconsistencies bear no relation to the paradoxes. By contrast with these substantive inconsistencies the paradoxes have never had any profound significance, and an investigation of them misses entire the important aspects of the struggle for consistency. The paradoxes have stayed at the level of artificial games, which is after all what they are. No one would dream of playing the Liar's game except as a game. The various artificial contradiction-generating games played by, *inter alia,* Russell, Grelling, Carnap, Berry, Burali-Forti, Richard, and the numerous Liars, stand in stark contrast with the inconsistencies which are incorporated into the world views in accordance with which people have tried to live. The game played by Grelling happens to illustrate perfectly those played by Russell and the Liars. But not all of these contradiction-generating games are the same, nor is there any particular reason why they should be. These artificial games never were a threat to the foundations of reasoning, as Russell held, and the view that they have such importance arises out of the adoption of an incoherent paradigm. It is a striking fact that in investigating our actual consistency-conserving procedures we do not touch on the famous paradoxes at all. In turns out that they are rule-breaking trivialities and that the difficulties associated with them are internal to adopted paradigms.

Since the paradoxes are rule-breaking procedures, it is of no importance whether a given rule-breaking game is played within a mathematical context or not. Russell's paradox is the same game in whatever context it is played. So the real significance of the expression 'the paradoxes of set theory' is to refer to these games as and when they are played within the context of set theory. But they in no way inhere within set theory. There never was any need to play them within the context of set theory and so no need to expend the considerable ingenuity that was expended upon removing them therefrom. This misplaced expenditure of ingenuity arose out of the adoption of misguided paradigms.

It is clear that an overall ban on self-reference, for instance, would be a ban on vast areas of our culture. This is an absurd price to pay for the removal of a gratuitously introduced blemish. The preoccupation with self-reference arose, in any case, out of a false theory about the causes of the contradictions.

When Peano divided the paradoxes into those which pertain to language and those which do not, he did so in terms of an adopted paradigm. But this division of the paradoxes is drawn in terms of the linguistic context in which they occur, a context which is irrelevant to the sort of rule-breaking that playing them

involves. It is the rule that is transgressed that is important here, not the context in which it is transgressed. This division of the paradoxes on the basis of the context in which they occur leads to the separation of like cases and the grouping together of unlike cases, which in its turn perpetuates misunderstanding of the nature of these paradoxes and their significance.

9. The homeostatic guarantee that the world is consistent

Could we discover, one fine day, that the world just is inconsistent? Or rather, could we discover that the world is such as to make our procedures, once and for all, inconsistent? The answer to this question must be a piecemeal engineering answer, not a milleniae answer. Whenever we do find ourselves involved in inconsistencies, as when we find ourselves having to say that there is only one God although three Persons are mentioned in the Scriptures,, as when we find ourselves having to say that every fundamental process displays both wave and particle properties, we react homeostatically. Theologians reacted homeostatically with the doctrine of the Trinity. Bohr, and the majority of quantum physicists, with the doctrine of Complementarity. Both were intra-linguistic readjustments aimed at the restoration of equilibrium. The craving for a security greater than this is, once more, a legacy from the Greek search for certainty. There simply is no greater security than this, and to crave for an unattainable standard is a perversion of the intellect. The homeostatic guarantee that the world is consistent is the strongest guarantee that there is.

10. The homeostatic account of our consistency-conserving procedures in Mathematics

The answer to the question: 'Could we, one fine day, discover that Mathematics is inconsistent?' has to be on the same lines as the answer to the questin: 'Could we, one fine day, discover that our procedures in dealing with the world are inconsistent?' The answer to both of these questions must be 'No' and for the same sort of reasons. In both cases there is an ongoing evolutionary process of adaptation to our surroundings, an evolution of new consistency-conserving devices in response to new challenges. Mathematics is just a particular case of the overall activity of transactions with the world, and the consistency of Mathematics is conserved in the same way as the consistency of our procedures in general. To ask for an overall, millenial proof that Mathematics is consistent is to ask for something which, in the nature of the case, can never be given. The craving for some final guarantee of consistency once and for all was a part of the Greek legacy of the search for certainty which infected so much of Western thought. The striving for consistency is a matter of piecemeal engineering, not of milleniae blueprints.

11. The irrelevance of the axiomatic paradigm to the homeostatic account of our consistency-conserving procedures

The logic of enquiry, as conceived of and defended here, involves taking up one attitude towards the problem of consistency, the axiomatic paradigm an altogether different one.

The adoption of the axiomatic paradigm, as in Hilbert, gives rise to the search for consistency proofs. But every consistency proof is relative to methods of proof which are themselves adopted without proof. So the axiomatic paradigm can only provide relative consistency at most, as Hilbert recognised. It was for this reason that, in spite of his official adoption of the axiomatic method as a universal paradigm, he made an appeal which fell outside of this paradigm, to the 'known' security of finite states of affairs, by contrast with the alleged insecurity of infinitistic methods. He offered no proof or supporting argument for this appeal, but simply asserted that finitary states of affairs may be relied upon to be consistent in a way that infinitistic appeals cannot. So even here the axiomatic method is not, in actual practice, the ultimate court of appeal. The ultimate court of appeal, even for Hilbert, is the consistency of our transactions with finite states of affairs, which were in any case, for him, the only actual states of affairs that there are. So the axiomatic method cannot in the nature of the case be self-authenticating. It follows that it cannot in practice be adopted as an ultimate paradigm, as Hilbert's own treatment shows. The axiomatic paradigm is constitutionally inadequate for dealing with the problem of consistency; and this inadequacy is quite distinct from any internal inadequacies, with their purely internal significance. By contrast with the inadequacy of the axiomatic paradigm, the logic of enquiry subsumes and accounts for the actual consistency-conserving devices of Mathematics.

12. The distinction between genuine and spurious homeostatic manouvres

Not all moves towards equilibrium, not all homeostatic manouvres, are legitimate moves. Which are the acceptable moves, which not? The acceptable moves are those for which there are identifiable, actual, procedures; all others are to be rejected. I give some examples of moves towards equilibrium which are, for this reason, to be rejected. These spurious homeostatic manouvres are widespread and are a prominent feature of people's ways of life. They are incoherent attempts to arrive at equilibrium and to conserve consistency.

13. The homeostatic account of 'two realm' cosmologies of Appearance and Reality

'Two realm' cosmologies of Appearance and Reality are widespread. They occur in Indian philosophies, Buddhism, the Presocratics, and in modern Physics. Millions of people have professed to live by them and continue to do so. By contrast with the paradoxes they are attempts, albeit incoherent attempts, to arrive at a substantive consistency. They are not esoteric or erudite, and above all they are not games. The external question of why so many people of different persuasions have tried to make use of them in the struggle to achieve a consistent view of the world can be properly raised only after these attempts have been shown to be incoherent. The distinction between what is the case and what seems to be the case is a consistency-conserving distinction; that is its sole function. It is not, and cannot be made into, a referring distinction. The distinction between 'is' and 'seems' cannot be made to work in the way called for in these cosmologies. In our actual procedures we apply this distinction when and only when all the referring that there is to be done has been done; it is not, in our actual procedures, a referential distinction at all. The work done by it is that of conserving consistency by a characteristically homeostatic move.

14. The homeostatic account of instrumentalism

The instrumentalist wishes to retain at all costs some cherished view, and does so by arbitrary fiat, by declaring the rival view to be merely a convenient instrument. In this way, by means of this move, he seeks to make his own preferred view impregnable.

The instrumentalist is trying to conserve a world view, a preferred paradigm, a 'research programme'. Yet his way of doing so cannot be accepted just because it is *ad hoc*, just because it is laid down by arbitrary fiat. But what is the fundamental reason here for rejecting his *ad hoc* move? What is the burden of saying that it is *ad hoc?* The burden of saying that it is *ad hoc*, arbitrary, is that is does not reflect any of our actual procedures. His move is made without the backing of actual procedures. He simply has no procedures, he merely makes a declaration by fiat. So the objection is in terms of the appeal to our actual procedures.

15. The homeostatic account of Theology

Theology is a group of attempts to conserve traditional views of the world in the face of perceived inconsistencies between those views and other assertions. It is an attempt, albeit an incoherent attempt, to restore equilibrium. It is a homeostatic manouvre. The inconsistency involved in these attempts is what I call the paradox of participation, which consists essentially in trying to accept two incompatible paradigms. One of these is the acceptance of an account of the world which was not established by investigation while at the same time trying to conserve it by the methods of investigation. If we adopt investigation of the world as a paradigm then we should adopt it fully, and this involves discarding those accounts which are not arrived at by investigation. Any attempt to conserve both of these paradigms is inconsistent, and Theology is an elaborate indulgence in this inconsistency.

16. The homeostatic account of the Kierkegaardian manouvre

This is a particular case of the account of Theology as a homeostatic manouvre. The Tertullian-Kierkegaardian manouvre consists in grasping the nettle of contradiction and absurdity. *Credo quia absurdum.* Kierkegaard actively wanted to incorporate contradictions and absurdities into his account of the world in order to conserve the assertions of Christianity. This manouvre is one among the many illegitimate devices for securing the impregnability of certain cherished assertions and is clearly akin to the manouvres of instrumentalism. What Kierkegaard was trying to do was to conserve certain assertions which are central to Christianity. But the need to do so arose only because there was already a recognised inconsistency between these assertions and other standard assertions about the world. In the absence of a perceived inconsistency of this sort Kierkegaard's view could not arise. So in fact it arises out of the concern with consistency. It is an attempt, albeit an incoherent attempt, to conserve the consistency of what he wants to assert about the world even at the cost of embracing *some* contradictions and absurdities. It is not enough merely to point out that he cannot consistently to this since this is merely objecting to him in terms of a paradigm which is foreign to his own. But since he has explicitly adopted a paradigm which involves the active acceptance of contradictions we who reject that paradigm can only continue the discussion from an external point of view. From that external point of view, we can describe and account for his manouvre. Kierkegaard is trying to preserve certain assertions by rendering them absolutely immune, in the tradition of the Greek search for certainty. But, it is an important feature of his conservative manouvre that he does not just embrace any contradiction whatsoever. He

talks about chairs and tables in the same way as anyone else. The contradictions which he embraces are not of this quotidian sort. They are special assertions which pay a special role in his way of life. And it is this special function which he seeks to preserve even at the cost of adopting contradictions. He is in fact making explicit what is implicit in the range of so called religious world views. The inconsistencies are, in general, not recognised and so are not explicitly embraced. Nevertheless these inconsistent accounts of the world and the inconsistent modes of life associated with them, persist for thousands of years. They have some homeostatic use. But that is another story. The task of Philosophy is to get clear of these inconsistencies, and this can be achieved only by making explicit our actual procedures.

BOOK REVIEW

AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

By

E.A. RUCH and K.C. ANYANWU

PUBLISHER: CATHOLIC AGENCY - ROME, 1981

412 pp.

In his forward to the book, one of the authors, Professor E.A. Ruch states as follows: "only an African can properly understand the African world-view and philosophy of life. Only a sympathetic outsider can communicate to other outsiders a certain insight into this world-view in a language which is intelligible to other non-Africans" (p.5). The book which is before us for review is the outcome of an attempt at realizing the above statement. It is a testimony to openness to ideas and an acceptance that philosophy is always in search of truth and never regards any answers as final but leaves its present conclusions open to criticism and review. That the two authors agreed to present their different stands on African philosophy side by side, even when they contradict each other, shows an intellectual maturity deserving commendation. Professor Ruch a European evidently is the "outsider" while Dr. Anyanwu an African is the "insider" in this exercise.

I hasten to say that it does not necessarily hold that the "outsider" must be a non-African and an African the "outsider". By this I mean that what is central is "understanding a system" in an objective philosophical manner. Fr. Placid Tempels in his work *Bantu Philosophy* is a good example of an "outsider" who both understands and "communicates his convictions, his beliefs and his enthusiasm to those who do not share them" (p.5). The contribution of this book under review to the building up of African Philosophy, is not so much who of the two authors is an "outsider" or "insider". It is precisely how much each is judged to understand what African Philosophy means.

The book is divided into an introduction; four main parts and a bibliography. At the conclusion of each part by the major author, Prof. Ruch, Dr. Anyanwu contribute a lengthy essay which more or less agrees or disagrees with the explanations of the major author.

Part I	:	The Nature of the Philosophical Endeavour. chs. 1-3. by Ruch.
Essay I	:	The African World-View and Theory of Knowledge by Anyanwu.
Part II	:	Myth in Africa. chs. 4-7. by Ruch.
Essay 2	:	African Religious Experience by Anyanwu.

Part III : Philosophy About Africa. chs. 8-11 by Ruch.
Essay 3 : Artistic and Aesthetic Experience by Anyanwu.
Part IV : Ideology for Africa. chs. 12-15 by Ruch.
Essay 4 : African Political Doctrine by Anyanwu.

A most important section of the book is the Introductory article "Is There an African Philosphy?" (pp.11-24) by Prof. Ruch. A slightly altered version of it had been published in *Second Order* July 1974 (pp.3-19) and had attracted serious criticism by E.L. Mendosa in the January 1976 issue of the same Journal. In the article as it appears in the book the author supports his stand that there is nothing like African Philosophy by evoking the criticism of African Philosophy by an African "insider" Prof. Paulin Houtendji "who wants at all costs to destroy theoretically this pervading myth" (p.14), contending that Philosophy in the strict sense of the word must be a scientific theoretical and individual discipline, just like algebra, physics or linguistics, and can therefore not be replaced by popular beliefs, traditional practices and a collective and unconscious behaviour (p.12). I am yet to be convinced that the contemporary protagonists of African Philosophy claim that "popular beliefs, traditional practices and a collective and unconscious behaviour" qualify as philosophy.

It is lamentable that the understanding of Philosophy is restricted to a scientific theoretical discipline like algebra or physics by some armchair speculators of Western universities. Happily such European authors like Soren Kierkegaard, Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers have vehemently criticized such conception of philosophy. Karl Jaspers for example in his *Way to Wisdom*, criticises what he calls systematic philosophy, which always reckons with the most advanced scientific findings of its time. "But essentially philosophy springs from a different source. It emerges before any science, wherever men achieve awareness... In philosophy men generally assume that they are competent to form an opinion without preliminary study. Our own humanity, our own destiny our own experience strikes us as a sufficient basis for philosophical opinion" (5,8,9). That there should be a doubt as to the existence of African Philosophy alongside Asian, Western or European Philosphies is an unconscious claim of superiority or inferiority depending on who doubts it. It is saying that European philosophy provides the measure and valid pradigm for philosophy; if what is called African philosophy does not conform to this paradigm, then it is not philosophy but myth or at best an anthropology.

After establishing that the African is mythical and the European rational, Ruch struck a compromise which he called "a third alternative", namely to introduce reason into the myth. He attempts, in the pages that follow, "to determine in what way mythical consciousness, existential and cultural reflection, and politico-social ideology, can be considered genuinely

philosophical" (p.24).

I now turn to Dr. Anyanwu's Essay I - "The African World-View and Theory of Knowledge". He exhibits a profound knowledge of the meaning of Philosophy, underscoring the relative and cultural aspect of philosophy which Prof. Ruch failed to note. Dr. Anyanwu contends that "by subordinating African cultural facts to the assumptions, concepts, theories, and world-view suggested by Western culture and developed by Western thinkers, confusion ensues" (p.78). He bluntly disagrees with Ruch's idea of universal, scientific or theoretical philosophy and argues that there is no neutral world philosophy applicable to all cultures at all times.

Dr. Anyanwu's position is nothing emotional or paternalistic because the celebrated German Philosopher C.W. Hegel had earlier attested to the cultural and relative dimension of Philosophy. "But men do not at certain epochs merely philosophize in general. For there is a definite philosophy which arises among a people and the definite character which permeates all the other historical sides of the Spirit of the people... The particular form of philosophy is thus contemporaneous with a particular constitution of the people among whom it makes its appearance, with their institutions and forms of government, their morality, their social life and their capabilities". (Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1:53).

What follows in Parts II, III, IV can be easily understood in the background of the two author's positions on African Philosophy. Whether it is Myth in Africa (p.101) or Origin and Destiny; the Sacred and the Profane (p.120) or The Dynamics of life forces (p.145) or African Identity (p.180) or Negritude or African Salvation Philosophy, (p.223) or Ideology for Africa (p.283) that Prof. Ruch discusses, his guiding principle is his new found "third alternative" namely to introduce reason into myth and to "determine in what way mythical consciousness, existential and cultural reflection, and politico-social ideology, can be considered genuinely philosophical" (p.24).

On the other hand, Dr. Anyanwu in his Essay 2 - "African Religious Experience (p.161); Essay 3 - "Artistic & Aesthetic Experience" (p.270) and Essay 4 - "African Political Doctrine" (p.369) is saying that there is no need for Ruch's "third alternative"; that the African is as reasonable as the European and that the European is as mythical as the African; that confusion is created by Ruch's and his kinds' imposition of assumptions, concepts, theories and world-view suggested by western culture and developed by Western thinkers on African cultural facts.

I will select Part II dealing with "Myth in Africa" to elucidate what I have just said. In this section Prof. Ruch gives myth a rather confusing connotation. Whereas the Western scholars ordinarily contrast myth with realty, Ruch

credits the mythical man with "knowing the scientific or technical sources of fertility or of technical efficiency. He knows how and when to plant his seeds ... he knows how to make efficient tool ... but he will attribute the efficacy of his technical work to the ritual properly performed (p.109). He further calls it the *magical efficiency of a symbolic* act. This is nothing but a betrayal of ignorance of the Power of Nommo (word) in African Philosophy. "Nommo, the life force, is a unity of spiritual-physical fluidity, giving life to evertything, penetrating, causing everything", says Janheinz Jahn (Muntu p.124). Alex Kagame further explains that myth in the African context "rests upon a kind of metaphysics which differs substantially from that of Western Philosophy (Bantu Philosophy p.35). One wonders whether Prof. Ruch could really communicate to other outsiders a certain insight into the African world view by calling the African mythical and magical instead of rational and philosophic.

In a review like this where concession to brevity is imperative, one cannot dwell on every chapter of a book even in a cursory many. There are interesting materials on chapters 8-12 which raise issues. Dr. Anyanwu has argued that the failure to understand the African belief systems is as a result of efforts at adapting them to those of Christianity and Islam. However Dr. Anyanwu in defence of his culture has made a number of gratuitous statements about religion. "Belief" in the Bible as the inspired word of God and in the Church as the solo knower of that reality are regrettable dogmatisms which destroy what religion should be: the manifestation of the divine qualities in man" (p.161). I think that there is an intrusion here into the area of revealed religion which is not the subject matter of Philosophy.

The two authors should be commended for the amount of work put into writing this book. They have presented their own personal idea of African Philosophy to the reading public. It is left with the individual reader to assess the success of each author. I must say however that there is a lot to learn from them.

DR. INNOCENT ONYEWUENYI

BOOK REVIEW

TITLE: The Ways of Knowing and Thinking
AUTHOR: Professor E. A. Ruch.
PUBLISHER: National University of Lesotho,
Roma, Lesotho, 1977.
376 pp.

It is difficult to find a book in philosophy that offers a student and a teacher of philosophy a general view of almost all the theories of epistemology on account of the broadness of the subject-matter. Professor E.A. Ruch has attempted to overcome this difficulty by offering in a single book almost all the different trends of epistemological theories in philosophy.

In his forward to the book, the author states as follows: "there is no shortage of works proposing some theory or other on knowledge. If we are to justify the production of yet another work on the subject, it can only be on the ground that we have attempted to approach the topic with a mind more open not only to the good elements which one can find in almost any theory, but also on a broader range of manifestations of mental activities" (p.5). In pursuing what he calls an "ecumenical approach" to "the ways of knowing and thinking" (p.5), the author acknowledges the existence of diverse theories of knowledge, proceeds to show their methods and doctrines; and then appraises them in order to show their merits and demerits.

The book is divided into an introduction, eight main parts, bibliography and index. *Introduction:* It has five sub-headings in which the author examines the nature, the possibility cases against scepticism, phenomenalism, nominalism, formalism and analytic philosophy.

Part I: General Phenomenological Description of Consciousness

There are five chapters under this general heading which examine the facts of consciousness from the psychological, logical and epistemological view-points in different theories of knowledge.

Part II: Typological Analysis of Knowing Thinking and Believing

This part which has four chapters with thirteen sub-headings deals with the analysis of thinking, knowing and believing; the kinds of knowledge they offer and the possible justifications of such knowledge.

Part III: Objective Knowledge and Extra-Mental Reality

This has five chapters and eleven sub-headings. Here the author examines different theories about sensation and the criteria of objective knowledge.

Part IV: Conceptual Knowledge and the Problem of the Universals

The four chapters and ten sub-headings under this general heading examine the nature of abstract and conceptual knowledge as well as the different philosophical interpretations of such knowledge, especially the doctrines of Plato, Aquinas and William of Occam.

Part V: Judgements and the Nature of Truth

This is divided into four chapters with seventeen sub-headings. The author examines critically the different philosophical theories of judgement, the criteria of truth and the nature of error.

Part VI: Inferential Knowledge and Logical Reasoning

This part is divided into four chapters with nine sub-headings. The author shows the use of inferential knowledge in everyday life, offers an analysis of the different methods of acquiring knowledge, and examines the validity and limitation of each method.

Part VII: Knowledge and Language

This has three chapters with nine sub-headings. The author shows how the traditional epistemological problem, the problem of how one knows what one claims to know, has been transformed into a problem of the proper use of language. The author critically examines the assumptions and doctrines of language philosophers, the views of logical positivists, the structure and function of language and points out the weakness inherent in the functional analysis of language.

Part VIII: Creative Thought and Action

Divided into three chapters with nine sub-headings, this part examines different theories about the sources and processes of creative thinking especially in the realm of art, science and technology. The author points out the limits of and the obstacles against creaivity, and these are largely due to what the authors refers to as "the mystery of evil", "the mystery of freedom" and "the mystery of death" ((pp.348-349). He adds that "the awareness of his own limitatins is recent lesson which man has learned from the disasters of two World Wars, the population explosion, the risks of nuclear holocausts, the problems of pollution and the oil crisis" (p.348).

Bibliography

Each of the eight parts into which the book is divided has well-documented references and rich bibliographies while the indexes include those of names and main topics.

Since "the present work remains, however, at the level of general and theoretical consideration" (p.5) according to the author, one would not find detailed accounts of all epistemological theories treated in the book or indepth examinations of their merits and demerits. But they would offer one the opportunity and incentive to pursue such theories elsewhere at a greater depth. And because of the general nature of the work, the book does not show adequately how the basic questions of philosophy (existence, knowledge, truth, goods, evil, value, beauty, etc.) are defined and redefined in accordance with the changing perspectives of human experience. This historical understanding would have given the book a better continuity and facilitated its comprehension. The book should have touched on the relevance of epistemology in human life so that one can better understand that different theories of knowledge stem from the social conditions of man and serve his vital needs. Furthermore, it would have been much easier to follow the trends of epistemological doctrines treated in the book if the author had started from the common-sense or everyday knowledge to the most abstract and reflective form of knowledge.

A philosopher must have a standpoint for his philosophizing activity, and the author seems to be sympathetic with the scholastic view of knowledge. What seems to be needed in this case is to make more explicit the basic assumptions of this philosophical standpoint (the schoolastic philosophy) and to appraise its doctrines and conclusions more critically. Aristotle's theory of knowledge should have been more developed because it was a challenge to Plato's realism (idealism) and without Plato, Aristotle's theory is inadequate. The ideas of Marx and Hegel should also have been much more developed while Nietzsche's ideas should not have been neglected at all. Due to the importance of science in our cultural lives, the ways of thinking and knowing in science should have deserved a special treatment.

However, in view of the broadness of the topic it is obvious that the author could not have successfully approached the diverse theories and doctrines of epistemology without an indepth understanding of the history of philosophy epistemology and logic. In this concise book, Professor Ruch has tried to do justice to the different epistemological theories and problems he discussed without sacrificing clarity.

The conclusion of the book brings out the moral dimension of knowledge and of creativity. "Man is neither angel nor beast", the author quoted Pascal.

"and the trouble is that he who wants to play the angel ends up by playing the beast" (p.351). This remark emphasizes the need for man to understand himself, his nature, his freedom and responsibility within his limitation. "Man is not endowed with a free and creative reason so that he may merely accept the absurdity of his existence as a necessary evil, but in order to give sense and movement to his existence" (p.351).

This book is quite instructive to the non-students of philosophy as well as to the students and teachers of philosophy. The former would find in the book the attempt made by philosophers to show how and if we know anything with certainty, the criteria of knowledge, the nature of beliefs, the consequences of knowledge and the extent to which man knows what he claims to know. For the latter, this book is almost an encyclopaedia of epistemology. It does not only provide insights into the problems of epistemology but also constitutes a handy reference to almost all theories and doctrines of epistemology.

Dr. K. C. Anyanwu