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TABLE OF CONTENTS

AFRICAN THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (EPISTEMOLOGY)

P. K. Roy

Two different approaches have been suggested and used for the study of African epistemology. One uses Western epistemological framework and the other one tries to discover an African epistemological framework to do African epistemology e.g. thinkers (academic philosophers) like Benjamin E. Oguah accept Western notion of 'experience' and 'reason' and take them as sources of knowledge and try to discover how these sources (can) do give knowledge about African reality. The other group of thinkers oppose this approach on the basis of a belief that African reality does not submit itself to the type of experience and reason accepted by the Western philosophers as a source of knowledge. They propose that there is a need to discover the type of experience an African uses to collect his data about reality and the type of reason he uses to subsume that data under rational concepts, laws, principles and theories, J.C. Onyewuenyi, and K.C. Anyanwu fall in the latter group. The purpose of this paper is to study critically those two different approaches to arrive at some more constructive conclusions.

Benjamin E. Oguah just starts with the bifurication of rationalism and empiricism and tries to prove that Fanti philosophy takes side with rationalism.[1] The reason he offers to prove that Fanti philosophy is rationalistic is given in the form of a simple statement, 'Fanti believes in innate ideas', and some explanatory statements to prove that simple statement. Oguah should have realized that 'reason' must include rationalistic explanation for what is being asserted. In other words he should have used argumentative approach to prove his point. If any argumentative approach is used by the Fanti to prove the statement that there are innate ideas, only then we can say that the Fanti are rationalistic in cartesian sense otherwise he is making a definitional and categorical mistake i.e. he is assigning something with a label that it is not. Using I.E. Wiredu's distinction between 'traditional thought' and 'philosophy[2] we may even question whether the Fanti traditional thought can be taken as philosophy. Wiredu shows his philosophical short-sightedness with reference to such classifications especially when he calls ancient Indian philosophy only literate and not logico - scientific like the philosophies of the West, especially of the Logical positivists. This problem needs to be discussed in a separate paper.

J. C. Onyewuenyi defines African concept of knowledge (wisdom) as "how deeply he understands the nature of forces and their interaction[3]" and he quotes P. Temple, "True wisdom lies in ontological knowledge; it is the intelligence of forces, of their hierarchy, their cohesion and their interaction"[4] "Later he suggests a distinction should be drawn between two levels of human intelligence.

transcendental knowledge of reality (a la Kant)

Intelligence can be either practical or habitual; practical intelligence is cleverness, slyness in dealing with the contingent aspects of forces. Habitual intelligence is an active knowledge of the nature of forces and their relationship" [5]

From an epistemological point of view there are serious difficulties in understanding what Onyewuenyi is attempting to say in the preceeding paragraph. Not only that he needs to give clear and explanatory meanings to the fundamental terms (or concepts) like 'intelligence of forces', 'practical intelligence', 'habitual intelligence', he is also required to show how these terms (concepts) are related to whatever they are about (forces etc.); and what type of epistemological statements these terms or concepts allow us to make about reality. He also needs to explain how these terms or concepts are related to each other to form a theory of knowledge.

K. C. Anyanwu attempts to go into much deeper philosophical analysis (although it remains a simple elaboration because it lacks philosophical subtlety, analysis, critique etc.) In his endeavour to discover African theory of knowledge, he claims that one of the fundamental philosophical question is this. How do the Africans know what they claim to know? He also assumes "If the African people have beliefs and knowledge about reality, these must be the products of human experience. The theories of such beliefs and knowledge must be the product of logical reflection"[6] Therefore he suggests "we must commence the study of African philosophy by examining the meaning of experience, the factors of experience and the African culture approach to such factors"[7]

Anyanwu believes that 'experience' to an African is "a procedure by which human beings become immediately and directly acquainted with the object of knowledge; that which is experienced is given to the individual who experiences"[8] The terminology used here to define 'experience' needs philosophical clarification. He needs to make a distinction between the meaning of an object of knowledge', and 'an object of experience', unless he is using 'knowledge' as equivalent to 'experience', in most of the philosophical contexts, 'knowledge' and 'experience' are not taken as equivalent terms. He also needs to clarify what he means by 'that which is experienced'. Does this expression refer to a real object i.e. an object outside in the world or to a mental object or sense-datum? It is essential to make this distinction here because the real object (in the world) is objective where as a mental object or image is subjective. However Anyanwu seems to suggest that immediate and direct experience is personal, since it is personal, it can only be known through personal experience "..... to know the truth about personal experience, a person must put himself in the context of that experience to feel, live with and grasp its relation"[9] Again Anyanwu fails to notice something here that, it is true that all the experiences of a person in relation to the world in one sense are personal, that these are the experiences of a person

who experiences them, hence subjective. However, many personal experiences can be objective in the sense that they also have a reference point in the world and thus can also be objectively communicated. As one may put it, all personal experiences are not strictly subjective and all scientific experiences are not strictly objective.

In the latter part of the same chapter Anyanwu does not stick to his previous definition of experience. Experience, though is still taken as personal experience, but it has become very comprehensive in scope. "Personal experience refers to totality of man and his faculties. Such experience does not address itself to reason alone, imagination alone, feeling and intuition alone, but to the totality of a person' faculty"[10] This notion of personal experience is very comprehensive (broad). It is broad because 'experience' here is used as a category word and it includes all types of experiences generating from different sources of knowledge i.e. sensation, perception, imagination, intuition, reason etc. Accepting of Anyanwu's this notion of 'experienc' as one of the fundamental concepts, can permit us to make epistemological claims of the following (order or) form:

1. I perceive x
2. I sense x
3. I intuite x
4. I feel x
5 I imagine x and so on.

Refering to their source of knowledge all above listed claims are of different types and permit different types of verification. What is common among all these claims is not the claim but the type (nature) of an espistemological claim is determined by the source of knowledge used by the subject to make that epistemological claim. Thus from an epistemological point of view it is essential to categorize experience with reference to the source of knowledge even when the subject (the experiencer) and the object (that is being experienced) remain the same. If we accept this conclusion, then the type of experience or of epistemological knowledge is determined with reference to the source of knowledge and not with reference to either an experiencer (African or non-African) or to the reality (African or non-African).

The preceeding discussion raises a further question if all the experiences of a person are necessarily analysable into different categories according to their sources of knowledge then can it still be possible that these experiences without refering to the (unity of) subject or to the (unity of) object be wholistic? Any philosopher who holds that epistemological knowledge is wholistic has to explain how different types of experiences and how different types of epistemological statements stand in relation to each other and form a whole. There has been a general trend, of course not without exceptions, in philosophy that if a philosophical system or

a philosopher accepts one type of statements as epistemological statements then he would reject all other types of statements as non-epistemological e.g. the logical positivists L. Wittgenstein in his *Tracratus Logico-Philosophicus accepts* only those propositions that represent facts as epistemological statements and excludes all other types (believing, imagining, feeling etc) as non-epistemological. However Wittgenstein in his latter work *Philosophical Investigations* changes his stand, "There are various forms of language. The language is used not just for one purpose, the stating of facts - on the contrary the forms and uses of langauge are inexhaustibly flexible and various"[11] Wittgenstein, however, here is supporting the idea that in addition to factual statements (propositions) there can be many other types of statements (propositions) epistemological or otherwise but he does not imply that they need to stand in some sort of wholistic relation[12]. Some philosophers even have stated that if a statement is derived from more than one source of knowledge it would be invalid e.g. when one term of the statement denotes something experienced and the other refers to something not experienced at all, in other words where one thing is directly perceived or perceivable through the senses and the other thing is not directly perceived or perceivable through the sense e.g. 'There is dust on the space' is an erroneous or invalid statement because the dust is perceivable through the senses while space is not[13]. Let us next look at how according to Anyanwu, an African looks at the factors involved in experience. He holds that the Western dualism in experience i.e. the subject and the object in experience are two separate and independent realities, is not found in African culturebecause to an African "Man is a man by virtue of the way he is situated in the world, the way he is the centre of the world, outside the world or on the periphery of the world. He is man, by the way he acts, reacts and is acted upon by events, that is the way he is interwoven into the multiplicity of events[14]" Anyanwu believes that it is the western's use of analytical approach to the study of self (man) that leads to the duality of the self and the world. This duality further leads to contradictions. His argument is as follows: "In every experience there are the individuals who experience and something experienced. This is called a duality. The subject who experiences something is the Ego and the object experienced is the world. So we have a duality in every form of experience. What does this duality imply? The Ego lives in the world but not like sand and stone. As long as Ego or self or subject lives in the world, it is a part of the world. So the self is dependent on the world and as an individual different from other individuals in the world. Man is part of the world yet a part of another world. But, he cannot be a part of the world and yet of another world? How can man be dependent on the world and still be independent of it

The argument is very expensive. However to test the validity of the argument, it can be reformulated as follows:

P1 The subject who experiences something is the Ego and the object experienced is the world. So we have duality in every form of experience (self and world are independent of each other).

P2 As long as self lives in the world, it is a part of the world.

P3 If self is a part of the world it is dependent on the world.

Conclusion: Self is both dependent and independent of the world (P1 – P3).

Although the argument looks valid but it is not. The invalidity of the argument, becomes obvious if we notice that 'world' is used in a different sence in P1, P2 and P3. In P1 'world' means 'an object of experience' and in P2 and P3 'world' is used in a broader sense that it included both objects of experience and the self that experiences. However what Anyanwu is trying to say here can be reformulated in simpler words. If we take world as consisting of material objects, and self as something that only experiences objects and itself not empirical then we get duality of the self (non-empirical) and the world (empirical). Take for example what Wittgenstein does in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus: World is a factuality*, a totality of facts. So anything like God, self values etc, that is not factual is mystical. Wittgenstein's stand is that we do not experience self as that is what experiences. Wittgenstein compares it to the case of the eye and the visual field. He says,..... "but realy you do not see the eye and nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye." Anyanwu here probably would say that first Wittgenstein abstracts, the self from sense-experience. Obviously it leads to daulity. Such a daulity Anyanwu suggests can be avoided only by using synthetic approach (i.e. realistic) to the study of self (He does not use the world 'synthetic'. He calls such an approach 'personal experience'). He describes 'personal experience' as follows: Whatever reality may be, it must have reference to personal experience. "Personal experience refers to the totality of man and his faculties. The world which is centred on the self is personal and alive. Self experience is not separated from experiencing self. The self vivifies or animates the world so that the soul, spirit or mind of the self is also that of the world. The order of the world and the self are identical. What happens to the world, happens to the self. Self order is a metaphysical contagion affecting the world order. The world that has no reference to the person, to self order or that is not self centred has no meaning for the African. So the world has meaning, order and unity by virtue of the self"[17]

Thus according to Anyanwu, man (self) and the world, those are necessary factors in experience, are so much intrinsically involved

that they are hard to be identified and be differentiated from each other. He argues that according to an African, man or self is the centre of the world. Whatever reality may be, it must have reference to personal experience and personal experience refers to the totality of man and his faculties. However one should notice here that to say that reality in order to be experienced must refer to personal experience, does not imply that personal experience does not refer to reality. Each can refer to the other in a different way and still can keep its identity. However this explanation would definitely lead to dualism that Anynwu is trying to refuse. May be such a dualism is inherent in the foreign language that Anyanwu is using to explore African reality.

What type of epistemological framework is required to do African epistemology? - a question of broader scope need to be discussed now. What is an epistemological framework? Some philosophers have used the word 'conceptual framework' instead, and have described such a framework as follows: "The role our conceptual framework plays in obtaining knowledge might be broadly described as follows: we obtain knowledge of the world by means of a set of concepts that are employed to make sense of items which (even if such item be our experience) are 'in the world'. Whether or not an item falls under a concept depends on the feature, of the concept and the item; nothing else. Picking out correct judgment will be 'an issue to be settled solely by the concept and item in question"[18]

From a very general point of view the preceeding notion of a conceptual framework for doing epistemology may be considered as satisfactory but from a specific point of view, conceptual framework within the context of epistemology (that should actually be called epistemological frame-work) should be more elaborated. L. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* is a good example. In this work "The main thrust of the system is in the direction of providing us with an account of logically perfect language, a language in which a sentence means something quite definite and also that is provides logical - pre-suppositions of empirical knowledge (asserting or denying facts). The rules of syntax should provide two types of conditions:

(a) The conditions for sense rather than non-sense in the combination of symbols.
(b) The conditions for uniqueness of meaning or reference i.e. symbols or combination of symbols.

Thus the propositions specify the syntactical features of the system and provides epistemological formalism of stating only. It may also be mentioned here that Wittgenstein in his above mentioned work also specifies the features of a fact that can be represented by a proposition. However the epistemological model that Wittgenstein has constructed in his above-mentioned work is just one instance of constructing an epistemological framework. This is exhibited even in Wittgenstein's latter work *Philosophical Investiga*

tions where he realizes that sentences do not get their meaning essentially in one way, namely through picturing, but there are countless kinds of uses of 'symbols' and 'sentences (*PI 23*). Every language does not essentially have the clear and firm structure of the formular in a logical calculus. There are various forms of language: that the forms of language are arrived through an agreement that has to be consistent with the given form of life *(PI 246,266)*.

Within the context of African Philosophy, some academic philosophers have offered frameworks for doing African philosophy or any branch of it. Unfortunately these frameworks are either too general or too narrow and vague e.g. P.O. Bodunrin says about such a philosophical framework. "When one is putting forward a philosophical thesis for an accepting we expect him to state his case as clearly as possible so that we know we are being invited to accept. We expect him to argue for his case and show us why we must accept the case. He may do this by showing the weakness of rival theories, if any, or by showing how his theory solves the problem(s) that has always worried us, or how to enlarge an understanding of something else we already know. We expect him to let us have a say: Let us, that is, ask and raise questions about his thesis". Obviously this framework is so general that it is framework for doing reseach in all areas of studies; humanities, social sciences, sciences, just name it. A similar criticism applies to what Henri Maurier says about framework for doing African philosophy in his article "Do we have an African philosophy".

K.C. Anyanwu takes the notion of epistemological framework in quite a broad sense. He proposes that there is a need to discover the type of experience an African uses to collect his data about reality and the type of reason he uses to subsume the data under rational concepts, laws, principles and theories"[22]. Anyanwu here seems to be equating an epistemological framework with a scientific framework, unless he is using the notions like 'rational concepts' 'laws' 'principles' 'theories' etc. both in a scientific and non-scientific sense. To assume that an African man, infact any man, can possibly be using in philosophizing, the proceedure or the framework described or proposed by Anyanwu seems unbelievable. Should not Anyanwu or any other philosopher who shares his enthusiasm to devise such epistemological framework consider the choice of language for such a purpose if we accept "we dissect nature on lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and the types that we isolate from the world of phenomenon we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a Kaleido-scope flux of impressions which has to be organised by our minds"[23]

influences of Kants Heide-
gger on African phy.

The question, how does an African formulate his epistemological theories about the world?, still remains to be discussed. Infact no answer is given to this question in an exact manner. However we can try to formulate an answer by putting together the bits and pieces of information we have concerning the question by trying to get the answer to the following questions:

(1) What type of epistemological statements are permitted in African Philosophy?

(2) What laws and principles, if there are any, allow such statements to be made?

(3) What theory provides us, in this case with a complete explanatory theoretical framework? or Conceptual framework

In order to give an answer to the first question, we ask the same question in a limiting form: what type of epistemological statements are permited to be made based on our previous discussion concerning the subject? If a man forms the centre of the world (this view is also known as anthropocentricism) and experiences everything from him as a reference point then all the epistemological statements (as noticed earlier) are made in relation to him. Thus no pure existential statements in the form of 'There is a tree' or 'There is a force' are permitted as epistemological statements. Only the statements like 'I see a tree' or 'I feel a force there' are permitted as epistemological statements. However further analysis can show that such statements are incomplete if we accept the idea (promoted by Anyanwu, J. Mbiti, etc) that in an experience man as a force act upon reality and reality as a force act upon man, then an epistemological statement based on such an experience would be operational and relational, like in the case of two electrons acting upon each other. purely Heidegerian -

An answer to the second question can be that such epistemological statements in the context of African philosophy are explainable in terms of law of causation; partly in the physical and partly in the mystical sense. What it means is that a traditional African uses causal explanation to explain the inter-relationship between the experience and that which is being experienced: It is not simple physical explanation of the inter-relationship between the man the experiencers, and that which is experienced. It also included mystical explanation e.g. there is a belief that in conjunction to a physical cause, a mystical cause is also present to produce an effect, that a physical cause alone would not produce an effect. In a symbolic form it can be expressed as follows: CI (Physical cause) & C? (mystical cause) effect. Furthermore these causal explanations are to obey the principles of ontological balance, to keep the balance of the forces[24].

An answer to the third question can be the theory of force. Metaphysical pre-supposition of the theory is that force is the ultimate and objective reality and the epistemological presuposition

Traditional African epistemology has been described as naïve realism or common sense realism. cf Kant. (See Ideinbaye, Tempels, Alexis Kagame etc)

* African metaphysics (Theory of Being) & epistemology (Theory of Knowledge) remain basically anthropocentric (i.e. man centered, not Being centered)

is that this force is experienceable and knowable, partly physical and partly mystical. The belief in the hierarchical order of the forces really provides what we call a rule of correspondence between the metaphysical and physical concepts of force: There is a belief that a man can manipulate both the forces; forces higher than him (like God, Divinities, ancestors) etc. as well as the forces lower than him, the forces in physical phenomenon.

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THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF OBAFEMI AWOLOWO

Olufemi Taiwo

1. PROLOGUE

Many of us know Obafemi Awolowo as one of Nigeria's leading politicians. Many of us can reel off chapters of his long and distinguished political career from memory. But very few know him as a political thinker of any importance. In this Awolowo is not alone. All too often the theoretical endeavour of practising politicans go unacknowledged. By some historical twist it is as if political theorizing is the exclusive domain of academic thinkers, impractical political framers, visionaries, and the like. This mode of perceiving politicians is so deep-rooted that some will consider it somewhat preposterous even to talk of such politicians contributing to the growth of political theory. The writing of this paper is proof of my unacceptance of this view of practising politicians and political theory. No pratice is possible without theory. Of course most politicians adopt theories formulated by other people. Others use theories that they do not elaborate or may not even be aware they are using. Yet you have a handful of them who go out of their way to elaborate a theory to inform their politics. It is to their latter category that Awolowo belongs.[1] The details of this theory, its strengths and weaknesses, etc. provide the subject-matter of this paper.

Why study Awolowo's political thought? I have mentioned the importance of theory to political practice. Of greater significance is the fact that there is widespread neglect of the thought of African thinkers, political and all. Without doubt, the area of political theory is one sphere in which African thinkers have made original contributions. Africa itself is a continent very much in a flux. This situation of flux creates the perfect condition for the efflorescence of new ideas and ideals for political organisation and social structuration. With very few exceptions most African countries have comparatively recently emerged from colonial domination. The political institutions fabricated in the colonial era have produced a mixed bag of results. Meanwhile, the race for development and the provision of the fruits of independence make it incumbent on African thinkers to come up with blueprints for social and political models which hold promise for the quickest solutions to the problems of ravaging underdevelopment. Needless to say, Awolowo's political reflections claim to provide such a blueprint and the need to assess its claims represents the second major justification for undertaking this project.

There are three major aims this paper sets out to achieve. The

first I already hinted at in the preceding paragraphs. I wish to record a significant contribution to political theory by a man who combines the discipline that practical experience provides with the analytical acuity of a theorist. Secondly, I wish to extend the frontiers of the study of Nigeria politics in the hope that others may find it worthy to examine other contributions that others, politicians and non-politicians alike, have made to the development of political theory in Nigeria. Finally, I hope to inaugurate a debate on the truth, correctness, adequacy or otherwise of the body of thought that we discuss here[2].

2 THE FORMATIVE YEARS

It is very difficult to weigh the impact of various ideas on Awolowo. His books and speeches are replete with numerous passages and quotes from several writers, philosophers, psychologists and others. Since this is not an exercise in comparative political thoery, I shall not seek to unearth what these influences are. Here I deal only with the historical and political influences.

I think it is right to say that the most important of these influences are provided by the colonial regime and its educational institutions. This is the way I explain his periodic eulogization of British colonialism. First, a true product of Christian Missionary Education, Awolowo thinks that Christianity is an unqualified good for the people of Nigeria. One can cite many passages from his writings to support this contention. I cite one from his *Autobiography:* "..... I was made to realize quite early in life that Christianity was, of a surety, superior in many respects to paganism"[3]. This avowal in itself is unimportant. When we recall that Christianity and the colonial adventure in Nigeria came on the heels of each other, the point assumes tremendous significance. If Christianity and colonialism are inseparable, and Christianity is good, given that the British were the inscrutable heralds of both, then we may see a redeeming dimension to the colonization of Nigeria, This view receives its most explicit mention in *The People's Republic*. After a review of the advent of British colonialism there is an assessment of the heritage of British colonialism. It is a paradoxical heritage. For in spite of the British pillage and rapacious exploitation of Nigeria's natural resources, colonialism was not an unmitigated disaster after all.

> Leaving their motives aside, the good that the British did in Nigeria, in material terms, is considerable and cannot be obliterated. They brought peace, order, good government, and flourishing commerce to a territory bedevilled and torn asunder by petty strifes and senseless wars. The credit belongs absolutely to them that Nigeria, as we know it today, was their exclusive and unaided creation. In other words, without British rule, there would have been no Nigeria.

Apart from Christianity, Awolowo's political outlook is very much a product of the colonial experience. While one may find echoes of Fabian socialism,[5] social democracy, etc., in his writings, the dominance of the liberal bourgeois world outlook in his thought is unmistakable[6]. But we can easily absorb his undying commitment to liberal democracy into his total ingestion of the colonial world-view and historical consciousness. He uses the degree of Western acculturation as a measure of civilization and a taxonomic parameter for the classification of the peoples of Nigeria[7]. He accepted the civilizing mission of the Europeans[8]. His hierarchization of the peoples of Nigeria must have fitted quite well with the colonial policy of dividing the inhabitants of a colonial territory in order to make ruling them a little easier. The fact that he belongs to the educated stratum of colonial society, he thinks, gave him a licence to dismiss the people as "the ignorant masses"[9]. The seeds of the elitism that has dominated his thought till now were sown then. These influences form the basic building blocks of his theory and they offer us a convenient *point de depart.*

3THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS: OF MYSTICISM' MAN AND MENTAL MAGNITUDE

The theory of human nature which underlies Awolowo's political philosophy may generally, but not exclusively, be characterized as the Christian conception of man. I say not exclusively because such a conception of man can be found in diverse philosophical traditions. Awolowo asserts that the sole object of his discourse is human beings.

> A study of some of the writings of political philosophers from Plato and Aristotle, through Hegel, Hobbes and Locke, to Marx, Engels and Lenin, would appear to suggest that all philosophies or theories have certain basic underlying principles in the nature of man, and the concept of the structure and origin of the State[10].

A proper knowledge of human beings is therefore indispensable to any efforts to promote their general well-being and happiness. The aim of politics is the ensuring of the material well-being of human being[11]. Why must this be so?

> Man is an animal; but an animal with considerable difference. He has something in him which puts him apart in a class by himself. The Christian Bible says, correctly in my view, that God forms man from the dust of the ground. He then breathes into his nostriles the breath of life, and man becomes a living soul. He is not a body with a Soul, but a Soul covered with body. He is ordained to have dominion over all other created

things, and to be monarch of the earth. On these grounds, his body must be made as sound as suitable and adequate food, shelter, and clothing, as well as health care, can make it; and his mind must be nurtured and polished by his being educated to the full extent of his capacity. His body is like an electric bulb; his mind like the filament in the electric bulb; and the breath of God in him is like the electric current which flows through the filament, and is reflected to the outside world by the bulb ...[12].

I have quoted the above passage at considerable length because it encapsulates Awolowo's conception of human nature. I shall not attempt a full explication of his conception of human nature here. It suffices for my purpose to point out that his view of human nature is essentially dualistic. A human being is a composite of a Soul and a Body. The possession of a body ranks a person among the lower animals. As a sole possessor of a soul, or to put it more accurately, as a soul, a person is closer to God[13]. The difference between person-soul and the lower animals is *thinking, consciousness.* Between soul and body there subsists a relation of mutual interaction and affectation. If the body is dead, there can be no life or mind. But the body needs the mind or soul in order to organize the data that the senses acquire perception. Both body and mind must be cultivated. The body needs constant and exacting physical exercises; the mind must engage in constant spiritual and mental exercises.

Awolowo does not believe that we are all equal except in the trivial sense that we all are children of God or share some physical and anatomical features in common. Individuals have innate differences in their respective abilities. We can grade human beings in a continuum from those who exercise their bodies and minds the most to those who rarely exercise or not at all. I ignore here the suggestion that belonging to one ethnic group places one above or below a member of a different ethnic group. Those who exercise the most are the fittest to lead those who exercise the least or not at all.

> The majority of the people do not have the disciplined education which is indispensable to systematic and scientific thinking. Consequently, their perceptual faculty is dull, vague and desultory, and their aperceptual, conceptual, and ideational capacities are either underdeveloped or never developed to any significant level.[14]

He advocates equality of opportunity for all within the certain limits imposed by naturally structured inabilities. In addition he

seems to be saying, as a defender of universal adult suffrage, one may stand to be voted for. Though this is suggested but I do not think it is a necessary part of the theory[15].

Nevertheless, those who exercise the most are able to think systemically, scientifically, clearly, constructively, and persistently, with a definite objective in view, act on the immutable law or universal mind (God) and make the universal mind materialize, in concrete form, the object of his (i.e., the thinker) thought[16] even then the 'natural' rulers who exercise the most realize that they themselves are inferior to God, the universal mind. Once one realizes the truth of God's superiority and develops one's body and mind, one,

> automatically enters into the regime of mental magnitude, properly and eminently equipped with a considereable measure of intellectual comprehension and cognition, insight, and spiritual illumination. In this regime, we are free from: (1) the negative emotions of anger, hate, fear, envy or jealousy, selfishness or greed; (2) indulgence in the wrong types of food and drink, and in ostentatious consumption; and (3) excessive or immoral craving for sex. In short in this regime we conquer what Kant calls 'the tyranny of the flesh', and become free[17].

To those who are inclined to be sceptical towards the preceding claims and the possibility of their achievement, Awolowo turns mystical. He invokes the authority of Jesus Christ who said we shall know the truth and the truth will set us free. Even if we do not know it now, at some time in the distant future we all will know the truth and royally enter into the regime of mental magnitude[18].

There are many who will be inclined to dismiss the ongoing views as nonsensical pieces of mysticism. Such a wholesale dismissal will be mistaken. The ontological foundations have great significance for the theory built on them.

In talking about human beings one thought that the equality of all persons is indivisible and that the call to take persons seriously and create the best conditions to enable them to actuate their potentiality was no mere ruse. However, by the time we come to the final theses of Awolowo's theory of human nature it turns out that people are unequal in very crucial respects; that one who has entered the regime of mental magnitude is superior to one who has not cultivated his or her potentiality. The right to govern other persons is reserved for those with mental magnitude. Only a few ever reach this exalted level[19]. Therefore, only a few can aspire to steer the ship of the nation while the preponderant majority will forever be followers because they lack the discipline to cultivate their bodies and minds. To take a specific example, on the appointment of judges, he writes:

> Over the door of the Academy at Athens, says tradition, was the following inscription: No one without a knowledge of mathematics may enter here...
>
> If we had our way, we would insist that no one without a good knowledge of mathematics, or logic and methodology, and psychology, in addition to his professional qualifications, should be elevated to the Bench[20].

(Anyone with some knowledge of Plato's *Republic* cannot fail to be struct by the similarity to Plato's doctrine of the philosopher-ruler. Perhaps the title of the book *The People's Republic* itself is the ultimate acknowledgement of Awolowo's intellectual debt to Plato[21].

I do not suppose that any society should glorify mediocrity. It is arguable, nonetheless, whether there is any correspondence betweem having a chain of academic qualifications and the ability to order the affairs of people. Awolowo's emphasis on the indispensability of a technocratic elite is not baffling in the least. We know who will run the State: the lawyers, the bureaucrats, the teachers, businesspersons, other professionals, etc. Of course they are assumed to know what is best for the people and it is they who are fit to rule. There is an implicit assumption that their professional and academic qualifications and success in business are evidence of the fact that they exercise their minds and bodies adequately and, therefore, of their suitability for membership of the regime of mental magnitude. The point here is that contained in the account of human beings Awolowo gives us is an incipient elitism that borders on contempt for the common run of persons which gets its full articulation in the programme he has for the realization of the socialist paradise he claims to want to build.

There are other implications suggested by Awolowo's ontological formulations. The only one I examine is what I call the theory of divine-ordained obligation[22]. Man images God. In creating conditions for the person to realize the god-element in him or her, we confirm and respect his or her kinship to God. When we fail to do so we reduce persons to the level of lower animals. Politics has for its sole aim the material well-being of humans. Any political regime that fails to cultivate this aim loses thereby its *raison d'etre.* It is not because of any inherent good in humans that we seek to make them free. Rather we do so in obedience to God. The state, on the other hands, owes obiligations to its citizens not because they discharge any duties but because for the state to do otherwise is to treat God's clones in less than godly fashion. The ground of political obligation on the part of the state towards its citizens and vice versa is provided by the existence of God and his injunctions.

Humans' fundamental rights flow also from the same fountainhead. Awolowo is not always consistent in his deployment of this ground of political obligation. As we shall see in the next section, his account of the origins and structure of the state is contractarian The two viewpoints do not cohere easily. If the obligation of the state arises from a compact agreed to by its members for mutual protection then it could not at the same time owe to any divine source. If it derives from some divine sources, then it remains valid whether or not there is a discontinuity between the interests being pursued by the state and those of the citizens - the only curb on the state being the injunction I already mentioned which exhorts us to treat human beings as images of God.

4. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE STATE

I argue in this section that Awolowo's conception of the state is incoherent. His account is contractarian and his theory of human society is evolutionary.

Human beings are social animals by their very nature. It is almost impossible to conceive of humans as completely solitary individuals. If not anything else, people have a stake in the survival of the species. This no one can do alone. If only for procreation and the propagation of the species human beings must marry - a union of at least two people, male and female. It is safe, therefore, Awolowo asserts, to say that all times in his or her life, a person is a member of a family. Humans are creatures invested with freedom - freedom in terms of absence of curbs on the individual's ability and willingness to do as he or she pleases. This freedom cannot be absolute. If it is, we may have a situation of generalized chaos. Hence the need for allowable curbs on personal freedoms such that the exercise of one's freedom terminates where that of the other person begins. The first instance of curbs on personal freedom occurs in the family in which a member must exercise by the other members of the family. Beyond exemplifying allowable curbs on personal freedom the family typified the primary form of social organization and, in Awolowo's view, all other more complex forms of social organization take their cue from that of the family.

According to Awolowo, in all history and in different parts of the world, the affairs of the family are presided over by the *paterfamilies,* the *materfamlies,* or by both of them in some sort of esoteric partnership [23]. Most cultures being essentially patriarchal in Nigeria, the *paterfamilias* sometimes advised and assisted by the *materfamilias* and other adults within the family, holds the reins within the family. He specifies the rules by means of which the affairs of the family are to be conducted. He adjudicates disputes between the family members, visits sanctions on any errant members.

In all, outside the sanctions of the gods and taboos imposed by the mores of the society, the *paterfamilias* is both the maker and executant of the laws within the family. Within the limits imposed by the *paterfamilias.*

> the members of the family enjoy all the rights and freedoms which are now summed up and known as FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS... (These limits) are partly dictated by superstitious beliefs and by the injunctions of the family gods. In so far as the limits proceed from the rational conscious thoughts of the *paterfamilias,* they are invariably motivated by affection for, and the best interests of, the entire family[24].

Do they? As those of us who grew up within the authoritarian structures of the traditional family would attest, it is not always the case that the interests of the family determine the limits the demiurge *paterfamilias* sets for the entire family. I do not press the point. Of greater importance is the incoherence that this conception of the family points towards in Awolowo's account of the origin of the state.

The single family is the primary unit, the basic building block of large complex societies. Large societies came to be formed due to the insecurity occassioned by competition among different families for the means of livelihood coupled with the propensity for greed, envy, etc. In essence families came together to eliminate inter-family squabbles, ensure mutual amity, protect individual liberty, and effect joint resistance against external foes. And combination was crucial to efficient production and exchange among and between families. This is how Awolowo explains the emergence of large, complex societies. Between the primitive society of remote antiquity and the complex societies of modern times there is only a difference of degree, not of kind. "All the present State paraphernalia of internal order and peace", etc. were all contained in the original social germ in "embroyonic forms". They have merely reached fruition at the present time.

The explication of the emergence of the state is not too dissimilar to that of the evolution of complex societies. In the case of the state, too.

> it was the passionate desire for peace amongst (people), and for mutual defence or protection against those outside their union, as well as for the procurement of economic benefits, which led to the emergence of, first, the village-states, then the city-states, followed by the nation-states or mult-nation states[25].

When the state came to be formed it was the *paterfamilias* writ large over a wider territory with more people. Just as in the family

the *paterfamilias*, as law-giver and executor, deploys his infinite wisdom in the service of his wards, so too the state as the repository of collective wisdom does insure that the interests of its subjects are well served.

Awolowo founds the state on a social contract entered into by two or more contending families or aggregations of families who felt tired of war and entered into negotiations between themselves for the attainment of peace and for mutual defence against other hostile families or aggregations of families. It should be pointed out that Awolowo does not make a historial claim in talking about the social contract. He employs the concept as a heutristic device to elicit a plausible account of the emergence of the state.

It may reasonably be assumed, Awolowo argues, that each contracting family agreed to submit their sovereignty to the collectivity and to preserve the equality among them. There also would have been a commitment to the preservation of the rights and freedoms of each constituent member of a contracting family. Needless to say individual *paterfamilias* would have had to submit their legislative, executive, etc. powers to a new body or bodies which wield such powers in the traditional spirit and style of an all-caring *paterfamilias*. To realize these purposes the original contractors would have considered it essential to set up machineries for law-making, adjudication of disputes, etc., etc. The sum of these institutions is the state[26].

I pointed out in the fast section that the creation of the state and its obligations to the citizens in it derive from a divine injunction. That persons are free and their freedom must not be abridged save in situations in which the freedom of others is in jeopardy. It is as free agents that families come together to form societies and establish states. If we grant this freedom to contract then an incoherence occurs in this account. In both the creation of large, complex societies and states it is clear from Awolowo's theory that if anything, it was not open to the contracting families to contract or not to. The occurrence of civil strifes, largescale insecurity, etc., fostered the necessity for bigger societies and, concurrently, the state. If it is to escape the insecure and unsafe conditions of living without a state that made people to form a state, then it cannot be that the necessity for a state derives from our imaging God. Furthermore, to the extent that the necessity for a state is foisted on us by natural and social elements it is not within our power to refrain from forming a state; after all a good part of the definition of freedom is that the agent *could* have chosen to do otherwise than he or she did.

Awolowo could rejoin that there is no incoherence in saying that a state is at the same time the product of natural or social contingencies and divine injuction. He would only accept that there might be a problem. And that the problem is easily solved. God made us in his image; but we have fallen short of his grace due to

our sinfulness. It is our sinfulness that prevents us from realizing God's purpose and forces on us the necessity to derive the state from civil strife and other vicissitudes. He would then say that one reason extant states are so imperfect is due to fact that they are not derived from divine purpose. While this rejoinder is within the tenor of Awolowo's general outlook, it is not one that will satisfy serious critics. It will not do for someone who does not subscribe to the christian world-view. Moreover, the rejoinder only shifts the the problem to another level; it does not solve it. A better solution will be to abandon the entire reference to the divine dimension in the evolution of the state.

What then is a state? According to Awolowo, adopting Keeton's definition.

> a state is an association of human beings, whose members are at least considerable, occupying a defind territory, and united with the appearance of permance for political ends, for the achievement of which certain governmental institutions have been evolved[27].

The objectives of the state are similar to the ends which the paterfamilias seeks to achieve in the family: the well-being of the family members by way of an efficient organization of economic production, the making of laws to guide conduct within the family, the execution of such laws and the deployment of sanctions on infractions, adjudication of disputes, etc. In short, the state is the family writ large.

One can mention some discontinuities between the family and the state. In the family, the *paterfailias* is supreme, his word is law. His authority does not derive from the consent, tacit or expressed, of members of the family. Perhaps he is subject to the norms, rules and mores of his larger society. Awolowo is of a different opinion.

He believes that sovereignity in the family belongs to all members thereof. He has to assert this because, otherwise, the analogy between the state and the family breakes down. He wants to say that the power of the state derives from the consent of its constituents.

> (That) the inherent characteristic of democracy, which distingushes it from any other form of government, is that it posits the ultimate principles that political power or sovereignty belongs to the entire people of a state rather than to the few or the one, and that it is the entire people of the state who are entitled to exercise this power for their own benefit[28].

For the family to serve as a miniature state, it must be held up as democratic, as an epitome of the sovereignty of its members. But the family - especially one in a sexist, patriarchal society like we have in most countries - as a democratic institution is a forced category. Hence my positing of a discontinuity between the family and the state.

Let us suppose that Awolowo is right. What are the grounds of political obligation? This is a question Awolowo does not address In consonance with the trend of his theory, it is fair to say that the state deserves to be obeyed and enjoys legitimacy in so far as it meets the purposes for which it was incorporated. What happens when it fails to fulfil these functions? If the head of a household fails in the same regard, the wife and the children can walk out on him, he can be pilloried and excoriated. In other words nobody blames the children of an irresponsible parent for revolting against him. If the analogy with the family holds, then one can assert that citizens of a state have a right of rebellion and revolution against it when it fails to deliver on the aims for which it was set up and on the basis of which it exacts duties from its citizens.

Awolowo does not draw such conclusions. In fact he abhors revolution[29]. He does not even consider the possibility that a state may fail in the crucial sense I mentioned all we have is the expansive hope that the state will never let things get so out of hand that a revolution would be a viable option[30].

Awolowo's state is a value-neutral one which is autonomous of groups and interests in the society. It is above and innocent of whatever struggles, cleavages, etc. may otherwise ravage society. *As a true paterfamilias,* the state caters to all and accommodates diverse interests. Here he clearly repudiates the Marxist view which sees the state as a class instrument - a weapon in the hands of whatever class predominates in class-divided society. According to him, if the state is a product of class struggle (war, he calls it) then there is no end to the war for the state; for the class just overthrown will never obey the state of its own free will and will always try to win over the class that just defeated it. The consequent state of perpetual war does not conduce to order and good government, security, etc. This will be a throwback to the same condition that people tried to avoid by coming together to form the state[31]. Anyone with a smattering knowledge of Marxim will know that Marxist theory of state does not lend itself to the kind of simplicity Awolowo foists upon it. But his strictures on the Marxist theory of the state serve a different purpose.

Marxists will at least agree with Awolowo that the state is a historical creation. They part company with him at the point where they assert that the state will wither at some time in the future. For Awolowo, the state is a historical category which, at its creation, becomes transhistorical. The state will always be. The dissolution of the state would lead, in his opinion, to fragmentation into family units which are essentially non-viable and precarious. Secondly, people will not easily agree to the dissolution.

This metaphysical conception of the state is incoherent and inadequate. There is considerable difficulty with a phenomenon that transmutes its historicality into a transhistoricality by virtue of its historical creation. If it was created, it is amenable to re-

creation and even demise. To the extent that the state is, let us agree for a moment, a mere instrument of social cohesion, we can think of a time when the same purpose may be served by a different concatenation of principles and individuals.

It is not enough to dismiss the arguments of those who advance a class analysis of the state. It is common knowledge that there is opression in many existing states. Awolowo himself is not unaware of the fact that quite often capitalists hold the reins of government in their thrall[32]. There are classes that monopolize political power to the exclusion of other classes. In capitalist societies it is hardly contested that those who hold the economic reins also hold the reins of political power. That in capitalist societies political power serves more often that not the interests of the ruling class and that there is an alliance between the captains of industry and finance and the pilots of the ship of the state.

Awolowo certainly would rejoin that any situation where political power is monopolized by any single bloc is a distortion of the ideal of democracy. This is a legitimate reply to my objection. Albeit when we see that the exception looks more and more like the rule in practice, we are right to ask whether there is not something in the nature of democracy as defended by Awolowo and others that bespeaks an unjust social order. Perhaps he would say that since the state is neutral as to groups it is left to those who excluded from political power to organize to secure control. This option is foreclosed by Awolowo. He abjures anything that smacks of 'class politics'. The result is that the potential power of the majority united as a single class is pre-empted. The victory of the existing ruling class is upheld. It is the perfect recipe for reformist politics.

5. THE MYSTIFICATION OF THE DIALECTIC: AWOLOWO'S CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

Awolowo has a dehistoricalized conception of capitalism. I take it that the widespred understanding of capitalism is that it is a specific mode of production which came to the historical stage at a point in human history. This conception is rejected by Awolowo. For him, at one level, capitalism is a matter of choice between different socio-economic arrangements. At this level the choice is between capitalism, socialism, or admixtures or aberrations of both[33].

Another level, Awolowo argues that the innate driving force of humans is "self-interest - greed". "In the pursuit of his self-interest, whether as a feudalist, slave-owner, or capitalist, the only abiding standard recognized by man is SELF"[34]. This innate driving force in humans receives full expression under capitalism. If self-interest is basic to human nature, it cannot be the case that capitalism is a

historical creation. Capitalism would best incarnate this driving force. Awolowo does not shy away from this conclusion, strange and even absurd as it may seen.

> .... (The) germ of capitalism, which is greed, has always been inherent in man. But because of a large number of factors including lack of education and technology, lack of communications, etc., it did not, until towards the end of the eighteenth century, attain any differentiated identifiable form and growth[35].

This is absurd. It means that all modes of production which came before capitalism have all been capitalism-in-miniature. Ancient Greece, Ancient Mali, or twelfth century China have all been capitalist. I do not wish to waste any further time on such an obviously nonsenical historiography. It is curious that the innate forces of greed did not drive human beings to the requisits level of education and technology, etc. at the dawn of history. Even more curious is the fact that Awolowo bothers to criticize capitalism at all. It is our nature to be greedy. Capitalism allows the fullest, uninhibited expression of this nature. One would have thought that capitalism would earn our approbation for being proximate to what we are and creating the conditions for the realization of our true nature.

Awolowo grants that capitalism has contributed to human progress. Nevertheless he argues that

> . . . (C) apitalism, in its essence and intrinsic nature, offends against the principles of dialectic. . . (T)he principle of dialectic is at once the inescapable doom of capitalism and the indefeasible hope of socialism 36

What is Awolowo's conception of dialectic? He states some metaphysical principles. The universe is an ordered cosmos and not a chaotic assemble of particulars. There is an 'immutable law' which rules in the physical world and the mental realm.

> This immutable law is sometimes referred to as the universal mind: it is latent, dormant, and inactive until it is set in motion by human thoughts, words and actions . . The sea of molecules in which we live, move, and have our being will remain dormant, until, by the transmission of sound waves and heat waves, or the application of our thoughts, we set it in motion to do our required bidding.
>
> ...The point we ... stress is that the immutable law, or universal mind, is set in motion just as effectively by our deeds or actions as by our thoughts and words. It is this setting in motion, the making dynamic of the static latent universal mind that we call dialectic. Since thought is father to words and actions, every thought, as well of course as every word and action, is dialectic.

This immutable law, under the active agency of man, will do every good and desirable thing we want, provided always that our technique is correct[37].

The dialectic has turned full circle. I hinted at what I called a mystical turn in an earlier section of this paper. This mysticism has now come into its own in the dialectic *a la Awolowo*. We birth to the world by our thoughts. We activate the latent powers of the universal mind (God) by means of dialectic-thought. The activity of humans that brings all into being is thought, sheer thought,

Thought can be applied to achieve anything in both the subjective worlds. The only requirement is that we master the technique.

> . . . whatever thought we hold clear, entertain, and cherish will manifest itself in concrete forms whether we like it or not. *The fundamental law is that thought is the cause, and the material world is only an effect.* If we persistently think and cherish good thoughts, good will result; if evil, will result.[38]
> My emphasis.

Thought then is the archimedean principle with which we are going to remake the world. Perhaps it is fair to say that capitalism has lasted till now because people have not been persistently thinking and cherishing its demise. And capitalism must have emerged in the first instance because naturally-greedy people intended only evil things; hence they gave birth to capitalism. The key to the creation of good things, therefore, is to think good thoughts.

To complete this process of mystificatory dialectic, Awolowo writes and I quote him *in extenso:*

> It is our considered view that if history establishes anything at all empirically and beyond any doubt, It is this. Like cause always produces like effect. In kind, we always reap what we sow; . .. Whilst the good seed, in spite of the stiffest obstruction and opposition, proliferates, flourishes, and transcends itself in quality, through aeons of time, the bad seed, in spite of the most generous encouragement, tends, through time, though sometimes imperceptibly, to diminish in quantity and degenerate in quality until suddenly it suffers total extinction. This in our opinion is the statement of the concrete manifestation of the true dialectic.[39]

Capitalism is a system founded on naked self-interest. The touchstone of what is good is LOVE. Anything which falls short of LOVE is evil. Hardly anyone will argue that capitalism allows love to flourish. If the true dialectic enjoins us to love our neighbours and capitalism enjoins greed and chicanery, it follows that capitalism is evil. As evil it is bound to wither in the fulness of time no matter what we say or do. This is the way Awolowo sums it up:

Since greed, selfishness, or naked self-interest is the essence and predominant motivation of capitalism, the system is bound to generate secular social disequilibrium in the society in which it is operative, and to diminish and degenerate through time until it suffers extinction, yielding place to another and better system which either approaches or approximates to the ideal of LOVE[40].

Whatever happened to the active agency of human beings? If capitalism already carries within it the germ of its own destruction why do we need to think and cherish thoughts of its destruction? why must any group of people organize to capture political power in hopes of building socialism? These questions are pertinent because Awolowo himself has spent practically all his life in political activity. I wonder why he just does not fold his arms and await the day capitalism will suffer perdition. Perhaps the dialectic is not meant to guide political practice. Nevertheless of what use is a theory that is completely irrelevant to any practice?

One may not suppose that Awolowo ever meant that we would overthrow capitalism be means of thoughts *alone*. It may be that thought is a mere starting point[41]. But even if we grant that thought must combine with practice to change the social order, it is difficult to grant that the kind of 'thought' Awolowo recommends can seriously undermine the existing structure of capitalism. It may even be that the dialectic of LOVE is not directed at capitalism, that, on the contrary, it is an oblique instrument for its survival.

Marxists are some of the most trenchant opponents of extant capitalism. They call for the overthow of the capitalist ruling class and the mode of production which sustains its power. A demand for the overthrow of capitalism presupposes that those who preach an overthrow will never wish to come to terms with capitalism. They will also try their best to turn the majority of those under the sovereignty of the ruling class away from the latter and get the majority to think, not only of the desirability of change, but also of its possibility. Marxists, therefore, will not preach 'love' where what is needed is to bring people to share the same distaste for capitalism that Awolowo appears to have in common with the Marxists. It is conceivable that someone who wants the triumph of capitalism would urge people to love the system. Awolowo's dialectic of LOVE lends itself to this interpretation. Those who want the survival of capitalism may proceed in the following ways:

(1) Get people genuinely and ardently to believe that capitalism will die a natural death and that there is no need for them to do anything either to bring about or hasten the demise. Of course we all know that no system has ever collapsed of its own accord. Always human beings are responsible for constituting and dismantling

social systems. Such a fatalist philosophy will serve only to prolong the life of capitalism or any other social system. That way the ruling classes can remain secure in their positions.

(2) Preach love and brotherhood in a world wrecked by hate and oppression. The victims of the system are exhorted to love those who are responsible for their misery and the daily subversion of their humanity. We never take up arms against those we love. The notion of struggle - class or any other - is anathema in a setting permeated by love. If those who are oppressed in the present order were to take their love lessons to heart there never will be any struggle against their oppressors. The result: capitalism triumphs, the ruling class predominates.

The two strategies just described cannot come from the pen of anyone who takes the problem of overthrowing capitalism very seriously. I think Awolowo's philosophy lends itself to these interpretations. It is possible therefore that he is not interested after all in the overthrow of capitalism.

6. THE CASE FOR SOCIALISM: THE MAKING OF A LEGAL–ATTITUDINAL STRATEGY FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

> What is socialism ? Socialism is a normative social science. It is in the same category as ethics. But whilst ethics seeks to set the standards for economic behaviour and social objectives..... (socialism) sets the standards of human ends which economic forces must serve, and prescribes the methods by which these forces may be controlled, directed, and channelled for the attainment of the ends in view[42].

I have subtitled this section 'the making of a legal-attitudinal strategy for social change' because it does not call for the overthrow of capitalism as a complete transformation of the social system. It is an attitudinal strategy because it calls for changes only in people's behaviour. It is legal because legislation is the sole instrument by means of which this change in people's behaviour is to be achieved. The procedures for achieveing socialism in Awolowo's sense are, first, that the goal of social justice and equality must be clearly declared; and, second, the method must be specified and permeated by love. Social justice and equality will be realized in a state of affairs in which the resources ofthe polity belong to all the citizens equally and all will come to share the products of the union of land and labour through the media of good wages, respectable standards of living, abolition of unemployment and the free provision of social amenities like health care, education, etc. More concretely, the objectives include the abolition of rent, dividend, interest and inheritance, the legal elimination of the *rentier* class, and the placing on salaries and wages of everyone in the country[43].

There are three broad methods to the objectives just adumbrate. First, consumption must be regulated by legislative acts. Second, the means of production shall be vested in the state. But no one who aready owns part of the means of production shall be divested of or made to surrender his or her holdings except on payment of a fair compensation. Since there is no right of inheritance, I assume that he is advocating a strategy of attrition in getting rid of the *rentier* class. Where some means of production shall be owned by private individuals, the state should set a statutory maxiimum limit to the income to which anyone of those in control shall be legally entitled. Finally, the state should continually take steps to stamp out any venture which is motivated by greed and may generate hatred, bitterness and widespread dissatisfaction[44].

One must not dismiss lightly Awolowo's advocacy for socialism. Many Nigerian leftists tend to do so. Even though not many of us have taken pains to read what Awolowo has written, all too often, some merely take a cursory look at his own life (he is a property owner and very wealthy man, a chief, etc.), his political activities and what not and dismiss as gratuitous his frequently passionate plea for socialism. It is not only unfair it is absolutely unwarranted to dismiss him so easily. Having said that I must acknowledge that it is very difficult to place him in the political spectrum and his claim to socialism is not unproblematic.

Throughout his writings, he often puts down ordinary people. In the *path to Nigerian Freedom,* he repeatedly stressed the fact that the masses of the people are

> ignorant, and will not be bothered by politics. Their sole preoccupation is the search for food, clothing and shelter of a wretched type. To them, it does not seem to matter who rules the country, so long as in the process they are allowed to live their lives in peace and crude comfort[45].

This was in 1947. One might argue that he was caught then in the colonial world-view to which we made reference in an earlier section. That is, one might say with Richard Sklar:

> Fabian socialism made a deep impression on Awolowo during his law-school years in London, and the vaguely elitist, really meritocratic, preocupation of his early thought has not survived his deeper belief in equalitarian democracy[46].

Sklar was writing in 1963 and by then (from 1960) Awolowo had started his increasingly strident avowal of socialism as the best ideology for Nigeria[47]. However, I think that Sklar's conclusion was rather hasty. Because if Sklar were correct, one would expect that Awolowo's writings and rhetoric in the post-1960 period would

reflect the dominance of a new world-view. I submit that this never happened.

In Awolowo's writings and speeches from the 60s to data, the commitment to a technocratic and meritocratic ordering of society which denies basic equality of all but strives for all to have equality of opportunity to compete with whatever resources they have has remained a fundamental feature of Awolowo's political philosophy. As recently as 1970 in *The Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic* he wrote:

> It will be generally agreed that the objectives which we have set out in this book are attainable. But it must be emphasized that they will be attained only if Nigerian *political leaders* possess and hold, respectively, certain attitudes and attributes of mind; and guide and lead the entire masses of their people to cultivate or at least to strive perseveringly to cultivate them[48]. My emphasis.

As I have pointed out, the regime of mental magnitude, membership in which entitles one to be part of the ruling bloc is not accessible to everybody. The conclusion is inescapable that Awolowo's philosophy contains a huge proportion of elitism. The conclusion is even more compelling when it is realized that the importance Awolowo invests in the state borders on statolatry. Hence he has been called "etatist' by B.J. Dudley[49]. His etatisme has considerable significance for political practice. As Dudley has pointed out, etatism is not an appropriate philosophy or vehicle for popular mobilization. Awolowo's grab-bag of goodies for one has fostered the illusion of a 'Santa Claus State'; the state provides everthing free and the issues of popular participation and control beyond the ritual of elections are pushed to the background. His elitism and etatism combine to ensure that the people are sidelined and are to be led to the socialist paradise by the 'leaders'. Do all of these problems entitle us to conclude that Awolowo's socialist advocacy is entirely fatuous? Not quite.

Awolowo's conception of socialism is quite far-reaching. He will legislate the *rentier* class out of existence, he will place everyone, yes everyone, lawyers, doctors, petty trader, businesspersons, landlords, etc., on salaries to be fixed by the state. He will rationalize remuneration and production, nigerianize and nationalize (with compensation) most categories of economic activities, etc[50]. We must not dismiss these too lightly. We may therefore as what exactly it is that makes Awolowo's commitment to socialism problematic.

In my view, Awolowo's elitism is not incompatible with his advocacy for socialism. It may be the case that the guardians of the state, infused with the right attributes and attitudes of mind,

may be able to tutor the rest of us through the transition to socialism. There is nothing odd about that. The problem, I think, lies in the lack of any seriousness to confront the fact that the state is not neutral between classes and the 'leaders' in whom he invests so much foresight, forthrightness, and selflessness, cannot be got from the present crop of bureaucrats, academics, businessmen, etc. in Nigeria or elsewhere. Awolowo studiedly ignores the class cleavages in contemporary Nigeria and refuses to acknowledge that the legal institutions of capitalism are intrinsic to this particular mode of production. But he says nothing of dismantling the structures of capitalism society. It is as if all we have to do is to take over these structures and pour new content into them. He forgets that the kind of party politics, legislature and other institutions he advocates are part and parcel of capitalism. He carefully evades the question of who will execute the changes he wants.

I take it that since he accepts western parliamentary democracy as the harbinger of good and equitable government the agent of social change will be a political party organized for the purposes of winning power and then using the power to reorder society through the agency of legislation. It is a hallmark of capitalist democracy that only the few well-to- do can form and finance political parties. It is also characteristic of those who form parties that, as members of the ruling class, they have an objective interest in the continuation of the *status guo*. To expect the same people who are direct perpetrators and benefactors of the worst inequities of the capitalist system to dismantle the basis of their well-being is to display sheer theoretical and practical naivete; It may be a strategy designed to secure the survival of capitalism.

Lastly, by turning the members of the ruling class into the agents of social change, the majority are effectively shut out of the precincts of power save their being called out quinquennially to choose who among the elite should rule them for another five years. To shut out the people from the making of decisions that affect the most vital parts of their lives is to display a contempt for the people that is quite out of place in a genuinely socialist programme. The situation is not least bit ameliorated by the promise of free this and free that in the platform of the elite political parties. The paternalism that eventuates from Awolowo's theory of politics is very much a product of a lack of faith in the ability of ordinary people to take charge of their own lives and a self-fulfilling messianic vision that is the hallmark of the elitist do-gooder.

7. EPILOGUE

This has been a very critical exposition of Awolowo's political thought. It is far from my aim to suggest that there is nothing good about the theory. If I have devoted so much attention to its weaknesses it is because I think that there is so much that is worthy of examination. For me, the lasting signficance of Awolowo's political

thought is that it is a valuable contribution to the debate on the best path to development for Nigeria and other countries that share our predicament. This is no mean contribution. Furthermore, his writings have contributed to the political ferment in Nigeria today in which supporters of socialism openly advocate their view without any embarassement and the opponents of socialism willy-nilly have to address the arguments of the socialist. Finally, I hope that others might take a closer look at the same materials I have examined and, possibly, come up with different conclusions. The importance of similar treatment of the thoughts of other Nigerian, even African, politicians cannot be overemphasized.

NOTES

1. For a contrary view, see Billy J. Dudley, 'The Political Theory of Awolowo and Azikiwe', in Onigu Otite, ed.*Themes in African Social and Political Thought*, Enugu, Fourth Dimension, 1978, p. 212.

2. Other attempts do not add up to a debate. They inculde the paper by Dudley already referred to. Others are: Omorogbe Nwanwene, 'Awolowo's Political Philosophy'. *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol. IV, October 1969 - July 1970, pp. 127 - 153; 'Awolowo's Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic of Nigeria - A Review Article', *Quareterly Journal of Administration, Vol. V. October 1970 - July 1971, pp. 229 - 241.*

3. Obafemi Awolowo, *Autobiography*, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 11.

4. Anyone who knows a little of the history of the peoples of Nigeria will easily see the falsity of the statements just quoted. Perhaps if one interprets the emergence of Nigeria only in terms of Lugard's administrative hook-up of 1914, then the creation of Nigeria was solely by the British. However, once we extend our purview farther back, we would see that much of the territory north of the Niger river had been wedged together under the Sokoto Caliphate and the Shehudom of Bornu. And in the south, contrary to Awolowo's account, centralization was the dominant tendency and much of the fighting and balkanization that he rightly dumped on were induced by British and other European commercial policies.

5. Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 281.

6. For a clear statement, see Awolowo, *Autobigraphy*, pp. 309 - 310.

7. Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, London, Faber & Faber, 1947, p. 49.

8. Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, chapter 3; *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution*, pp. 25,35, 153.

9. Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, p. 31.

10. Obafemi Awolowo, *Voice of Wisdom: Selected Speeches of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Vol. 2, Akure, Fagbamigbe Publishers, 1981, p. 40.

11. Obafemi Awolowo, *Voice of Courage: Selected Speeches of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Vol. 2, Akure, Fagbamigbe Publishers, 1981. p. 180.

12. Awolowo, *Voice of Wisdom*., pp. - 174.
13. Obafemi Awolowo, *Voice of Reason: Selected Speeches of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Vol.1,Akure, Fagbamigbe Publishers, 1981, pp. 180 - 181.

14. Obafemi Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, Ibadan, Oxford University Press,. 1968, p. 229. See also, Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, pp. 31, 57, 63, 77, 110, *Voice of Reason*., p. 133.

15. For a different view, see Dudley, 'The Political Theory of Awolowo and Azikiwe'., p. 209.

16. Awolowo, *The People's Republic, p. 229.*

17. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 230: *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution*, pp. 158 - 159.

18. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 231.

19. See Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, pp. 63, 64; *The Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic*, London, Macmillan, 1970, pp. 95, 100.

20. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 279; also *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, pp. 63, 64; *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution*, Ibadan, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 158.

21. For a similar view see Nwanwene, 'Awolowo's Political Philosophy', p. 135; Dudley, 'The Political Theory of Awolowo and Azikiwe', pp. 209 - 210.

22. I have left out of consideration the problems associated with the dualistic conception of human nature on the relationship between the soul and the body.

23. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*. p. 76

24. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 77.

25. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 81.

26. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 82.

27. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 83.

28. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, pp. 92 - 93.

29. See Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, pp. 285 - 286;

Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution pp. 115 - 116.

30. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, pp. 285 - 286.

31. The denial of class struggle in African society is a standard feature of African political theories in the period immediately following independence. See for example, Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*, Dar es Salaam, Ozford University Press, 1968, p. 11.

32. Awolowo, *Voice of Courage., p. 60.*

33. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 159.

34. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 161.

35. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 163.

36. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 181.

37. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, pp. 186 - 187.

38. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 187.

39. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 188.

40. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 189.

41. This interpretation is suggested by some of his writings. See Awolowo, *The Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic*, pp. 97 - 98.

42. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, pp. 190 - 191.

43. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, pp. 192 - 193.

44. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, pp. 193 - 195.

45. Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, p. 31.

46. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*, p. 281.

47. Segun Osoba has suggested that Awolowo became a socialist in the wake of his party's loss in the December 1959 Federal Election. See S. O. Osoba, *Considerations on Some Conceptual and Ideological Aspects of Nigerian Under-development in Historical Perspective*, University of Ife, Department of History Seminar Series, 1980, p. 13.

48. Awolowo, *The Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic*, p. 95.

49. Dudley, 'The Political Theory of Awolowo and Azikiwe', p. 210.

50. For a full treatment, see Awolowo, *The Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic* pp. 1 - 46.

The Nature of Ideas in Descartes' Theory of Perception

Eugene O. Iheoma

Common sense assures us that we have knowledge of things around us. To the unreflective mind our knowledge of the external world presents no problem. We simply take it for granted that we directly know or perceive the world of our experience. To the philosopher, however, the phenomenon of knowledge is problem matic. Indeed, one of perennial problems of philosophy has been the problem of knowledge. Thomas Reid (1785, p. 128) in his survey of accounts of perception and our knowledge of objects notes the conflict between the philosopher's description of the world and the ordinary person's beliefs about the world:

> An object placed at a proper distance, and in a good light, while the eyes are shut, is not perceived at all; but no sooner do we open our eyes upon it, than we have, as it were by inspiration, a certain knowledge of its existence, of its colour, figure, and distance. This is a fact which everyone knows. The vulgar are satisfied with knowing the fact and give themselves no trouble about the cause of it: But a philosopher is impatient to know how this event is produced, to account for it, or assign its cause.

Philosophers have traditionally discussed epistemology under three different, though related aspects namely, **how** we come to know, the sources of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge and truth claims. Seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosopers were primarily concerned with the question of **how** we come to know. Through what means do we know? Do we know objects directly or indirectly?

A key concept in Descartes' account of how we come to know external objects is the term 'idea'. Unfortunately, **idea** was an ambiguous concept: it could designate the content or the act of thought. A further difficulty in the way of understanding the role of ideas in Descartes' theory of perception was the frequent use by seventeenth-century philosophers of the language of optics and spatial metaphors to describe cognition. These two difficulties together have contributed significantly to the popular standard reading of Descartes as propounding a representatives theory of knowledge. A representative theory of knowledge is generally understood as a theory which makes our knowledge of objects indirect and therefore uncertain. According to this theory we do not have direct knowledge of objects; what we perceive directly are our **ideas** which 'represent' the objects outside.

In Reid's assessment, this is basically the stand taken by philosophers from Plato to his own time: "For they all suppose that we perceive not external objects immediately, and that the immediate objects of perception are only certain shadows of the external objects". (p. 133).

There are three features generally associated with the representative theory of knowledge: 1. ideas regarded as apecial objects, 2. the separate existence of idea-objects from physical objects, and 3. our inability to really know the world of objects. Rorty (1979, p. 113) believes that the representative theory of knowledge inevitably leads to skepticism and he traces its revival in modern philosophy to the epistemology of Descartes and Locke:

> The seventeenth century gave skepticism a new lease on life because of its epistemology, not its philosophy of mind. Any theory which views knowledge as accuracy of representation, and which holds that certainty can only be rationally had about representations, will make skepticism inevitable.

J. W. Yolton (1975, 1984) argues, however, that the standard reading of Descartes and Locke as representationists is incorrect and needs emendation. In this essay I intend to support Yolton's interpretation of Descartes. To this end, I shall first explore Descartes' concept of **ideas** and the role he assigns to it in his theory of perception. Then, I will try to evaluate the popular reading of Descartes as a representationist in the light of a comparative review of the formulations of the traditional doctrine of direct realism associated with the epistemology of Aristole and St. Thomas Acquinas.

Descartes' Concept of Ideas

The referents for the term 'idea' in Descartes' work differ from context to context. For instance, in some texts, thoughts, volitions, affections and judgments, images and even the capacity to know are characterized as ideas. Thus in **Meditations III** where Descartes gives us his classification of thoughts, the term 'idea' is applied to various forms of thought. Some thoughts are described as (a) 'images of things'. To these alone, according to Descartes in this context, "is the title 'idea' properly applied". Examples of these images which are called ideas are given as "my thoughts of a man, or of a chimera, or of heaven, of an angel or of God". (H and R, 1, p. 152)[1] (b) There are other 'thoughts' which are in the form of volitions, affections and judgments. Descartes observes that 'ideas' per se "cannot properly speaking be false". Ideas considered in themselves are ideas not related to anything else,

that is to say, we do not consider what they may represent or stand for. Thus ideas per se are simply acts of the mind and as such, they cannot be false because, in Descartes' words, " whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one than the other". Similarly, falsity is not applicable to volitions. The only possible source of error left then is judgment.

Ideas may, however, be considered from the aspect of their being "images of things", the fact that they "represent" things. Differences between ideas arise only when they are considered as "images". that is to say, when we consider their representative character. Descartes writes:

> If ideas are only taken as certain modes of thought, I recognize amongst them no difference or inequality, and all appear to proceed from me in the same manner; but when we consider them as images, one representing one thing and the other another, it is clear that they are very different from one another (H and R, 1, 161-162).

What does Descartes mean by calling ideas "images of things?" What is common to my thought of a man, a chimera, etc., such that we can say they are all images? The examples Descartes gives of ideas which are "images" suggest that the term 'image' does not refer to material images like images of things on the eyeball, nor does it refer to what Descartes described as "pictures in the corporeal imagination". Secondly, since we can have an "image of a chimera", such an image can not be said to resemble a chimera by having for instance, similar features such as shape or figure. Yet the image of a chimera represents a chimera just as the image of a man represents a man. Consequently, we may observe here that the notion of representation, The representative function of ideas or 'images of things', does not necessarily involve the notion of resemblance or similarity. What is common to my thought of a man, and my thoughts of a chimera or an angel is the fact that they are all mental acts, products or creations of the mind which 'represent' or stand for "things" whether those "things actually exist or not".

We may summarize our review of the text of **Medtations III** by noting two aspects of ideas which are also called images.

a) their nature as acts of the mind
b) their character as representing something.

In the third set of objections, Hobbes had denied that we had any real idea of an angel. His reson was that:

> When one thinks of an Angel, what is noticed in the mind is now the image of a flame, now of a fair winged child, and this, I may be sure, has no likeness to an Angel, and hence is not the idea of an Angel.

Descartes' reply was to deny that "images depicted in the corporeal imagination" were ideas and he proceeded to define idea as "whatever the mind directly perceives" (H and R, II, 67). Hence, ideas for Descartes apparently are the same as perceptions. Descartes' most detailed definition of the term idea occurs at the end of his reply to the second set of objections:

> Idea is a word by which I understand the form of any thought, that form by the immediate awareness of which I am conscious of that said thought; in such a way that, when understanding what I say, I can express nothing in words without that very fact making it certain that I possess the idea of that which these words signify (H and R, II, p. 52).

The above passage shows that for Descartes idea is the means of understanding. Every significant word contains an idea. For one to have an idea X, it is sufficient that one should understand the meaning of the word X. Ideas are thus instruments of consciousness or awareness.

Formal and Objective Reality

In Descartes' theory of perception, ideas have two kinds of realities namely formal and objective. Formal reality refers to the acutal reality of anything. The formal reality of a stone, for instances, is that it exists in time and space with certain physical properties. The formal reality of ideas is that they are modes of thought; they exist in minds, they are creations of the mind and not caused or produced by things outside.

Ideas for Descartes, have another kind of reality called 'objective reality'. Ideas represent objects. This representing function is their objective reality. The objective reality of any object is the **being** of that object in the mind.

Descartes introduces the doctrine of objective reality of ideas in **Meditations III** in the course of his arguments for the existence of God. To demonstrate the existence of God, Descartes invokes the principle of efficient causality according to which "there must be as much reality in the efficient cause as there is in its effect". This principle is then illustrated by the idea of a stone or the idea of heat. The stone, it is admitted is not the formal cause of my idea of a stone, since it does not transmit anything of its actual reality to my idea. However, the stone is nonetheless a real cause of my idea in some way. All ideas are caused only by the mind in the sense that their formal reality is a product of the mind and not of external objects. But "in order that an idea should contain

some one certain objective reality rather than another, it must without doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of objective reality" (H and R, pp. 162-163).

The doctrine of objective reality of ideas thus accounts for the content of ideas or for the distinction between one idea and the other. Descartes does not give any details of how the objective reality of ideas gets into the mind. The precise nature of the causal link suggested between ideas and their objects is not spelt out. But it seems clear that, in Descartes' account, ideas as ideas have only the mind as their cause with the possible exception of the idea of God which has God as its cause. Ideas in their representative role, however, have causes and these causes are the objects they represent.

In addition to marking ideas as representative of objects, the term objective reality is also used to indicate the being of objects in the understanding. Descartes defines objective reality as "the being of the thing represented by the idea (entitatem rei representatae per ideam) in so far as that object exists in the idea. For whatever we perceive as being as it were in the objects of our ideas, exists in the ideas themselves objectively" (H and R, II, pp. 52-53).

The notion of objects being present to the mind was a key concept in the accounts of cognition given by the seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophers. It was an ambiguous concept that was interpreted in various ways which moved between an indirectness of knowledge where only a representative, proxy object could be present to mind and a direct realism where the object known was in some way itself present to or in the mind.

How is Descartes' concept of objective reality or the being of objects in the understanding to be interpreted? The nature of the objective reality of ideas in Descartes' epistemology may be further clarified if we examine the detailed answer he gave to the first set of objections, those of Caterus. Caterus, a scholastic theologian, had argued that Descartes' notion of objective reality was a mere name, an extrinsic appelation which adds nothing to the reality of the object. In his reply Descartes concedes a number of points to Caterus. 1. The objective reality, i.e., the being of an object in the understanding is not a real or actual being existing outside the mind (H and R, II, p. 10). The two modes of existence, existence outside the understanding and existence in the understanding should not be confused: formal reality differs from objective reality. 2. Descartes also agrees with Caterus that the object existing in the understanding is not an entity of reason created by the mind; it is only the real object as conceived. But from this fact, Caterus concluded that objective reality was nothing real in the understanding. As Yolton (1984, p. 33)

points out, "Caterus does not believe that thinking or perceiving involves any ontology in thought". But for Descartes objective reality, the being of objects in the understanding is reality as well as representation. 3. Finally, Descartes concedes to Caterus that thinking or perceiving does not in any way affect the object perceived, that we do not need to explain or find a cause for the object's formal existence. But what needs to be explained is how one particular object rather than another is perceived or thought of by me. It is the latter phenomenon that the doctrine of objective reality is meant to explain. Descartes' doctrine of the objective reality of ideas is a way of expressing the congnitive presence of objects in the understanding. When I perceive the sun and recognize that it is sun that I perceive, the sun is said to be objectively in my understanding. The sun as an object external to my mind is obviously not in my mind.

Ideas and Knowledge in Descartes

Descartes' doctrine of objective reality is in important respects similar to the scholastic doctrine according to which the forms of objects are present to the mind in cognition. Brian O'Neill (1974) and Yolton (1975) have argued convincingly for such similarities. Descartes, as well as the scholastics, explained the process of cognition in a way that made reference to three factors:
(a) the (external) object know, (b) the intellect or mind which knows, and (c) the presence or form of the object in the understanding.

According to the standard reading of Descartes, his doctrine of the objective reality of ideas adds a fourth element to the three factors in cognition, namely the idea as an entity intervening between the knower and the object known. Thus Kenny (1068, p. 114) writes: "But for Descartes the *res cogitata* that exists in my mind when I think of the sun is not the sun itself, but some proxy for the sun". Gilson (1967, p. 206) also thinks that Descartes introduces an entity between the mind and the object. "Being a representative form, the idea is a thing thought, and in that way, a reality". Thus both Gilson and Kenny interpreted the phrase "the thing thought" from Descartes' reply to Caterus as applying to the idea instead of the object that is thought about. But as Yolton has argued, the correct reading of Descartes in the context is to understand him as saying that the word idea designates the things thought of, in so far as those things are objectively in the mind" (1975, p. 152).

Yolton supports his interpretation of the phrase *res cogitata* as referring to the object thought about rather than ideas by a reference to several passages from Descartes' letter to Clerselier in 1646. In the letter Descartes comments on Gassendi's reponse to

his replies to the fifth set of objections. In one of the comments Descartes writes: "if we take the word idea in the manner in which I expressly said I took it" the only way one could deny having an idea of God is if one does not understand what these words signify: "that thing which is the most perfect that we can conceive" (H and R II, p. 129). Descartes then goes on to equate "not having any idea of God" with having no perception corresponding to the meaning of the word God". Arnauld, a perceptive commentator on Descartes understood Descartes' remarks as equating ideas with perceptions: "it is without question that the word 'idea' must be taken for 'perception' as has M. Descartes in that demonstration of the existence of God" (*De Vraies et des Fausses Ideas* 1683 cited by Yolton, 1984, p. 35).

The remarks in the letter to Clerselier clearly show that for Descartes ideas are not entities distinct from perception. The status or role of ideas in Descartes' theory of perception is comparable, as was indicated earlier, to the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of intelligible species or the forms of the objects in the mind. According to Thomistic epistemology, which is traditionally understood as espousing direct realism, the intellect knows or apprehends objects through the immaterial intelligible species which it derives from objects. The scholastic theory of cognition is based on abstraction which is said to take place both at the level of sense and at the level of the intellect. The sensible form or phantasm is an abstraction from sense objects and the intelligible species, in turn, is an abstraction from the sensible forms or phantasms. Both the sensible form and the intelligible species have their own proper mode of existence different from those of their sources. Thus, Aquinas writes: "the sensible form is in one way in the thing which is external to the soul, and in another way in the sense". Similarly, the intellect "according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility the species of material and moveable bodies; for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver" (*Summa Teologica*, Ia, Q. 85 art. 1 and 5).

Basic to the Aristolelian-scholastic theory of cognition is the principle that for knowledge to take place, there must be some kind of union of the object with the intellect. Aristotle wrote that "the thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object, that is, it must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object" (*De Anima*, 429a 14-17). The *form* of the objects or the intelligible species which the active intellect (intellectus agens) abstracts from the phantasms of sense was the means by which the union of the mind and the object was effected.

It is the role or function of the intelligible species or the form of objects in the soul which is relevant to an understanding of the

role of 'idea' in Descartes' epistemology. At the level of sense, the sensible forms or phantasms function as the means of sensing without being what is actually sensed. Similarly, at the level of cognition, the intelligible species is not what is actually understood or known, but the means by which the intellect knows objects (Ia, Q 85 art 2). It is through such continuous and uninterrrupted process of abstraction that Aristole and Aquinas evolved a consistent, even if unsatisfactory, doctrine of epistemological realism.

Descartes' theory of perception retains the close relation which the scholastic theory established between the mind and external objects but it is silent on the notion of abstraction and rejects the concept of the intelligible species. In place of the intelligible species which he ridiculed as "little flying images", Descartes substituted the concept of objective reality of ideas. This was probably because, as O'Neill has suggested, the doctrine of the intelligible species had at the time degenerated into a kind of "material entity bearing a spiritual quality" (O'Neill, 1974, p. 66).

However, we may note two important features of the intelligible species which are relevant to an understanding of the nature of the objective reality of ideas in Descartes epistemology. (a) the union of the object and the mind in cognition is not a literal or physical union. The object known is not literally present to the mind. (b) The suggestion that the mind knows objects through "species" or "forms" does not exclude direct knowledge of the objects.

Direct Realism and Representative Ideas

We noted earlier that the notion of objects being present to the mind was a concept plagued with ambiguities. Quite a few philosophers understood the expression in a literal sense and thought that the mind must travel to the place where the object is located in order to achieve the required union of mind and object. It is because such a physical confrontation between mind and object is impossible that philosophers like Malebranche denied that we can ever know objects directly. On the basis of such interpretation, our knowledge of objects can only be indirect, through the medium of ideas which then as proxy entities are the only things that can be directly present to the mind.

Arnauld's work, *De Vraies and des Fausses Idees* (1683) marks an important step towards clearing the ambiquities in the notion of the existence or presence of objects in the mind. He makes the important distinction between spatial and cognitive presence. He criticized Malebranche for confusing the two kinds of presence by uncritically accepting the principle that in order for our minds to know objects, the objects must be present to the mind. Arnauld observed that the word "presence" signified a local presence with regard to bodies, and with regard to minds an objective presence according to which objects are said to be in our minds when they are known by the mind. Spatial or local presence has nothing to do with cognition. Direct realism would be impossible on any model which requires direct physical contact between the knower and the object known.

Another important clarification Arnauld made toward an understanding of direct realism is his observation that *idea* and *perception* are the same. Idea and perception are not two different entities; they refer only to one modification of the mind which contains essentially two relations. The term "idea" refers more appropriately to the object perceived, while "perception" refers to the act of perceiving.

Thirdly, Arnauld notes that the representative nature of ideas or perceptions is unique to the mind. It is not like the way a picture represents its original or the way language is said to represent thoughts. Ideas "represent" because they are our conceptions of things. To represent is to be conceived or to be known or to "be objectively in the mind".

Finally, Arnauld observed that the fact that ideas are representative of objects does not make our knowledge of objects indirect as Malebranche would have it. Representation does not involve "idea-entities" which intervene between the mind and the object. Arnauld pointed out the equivocation in Malebranche's thesis that we do not know things directly or immediately and that ideas are the immediate objects of our thoughts. If the phrase "immediate perception" is taken to mean awareness without ideas-perception, then of course we do not perceive objects immediately. We perceive the sun or a square only by the perceptions that we have of it. But if immediate perception is denied because it is claimed that perception is by means of ideas regarded as distinct representative entities, then Arnauld insists that we know objects immediately because there are no such entity-ideas in cognition. Direct realism as Arnauld explained, is compatible with a theory that describes ideas as representative. Only when ideas themselves become entities as they did for Malebranche does the representative nature of ideas become a tertium quid between the mind and the object it knows.

In the light of our analysis of important Cartesian texts on the nature of ideas which are described as acts of the mind, given Descartes' rejection of the intelligible species as unnecessary entities, and given Arnauld's authoritative interpretation of "objective reality" as simply "understood", one has good reasons to conclude that the doctrine of the objective reality of ideas was an attempt by Descartes to express the semantic and cognitive nature of the way objects were said to be present to the mind. A theory of knowledge such as Descartes' in which we know objects through ideas which are not themselves entities is quite compatible with epistemological direct realism.

Notes and References

1. References to Descartes' work are taken from *The Philosophical Works of Descartes* translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross and cited in this paper as H and R followed by volume and page numbers.

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Being and Goodness: The Metaphysical Foundation of Ethics

— Joseph I. Omoregbe

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to show that being is the foundation of goodness, that metaphysics is the foundation of ethics and, consequently, that an ethical proposition can validly derive from an ontological proposition about human nature. The idea that being is the foundation of goodness is implicit in the thoughts of some philosophers in the Ancient, Medieval and Modern times. Hence I shall begin by examining the relationship of being and goodness in the thoughts of Plato, Plotinus, St. Augustine, and others.

Ancient and Medieval Traditions

Plato's identification of being with goodness through his concept of the Good was the first clear illustration in Western philosophy that being is the foundation of goodness. In the *Republic*[1] Plato presents the form of Good as the source of all realities (that is, the source of all other forms) as well as the sum-total of all virtues and the source of the goodness found in all things. Thus, the *Good* is the transcendent source of being and of goodness from which all things derive their being and goodness. "The Good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their existence and reality: yet it is not itself identical with reality, but is beyond reality, and superior to it in dignity and power"[2]. Plato compares the Good to the sun which is the source of light and sight. The *Good* is the source of being as the sun is the source of light. It is the source of being, and the source of goodness. As the transcendent source of being the *Good* is the highest object of philosophic knowledge and the highest point of intellectual achievement beyond which the human intellect can no longer go. When the human intellect has been able to grasp the *Good*, says Plato, "one is at the end of intellectual progress"[3].

Following in the footsteps of Plato, Plotinus also identifies being with goodness through his concept of the *One* which looks very much like Plato's Good. Here again, being is the foundation of goodness. For Plotinus' the *One* is the transcendent source of being and of goodness. Plotinus even goes beyond Plato in showing that being is the foundation of goodness. If being is identical with goodness and is the foundation of goodness, then the negation of being is also the negation of goodness, and that is precisely what evil is. For evil, according to Plotinus, is not a being. On the , it is the very negation of being, for where there is no being there can be no goodness, since being is the foundation of goodness. St. Augustine follows Plotinus in this regard and also identifies being

with goodness. Augustine therefore maintains that every being, by the very fact that it is a being, is good - "omne ens est bonum". Since being is the foundation of goodness whatever is a being is good in so far as it is a being. wherever there is being there is goodness, and wherever there is lack of being there is lack of goodness. and that is what evil is, namely, the lack of being. Augustine argues[4] that nothing can be completely evil since evil is the negation of being. A thing can only be evil to the extent that it lacks being, and since nothing can be completely devoid of being and continue to exist it follows that nothing can be completely evil. Before Augustine read Plotinus' works, he had been asking himself who created evil since it could not have been created by the infinitely good God. Having learnt from Plotinus that evil is not an entity, not a being, but the negation of being, Augustine felt relieved. Since it is not a being, not a positive thing, evil was not, and could not be, created. Only beings can be created and were actually created, and they are all good by the very fact that they are beings. Aquinas follows St. Augustine in maintaining that being is the foundation of goodness. "Everything has as much goodness as it has being; for the terms 'good' and 'being' are equivalent terms"[5]. The lack of being is evil, for "evil is not itself anything but the privation of some particular good"[6].

Being and Goodness in the Non-Moral Sphere

That being is the foundation of goodness is true both in the non-moral sphere as well as in the moral sphere. It is being that determines goodness and is the measure of goodness. In the non-moral sphere a thing is said to be good if it is what it ought to be. This applies both to artifacts as well as to natural objects. An artifact is said to be good if it is what it ought to be, that is, if it is what it is meant to be, for this is what constitutes its being. Thus, for example a pen is said to be good if it is what it ought to be, , an instrument for writing. An artifact is defined in terms of the purpose it is meant to serve, and if it serves this purpose it is said to be good because it is what it ought to be. Its being, that is, what it ought to be, is the basis of its goodness. That being is the basis of goodness is even more evident in the case of natural objects which are considered as good in virtue of their being what they are. Hence whatever enhances the being of an existent is considered as good, while, on the contrary, whatever detracts from the intergrity of the being of an existent is considered as evil. Thus for example deformity (through accident or malformation) is considered as evil. This also explains why the emergence of a new being (by birth) is considered as something good while the passing away of a being (through death) is seen as evil precisely because being is the foundation of goodness. Its emergence is something good and a cause of joy while its passing away is seen as evil and a cause of sorrow.

In the Moral Sphere

In the moral sphere being remains the foundation of goodness , for actions are judged as morally good or bad in terms of their relations to the being of other people. Actions that enhance the being of other people are good while those that adversely affect the being of other people are evil actions. It is therefore with reference to being - that is, the being of other people - that actions are judged as good or as evil, for being is the foundation of goodness. The moral imperative is ultimately the imperative to enhance being and to refrain from whatever is detrimental to being. Thus, being is the basis of morality.

The ultimate goal of morality is the enhancement of one's being, the full actualization or realization of one's being. This of course presupposes that man's being is not yet a closed book, a finished product. Man's being is yet incomplete, unfinished and stands in need of further development which man himself has to carry out through the moral process. Man, in other words, is a self-developing being, and morality is a process through which he carries out this task of self-development, self-enhancement, self-realization. In the language of Aristotle, morality is the process whereby man progressively actualizes the potentialities of his being, until he eventually attains the fullness of his being. The highest perfection possible to man is reached when he attains the fullness (that is, the full actualization, the full realization) of his being. This is the ultimate goal of the moral process, for, as I have said, morality is a process of progressive self-actualization, self-realization and self-perfection.

Modern and Contempoary Insights

This concept of man as a being who is yet incomplete but advancing towards its completion through the moral precess cannot be understood against the background of the metaphysics of Parmenides which portrays reality as static, complete and unchanging. Rather it should be seen against the background of the metaphysics of the German idealists, the neo-idealists, or that of Whitehead which portrays reality as a dynamic, on-going process, striving, developing towards its completion and perfection. Thus, for Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Thomas Hill Green, Edward Caird, Bernard Bosanquet, Francis Herbert Bradley and Whitehead, reality is yet in-complete and imperfect, but is striving and developing towards its completion and perfection through the dialectical process. The ultimate reality, the absolute, is not yet fully itself and it experiences self-alienation in its being as it develops and strives towards complete self-consciousness, self-realization and perfect freedom.

Now, the moral process is to individual man, what the dialectical process is to the absolute, namely, a process of gradual development towards complete self-realization, self-fulfillment and self-perfection. This aspect of man as a being who is yet incomplete and unfixed was articulated in the first part of this century by the two great existentialist thinkers of our time, namely, Heidegger and Sartre. In their existential analysis of man these two thinkers portray man as an incomplete, unfinished but self-developing being. In *Being and Time* Heidegger says man is not a being who has been completely made, and fixed once and for all. Man's being is not fixed, not determined in advance. Rather, it reveals itself as a possibility to become what it is not yet. Thus man is a being who is not yet what he is, and who is more than what he is at any given moment. He is a self-creating, self-developing being who is always living beyond what he is at any given moment. For man lives towards the future in which his possibilities lie. In other words, man transcends the present and lives towards the future, striving towards the fullness of his being. To this end man projects himself and lives towards his self-projection[7]. In his *Being and Nothingness* Jean-Paul Sartre gives a similar picture of man. Man, Sartre says, is a being "who is not what he is and who is what he is not"[8]. For man experiences himself as an incomplete being who is not full himself. There is an emptiness, a vacuum in man's being which separates man from himself and prevents him from being fully himself. Sartre says man carries nothingness within himself at the heart of his being which makes him experience an ontogical self-alienation and incompleteness. "Human reality carries nothingness within itself ..... This nothingness which separates human reality from itself is at the origin of time"[9]. This experience gives rise to a sponteneous urge, that is, the urge to overcome this ontological incompleteness and self-alienation. This sponteneous urge is no other than the moral imperative urging man to strive towards his self-completeness, self-realization and self-perfection. Speaking from the static world-view point of the Parmenidean metaphysics, Hastings Rashdall attacks the notion of self-realization as involving self-contradiction. "To. realize means to make real", he contends, "and the self must certainly be real before we are invited to set about realizing it"[10]. This objection to the concept of self-realization can only come from the viewpoint of Parmenidean metaphysics which portrays reality as static, complete, fixed and unchanging. But a deeper insight into reality reveals that reality is an on-going process, a dynamic process of self-development. This is the insight of German idealism and process philosophy, and it is confirmed by experience, for everything around us testifies to the fact that reality is an on-going process.

The Being of Man, the Goal of Morality

The moral imperative then is an imperative urging man to strive towards the fullness of his being, that is, towards his self-realization, self-completeness and self-perfection. The being of man is thus the goal of morality, the ultimate objective of the moral imperative. Good actions are those that contribute towards attaining this objective, while actions that detract from, or militate against, this objective are evil actions. Being thus, remains the foundation of goodness in the moral sphere. Morality takes place, of course, in society and its effects are felt in society. It has to do, as it has been already pointed out, with the being of others in society. Actions that enhance the being of others is morally good while these that are detrimental to the being of others are evil. But in the final analysis the most lasting effects of moral actions are the being of the doers of such actions. For moral actions are boomerangs that come back eventually to those from whom they went out, leaving lasting effects on them. This was the insight of Plato who contended that the doers of injustice inflict more harm on themselves than on the victims of their unjust actions. This is so because morally evil actions militate against the full realization and completion of one's being, that is, the being of the doer. In other words, they are obstacles to self-realization self-actualization and self-perfection. While morally good actions contribute towards this goal, morally evil actions militate against it. The full actualization of the being of an immoral man is obstructed by his immoral acts. Thus, man's summum bonum (man's highest good) is the fullness of his being, that is, the full actualization and perfection of his being, and this is the ultimate goal of the moral process. From the foregoing, it becomes clear how being is the foundation of goodness both in the moral as well as in the non-moral spheres.

The "is" - "ought" Problem

The foregoing discussion sheds light on the famous "is" - "ought" problem, first raised by Hume. Hume questions the validity of the transition from "is" propositions (that is, propositions of fact) to "ought" propositions (that is, propositions enjoining obligation).

> 'In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with *ought* or *ought not*. This change is

imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or *ought* not, expresses some new relation of affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable how this new relation can be a deducation from others which are entirely different from it"[11]

Hume is obviously referring to ethicists who base their ethics on human nature. These philosophers, Hume says, begin by describing human nature and then suddenly change from descriptive propositions to normative propositions without explaining how normative propositions derive from descriptive propositions. The explanation lies in what we have been saying in this paper about human nature. The "is" "ought" dichotomy with regards to human nature stems from the fact that the human being, unlike the infra-human beings, is a being who is not yet fully what he is meant to be because man is not a finished product, i.e., a ready-made being. He is a being who is yet incomplete. If man were a finished product, a ready-made being, the "is" – "ought" dichotomy would not exist and the problem of deriving normative propositions from descriptive propositions would not arise. But man is yet an incomplete being, a being who is not yet what he is meant to be. This is the basis of the "is" – "ought" dichotomy.

To say that man is incomplete amounts to saying that something is lacking in it. And to say that something is lacking in human nature is a proposition of fact, that is, a descriptive proposition which, however, implies a normative proposition. It is, in other words, an "is" proposition which implies an "ought" proposition. For to say that something is lacking in a being implies that there is something which *ought* to be in that being but which is not there. The proposition "something is lacking in X" means "something which *ought* to be in X is not there". If "something which ought to be in X is not there" then it follows that it ought to be supplied. Let us call the first proposition, "something which ought to be in X is not there" proposition (a). This is the meaning of the proposition of fact which states that X is incomplete. Let us call the second proposition, "That which ought to be in X but which is lacking *ought* to be supplied" proposition (b). Now it is clear that proposition (a) implies proposition (b). This means that proposition (b) derives validly from proposition (a). In other words, there is a valid transition from an "is" proposition (proposition of fact or descriptive proposition) to an "ought" proposition (that is normative proposition).

CONCLUSION

An existential analysis of man reveals that man is an incomplete being, a being, who is not yet what he is meant to be, "a being

who is not what he is and who is what he is not", to use Sartre's words. Something is lacking in him which ought to be there. From this it follows that what is lacking in his being ought to be supplied. But this must be by himself - it is he who has to supply what is lacking in his being in order to become.complete. This is the moral imperative. Man's creation was not begun by him (which would of course be impossible), but it has to be completed by him. This he does through the moral process, which is a process of self-creation, self-completion, self-perfection. The moral imperative follows from man's ontological incompletness. If he were ontologically complete, that is, if man were fully what he is meant to be, there would be no moral imperative urging man to strive towards his self-completeness, self-realization and self-perfection. Thus, the beginning and the end of the moral imperative is ontological, for it has to do with man's being. These two aspects of man, namely, the ontological and the moral aspects go together and are revealed together in the same intuition.

If, as I hope I have shown in this paper, being is the foundation of goodness, then ontology is the foundation of ethics. That being the case, an ethical proposition can legitimately follow (as I have shown above) from an ontological proposition. Thus, Hume's problem is solved.

FOOTNOTES

1. Plato, *Republic*, VI, 508b - 509b; VII, 532a
2. *Ibid*. VI, 508b
3. Ibid. *VII, 532a*
4. *Augustine,* Confessions, *book VII, Chapter 3 & 5*
4. Augustine, *Confessions,* book VII, Chapter 3 & 5
   See also *The City of God*, book VII, chapter 3 & 6
5. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1,5,3,
6. Aquinas, *De Malo*, 1,1,
7. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1873, pp. 374, 387
8. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, London, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1969, p. 23

9. *Ibid.* p. 102

10. Hastings Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, London, Clarendon Press, 1907; Book II, chapt 3 of this book is reprinted in *Problems of Ethics*, edited by R.E. Dewey and others, New York, Macmillan, 1961, p. 244.

11. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by Mossne, Book III, p. 521.

RUTH MACKLIN ON THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF CAUSALITY WITH CONSTANT CONJUCTION

— Dr. K. C. Anyanwu

INTRODUCTION:

I share Karl Popper's view that "the function of a scientist or of a philosopher is to solve scientific or philosophical problems, rather than to talk about what he or other philosophers are doing or might do"[1]. Karl Popper is of the opinion that one does not have to talk about philosophy but should philosophise, that is, should solve certain philosophical problems; and he seems to have directed his remarks specifically to Wittgenstein and his followers who maintain that philosophical problems are pseudo-problems.

One may extend Popper's remarks to the discussion of Hume's and Macklin's philosophies, and say that it is needless to talk about their philosophies but to dwell on solving philosophical problems. Just as Popper concludes that only excuse for talking about philosophy (in his critique of Wittgenstein's views about the nature of philosophy) is that it may offer him an opportunity of philosophising, I believe that by talking about Ruth Macklin's philosophy I would, at least, delve into the short-comings of Hume's solution to the problem of causality.

What I would do in this paper is to examine and clarify the grounds on which Macklin undermines Hume's proposal that constant conjunction is compatible with causality. In other words, I would argue that Macklin succeeds in showing the inadequacy of Hume's thesis that the knowledge of constant conjunction of C and E is required before one can conclude that C is the cause of E. And the way in which Macklin succeeds in undermining Hume's argument or thesis is by showing instances where the Humean requirement for the knowledge that C is the cause of E does not apply. In this way, Macklin offers more insight into the problem of causality.

HUME'S POSITION ON CAUSALITY

A brief view of Hume's notion of cause is indeed necessary for the understanding of the criticism against it. Hume maintains that "a cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines in the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other"[2]. Then he concludes: "I find in the first place ... relation of contiguity as essential to that of causation"[3].

Even though most positivists are of the view that the concept of causality should be replaced by or reduced to invariable succession in time, their identification of cause with invariable uniform succession has been criticised[4]. In Auguste Counte's view, for example, the human mind, in the positive scientific stage, does not intend or seek to know the intimate causes of events. Rather, it seeks to know their effective laws or their invariable relations of succession and similitude. Mill explains also that the recognition of the law of causation constitutes the main pillar of inductive science, and he sees this law as nothing but the familiar truth of the discovery by observation that invariable succession holds between every fact in nature as well as other facts that preceded it.

Comte and Mill are basing their arguments on the ground that invariable succession as well as conjunction are furnished by experience, and Mill seems to be more explicit on this assumption. He argues, for example, that an invariable sequence between any event as well as some special combinations of antecedent conditions are facts of experience. He further remarks that, from experience, one notices that whenever there is a union of antecedent events, the event does not fail to take place.

Mario Bunge has shown some of the short-comings of the Humean notion of causation as involving contiguity and antecedence by pointing out that "if causation were nothing but uniform succession, relativity could not hold"[5]. Though Bunge's criticism of the empiricist's notion of causality is relevant to the understanding of the over-all weakness of Hume's account of cause, it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into Bunge's arguments. The questions which have to be considered here are these:

(a) Is Hume's demand that the experience of the conjunction of C and E is essential for knowing or concluding that C is the cause of E an appropriate one? (b) Can there be or are there cases in which antecedent conditions may be known to be the cause of an event, but without a person having prior observations of the sequences? It seems that the answer to the second question would decide the outcome of the first question.

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY

It appears that the empiricist's analysis of causation is based on psychological arguments, that is, on the study of the (psychological) origin of the concept of causation. And this assumption seems to be evident in Hume's account of causation where he writes: "I shall only observe before I proceed any further, that though the ideas of cause and effect be derived from the impressions of reflection as well as from those of sensation,... I commonly mention only the latter as the origin of these ideas; though I desire

that whatever I say of them, may also extend to the former"[6]. Nicholas Maxwell, on the other hand, seems to have adopted a linguistic analysis of the problem of causation; and here he tries to reject Hume's argument that no logically, necessary connections exist or can be found between successive events. His conclusion is that "it may be, it is possible, as far as we can ever know for certain, that logically necessary connections do exist between successive"[7].

But Hume does not seem to deny that necessary connections exist between events. Rather, he argues against the possibility that the logically necessary connections between events have objective existence. It seems therefore that even if Nicholas Maxwell establishes the existence of logically necessary connections between events, Hume's problem would not have been solved; that is, to establish that those logically necessary connections have objective existence. One may further argue that Hume recognises the existence of necessary connections between successive events from his remark that the idea stems from habit or custom after the conjunction of two events has been frequently observed. Do the necessary connections between successive events exist objectively in the world? This, I believe, seems to be the question confronting Hume; and it is therefore the question to which Nicholas Maxwell has to address himself.

Hume, in his judgement, declares that "upon the whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects ... Either we have no idea of necessity or necessity is nothing but that determination of thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union"[8] What Hume seems to have done here is to offer an analysis of the notion of necessary connection, not a rejection of it; and what Maxwell tries to do, on the other hand, is to interpret or analyse the proposition: "there exists a logically necessary connection between two successive events E1 and E2"[9] in such a way that its refutation on a prior grounds would be impossible. Events cannot be logically related or connected because only propositions can have this character, and this is why Maxwell's criticism of Hume's notion of "necessary conection" seems to be inappropriate. In fact, his own proposed solution is objectionable.

I do not however claim that the psychological or the linguistic approach to the notion of cause is appropriate or inappropriate. Rather, I am pointing out the several approaches used by different philosophers so that the position of this paper may be understood. The approach being adopted here to Hume's notion of causality is epistemological, and from this standpoint Hume's account of causality embodies some traits which are epistemologically objectionable. Furthermore, Hume's search for the psychological origin of the causal principle seems to be irrelevant to physical science because the aim of this science is to find the causal explanations of

all events, including psychological ones; and not to discover or offer the psychological origin of causal principle. From the standpoint of the physical science, Hume's treatment of causality is more than necessary; and Hume is therefore mistaken in assuming that the psychological conclusions which he arrives at are also applicable to the treatment of causal principle in physical science.

CAUSAL EXPLANATION

Let us now examine Ruth Macklin's objections to Hume's explanation of causal principle by considering specific examples of "cause" in the realm of human action and in physical or natural science. The central thesis of Macklin's arguments is that the empiricist's notion of causality would be undermined (if not refuted) once the possibility of a non-Humean or a non-mechanistic causal explanation can be shown, even in the realm of human action.

But before those examples are considered, it is necessary to examine the arguments of some philosophers who express the view that causal patterns of explanation are generally not appriate for human actions. Some of those philosophers areD.W. Hamlyn, Stuart Hampshire, Peter Winch, Anthony Kenney, etc. According to Macklin, "whether the theses of these authors are explicitly stated or tacitly assumed, their acceptance is crucial to the view that we cannot provide causal explanation of human actions"[10] In Macklin's view, these are the grounds on which those authors base their arguments.

(1) They argue that causal explanations are generally, usually or always mechanistic in nature; and they therefore conclude that the psychological terms like "desire" and "intention", "want" and "motive" have to be reduced to physiological as well as electrochemical terms if one is to offer or attempt to offer a causal explanation of human action. The underlying assumption of this reductionism is, of course, that mental events are nothing but physical events; and this suggests that what is known as a human being is a bundle of physico-chemical elements. (2) They also argue that though one may cite psychological terms as "reasons" for (man's) actions in question, nevertheless such terms are inappropriate for denoting causes in the explanation of those actions. And the reason for their objection is that psychological terms do not constitute the "correct logical type", and if granted that they are logically linked to actions, they argue that those terms are not contingently linked to such actions. Therefore they conclude that to regard them as the causes of man's actions would be conceptually erroneous. (3) They point out that one can clearly draw a distinction between what a man does and what happens to him. (4) They maintain that since man's actions are rule-following or subject to rules, no theory of human action which ignores this feature would qualify as an adequate theory.

All these theses, as earlier mentioned, stem from the assumption that all mental acts are electro-chemical actions, that is, from the reduction of mind to matter. Though many writers like May Brodbeck[11], E. Davison[12], J. C. Smart [13], W.D. Grean[14], etc. have criticised the above theses, Macklin points out that it is difficult to establish the view that any explanation involving causal laws has to be a mechanistic one, that is, that mechanistic laws or predicates are involved. In defending this view, Macklin points out that any appropriate, causal explanation of human behaviour and of natural events has to embody the "notion of generality". She acknowledges that this law may not necessarily be available, but she considers it necessary to subsume that causal explanation under some law. In this manner, references can be appropriately made to "causes" or "causal factors" on the assumption that the condition for generality will be satisfied.

Let us consider attempts to provide a non-Humean notion of cause or causal explanation which is not only relevant to human action and to natural science but also avoids the undesirable epistemological feature which Hume's account of causality possess. In other words, a non-Humean notion of cause has to avoid what Hume regards as one of the necessary features of causality, namely, the knowledge of the constant conjunction of C and E before one can claim that C is the cause of E. The first attempt is provided by G.E.M. Anscombe, and in this analysis of causality "the subject is able to give the cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind or way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs"[15]. Macklin points out the significant feature of Anscombe's notion of mental cause, namely, the view that there are recognisable events in the human realm to which Hume's notion of causality is not applicable. What Anscombe is trying to show is that in mental causation, a person possesses the awareness that C causes E without any previous observation or without the knowledge of constant conjunction of C and E as required by Hume. "Note that this sort of causality or sense of 'causality' in so far from accomodating itself to Hume's explanations that people who believe that Hume pretty well dealt with the topic of causality would entirely leave it out of their calculations; if their attention were drawn to it they might insist that the word "cause" was inappropriate or was quite equivocal. Or conceivably they might try to give a Humean account of the matter as concerned the outside observers recognition of the cause, but hardly for the patients"[16].

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According to Macklin, "John Yolton provides a non-Humean notion of cause that is similar to that of Anscombe, and he is in agreement with Anscombe that the notion of cause has been existing in a state of confusion due to the analysis of cause as a uniform and ordered sequence, the analysis initiated by Hume and refined by Kant ... It made our knowledge of cause the result of repeated observations, of induction"[17]. In John Yolton's explanation of causality", "the notion of cause as correlation, as ordered sequence, is clearly inadequate when we seek to formulate our thinking about action ... To say 'X causes Y' usually involves the thought of energy expended, or chemical or electrical processes, of motion and impact. There may be no need to retain these notions of causes in our sophisticated philosophy of nature or science. We need them in our philosophy of man. Yet, paramechanics threatens if we try to apply these pushings and impacts, even these electrical and chemical changes, to thought and action"[18].

Yolton's objections to Hume's explanation of causality are more forceful in his paper: "My Hand Goes Out to You", and he further argues here that Hume's account of cause is not applicable to human action. To Yolton, the operative concepts in human actions are "causes" in many ways. "If we stay with Hume's dictum about not being able to say, prior to experience of the conjunction of C and E, anything about E on the basis of C alone, we must exclude cause from actions. ... For one of the features which distinguishes an action from mere bodily movement is the knowledge of what I am going to do. I cannot be a moral person, that is, responsible for what I do, unless I am the agent of my action. We must quickly conclude that Hume's dictum does not hold for instances of mental causations"[19].

How does the notion of mental cause enter into human action? This is why, I believe, Macklin's view of causality undermines the Humean notion of causality. Macklin offers a good example to illustrate the non-Humean notion of cause or to show that the knowledge of the constant conjunction of C and E (as required by Hume) is not necessary. She asks us to imagine a person, X, who, having seen a strange and terrifying face, Y, as he opens his window, called the police. Definitely X is frightened by the strange face, and the freight leads to his subsequent action of calling the polic, he would reply that strange and terrigying face that he saw caused it. Furthermore, X knows that he is terrified and, according to Macklin, his knowledge of this fact (that he is terrified) is surely non-inductive. In other words, Macklin is arguing that X's knowledge of being terrified is not founded on any previous experience of a strange face that appeared at his window, conjoined with his being terrified and of calling the police. It is even possible that X has never experienced before any conjunction that is in any way similar to this one in question.

Macklin concludes therefore that Yolton's argument for a non-Humean notion of cause is based on the fact that human behaviour, at least, some cases of it, is similar to the example she provides, and where the prior experience of the conjunction of C and E does not obtain. Yet, one knows on the basis of C alone that C is the cause of E. If one tries to formulate X's experience in a causal law according to Macklin, It may be stated thus: 'Whenever an individual sees a strange and terrifying face at the window as is terrified by it, he calls the police'. But, is a causal law of this form necessary in order to explain the behaviour of X in this matter? It is quite absurd, as Macklin points out, to suppose that such a causal law is needed. In other words, she is saying that one does not have to subsume the causal antecedents under laws which can be stated in terms of the example already considered before one can talk meaningfully about the causes of human actions.

Macklin then points out some basic conditions which any causal explanation that claims to be appropriate for human action must satisfy, and those conditions can be achieved beyond the analysis of causality as offered by Anscombe and Yolton. First, it would not involve mechanistic ideas and must avoid some features of the Humean notion of cause. Second, it has to fulfil or satisfy the condition of generality in the sense that it has to be subsumed under some law, and only by meeting these requirements can its relevance to the explanation of human action be justified.

In Yolton's analysis, as Macklin observes, there are some claims made by Yolton but which his opponents (the "mechanists") would quickly reject, that is, that there a notion of cause which is neither Humean nor mechanistic; and where the psychological terms like "volitions", "decisions", "motives", "intentions", etc. serve as examples of mental causes. It seems that if a notion of cause that satisfies the mentioned conditions is accepted, then the psychological terms which Yolton alluded to can be considered or admitted as candidates for the causes of human action.

But the burden of evidence seems to weigh heavily on the shoulders of Yolton and his supporters or school of thought because, as Macklin clearly indicates, in order to meet the objections of the "mechanistics" against causal explanation in the realm of human action it would be necessary to show that the charateristics of this notion of cause (said to be applicable to human action) have also to be found or are also those found in causal explanations used in the natural science. In this case, if it can be shown that a non-Humean or a non-mechanistic notion of cause is used (in some or significant cases) in natural science for accounting for natural phenomena, then the view that the pattern of explanation found in the natural science differs from that which operates in the science of human behaviour will be undermined, if not refuted.

There are cases in the natural science, according to Macklin, where the notion of cause does not fit. into the pattern of the Humean notion of cause. The cases in mind are those in which the antecedent conditions are known to be the cause of events, even though there are no prior observations of this sequence. Macklin gives a good example in the case of the first explosion of atomic bomb. Here, there was a particular event which was not observed before to act in that particular way. There may also be other examples in the realm of chemistry as Macklin also observes. For example, there are cases in chemistry where the combination of certain chemicals produce new compounds even though the particular cause-and-effect sequence is never before observed. If an adequated and complete causal explanation is to be oftered, it would be important to take the microstructure of the chemical world into account. Therefore, the terms under which an event is explained need not be, stated only in terms of observables.

Macklin offers another good example to illustrate this fact. It is not difficult or impossible to find cases or events where person knows that a particular set of antecedent conditions produces a particular result even though he has never had a previous experience of that particular sequence of event. Think of a person who puts his hand in hydrochloric acid believing that it was water. He feels pain as a result of putting his hand into that "Liguid" or acid, and he knows that the pain is due to the putting of his hand into the acid. But he has no prior observation of a similar sequence. In other words, he might not before have put his hand into a liquid that was not water. He might even be unable to explain the nature of the liquid (in this case, the hydrochloric acid) that causes him pain as he puts his hand into it. But he knows something, that is, that the pain he has is caused by putting his hand into the liquid in question, irrespective of its true nature. There is no doubt that Macklin's examples undermine Hume's notion of causality.

Many other cases or examples can be found, but there is no doubt that the examples already given here do not satisfy the Humean notion of causality. In fact, they seem to confirm or support the views of Donald Davidson that "we are usually far more certain of singular causal connection than we are of any causal law governing the case"[20].

It seems, as Macklin also argues, that it is in the case of particular or singular causal connections that repeated observations of a constant conjunction may not be necessary in order to know that X causes Y. This, in Macklin's view, may be cited as an empirical case in human action, and even though this type of case may not be very common in natural scuence, its existence seems however possible.

ANALOGY BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

Davidson offers an analogy (of causal explanation) between some cases in natural science and the typical case in human behaviour. According to him, "ignorance of competent predictive laws does not inhibit valid causal explanation, or few causal explanations could be made. I am certain the window broke because it was struck by a rock. I saw it all happen, but I am not (is anyone?) in command of laws on the basis of which I can predict what blows will break which window. A generalization like 'windows are fragile and fraile things tend to break when struck hard enough, other conditions being right', is not a predictive law in the rough - the predictive law, if we had it, would be quantitative and would use very different concepts"[21]. What Davidson implies here is that this generalization (like our generalization about human behaviour) has a different function; that is, it offers evidence that there exists a causal law co-vering the case in hand.

Those who reject the Humean notion of cause, as Macklin explains; do not deny that there is, at least, some kind of generalization underlying a singular causal, judgement. Therefore, the important point to be noted is that the causal model which, for some writers, is applicable to all physical phenomena may, by no means, be the only causal model or even the most prevalent one. R. Hancock's view on this point is very significant. He writes: "where the cause is a familiar human action altering the normal cause of events and the result follows immediately; it can be argued that the sequence is recognizably a causal one even though similar cases have never been observed. One can surely see in a single case that, for example, hammering a glass causes it to break, without ever having experienced this sequence before: the use of causal language no doubt presupposes some kind of regularity in experience, but the same is true of the use of causal language in interpersonal causation ... I conclude, therefore that while it is true many cases of physical causation cannot be recognised as such apart from past observation of the same sequence, this is not in general true of physical causation and does not prove a difference in meaning between causal language in interpersonal and physical connection"[22].

It is important to recognize that whatever analogy may exist between some cases of causal explanation in natural science and the typical situation in human behaviour, the explanation of such causal principle is very complex. This means, as Macklin points out, that it is an over-simplication of the issue of causal explanation to look for *efficient cause* or the cause of any event or action. For example, since the explanation of events in science (at least, in natural and biological science) often embraces some theoretical entities, Macklin wonders if some descriptions of psychological phenomena may not also embody such theoretical terms. In other

words, she is suggesting that some explanations of human action can also include some references to unobservable entities or micro-phenomena.

What Macklin seems to emphasize here is that in a case like the one already mentioned (where complex scientific explanations involve theoretical entities), nobody determines the cause (of an event) simply by experiencing or noting a constant conjunction between observable antecedent conditions as well as the subsequent effects (as Hume maintains). An example can be found in biology according to Macklin, where the cause (may be one of the causes) of an abnormal (animal) behaviour may be traced to mutation or to some genetic factors; and the mutation (on the other hand) may have been due to a high degree of radiation in the environment. In this case, any attempt to offer a complete or a satisfactory explanation of this biological phenomenon would mean that reference has to be made to the postulated change in the genetic constitution of the animal, not merely the radiation alone.

Again, causal explanation can be formulated here even though the appeal made to those unobservable or micro-events might not have been observed before. If, as Macklin argues, we can possibly construe some psychological terms as theoretical terms, it would be possible to show that the explanations of human actions are similar to the kind of biological explanation already mentioned. It is doubtful, however, that "mind", as a theoretical entity requiring a deductively, formulated theory as opposed to "mind" as a concept by intuition (and therefore known through introspection) is acceptable today. However, the Humean notion of cause is inadequate for explaining some natural events and human actions; and to suppose that the Humean notion of cause is valid here would mean that many explanations in natural science have to be regarded as non-causal.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to show or to support Macklin's view that there is (or may be) a notion of cause which does not entail mechanism, and that that is appropriate for the xplanation of human action. Even if the examples of such a notion of causes which are cited here may not represent the adequate notion of that *cause*, Mackline still maintains that they open new avenues that may be philosophically valuable and significant. But there is no doubt that some evidences from natural science have undermined the Humean notion of cause according to which our knowledge of cause is always regarded as inductive in nature.

Finally, as Yolton remarks, "if we free ourselves from some of the Humean notions of cause, as well as from the mechanical notions of causes as pushes, we may free ourselves from talking of mental causes in the important sense of mental events which control behaviour"[2 3]. If a non-Humean or a non-mechanistic sense of cause is possible, Macklin concludes, if a "mental cause" is acceptable, then the problem of teleology has to be re-examined. Until now, mechanistic philosophers believe that the problem is dead and buried.

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FATALISM AND NOT SUPERSTITION

S. B. Oluwole

Fatalism is generally regarded, at worst, as an obnoxious theory that flouts all experience. At best, it is seen as synonymous with the scientific theory of determinism! The first interpretation sees it as involving a practical contradition as well as a denial of the causal law.[1] The second regards it as a denial of the freedom of the will.[2] My aim in this paper is first to refute the adequacy of these popular interpretations and then present an analysis of the theory which I deem consistent with experience and yet avoids traditional criticisms.

The most popular way of putting the theory of fatalism is to sketch it as the claim that all events in the world are pre-determined by a deity or a supernatural force sometimes called 'Fate'. This means in effect, that all empirical occurences are already planned, or 'laid down' in such a way that man has no power to avert their effects or prevent any from taking place. On this very note disappears our illusion that we are free to do what we like so as to bring into existence an event that we want or prevent those we do not want from occurring.[3] Event 'E', for instance, does not happen to Mr. X because he did 'a' at time t_1, 'b' at time t_2, and 'c' at time t_3. According to this version of fatalism, even if X decided otherwise and did 'd' at time t_1, 'e' at time t_2, and 'f' at time t_3, the resultant event would be 'E' all the same, just because Mr. X IS FATED TO EXPERIENCE 'E' AT TIME t_4.

Seen in this light, fatalism amounts to the claim that what must occur must occur NO MATTER OUR EFFORTS. We cannot prevent or effect the occurrence of any event. This is another way of saying that events have no humanly explainable causal connections or at best human actions have no influence on such relationships. For if no matter what we do events that are 'destined' to occur will occur, then there would be no way of avoiding our 'fate' or scientifically predicting the occurrence of future events. It therefore becomes evident that if these are the true claims of fatalism, it is a theory that imbibes indeterminism and denies causality, at least in so far as human actions are concerned with empirical events.

The order formulation of the theory presents it as an affirmation of causality rather than a denial of it. This version is usually analysed as stating that all events are causally connected with, but without possible interfference from man. As such past events determine which present events must occur. These in turn determine

future events, all in an unbreakable causal chain. There is therefore no possibility of changing or preventing the occurrence of any event since we have no way of effecting a change in the past events which determine the occurrence of present and future ones. The causes are past, we have no control over them any more.

Sketched in the second fashion, fatalism becomes synonymous with the thesis of determinism and entails not only pre-destination but also a complete denial of the freedom of the will. This is even more so since determinism accepts the possibility, even reliability of predictions. Thus, if there were an omniscient being who knows all the necessary facts-including how human beings would decide at particular times he would be able to predict the occurence of event 'E' at time t_4.The problem now is not that Mr X would have been unable to prevent the occurence of 'E' if he did 'd', 'e' and 'f' instead of 'a', 'b' and 'c' respectively at items t_1, t_2, and t_3 Rather it is that Mr X will be unable to make the initial change from 'a' to 'd' because 'a' has been determined by the events that occurred prior to it, and which Mr X has no power to change any more at time t_1. The belief that Mr X could have done 'd' instead of 'a' derives from a logical rather than a practical possibility. It is the assumption of this logical possibility that makes the idea of freedom meaningful.

Some advocates of determinism have refuted the latter as a faithful rendering of the main tenets of their theory. According to these authors[4], determinism does not entail the implied invariable, necessary connection between events as presented above. What the theory of determinsim claims is that it is possible, on the basis of our experience of the sequence of the occurrences of events, to formulate mathematical laws which are useful aids in predicting the sequence of future events, given a full knowledge of ALL relevant facts. When we go further and observe the actual occurrences of such events we discover to our pleasure that they more often than not coincide with our expectations. On such occasions we say our predictions come true. But then determinism does not claim either that we have a method through which we can assure ourselves that ALL our predictions MUST come true or that events in themselves are NECESSARILY CONNECTED. Determinism takes cognizance of the possibility of the failure of our predictions. Our faith in the reliability is based on the fact that past experiences show that events often follow regular paths of occurrence. We therefore formulate our predictions along these discovered paths knowing fully well that future events may not necessarily follow the same paths at all times and under all conditions.

This 'new' formulation of determinism is seen by many as successfully avoiding the necessity which fatalism concedes. If determinism is not wrongfully regarded as the claim that all predictions or causal laws are documentations of logical relationships among events, then the talk of a pre-ordained sequence of events does not arise[5]. All that determinism states is that given Mr. X's

decisions at times t_1 through t_3, we can predict the ocurrence of 'E' at time t_4. This possibility of predicting 'E' from full knowledge of 'a', 'b' and 'c' is all that determinism claims. Had Mr X decided otherwise and did 'd' instead of 'a' etc., the resultant event would have been something other than 'E'. In such cases it becomes apparent that Mr X can change what was to occur to him at time t_4.

II

The first traditional way of formulating the thesis of fatalism, to my mind, is nothing short of an allergory. It is a beautiful metaphorical way of putting forth the philosophical issues at stake. This anthropormorphic coloration of the theory as involving the existence of some animate force that dictate every occurence of empirical events is nothing but an artistic presentation which is an unscientific way of stating an otherwise systematic philosophical thesis. Fatalism as a refusal to acknowledge man's undeniable efficacy to effect a change of an impending event need not lead us to a deity nor to a claim of indeterminism. It needs not hold that men's actions have no effects on the occurrence of future events in general. Fatalism may well accept the law of causality but at the same time deny man's absolute efficacy in changing the future. And this can be seen from the very premises of determinism.

First, if determinism is true in its 'new' form, then Mr. X's actions are equally traceable forwards and backwards on the regular paths between causes and effects, even if this is taken only in the Humen sense. Given the prior occurrences of 'a', 'b' and 'c' therefore, we can predict the occurrence of 'E'. A denial of this is not just simply that of a logical necessity between the occurrences of 'a' through 'c' on the one hand and 'E on the other as their effect as the new formulation suggests. It is essentially a complete denial of determinism not just as a theory of natural law but as a universal law itself. And there is a world of differences between these two claims.

The 'possibility' with which we replace 'necessity' in our new presentation is not to be regarded as the relationship between occurrences 'a', 'b' and 'c' and the occurrence of 'E' as their effect. Rather it is a replacement of the necessity that our prediction must always come true with the claim that predictions contigently come true. If we regard this transpolation as different relationships between causes and their effects, then it follows logically that Mr X's different groups of choices could both bring about the occurrence of the event 'E' or each brings about the occurrence of either 'E' or 'D' at time t. In each of these cases there can be no claim to possible method of calculations which will enable us to predict with any iota of faith what event to expect at time t_4, no matter how 'unnecessarily true' we may regard such predictions. The fact is that there can be no predictions possible AT ALL, because the conjunction of any events whatsoever can bring about the occurrence of any event whatsoever at whatever time.

This seemingly simple problem takes a much more serious dimension if two of these possible effects are contradictory. In that case, indeterminism rather than determinism would be a much more faithful rendering of the paths followed by empirical events. In other words, we would have to accept that natural events are not subject to any calculable laws of causation. A full knowledge of Mr X's decisions at times t_1 through t_3 will give us no clue as to what event to expect at time t_4.

At this juncture fatalism becomes a logical entailment of determinism either as a total denial of necessary causal relationship between events or an affirmation of it. Prediction is possible only if we assume a regularity of behaviour as an inherent feature of natural events. It is only if past events determine present ones and these in turn determine future ones that the belief in the possibility of prediction becomes reasonable. If this is not so, then we must concede the uselessness of formulating predictive laws since these would have no relevance whatsover to the occurrences of natural events which on the basis of the alternatives above are as whimsical as the changing colours of the chameleon—or even worse than it still since the chameleon is supposed to change its colour according to the prevailing circumstances around it!

Shall we then imbibe indeterminism in preference to determinism and thus accept fatalism? I should say not necessarily. Fatalism, if adequately formulated can, in my opinion, accomodate both determinism and indeterminism. This sounds contradictory but it can really be consistently systematized.

III

The law of determinism we said, simply states that natural events, most times, have causally related effects. This means that given the events prior to the occurrence of 'E' we can by calculation arrive at an expectation of 'E'. This is the basis of the belief in the reasonableness of prediction. The theory of indeterminism does not have to reject this. All it needs deny is the universality of determinism. In other words the thesis of indeterminism does not have to postulate that there are no causal connections between events What it must deny is both the notion that there is an invariable connection between natural events as well as the belief that causality is UNIVERSALLY TRUE of ALL empirical occurrences. Our formulation of fatalism therefore takes off from the acceptance of the possibility of there being causal relations between events. It only stresses that no amount of accuracy can vouchsafe the necessary truth of any prediction. I personally regard this as the true rendering of the thesis of determinism but a very often misunderstood tenet.

It is true that any claim of possible calculation must assume some regularity of the behaviour of events. This regularity need neither be identical with invariable connections nor with whimsical changes that defy all evidence of correlative causal relationships among such events. Yet some regularity, no matter how variable, must be assumed for prediction to take place at all.

If we do not take either determinism or indeterminism each in its extreme form, that is, if we do not regard each as the one and only natural principle that determines all empirical occurrences, then we can formulate a theory of fatalism that is both consistent and at the same time realistic, faithful to every aspect of our experience. And this we do without any danger of falling into self-contradiction. First I shall illustrate how this is theoretically possible. Then I shall try to show the implications of this compromise in practical terms.

Suppose Mr. Y who is not a fatalist but a determinist predicts that Mr. X (who is also not a fatalist) will experience 'E' at time t_4. Mr X asks whether he can prevent the occurrence of 'E'. Mr. Y, if he is a traditional determinist, must admit the impossibility of Mr X's ability to change or prevent event 'E'. If Mr Y is a reformed one, he must concede this possibility but then he must also accept the non-necessary nature of causality. For if Mr Y truly holds that events are by nature predictable, then he cannot allow that Mr X can jump up in the middle of a chain of occurrences and prevent an impending event. It is not enough to say that this excuse is justifiable since we now note that events are not logically connected with one another. Nor is it alright to claim that since event 'E' is casually determined by other events in conjunction with Mr X's decision, a change of that decision will necessiate a change of the resulted event.

All these explanations sound well and good, but they take too much for granted. Mr. Y's prediction of 'E' cannot be valid with an exclusion of Mr. X's decision at time t_1 unless we want to claim that X's decision is not part of the determinant causes of the predicted event for time t_4. Furthermore Mr. X's decision itself is an event and as such the causal effect of prior events. If determinism is true, then it should not be possible for Mr X to change his decision at time t_1 and that without any causal hinderance. If we become less deterministic and say that the fact that actions are casually connected does not mean a particular decision is bound to be made at a particular time, then we are smuggling in some element of indeterminism and thus we end up denying not the law of causality but its universality. Man becomes free to make whatever decisions he likes but once a decision is made the law of causality takes over from there.

These reformulations, I think, still contain some inherent contradictions. No matter the amount of contigency we allow between

the causal relationships of events, once we allow the possiblity of whimsical decisions effecting causal processes, then we make a child's play of our belief in the meaningfulness of predictions. Man's actions, since they are not causally determined, will not themselves be predictable but at the same time will be partly accountable for changing event 'E' to event 'D' or even for a negation of 'E'. If man's decisions are so free, then how can we justify the possibilty of prediction when one of the essential functional elements that makes prediction possible is itself unpredictable?

Again our alternative is to accept the universality of causation and say human actions are also subject to its laws. If we do, we find ourselves where we started. Mr X cannot change his decision at time t_1 from 'a' to 'd' hence he cannot prevent the occurrence of E. Therefore whether we accept or deny causality, we still end up with fatalism UNLESS we view some notions of causality differently from the way it has generally been viewed by many.

IV

What then is fatalism if it follows from both the denial and the affirmation of determinism? We can answer this question only from a redefinition of our views about both of these theories. Fatalism can safely take off from a view of determinism when the latter denotes causal laws as raliable documentations of the regularities noted in the occurrences of past events. This is consonant with the fact that although we do meet with deviant cases, we ignore or dismiss them and that in good faith. We do this because our predictions of future occurrences can only be systematically worked out on an assumption of some regularities in the succession of events. We also note that at times our predictions run foul of what later occurs. In such cases we can only gape in awe for we have no way of making sure that ALL our predictions must come true. The best we can do under such circumstances is revisit our existing laws and mathematical calculations to see whether there are ways whereby these deviant cases can be calculatedly intergrated into future predictions. But then we mustbe careful not to press this too far or else we may be guilty of an offence of which we have earlier on warned ourselves, namely that we do not regard causal laws as logical necessites. A true empiricists' position would therefore be to concede the possibility of some erratic occurrences of events. The falsity of our prediction will then be seen not as a result of the mathematical inadequacy of our method nor the incompleteness of our knowledge of facts but as a result of the possibility that the nature with which we are confronted MAY, AFTERALL NOT BE WHOLLY RATIONAL.

Fatalism therefore draws our attention to the inadequacy of trying to replace OUR IDSCOVERY of regularities in nature with an INHERENT NATURAL NECESSITY whenever our prediction fails. This indeed is the great message of Hume's philosophy, but the idea that nature may not be wholly rational does not entail that it is wholly irrational! When a fatalism argues that we cannot prevent the occurrence of a predicted future event he does not necessarily have to say either that our decisions and actions have no causal effects or that the predicted event must of necessity occur. All he can legistimatley claim and maintain is that we have no sure way of estabilishing that our attempts to change a future event will necessarily be successful. This view is consistent both with determinism as well as with indeterminism, again provided we do not regard either as universally, and hence necessarily, true.

Many will see our analysis here as contradictory to the traditional views of fatalism. As we noted earlier on the fatalist is usually depicted as one who uncompromisingly denies the causal efficacy of man's actions. He holds, they say, that "what will happen will happen no matter our decisions". One does not have to be a philosopher to see that a corollary of this position should be that we close down all places of man's activities and endeavours, all schools and hospitals since they are of no avail in making us what we are not fated to be or prevent any impending event or cure our ailments. One of the popular illustrations of the belief of the fatalist is the claim of the soldier who says "if a bullet has got your number on it, it cannot miss you".

Well, I do not see what is specially ridiculous in this except that it is ridiculously presented. For if we ever sat down to ask why X is a soldier, the answer may be that he freely joined or that he was conscripted the biblical way which means that a number of previous events causally account for his being in the army, and this partly determines how he would die. Or we may go indeterministic and say his death is not determined by his being a soldier. In both cases X has no way of determining how his death will come. This again does not mean that his actions are irrelevent to how eventually he dies. The point is that we do not always have an invariable assurance that we will die the way we want. We have already warned ourselves that this should not be mistaken to mean that this failure

is due to the incompleteness of our knowledge of all relevant facts. The point is that natural events by their very nature do not always submit themselves to calculations that vouchsave the certainty of man's control. It is evident that it is not always the bravest soldier that comes home alive nor is it the most conwardly that dies first. A number of facts will of course account for every death yet we are all incaptable of every escape in precisely the esence in which we have analysed above. The Yoruba man is therefore not being unnecessarily superstitious in the debased sence when he has it that:

X was told he would die of water.
He determines neither to swim nor even go near a river.
Mr. X takes a sip of water at home, has hiccup and dies.
He has been killed by water!

V

We may now illustrate our considerations with a more cogent example. Mr. Y is a fatalist, and predicts the death of Mr. X for Sunday.the 5th of June, 1988. Mr. X who is not a fatalist engages him in the following argument:

Mr. Y: Mr. X, I predict you are fated to be killed by a bus at Tinubu Square on Sunday the 5th of June, 1988 exactly at 2 p.m.

Mr. X: You mean I cannot prevent this?

Mr. Y: Yes, you cannot.

Mr. Y: Even if I lock myself up in a room at No. 10 Modele Road, Yaba at that material time?

Mr. Y: You will still be killed at Tinubu Square at that specific time.

Here Mr. X pulls his net. An apparent contradiction is involved in Mr. Y's argument. His fatalistic view involves:

(a) Mr. X being locked up in a room at Yaba, and
(b) Mr. X being killed some ten kilometers away both at the SAME TIME: This shows that fatalism not only flouts experience but that it is a ridiculously absurd theory since it leads to a practical contradiction and as such an impossibility on the simple note that no one macro-individuated entity can occupy two different special locations at one and the same time.

This is the type of ridiculous answer credited to fatalists to prove the ridiculous nature of fatalism. But what exactly does the fatalist mean by his last answer? Definitely he cannot be implying the possible bilocational nature of Mr. X. All he needs insist upon is that events before the predicted death of Mr. X will be such that it will be practically impossible for Mr. X to realise his planned escape.

Imagine Mr X waking up on the morning of Sunday 5th of June, 1988 determined to prevent his impending death. As early as 8 a.m. he goes to Modele Road, Yaba and locks himself up refusing to go out even for a blink of the eye. At 1 p.m. fire suddenly breaks out at No. 10 and X's room is engulfed in smoke. Mr X is seriously injured and had to be rushed to the General Hospital, Lagos, for treatment. On its way the ambulance conveying him collides with an army bus. Mr. X is killed by the bus, at Tinubu Square, on Sunday 5th of June 1988, exactly at 2 p.m.:

What shall we say? Mr. X's actions did have effects on his death, yet they were ineffective in changing Y's prediction. Have we not made our example intentionally naive so that it can easily bend to our analysis? I do not think many will deny that occurrences more bizzare than this do occur in real life.[7] These may be fewer than other regular events but their existence cannot be denied. As much as they do not provide us with a universal law depicting the regular behaviour of events so also do they testify to the fact that the more regular ones do not either.

What have we so far been able to show about fatalism? Our considerations have been meant to remind us that although we may not accept the whole of the philosophy of David Hume, we cannot but concede that he has sucesstully warned us of the danger of regarding the regularity observed in occurrences of natural events as evidence that they are governed by logical laws.[8] We cannot legitimately force man's rational laws on nature in the belief that these necessarily coincide with mathematical laws. We can, of course make our epistemological laws metaphysical by making them Kantian. Yet the Copernician Revolution that thus results, namely, that nature, if it is to be meaningful TO US,must subject itself to our cognitive apparatus, does not thereby become a metaphysical reality. Objectifying nature becomes justifiable only on epistemological grounds.

The wish that all events are explainable as logical necessities is as old as philosophy itself. This illegitimate demand was first made by the critics of the first Atomists. Democritus [9] and others has postulated that:

(i) There was void, empty space that is;
(ii) There were innumerable atoms;
(iii) The atoms were limited in kind;
(iv) Atoms were falling down;
(v) Events are the results of collisions of atoms in space.

The Atomists thus presented a consistent, coherent theory of the world that is commesurable with the observed events in the world But critics$_{10}$ felt that an essential aspect of the theory was left unexplained. What caused the first collision, they asked. If the first event was the result of an accident, then we have two problems, not one. A claim that this accident occurred because it is in the nature of the atoms so to behave makes indeterminism an inherent law of nature. But then, so the claim goes, the world that resulted from these and subsequent collisions seem too rational to be the result of an initial accident. In this way, teleology was introduced as the guiding principle of the universe in preference to chance, a term philosophers seem so much to abhor.

And this was the beginning of trouble. The problem of the uncaused first cause has ever since haunted us. I do not think we have good reasons for our uneasiness. Democritus, by making the first event the result of chance need not make chance the invariable guiding principle of the universe. That the first collision of the atoms which set future ones in motions that eventually culminated in the "creation" of the external world was not purposeful but spontaneous does not logically entail the conjecture that all subsequent collisions must be whimsical. Neither does it imply that all later events must henceforth be logically related to the first. In fact, Democritus' position might be explained by stating that micro entities behave differently from the way they do, once they coalesce into macro-entities. And since the behaviour of micro-entities some times explain the behaviour of the macro-entities rational and irrational behaviours may both be natural behaviours of matter at different levels of existence, a position which is very close to if not identical with, today's Quantum theory.

The early atomists may then be regarded as fatalists in the sense Plato indeed described them when he stated that according to Democritus things happen both by nature or necessity and by chance.

I think we can, as philosophers, reject Dame Fortune and still retain our notions of change and of causality as Aristotle took him to do. All he needs do is to explain that although the first event of 'creation' shows a regularity that makes us suspect that it is causally connected with later ones, that first occurence was itself not

causally determined. Hence even if Democritus makes that first behaviour a result of an inherent force in the atoms, this would not destroy the claim that causality stepped in at the point of combination. The initial accident only provides an explanation of occasional deviant occurences. The possibility that the atoms may in future repeat this whimsical behaviour does not therefore rule out the possibility of systematic relationships which make prediction possible. All that Democritus draws our attention to is the fact that human experience justifies both rational and irrational behaviours of the atoms. This, in essence, means that we must recognize both causality and chance as two indispensable facts (not necessarily laws) of nature.

CONCLUSIONS

The solution which our analysis of fatalism provides to the basic problem of determinism and indeterminism is not that of a denial of the reality of causal connections amongst empirical events nor of the truth that some occurrences defy that causal principle. What our thesis denies is the necessary connection between events. Fatalism adequately formulated sees both causality and chance as co-existing phenomena. But it also refuses to accept the popular position that one of the two views must give way to the other. Rather than accept this recommendation which is based on the erreneous view that the two theses are contradictory, fatalism emphatically denies the reasonableness of making one of them the ONE AND ONLY UNIVERALLY TRUE LAW OF NATURE. In this sense, fatalism is more faithful to human experience because it does not discard any aspect of nature at the expense of another. What it emphasises is the helplessness of man when nature goes irrational.

Thus the incorporation of some erratic behaviour of the elements into a viable theory of science proves the realization of the non-necessary nature of causal laws. This is why fatalism gives room to chance occurrences that defy man's wisdom. This is the fate beyond man's control.

It is ironical that man, who tries to force reason into nature via the process of formulating mathematical laws as determinants of nature events, is himself not totally rational. But even if he were, the fact that man remains a rational being within a world that is partly irrational is not, in any sense, a paradox.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

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THE POVERTY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY: A DEFENCE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

Olusegun Ladipo

Western Democracies, according to C.B. Macpherson[1], rest on two 'maximizing claims': (ii) the claim to maximize individual utitities; and (ii) the claim to maximize individual powers[2]. These two claims, according to him, are 'made in the name of individual personality. The argument in both cases is that the liberal society provides for the great measure of the realization of human personality...[3]. Accordingly the theoretical basis of liberal-democratic practice has been one that de-emphasizes state control in favour of individual rights and freedoms; it is based on a conception of the individual as being 'essentially the proprietor of his own power and capacities, owing nothing to the society[4]. On the basis of this assumption, liberal theorists (from Hobbes to Hayek) hold that human relations are essentially contractarian, since, as free agents, men can only enter into relations with others on a voluntary basis. Thus, society has no right to coerce an individual into any relation which is against his interest. Political society, then, for the liberals, is a 'human contrivance for the protection of the individual's property in his person and goods, and (therefore) for the maintenance of orderly relations of exchange between individuals who are regarded as proprietors themselves'[5] '. Thus any social policy that tends to interefere with individual rights is considered unjust.

To the liberals, therefore, 'social justice' is a mirage because 'it is thought to be much more difficult to establish the justice of any particular pattern of holdings than a particular procedure of acquisition and transfer'[6]. Not only that, it is also thought that any attempt to make 'social justice' a reality necessarily involves constant redistribution, an exercise which is thought to be incompatible with 'any reasonable amount of individual liberty'[7]. A necessary connection is therefore postulated between the maintenance of a so-called 'perfect marked order' and justice such that any attempt to redistribute income in order to improve the personal welfare of individuals within a society is considered unjust. This is not to say that liberals do not recognize the need for social organization. No. They do, in fact, recognize this since they do, at least, accept a minimum form of social organization that will guarantee the impersonal operation of the market system (the price mechanism that is); all they are trying to say is that 'since freedom from the will of others is what makes a man human, each individual's freedom can rightfully be limited only by such obligations and rules as are necessary to secure freedom from others'[8]. This is a point that is clearly expressed by J.S. Mill in his popular essay "On Liberty"

when he maintains that the sole end for which men are justified in interferring with each others' liberty, either solely or collectively is 'self-protection' and the only part of the conduct of the individual that is amenable to societal control is that "which concerns others'[9]

The attempt, in this short paper, is not to show, like Macpherson, that the assumptions of the liberal-democratic theory are no more adequate for a 'moral competition between West and East'[10] or that they cannot sustain 'a fateful race between ontological change and technological change'[11]; the attempt, rather, is to show that the liberal-democratic theory is faulty, because of its too narrow and unrealistic conception of man, freedom and the nature of the social organization that provides a minimum condition for the possibility of mutual inter-actions between individuals in a society. My position is, therefore, going to be a defence of "Social Justice" to the extent that I intend to argue that the performance of welfare functions by any social organization (the state that is) does not entail a violation of civil rights.

The liberal-democratic theory, as already noted, rests on a 'particularly individualistic conception of liberty'[12]. Locke, for instance, held that although man in the state of nature is absolutely free (he absolutely controls his own person and possessions), 'the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure'[13]. What motivates men to unite in society under one social organization, then, for Locke, is the need for them to mutually preserve their lives, liberties and property. 'The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government', he wrote, 'is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting'[14]. For traditional liberalism, the individual is born with certain inalienable rights-namely, the rights to life, liberty and property. The primary (if not the sole) function of the state, then, according to this theory, is the protection of those rights. In other words - and according to traditional liberalism - the state exists for the primary purpose of preventing and settling conflicts, or, to put it in another way, the keeping of order and the maintenance of security, within society. This conception of the role of the state, it is obvious, is an essentially negative one; for what it emphasizes is the prevention of harm to existing rights or existing well-being, not the positive function of adding new ones or redistributing old ones. And the argument for this restriction on the role of the state is that the individual should be left a large area of liberty as possible, so as to ensure his effective participation in the competitive market economy which the liberal-democratic theory is meant to justify.

This essentially negative conception of the role of the state rests on a fundamental assumption -i.e. the assumption that the market system is impersonal in its operation, such that it can guarantee free market relations between 'utility-maximizing individuals'. Traditional liberalism considers the advantages of the impersonal operation of the market order to be: (i) that of guaranteeing individual rights; and (ii) making it possible for 'utility - maximizing individuals' to make gains from trade, thereby making all possibilities of exchange to be exhausted and, consequently, allowing for an 'efficient and optimal allocation of resources'[15].

But, can the two advantages just listed be derived from an impersonal operation of a market system, guaranteed by a social order which only fashions out rules for mutual transactions and exchanges between free agents; and to what extent, if any, can the assumption that the market system operates impersonally be justified, given our understanding of the nature of the "social order" (i.e. the state)? An attempt to answer these two questions, I believe, is likely to expose the fundemental weaknesses of the liberal-democratic theory.

The advantages claimed by liberal theorists in favour of a minimal conception of the role of the state cannot be realised, given certain basic facts about man and society. The fact is incontestable, I think, that men are not equally endowed in their capcities and abilities (both mental and physical). Therefore, in a free competition between individuals, some people are likely to gain more than the others. This possiblity seems not to constitute a danger to the extent that we can talk of the availability of a limitless quantity of consumable resources within society, such that each individual has chances of getting as much of these resources as his abilities and capabilities allow. But, is this the case? This, obviously, is not the case; for we do know that the consumable resources of a society (Land, for example) at any particular point in time are limited. This being the case, a free-for-all struggle for resources, against a background of unequal individual powers (as manifested in their mental and physical capabilities) is likely to lead to a situation in which the more of these resources some people have, the less the others have. It is impossible, under this kind of situation for men to maxmize their 'individual utilities'. And since there exists a dialectical relationship between the maximization of individual utilities and the maximization of individual powers such that one (the maximzation of individual powers) cannot be achieved without the other (the maximization of individual utilities) and vice versa, it becomes obvious that a free competition between people of unequal natural endowments within a society with limited economic resources,

rather than lead to an optimal allocation of resources is likely to lead to a lop-sided allocation in which some individuals (a few ones at that) are favoured at the expense of many others. Now, since the achievement of the two maximizing claims on which the liberal-democratic theory is based - i.e. the maximization of individual powers and the maximization of individual utilities is only possible if an optimal allocation of resources within society is possible, it follows that they cannot be achieved, given the fact - which has already been argued for - that the free, but unequal competition, engendered by an impersonal operation of the market order cannot lead to an optimal allocation of resources. This is one aspect of the poverty of the liberal-democratic theory; that the society it postulates cannot provide the expected benefits.

Let us now consider the question as to whether the assumption of liberal theorists that the market order operates impersonally can be justified, given our understanding of the nature of the state. The answer to this question is, again, bound to be negative. This is because liberal theorists do admit the existence of the social order (the state) which is expected to provide the framework within which the market order could operate. But we do know that the social order is a product of our getting together in society. It is thus socially constituted and has rules which are expected to regulate certain activities within society. These rules are not God-given. They are made by people who have interests, nurse hopes, have aspirations and commitments; people who can be influenced, pressurised and so on, not the Rawlsian 'people of the original position', who are ignorant of their circumstance, needs and so on. If that is the case - and certainly it is - then we have to admit the possibility of rules being made to suit particular interests - an admission which betrays the pretentiousness of the claim that the rules that regulate the operations of the market order and interpersonal relations within society are abstract, impersonal rules. This possibility - coupled with the fact that rules are not just made with no ends in view; they are always made in relation to certain known or postulated consequences clearly shows that the operation of the market system is not as impersonal and as free as liberal theorists would want us to believe. But if individual utilities and powers can only be maximized if we had a market system which is free and impersonal in its operations, the demonstration that there is no such market order (i. e. a market order which is free and impersonal in its operations) clearly leads to the conclusion that individual powers and utilities canot be maximized within a liberal social order. This is another demonstration of the poverty of the liberal-democratic theory which is that its postulation of an impersonal and free market system is a flight from reality. For even if we grant that the operators of the social order are unbiased in their fashioning of rules, we still have to recognize the activites of different participants within the market system who have particular interests to protect.

III

Let us, at this juncture, consider the specific issue of whether it is necessary to fashion out rules to guarantee social and economic rights, in addition to civil rights, for people in a society - another fundamental assumptions of liberal-democratic theory being that civil rights are incompatible with social and economic rights. The reason why this is held to be so, according to one of the leading 20th century exponents of the theory (F.A. Hayek), is that 'the new rights could not be enforced without at the same time destroying the liberal order at which the old civil rights aim'[16]. This claim, I want to argue, rests on a rather narrow conception of 'rights to freedom' which arise 'from our respect for a person's autonomy'[17] Yet, it is obvious that there are other rights, especially 'social contract rights', to which everybody is entitled by being member of particular societies. For in coming together to live in groups, men concede certain 'rights to freedom' to the social order, because it is believed that it is within such an order that there can be equitable distribution of benefits and burdens within society. If all individuals in a society are required to obey rules, irrespective of their abilities and capacities then, of course, they should also be able to enjoy certain basic benefits of social organization, irrespective of their abilities and capacities. Such benefits, I think are those which can be considered as minimum needs which people living in society should be able to satisfy if, indeed, the social order is to be regarded as a just one. And although the conception of these rights may vary from society to society, nobody is likely to contest the fact that they should include the provision of basic amenities like piped water, roads, schools, health institutions and so on.

Liberal theorists also claim that the enjoyment of additional social and economic rights by the people in a society will necessarilly lead to an infringement on abstract individual freedoms. In other words, it is held that any expansion in the frontier of rights - to include social and economic rights - will necessaryily lead to a curtailment of freedom, since it would mean an increase in the powers of the state. This claim is untenable. There is no such necessary connection between the rights of the individuals as members of a society and state power, such that an increase in the frontiers of one will, of necessity, lead to an increase in the scope of the other, as an examination of societies where welfare programmes are being implemented (incidentally, almost all societies now do this) is likely to show. In many societies which encourage free enterprise - the U.S.A. for example - the performance of welfare functions by the state has not led to any noticeable infringement on civil rights such as the right to vote and be voted for, freedom of speech, freedom of association, right to life, right to

personal property and so on — rights the enjoyment of which liberal theorists regard as the hallmark of a free society. Therefore one could not but agree with Peffer when he maintains that 'there are no a priori reasons to reject the notion that men have rights to well-being as well as rights to freedom...'[18]. To maintain that 'rights to freedom' are the only rights we have is to imply given our understanding of the nature of society, the mode of functioning of the social order and the operation of the market system - that freedom simply is the freedom of the powerful few ("power" here taken to be both physical and intellectual) to exploit the weak, thereby leading credence to Trasymachus' definition of "justice" - rightly rejected by Socrates in Plato's *Republic* - as the interest of the stronger party. The acceptance of this conception of freedom implies that men should go back to the "state of nature" where there would be war of every man against every other man and where, consequently, life would be nasty, brutish and short. This, it seems to me, is another manifestation of the poverty of liberal-democratic theory.

IV

An important objection that is usually raised against the suggestion that, apart from 'rights to freedom', other rights to well-being' and 'social contract rights'[19] should be guaranteed by the state is this: That 'social justice" tends to destroy genuine moral feelings (1) by encouraging what has been called 'malevolent and harmful prejudices' and (2) by going against certain traditional moral principles like, for example, that 'each taxable adult is primarily responsible for his own and dependants welfare.....'[20] The first claim can only hold if it can be shown that those who are disadvantageously rewarded by the operation of the social process are naturally bound to be so rewarded. To do this, we should be able to point to certain inherent features of their nature or certain peculiar actions of theirs which make them worthy of being so rewarded. If we cannot do this - and I believe we cannot in most cases - then the inference can be drawn that these people are what they are, not because of any natural deficiency or lack of effort on their own part, but because of the way the social process has been, or is being, directed. Thus, contrary to what liberal theorists would want us believe, it is the failure to recoginse other kinds of rights apart from 'rights to freedom' that leads to the nursing of 'malevolent and harmful prejudices'.

The second claim that the demand for social justice destroys certain traditional moral principles does not hold either; since nobody is saying that individual initiatives and drives should be disregarded in considering who merits what within society or that there should be strict equality among individuals in society. The point that is being made is that any inequalities or differences,

arising out of the way benefits are distributed among individuals within society, should be capable of being justified by reference to certain objective facts of the given situation or individual, not by any vague (perhaps insincere) reference to the impersonal operation of abstract rules within society. Nothing in the demand for social justice within society, then implies the destruction of genuine moral feelings (whatever these are), since there is no incompatibility and the demand that the social process be directed toward an equitable distribution of benefits and burdens within society.

V

It could be seen that the liberal-democratic theory is faulty, not only because its justifying claims are contradictory, that also because it is based on a narrow and unrealistic conception of rights and freedom within society. And since it is based on a misinterpretation (deliberation?) of the social process, it cannot be other than what it is - a poverty-stricken theory which cannot even sustain the practice it claims to justify. Now, to the extent that the demand for social justice is a genuine demand dictated by certain objective facts about the operation of the social process, it cannot but be regarded as a realistic one to which any good government should not only listen, but should also faithfully and positively respond.

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