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CONTENTS

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TOWARDS A RATIONAL FORM OF MORALITY

By

F. A. Adeigbo

INTRODUCTION: Status Questions

I wish to describe my approach to moral learning as A stage-Sequence Model For Teaching Moral Education. The justification for this description will emerge, I hope, as the model unfolds. Although morality is not a subject on the curriculum of most schools-- at least in the sense in which Physics or Biology is, teachers should be clear on what is involved in the moral development of their students. Every teacher, it is often said, is a teacher of morals. So, whether or not moral education is explicitly introduced in the classroom,there is an obvious case for getting quite clear about the sorts of learning experiences that people must go through if they are to emerge as moral beings from their childhood.

It is sometimes assumed that there is a conflict between different moral positions. For this reason, I must briefly outline the standpoint about morality from which I approach the issue of moral learning. I propose to confine my model to the area of morals that is concerned with interpersonal rules. That is to say,my interest is in the emergence of a **Rational Form Of Morality,** which enables a person to adopt a stance critical of tradition but not subjective. This kind of stance, needless to say,cannot be characterised purely in terms of **a person's ability to reason,** in the sense of making inferences. If this stance is to be effective,it must be supported by the demand for consistency,order,clarity,and relevance. The ability to reason in the moral domain must be consistent with what Piaget calls "reversibility in thought". But more importantly,an individual engaged in the process of moral development must be able to look at the rules and practices from other people's point of view. In one word, I am adopting a position in moral education similar to that of David Hume who had argued for some kind of shared response amongst human beings. Perhaps neither concern for others nor concern for oneself can be demonstrated as a logical predicates in the application of this interpersonal ethics. However, I am assuming them as pre-conditions in my model of moral development and content learning.

In Epistemology, distinction is made between the form and content of a belief. The content of a belief might be that the "earth is round". But this belief could be held in different ways or for different reasons. It could be believed just because it had been read in a book or proclaimed by an

authority. On the other hand, it could be believed because someone had examined it critically and looked into the evidence for it. Thus a belief with the same content could be held in quite different ways,which would then constitute the distinct forms which the belief might have. This distinction is particularly relevant to accounts of moral development and moral learning. And it is a distinction which is explicitly acknowledge by L. Kohlberg in his account of moral development. Although Kohlberg maintains that the content of rules (e.g rules about not swearing or not stealing) is learnt by instruction and imitation,I shall, in this model,argue that if a child is to internalize a certain type of content,there may only be certain ways in which this can be done at a certain age. In other words, my model takes the point of view that certain theories of content learning (e.g Bruner's theory of discovery learning and Ausubel's subsumption theory) actively impede the development of a rational form of morality. I shall defend this point of view by considering briefly the psychological stages that may be necessary for the development of a rational form of morality and then pass on to developing my thesis about the importance of content learning in the moral domain.

I

Towards Developing a rational form of Morality

The development of a rational form of morality progresses in a three-stage sequences (which is more or less parallel to Piaget's cognitive developmental stages).[2]

The Egocentric or Intuitive Stage

At this stage,the child does what is laid down because he wants to avoid punishment or to obtain rewards. (This should not be confused with the classical instrumental conditioning type of situation,in which some response is reinforced and gradually stamped in without the individual seeing any connection between what he does and the state of affairs (whether pleasant or painful which results). Rather the child is envisaged as seeing the means-end type of connexion. For this stage to have been reached the child must have **developed a basic cognitive and affective apparatus.** Although a child's thinking at this stage is largely dominated by perception rather than by reason, he is no longer an infant beset by various forms of pre-rational wishes and aversions. This stage is called Egocentric (1) because a child interpretes a problem strictly from his point of view,and(ii) because "mental images rather than rules or principles are utilized in arriving at answers".[3]

The question arises: What assumptions do we have to make about the sorts of experiences which are likely to lead to this sort of development? Quite obviously, the framework of concept necessary for rational thought and choice cannot be imparted by specific teaching at this stage. And so,

the child will have to be provided with plenty of concrete experiences. He will gradually come to grasp the organising notions of this experience if he is suitably stimulated. And there is a sense in which these contentions must be true. Afterall, what is being taught and learnt in moral learning is a principle (or set of principles) which provides unity to a number of previously disconnected experiences. This has to be seen and grasped by the learner and it cannot be grasped as a principle unless he is provided with experiences of the item it seeks to unify. If a teacher, for example, is trying to get a child to learn (or grasp) the principle behind the rule that forbids stealing, he has to draw the child's attention to the common features of cases involving theft and hope that the penny will drop, as they say.

In fact, empirical evidence supports the logical analysis of the learning situation in terms of "cognitive stimulation": a child develops a basic apparatus for conceiving of an orderly world by being given an experience of objects and processes instantiating such concepts. There is also evidence that the development of a rational form of morality at this stage can be influenced by socio-linguistic factors. Joseph Klein, for instance, conducted some sociological studies of people who might be termed unreasonable (rather than 'irrational') which shoe that certain learning abilities -- the ability for abstract thought, the ability for generalization, etc. --- develop in proportion to which a people have an elaborated form for language.[4] This strikes me as an interesting notion. Moreso, as it has a parallel in the new idealism of the social sciences. This idealism, at most Wittgenstein-wise and at least Winch-wise, has moved first from stuff to subject and now from subject and now from subject to meaning.

And it seeks to tell us that:

> *Our idea of what belong to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use. The concepts we have settle for us the form of experience we have of the world... There is no way of getting outside the concepts in term of which we think..*[5]

In other words, to say x is real is to refer x to a rule for recognising x on other occasions. And understanding x implies knowing the rules which govern the use of x as well as for re-identifying it. These rules would seem to constitute their own institutional framework. The notion of a rule, then, is crucial to an understanding of what takes place when an individual has developed a rational form of morality. And it is to this stage that I now turn my attention.

The Rule-following Stage

At this stage, a rule (principle) comes to be seen as a rule and to depend for its existence on the will of the peer- group and/ or authority figures. This is a crucial stage in moral development; for it involves the realisation on the part of the child of what it is to follow a rule, to accept a rule as binding on one's conduct. At this stage of development, children come to enjoy following rules and to revel in the sense of mastery that this gives them. They have, as yet, no notion of the validity of rules. They regard them as just there-- supported by the approval of the peer-group. This is a stage when imitation and identification are extremely important in moral growth. If piaget and Kohlberg are right in their assumptions about the development of moral autonomy, then every individual has to go through the stage of rule-following. Bruner points out that in some cultures (for example, among the Wolof in Senegal) this stage is the terminal point of moral learning. This forces one to raise the question: Is behaviour moral once it us shown to be an instance of rule application? Or is it possible to describe moral behaviour in terms of 'habits' or 'custom'? Micheal Oakeshott has argued persuasively that the dividing line between habitual and rule-governed behaviour depends on whether or not a rule is consciously applied. The same point has been articulated by Peter Winch via a distinction on between "learning a rule" and "acquiring a habit":

> *There is a sense in which to acquire a habit is to acquire a propensity to go on doing the same kind of thing: there is another sense in which this is true of learning a rule. These senses are different and a great deal hangs on the difference ... any understanding of what is meant by 'doing the same thing on the same kind of occasion, this is precisely what a human being has to understand before he can be said to have acquired a rule .*[6]

These ideas compel us to subdivide the rule-following stage into (a) that stage where the learner cannot validate the rule beyond citing the will of the peer-groups or some authority figures, and (b) the stage of an intelligent discriminating compliance with the rule. When the child is at stage (a), he is not troubled by the illogical or a-logical character which a rule may possess. It is sufficient that he is told that there is "a rule against cheating" or there is a "rule which forbids disobeying one's parents:, and so forth. Because of the concrete connection between the rule and the action it enjoins or forbids, the child learns to behave accordingly. Thus he learns to obey the rule long before he develops the qualities and abilities essential to a rational form of morality. Kohlberg has called morality at this stage "the good boy morality". And it tends to correspond

to that stage of cognitive development which Piaget refers to as the "stage of concrete operations"[7]. However, in as much as a person does not have a moral education until he can deliberate rationally about moral rules and about alternative courses of conduct, he needs to move from the egocentric and "good boy morality" stages to a stage of autonomy. Now, what types of factors characterise this stage of development?

II

The Autonomous stage: A formal Operations Thinking?

First, for any development to be described as autonomous there need to be a feeling of authenticity or genuineness. This implies that a person does not only accept the rule, but also he can validate his acceptance. There is here the suggestion that the motivation for following the rule is not some extrinsic factor (such as reward and punishment, praise and blame) but an intrinsic (or as I choose to call it, a non arbitrary) reason for his decision to do so.

Secondly, there is required an ability **to stand back** and **reflect** on the rules from the point of view of their validity and/or appropriateness. Piaget connects this aspect of moral development with the reversibility of thought and the ability to adopt the standpoint of others. As one adopts a detached stance on moral rules, he, **ipso facto,** strengthens his ability to resist contrary inclinations that may persist from his experiences in the previous stages (e.g. obeying the rules for reasons of fear, punishment, disapproval, possible ostracism).

I mentioned earlier that striving towards autonomous development is marked by authenticity and a critical reflection on moral rules. I now want to explain what I mean by it and to relate it once again to the piagetian developmental theory. In the moral domain, 'authenticity' is closely connected with the capacity to experience compassion or concern for others in a first-hand way. David Hume puts the point admirably when he remarked that "no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of it's morality". To get beyond the rule-following stage, then, children must not do what is right just because the rule prescribed it or simply out of a 'sense of duty', or because it is the done thing. Rather the decision to do or not to do should be guided by a concern for the situation of the other or others. I will grant that this kind of concern may be difficult for the children at the concrete operations stage, since, as Piaget points out, they cannot as yet connect an act of theft with the harm done to others. This connection is possible only at the **Formal Operations Level** when children are capable of making hypothetical deductions and reasoning.[8] But even so, the child's capacity for sympathy and trust and concern

needs to be nurtured, as Hoffman points out, by a pattern of positively reinforcing social relations.[9]

Reflection on rules has to do with the kinds of reasons regarded as justifying acceptance of the rule (such as concern for others). Reasons for doing things can be indicated early in the life of a child. It seems to me there is enough evidence to show that children are quite amenable to, and can appreciate good reasons. However, the fact that a child, particularly in the early ages, has not accepted his teacher's (or parent's) reason is not a sufficient condition for not doing what is sensible (e.g. not attempting to climb unto a moving locomotive).

Let it be recognised too that institutions (schools, colleges, etc) as learning situations and centers plays a significant role in the moral development of the child, particularly in helping to provide cognitive stimulation of the kind Kohlberg talks about. An institution may provide or hinder this stimulation by what it actively does (e.g.its general system of control) as by the motivational assumptions which it supports. It is unlikely, for instance, that an autonomous student growth will emerge from an authority-riden school systems, where everything (including what is right and wrong) is decided by the fiat of the principal or administrator. Also, students are unlikely to develop a delight in doing things for reasons intrinsic to them if rewards and punishment (but, more often, punishment) form the base of a pattern of reasons for action as well as provide the only incentives to learning. The student's perception of moral values are bound to be coloured by these institutional realities. It is for these reasons that it is essential that institutions should actualised their potential fostening an attitude to rules which go beyond the egocentric or routine rule-following stages. It bears pointing out that if students are to attain a rational form of morality, the educational process should be so organised that children can pass easily from the stage of seeing the rules as connected with rewards and punishment to seeing them as beacon-lights to authentic moral autonomy.

So far, I have tried to show that a child's moral development like his cognitive development progresses in stages. Using Piaget's development theory as a foil, I have tried to trace the stage-sequence of a child's moral development. Beginning with the external stimulus patterns which regularly accompany them, a child perceives the world in terms of objects, and as he does so, he comes to like or dislike them. He does not care to justify his like or dislike. This stage in his moral development I have called the Egocentric or Intuitive stage.

As he develops and/or acquires the use of Language and symbols, he also develops the ability to perceive the world from another person's point of view. He thus learns about the value systems of other people and

their evaluation of his own behaviour. This stage, then, the rule-following stage, kindles the embers of his moral consciousness. But that is not all. As he completes the cycle on Piaget's Concrete Operations Thinking level, he is ready to classify values and priorities relations and obligations.

The stage of autonomous moral growth coincides with Piaget's Formal-Operations stage. At this stage, a child's (or, better still, a "young adolescent's) feeling become "decentred" still further, as they are freed from perceptual processes. Now, moral rules come to be seen as a matter or collective social ideals: the adolescent views his own activities and plans as part of the total activity of the social group.

III

Content-Learning and the Question of Appropriate Technique

I now wish to conclude by raising two questions. The first is: Why should we teach pupils the content of morality? Or what is the importance of content-learning in moral education? And the second is: what technique is appropriate to this type of learning? In raising the second question, I am assuming that the first question can be given a satisfactory answer. **In The Logic of Education,** P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters characterise education as the initiation of persons into desirable forms of life. Such forms of life include the development of desirable qualities as well as some degree of knowledge and understanding. It is possible that these rough criteria are neither necessary nor sufficient for an activity properly to be called "educational". But I think may be regarded as a minimal description of what happens or should happen when we say a person possesses moral education. Properly speaking, a person does not have moral education until he is able to think himself and make his own decision about moral matters, as I have mentioned before. Therefore talk about content learning is better confined to children who cannot deliberate about moral rules and about alternative courses of conduct. What reason might there be for wanting to teach children of this class (or of any class for that matter) some content of morality?

One reason might be that children have been known to perform actions with a high level of risk to themselves and others. As Hobbes one noted a man can be killed while he is asleep by a child. For reason of self preservation and social safety, children ought to be taught a basic code which will help regulate their behaviour. There is also the point that if a child has moral education he is less likely to lie or to steal or to vandalise property. Although one might object plausibly that being morally educated does not guarantee that lie-telling, stealing or acts of vandalism will not happen, we can counter this objection by saying that some moral content learning will forestall them .[10] It has also been maintained that a

great number of people do not develop to a rational level of morality. If this is so, and if the morality of some people is not to remain unthinking or irrational then the learning of content is of crucial importance. These admittedly are instrumental reasons, Are they good enough to justify teaching children a moral content? At the level to which I have confined content teaching, there can be no quarrel with these reasons, although I am convinced that moral education is not valuable merely as a means to serving certain desirable social ends (e.g. order in the classrooms, the safety of school property, or whatever). A moral education is something "owed to" a child. And to provide such education is to do something for the child's sake. The basic idea is the moral education on is importantly related to the dignity that individuals have in virtue of being persons. The necessity entailed in this claim is not a logical necessity, but a deontic one.

On this kind of necessity, a child should be given a moral education even if it could be proved that his having such education is neither in his interest, nor in the interest of his parents or teachers,nor of who might otherwise benefit. This claim, I am persuaded, connects with our intuitions about what **persons should have if they are to be persons.** While one might question the value of medical, political or religious education for any one individual, it is difficult to see how a similar question might be raised to a person's moral education without at the same time raising questions about that person's right to be a person. This, then, is the rationale for moral education. How to teach this type of education is my next concern.

Bearing in mind my stage-sequence model for moral development, the obvious answer to the question of method is to meet the child at the stage of development at which he is. In other words, in moral education as in other types of learning, the pedagogical principle which exhorts the teacher to begin where the learner is a good one to remember. But let me briefly explain what this implies for moral learning.

'Learning that' and Knowing that'

Suppose a pupil has **learned that** Abuja is the capital of Nigeria, we would normally describe his behaviour as knowledge (that is, as **knowing that** Abuja is the capital of Nigeria). And yet we can hardly conclude from this that whenever a person P has **learnt that** Q, he has come to **know that** Q.

Suppose that P has learnt from his tutors that mini-skirts cause cancer in the eye of the beholder, we would be unwilling to describe him as having come to **know that** cancer of the eye is caused by looking at girls clad in mini-skirts. We could not so describe him, that is, without ourselves admitting that looking at mini-skirts does in fact cause eye

cancer. As Israel scheffler has remarked, for us to say that some person, P, knows that such and such is the case is, in general, for us to commit ourselves to the embedded substantive assertion that such and such is the case. Where such commitment is repugnant to us, we will accordingly refrain from attributing knowledge (though we may still attribute belief). In such a situation, we would describe P's **learning that** Q as a case of believing Q. Let us call this a weak or tutorial sense or **learning that.**[11]

There is another use of **learning that** in which we seem to commit ourselves substantively to the content of Q. Suppose P, after intense and painstaking research, did find out that mini-skirts, afterall, do cause eye-cancer. If we describe P's finding as 'learning that...', then, we would be substantively committed to the assertion of the description. Let us call this the strong or discovery use of **learning that.** Now, whereas the tutorial use of **learning that** attribution does not commit us substantively and therefore blocks the generalization of what P has learned, the discovery use precisely does permit such a generalization. Thus, if a child has learned (or has been taught) moral rules and has therefore come to believe these rules, and if further, we are willing to identify with his belief, then we must acknowledge that the child truly believes them and hence knows them.

It is therefore possible for a child to learn about moral rules in the weak or tutorial sense. That is, as a bit of verbalism without really understanding their implications. But to the extent that the development of a rational form of morality is psychological parasitic on one's ability to reason about moral rules, a child must learn them in the strong, discovery sense. He must learn them in the sense of being able to distinguish similar from dissimilar cases and be able to apply them in a variety of situations. Unlike simple skills which may be learnt by watching others do them, moral rules could not be learnt simply by watching others: one needs to act. Nor could they be learnt by a trial-and-error method. A child could not distinguish between 'borrowing' and 'stealing' if he merely watched A and B come out of the book store - each clutching a book. (A has taken the book with the intensions of returning it after he has secured the permission of the book-seller. B has taken the book from the book case when the book-seller was not looking, has not paid for it and does not intend to return it). A child needs to be instructed in the distinguishing features of these two concepts ('borrowing' and 'stealing') and how they function in various language games. But in giving such instruction, it is important, I believe, for instructors themselves to distinguish between aids to learning (such as reinforcements) and processes of learning. At the Egocentric stage of moral development, when a child wants something now or wants something at the expense of others, aids to learning such as

rewards and punishment, praise and blame seem to me to be indispensable. In fact, exponents of the Piagetian theory have maintained that children at this level can only see rules as things to be done or followed to avoid punishment to obtain rewards. They may later come to appreciate moral rules as expressions of their moral autonomy. My own view is that if children are going to be taught moral rules, and if they are to acquire moral learning in the strong sense that I have defined, then, the use of negative (aversive) reinforcements such as punishment, blame, sarcasm or disapproval should be minimised at all levels of the learning process. Aversive contingencies may occasionally produce a good learning outcome. But more often than not punitive and negative techniques are self-defeating, since they generate anxiety and undermine the child's self-confidence. What need to be emphasised more of the time are such positive aids to learning as approval, rewards, parental/teacher warmth and encouragement, which are thought to correlate well with moral learning.

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4. J. Klein , **Samples of English Culture** (London, 1965), pp. 78 - 125.
5. Peter Winch, **The Idea of a Social Science** (London, 1958), p. 15f.
6. Perter Winch, **Opus cit**, pp. 60 - 61
7. Guy, R. Le francois, **Opus cit**, pp. 216f.
8. Guy, R. Le francois, **Opus cit**, pp. 221f At this level, the "young adolescent" need no longer confine his attention to what is real. He can consider hypotheses which may or may not be true, and work out what would follow if they were true.
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SPINOZA AND THE HUMAN CONDITION

By

B. Abanuka

The burden of the First Part of the Ethics of Spinoza is to demonstrate that all things exist in an all-inclusive system, i.e, that apart from substance and its modes, nothing can exist or be conceived. In the Second Part of the Ethics, Spinoza treats the specific essence of man: he considers what belongs to the essence of every man such that if it is removed, the essence of man is removed; and if it is given, the essence of man is given. It is the view of Spinoza that God, considered as the unique substance whose essence is constituted by an infinite number of attributes each of which is infinite in its kind, cannot belong to the essence of man. On the contrary, the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of some of the attributes of God. In this sense, the essence of man is constituted by God and can neither exist nor be conceived without God[2].

The First and Second Parts of the Ethics of Spinoza contain general or abstract considerations from which certain conclusions about man follow. Man, like all other finite beings, depends absolutely on the efficient causality of God with regard to his essence and existence (EI, 25). Although God is the efficient or immediate cause of the essence of man (as he is the efficient cause of the essence of all other things); nevertheless, the existence of man and that of all finite things is mediated in an infinite chain of finite causes (EI, 28). In addition, man is not exempted from the universal or strict determinism which rules all things (EI, 27, 28, 29).

However, certain considerations are specific to man. The human mind is the idea of the body (EII, 13). Also the human body is made up of a number of individual parts of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex, and so is the human mind (EII, 13, Note, EII, Postulate 1)[3]. In addition, the essence of the human mind is knowledge, but the object of this knowledge is the human body, i.e., a certain mode of extension which actually exists (EII, 11, 13). In so far as the essence of man can be considered as constituted by certain modes of some attributes of God, it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite mind of God (EII, 11, Corollary). Consequently, the perceptions of the human mind are those of God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he perceives through the human mind, the essence of which God constitutes. Finally, by overcoming confused knowledge with which it is riddled in

the common order of nature (on account of the modifications of the body), the human mind can come to have a proper knowledge of the infinite divine essence and of particular things (EII, 39, 40, Note, 47)[4]. Since, for Spinoza, will and understanding are modes of Thought, it follows that they are identical, for there is no absolute faculty of volition or of negation and affirmation. In the view of Spinoza, will and understanding are one and the same thing (EII, 49, Corollary)[5]. Such in general outline is Spinoza's abstract conception of the position of man in the order of things, and the possibility of his attaining knowledge and freedom. Spinoza does not stop his considerations on the abstract level; in the remaining parts of the Ethics, he proceeds to show how man can actually realise his freedom through adequate knowledge.

Spinoza brings his abstract or general consideration of the essence of man to a concrete level by his conception of "conatus", i.e., the striving of each thing to persist in existence (EIII, 4). Spinoza already gives a hint to the source of this perserverance in existence of particular things when he said that "God is not only the cause of things coming to existence, but also of their continuing in existence" (EI, 24, Corollary). Particular things are nothing but determinate ways in which God manifests his power. Thus the efficacy of finite causes is the very power of God acting through finite things themselves. Hence, considering the essence of a particular thing purely in itself, the thing in question tends to persevere in existence and can only be counteracted by similar but opposing forces exerted by other things. Therefore, every finite thing, "in so far as it can, and in so far as it is itself, endeavours to persist in its own being" (EIII, 4, Proof). In this manner, Spinoza identifies the "conatus", i.e., the effort of each thing to persist in its own being, with the essence of that very thing in so far as that essence is the power of God working through that particular thing. However, considered as conatus, this essence or power of God as mediated through a particular thing "is nothing but the actual essence of the thing in question" (EIII, 7).

Spinoza's conception of "conatus" can only be properly understood within his consideration of action and passion. Here lies the reason for beginning the Third Part of the Ethics with the definition of "adequate" and "inadequate causes", "actions" and "passions", and "emotion". For spinoza, if we can clearly and distinctly perceive or understand an effect through its causes, then the cause is adequate. It should be noted that adequate causes are not simply conceptual entities. If we can form a clear and distinct idea of something, then the thing is actually existing (given that clear and distinct ideas do not admit of falsity and inadequacy). Consequently, the adequacy of a cause is to be fundamentally understood as ontological: an adequate cause constitutes the effect by its action.

Partial or incomplete constitution of the effect yields inadequate causes, i.e., those causes whose effects cannot be understood through these causes alone. Hence, the term "cause", connotes efficacy and producing an effect. One can equally view a cause as referring to an activity which is adequate or inadequate to produce an effect. When this activity is adequate, Spinoza calls it action. Thus we are said to "act" when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause", and we are said to suffer or to be passive "when something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause" (EIII, Def. 2). What is "done" or takes place, within or without us, i.e modifications of the body, in so far as it changes our power of acting, either increasing or diminishing it, Spinoza calls an emotion or an effect (EIII, Def. 3). Spinoza gives this definition both in terms of the modification or affections of the body and of the ideas of these modification in the mind. To be precise, emotions are changes in a person activity, enhancing or hindering it. Emotions are never neutral; they entail some change in a person's vitality or conatus. Viewed in another way, one can also say that Spinoza maintains that a man's vital activity is constituted of a composition of emotions. In this sense, the emotions are simply the variations in intensity and power of the conatus or the thing's driving power.

In this connection, Spinoza can be understood as affirming that the main characteristic of the person acting is his "power" of acting. One can even go further and say that the very existence of the person acting is this power, both as it pertains to the body's activity and the mind's. In other words, Spinoza sees the cognitive and emotive faculties as one. Similarly, Spinoza denies any split between thought and action[6].

After his definitions and postulates, Spinoza proceeds to a systematic deduction of the actual emotions, carefully giving a balance between those which are actions and those which are passions. Spinoza outlines three primary emotions, desire ("cupiditas"), pleasure ("laetitia") and pain ("tristitia"). Desire is the conatus itself: it is the mind's consciousness of its own striving or endeavour to persevere in its own being. More succinctly expressed, desire is striving itself and its consciousness. Understood in relation to the mind itself, Spinoza calls this striving "will"; considered in relation to the body, he calls it "appetite". But, according to Spinoza, both will and appetite are the same. Spinoza further notes that between desire and appetite there is no difference; they are distinguished only in so far as desire is conscious appetite. In addition, Spinoza says that desire is "the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself" (EIII, Def. of the Emotions, 1). In an explanatory

note, Spinoza more comprehensively characterises desire as "all man's endeavour, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn" (EIII, Def. of the Emotions, 1, Explanation). However, in view of the fact that the emotions can be characterised as relating to the increase or decrease of one's conatus or driving-force, can we also say that desire is the essence of man?

A proper consideration of the above problem seems to show that Spinoza accomodated a certain inconsistency in his procedure, for either desire is the essence of man, or it is an emotion, i.e., a modification of this essence. On close examination, however, this apparent inconsisstency disappears. In the first place, it seems clear that a person's conatus is not merely a formal essence; rather, it is the concretely constituted and changeable energy or activity of his existence. Thus, when Spinoza maintains that desire varies according to man's changing "disposition", he is only saying that a man's power of acting changes, in accordance with the particular and concrete situation of a man at a given time or through some time.

In this regard it seems appropriate to consider dispositions as "structures"[7]. For a human being to exist as this particular composite individual, is to be able to act in a certain way. For Spinoza, a given "structure" or composite does not first "exist" and is only then "affected" by this or that desire. On the contrary, desire is the temporally indefinite (though finite) mode of activity which, considered as activity, is identical with or expresses a given composite or "structure". Understood as man's actual essence, desire or conatus is identical with his essence.

Spinoza deduces the other two primmary emotions in relation to the conatus (i.e., the desire) of every man, and therefore the action and passion of the individual man. Frustration of the conatus such that the power of action of the mind and body is diminished results in the emotion of pain ("tristitia"). While "tristitia" is sometimes translated as sorrow or sadness, Spinoza uses it more in the sense of "pain", though he wishes to include the notion of dejection which goes with the feeling of reduced effectiveness and frustrated effort. Pain is defined as "the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection". The opposite of "tristitia" is "laetitia" which means "pleasure" rather than joy (for which Spinoza uses "guadium") and is defined as the "transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection" (EIII, Def. of the Emotions, 2 and 3). Pleasure is the concomitant of successful striving, while pain is the consequence of frustration[8]. Since by perfection, spinoza means the same as reality, existence or power of action, when he defines pleasure as passage to a

greater perfection and pain as passage to less perfection, he is not using figures of speech, rather he is speaking literally. For Spinoza, pleasure and pain are characterisations of man's degree of self-mastery. In other words, they indicate the extent to which his actions proceed from his nature, i.e., the degree to which he is the adequate cause of that which he does. However, to the extent desire, pleasure and pain are related to external objects, our knowledge of them is through the imagination. In this respect, our ideas of these emotions depend on what we know inadequately. All such emotions which are inadequately known are passions, not actions.

For Spinoza, the root cause of passivity to the emotions is the finite nature of man - i.e., the fact that man is only a part of nature. As Spinoza puts it, "We are only passive in so far as we are a part of nature, which can not be conceived by itself without other parts"; also, "The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes"; he says in addition, "It is impossible that man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause" (EIV, 2 - 4). Confronted with these declarations of Spinoza, one is not only convinced that we have arrived at the darkest part of the Ethics, but also that Spinoza is calmly pessimistic about the condition of man in the order of things. For on account of his finite nature, man, in the common order of nature, is irrevocably bound to the tremendous power of the passions; consequently, he is harrassed by inadequate and confused ideas. Is there a way any ray of light can penetrate this discouraging order of things? Is it possible for man to attain adequate knowledge thereby scaling the limitations of the passions and thus reaching freedom?

Spinoza's Ethics is mainly a search for the liberation of man from confused ideas, and one principal element of that search is his position that "good" and "bad", and generally all evaluative means, are relative: they do not express the reality of things in themselves. Spinoza's view is an outcome of his basic philosophical position. For spinoza, whatever properties anything possesses in Nature flow from the necessary laws of Nature as a whole. Hence, if something appears to us imperfect or bad (i.e., the thing is "not what it should be"), this is simply because we are ignorant of the necessary laws of Nature. If one understands the necessary laws on which particular things depend, one would, as a result, understand the part that various things play in the whole system. In a philosophical sense, all finite things within nature can be described as imperfect, because they are parts of Nature, which alone is complete and perfect. But these finite things fit perfectly into the whole system and

could not be other than they are. Secondly, all general ideas which are employed in distinguishing different kinds of natural things, are confused; they are formed from arbitrary association of ideas, and do not represent the real essences of things. To understand the nature of anything is to fit it into the system of causes and effects of which it is a part. Consequently, all qualitative and evaluative classification are arbitrary and relative. Thirdly, Spinoza denies purpose or design in nature, in the sense that when we say that a thing or person fulfils or fails to fulfil a purpose or design, we imply the existence of a cause which is distinct from (i.e., unrelated with) the effect. In the view of Spinoza, this is a contradiction[9].

In brief, spinoza maintains that a scientific and systematic consideration of nature shows that nothing can be said to be in itself morally good or bad, morally perfect or imperfect. Everything is what it is as a result of necessary laws. To say that someone is morally bad is, in the ordinary sense, to imply that he could have been better. This implication is always and necessarily false and is based on incomplete knowledge. Spinoza permits no sense in which the terms, "good" and "bad", can be applied to persons which is not also the sense in which they are applicable to other natural objects, things and brutes alike. Spinoza's trend of mind is quite disturbing, and raises the question whether an ethic is possible in his strictly deterministic system[10].

Spinoza seems to wriggle out of this impasse by distinguishing between confused thinking and clear or adequate thinking. He holds that ordinarily, one cannot arrive at a clear understanding of ethical principles: the ordinary use of ethical language is based on generalisations which, because they do not express the nature of things, are irremidiably confused. Ordinary ethical language employs standards of judgement of which it cannot give any cogent justification.

Unlike ordinary men, who employ ordinary ethical language, one can construct a standard of judgement for which a convincing justification can be given. This latter approach is possible only for the clear-minded thinker, the philosopher. Therefore, spinoza wishes to found his ethic not on the many general ideas of human nature which confused men use as standards in judging other men, but on the one idea of human nature which only philosophers could employ in judging other men and of course themselves. Thus, after maintaining in his Ethics that good and bad indicate nothing positive in themselves, but are merely ways of thinking, spinoza goes on the say:

> *Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be retained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature which we may hold in*

view, it will be useful for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have indicated
In what follows, then, I shall mean by "good" that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad", that which we certainly know to be a hinderance to us in approaching the said type[11].

It seems doubtless that when Spinoza says that he is setting up an ideal of human nature (i.e., human nature stronger than the present one), and which ideal he strives that he and others may attain, he is implying that such an ideal can be formed as a justifiable standard of judgement. though other ideals of human nature may abound, still this very ideal must have some privileged status.

It is true that spinoza does not in the cited passages say much about this ideal of human nature, which is to be placed before us, nor does he say how to go about attaining the ideal. He fills these details in the fourth and Fifth Parts of the Ethics. Towards the end of the Fourth Part of the Ethics, Spinoza does give some outline of the life of the freeman. A freeman thinks of death least of all things; living among the ignorant, he strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them; he never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith; he hates no one and envies no one; he is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent; he strives to unite other men with him in friendship.

It seems clear that in these statements and others which Spinoza makes in these parts of the Ethics, he is giving a description of that kind of human nature which we may take as the ideal for our judgement. This certainly is the stronger human nature which Spinoza endeavours that himself and others attain.

While the ethic which Spinoza sets up is markedly intellectualistic, since it proclaims that one's actions should not proceed from or be done under the influence of the emotions of pleasure or pain (EV, 6, 17), yet it will be wrong to consider that he is encouraging idle contemplation. Though ideas may be true, nevertheless, these ideas cannot alter an emotion, just because they are true ideas (of good and evil). These ideas can check an emotion only in so far as they are considered as emotions (EIV, 14). Thus it is only by the knowledge of an emotion as an emotion or by realising the power of an emotion as an emotion can it be checked. Secondly, an emotion which decreases our power of action (i.e., a passion) cannot be checked or attacked directly. These passive emotions have at least part of their causes in external bodies of which we cannot have adequate ideas; so they limit our activity. Such passive emotions

can only be checked by a contrary passive emotion. The consequence of this composition of forces being a lesser decrease by virtue of which we obtain a relative increment in our power of action. Spinoza puts it more directly, "An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion" (EV, 7).

However, it may happen that we do not possess an adequate knowledge of our emotions. In this case, Spinoza suggests that, from our general insight into our ideal of human nature, we frame a provisional rule of right conduct (EV, 10, Note), which we commit to memory and apply to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life.

NOTES

1. I acknowledge my discussions with Prof. Dr. H. De Dijn of the Institute of Philosophy, University of Louvain for casting light on certain points in this article.
2. For a more detailed treatment of this point, see my "Spinoza on Immanence and Transcendance", in **The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy** 2 (1982), pp. 13 - 14. See also Ethics (E), II, 10, Corollary and Note. Quotations from the Ethics are taken from R.H.M. Elwes' translation: **On the Improvement of the Understanding, the Ethics, Correspondence**, New York, Dover Publication, 1955.
3. Spinoza's resolution of the mind-body relation is this position that the mind is the ideal of the body. Spinoza can be interpreted to maintain that mind and body are two aspects of the same finite reality, man. Man can be viewed from his mental or bodily characteristics, and whichever way he is viewed, he is the same finite reality. Hence Spinoza's famous saying, "The order and connection of ideals is the same as the order and connection of things" (EII, 7). This view of the mind-body relation is founded on the unity of the divine essence. For spinoza, God's reality, in so far as he is the cause of man, is not only thought nor is it extension, but is constituted by an infinity of attributes, two of which are thought and extension. Each of these infinite attributes fully expresses one and the same divine essence (EI, Def. 6). Similarly, we must relate mind and body (which are respectively modes of thought and extension) to man, as each expressing the same finite reality. thus the position of Harris, who maintains that "Body and mind are one thing viewed in two alternative ways: as a mode of extension or as a mode of thought", seems inacceptable. See E.E. Harris, **Salvation from Despair. A reappraisal of spinoza's Philosophy**, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1973, p 82. Mind and body are not one thing viewed in two alternative ways, but two aspects of viewing the same finite reality, and in our case, man.

4. Spinoza outlines his three kinds of knowledge in EII, 40, Note 2. The first kind of knowledge is ordinary experience ("imagination" or "opinio"). The second kind of knowledge is derived from commom notions, i.e notions common equally to the parts and its whole ("ratio"). Thirdly, and on the highest level, is knowledge which proceeds from the adequate knowledge of the formal essence of certain divine attributes to adequate knowledge of the essence of particular things ("scientia intuitiva"). See Elwes, p. 113; See also Spinoza, **Opera,** 4 vols, edited by Carl Gebhardt, Heidelberg, Carl Winters, 1925, Vol. II, p. 122. All subsequent references to Spinoza's **Opera** are to the edition of Carl Gebhardt (CG). A detailed examination of spinoza's theory of knowledge is outside the scope of our present discussion. For more details, see M. Gueroult, **Spinoza, L'Ame (Ethique, 2),** Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1974, esp. pp. 190 - 487; S. Hampshire, **Spinoza,** Penguin, 1951 (1976). Chapter III, pp. 82 - 120; see also my **The Ethics of spinoza, A Study of the Three Kinds of Knowledge,** Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Louvaiiin, 1978.

5. In maintaining the identity of understanding and will, spinoza's reasoning is consistent with the fundamental data of his philosophy. Spinoza's unique substance has an infinity of distinct attributes each of which expresses the same essence of substance. Will and understanding are both modes of thought. There is no absolute faculty of willing separate from the faculty of understanding. Affirmations or negations of idea as the intrinsic or belong to the essence of the ideal itself. On the true idea as the criterion of its truth and falsity, see **On the Improvement of the Understanding,** Elwes, pp 26 - 27. For an interesting discussion of this problem of the identity of will and understanding, see Gueroult, op. cit., pp. 499 - 515.

6. From these considerations, we again arrive at spinoza's identification of will and understanding, volition and idea. Thinking is involved in an affective activity, or more precisely, it is this very activity itself in so far as it is self-reflective or reflected upon. In brief, thinking is action under the form of reflection, or it is self-conscious action. Will is considered not as a separate faculty, but only as the mind's affirmation or negation of truth and falsity. Hence, will is an abstract characterisation of the concrete and particular acts of volition, which are expressions of appetite or desire, when these are conceived under the attribute of thought alone. On this account, Spinoza can affirm that will and understanding, volition and idea are identical (EII, 49).

7. "Structure", as used in this context, does not indicate a permanent and unchanging state or condition. On the contrary, it should be understood as denoting both the identity and change that is typical of Spinoza's particular things which are composed of essence and existence. With regard to their essences, particular things are unchangeable; but with regard to their

existence, they are changeable, since they come to be and pass away in the infinite chain of finite causes (EI, 24, Corollary; 28). Compare, Marx Wartoffsky, "Action and Passion", in **Spinoza, A Collection of Critical Essays**, edited by Grene, University of Notre Dame press, Notre Dame, 1979, p. 347.

8. Spinoza deduces the rest of the generally recongised emotions is terms of the primary emotions, desire, pleasure and pain. It should be noted, that Spinoza's deduction and analysis of the emotions serves chiefly to show that the emotions basically arise from the "conatus", the endeavour to persist in existence, which is common to all things, both human and nonhuman. In addition, Spinoza' s approach is aimed at bringing out in clear detail the ramifications of human inactivity and stagnation under the influence of the emotions. Thus such ordinarily distinguishable emotions like love, ambition, pride, anger, pity, etc., are shown to be differentiated only by the way in which the primary emotion of desire, pleasure and pain are evoked. Compare Hampshire **op. cit.**, p. 138.
9. For these views of Spinoza, see Ethics, I, Appendix, Elwes, pp. 74 - 81; Ethics, IV, preface, Elwes, p. 187; Letter 19, to Blyenberg, A. wolf, **The Correspondence of Spinoza**, Frank Cass, 1966, p. 146, CGIV, p. 86.
10. See, for example, H.De Dijn, "The possibility of an Ethic in a Determministic system like Spinoza's" in **Spinoza Philosophy of** Man, edited by Jon Wetlesen, Bergen and Tromso, 1978, p. 27.
11. See Ethics, IV, perface, Elwes, pp. 189 - 190. Compare what Spinoza says in the **Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding,** Elwes, p. 6, "... man conceives a human character much more stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should not himself acquire such a character. Thus he is led to seek for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and calls everything which will serve as such means a true good. The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid character".

CAN MACHINES BE EQUATED WITH MEN?

By

Oladele Abiodun Balogun

In this paper, I shall attempt a critique of some attempts made by philosophers like J. C. Pollock, Kenneth Sayre and william Rapaport in equating machines with men. [1]

J. C. Pollock in his article "My Brother, the Machine"[2] believes that the equation of machine with man is possible in that there are some essential features of man which can be associated with machines.[3] Kenneth M. Sayre in his book, "**Consciousness: A Philosophic Study of Minds and Machines**", also believes that there is nothing essentially human when talking about consciousness that cannot be met in a mechanical system capable of a particular sort of information processing.[4]

William J. Rapaport in his review of John Searle's book "**Mind, Brain and Science,** also argues that there is no information that can begotten from man that cannot be gotten from computers, hence machine can be equated with man.[5]

I shall argue that inspite of all what computers can do and the tremendous contribution of Artificial intelligence in the area of information storage and in performing intelligent actions, machine cannot be equated with man. Furthermore, I shall point out that any equation of man with machine is unrealistic because human consciousness and Artificial Intelligence cannot be reduced to another. Finally, I shall argue that apart from the fact that machines do not possess that irreducible quality in man, that is, self consciousness, there are other fundamental differences between machine and man. Hence, such attempts to equate the two are mistaken since machines lack such human virtues like religion, society, culture and ethics which are all vital to the development, growth and uniqueness of man.

Artificial Intelligence is a sort of intelligence that emanates from machines that are capable of performing intelligent actions like that of human beings. It is the ability of a machine to produce an intelligent information within the shortest possible time. Artificial Intelligence is not the same as computers or any kind of machine, but the intelligence that comes out as a result of the activities of such computers or machines. Thus, one can say that computers, machines and robots are the tools of

Artificial Intelligence. A Precise definition of Artificial Intelligence has remained a controversial issue, but consensus have been reached by the Artificial Intelligenstia that Artificial Intelligence seeks to produce on a computer programme an output that would be deemed intelligent, if it were to be displayed by human being.

The goal of Artificial Intelligence is to embody in a machine a repertoire of intelligence behaviour comparable with human behaviour in similar contexts.[6] To Joseph Weizenbaum, "Artificial Intelligence can be seen as an attempt to build a machine on the model of man, a robot that is to have its childhood, to learn language as a child does,to gain its konwledge of the world by sensing the world through its own organs and ultimately tocontemplate the whole domain of human thought."[7] The ability to do the above by machines is to show that they are capable of performing intelligent actions like that of man.

Another branch of Artificial Intelligence is commonly referred to as "expert system". In the word of James Momoh: "An expert system combines knowledge of all experts in a given field into a computer data base consisting of all the rules and facts that these experts use to make decision".[8] In this case, Artificial Intelligence tends to store all the knowledge of experts in each field into a computer base of inference machine and such knowledge will be produced to solve any problem in such field whether the experts are around or not. An expert system is an intelligent computer program that uses knowledge and inferences procedures that are difficult enough to require significant human expertise from their solution. To make it clearer, Momoh gives example of how Expert system has been applied in the power industry. In the power industry, an operator must watch over a massive control board filled with deals and guages, monitoring power usage every minute of every day, but, since this is a complex operation, all the knowledge of everyone who had ever worked at the control board can be accumulated and stored in a knowledge base. In this case such information could be accessed and used when a crisis arises in future (whether the experts are around or not).[9] Also in the area of machine, such experts system are in existence and they make it possible for us to have access to the information needed to solve the problems of any patient in due time. It is the above that makes E. Feigenbaum to argue that: "Artificial Intelligence research is part of computer science that investigates symbolic reasoning processes and the representation of symbolic knowledge for use in inference."[10]

Today, we now have intelligent computers that have theories and help in showing how the cognitive processes go on human being. So to some people there are now machines or computers that have mind and such minds are the explanation of these cognitive processes. The above is

supported with the observation that there are now computer robots that think and behave intelligent; robots can be sent to market and even work in factories. In fact, in highly industrialised societies like United State of America, Japan, Germany, for example in German companies and factories, robots are now prefered to man because they are capable of doing what a human being would do in a limited time and at the same time they are easier to maintain more than human beings. In addition, to this, is the fact that with the aid of digital computers which is the tool of Artificial Intelligence, machines now command the knowledge which they possess. Also, in Japan, there are now industrial robots with a soft touch. These industrial robots are revolutionising such heavy industries in that there are now robots with mechanical "hand" that allow them to grip even very fragile items, they also have special sets of finger that ensure a firm grip and these hands are very useful in many assembly operations. Likewise in U.S.A., there are now computers that can translate from English to French, German, etc.[11]

As a result of the expert system, we can now be sure of certain category of knowledge stored in computers, unlike the knowledge stored in human memory which cannot only be easily forgotten, but may be difficult to recollect accurately. The experts system do not forget easily and they can recollect any knowledge of the past stored in them accurately. Also some of the problems that are associated with human memory have been taken care of by Artificial Intelligence (expert system). For example, it has been said that the mere passage of time makes man to forget easily, that is, if one keeps on learning and acquiring more knowledge, with time, one is likely to forget some of the knowledge already acquired, but with the use of the experts system, as another knowledge is coming into it, the one already stored will remain intact which means that the passage of time is not a barrier to the authenticity of any knowledge acquired or stored in the experts system. This is why some intelligent works have been left for the computers to do since we are sure that without doubt, nothing can temper with such knowledge already stored in their data base, whether the experts are around to recollect or not.

The contribution of Artificial Intelligence in extending the scope of human knowledge and in disposing some of the problems of memory cannot be underestimated when one realises that it is now possible for patients like mad men to first store all their knowledge before electro-convulsive shock is applied on them, which makes them to forget all other unnecessary things before the operation and enable them to take such knowledge stored back after they are well.[12] Without doubt, Artificial Intelligence has aided and extended the scope of human

knowledge than what human capacity can do; it has shown us that we can now rely on the knowledge of the past and that to some extent such knowledge of the past can still be seen experientially when we are punching the experts system to reproduce such knowledge, thereby reducing the problem of memory to the barest minimum.

It is as a result of all what intelligent machines can do that made Philosophers like Pollock to argue for equation of machine with man. Let us now see their arguments so as to know whether such equation is justifiable or not.

Philosophers have put forward some arguments in support of the position that, machines can be equated with men. Pollock believes that there are some essential features of man that can be associated with machine which make the equation of machine with man a justifiable attempt. Once machine can be equated with man, Pollock believes that the mind-body problem which arose for man as a result of self consciousness also came up in the same way for the intelligent machines. To him, man is a cognitive agent who has first order sensor (physical), a second order sensor (mental operation) and third order sensor (introspection) which enable him to distinguish perception of physical states through second order sensor and perception of the mental state through third sensor.[13] It is this that led to the puzzle about the relationship between their physical and their mental state which later generates the mind-body problem which arises for both men and the intelligent machines.

In an attempt to debunk the argument that man possesses an irreducible quality, that is, self consciousness, which machines do not possess, Pollock argues that there is no fundamental difference between mind and body; the two are related in that mental events are just physical events that can be sensed in a second was.[14] Similarly, he asserts that men are physical objects and whatever they perceive through their inner senses is the neuro-logical state of their bodies. Like the intelligent machines which have reasoning faculties that entail a way of encoding information, facts of proposition, language of thoughts, which is useful in a descriptive way of thinking about others, man also has such reasoning faculties that enable him to think about himself and others under these types of description.[15]

The above provides the basis for Pollock's argument that just as man is conscious, we could create an intelligent machine that will be conscious, that is, machine that will be creating sentience and not just simulating sentience.[16] For Pollock:

> *It is all a matter of programming (or wiring), in particular, we do not have to equip oscar with a*

cartesian ego and a way of perceiving it.... We can make perfectly good sense of all this without having to postulate a ghost in our machine.[17]

His argument is that since self consciousness is the sense of self awareness of one self as an entity, machine is conscious precisely in the same way as man, because it has "de se thought", which gives it the ability to think and be conscious like man.

Furthermore, Pollock argues that physical objects like men and machines are supervenient objects, that is, they are like statue or house which supervenes on lumps of clay or bricks; whenever a physical object or a person ceases to exist, like when the house ceases to exist, the heaps or bricks will continue to exist. To buttress the above argument is the fact that when a person dies, his body typically exists for a while. This is to say that when a person dies, sentience is no longer there, but that is not to conclude that such body is no longer the person; after death, I am not longer a person, even though I will continue to exist as a mere body. From this, one can then say people are essentially people, just as machine is essentially machine; if the machine is crushed into lumps of metals, in ceases to exist, but the metal will continue, hence the two are not identical, machine is supervenient on lumps of metals.[18]

Moreover, in supporting the argument that machines can be equated with men. Pollock believes that we can remove almost all the parts of one's body, so far central nervous system is intact. Medical science is now able to replace severed limbs with artificial limbs, diseased hearts with mechanical hearts and so on. There has been successful experimental work aimed at replacing the eye of a blind person by a television cortex, yet we cannot doubt the identity of such person whose faulty parts are being replaced by the artificial parts. He strongly believes that the time is coming when we will keep someone alive by replacing as much as three - fourth of his body by mechanical contriviances (with nervous system intact). With this, the person will certainly no longer have the same body like the old one but such new body may not entirely be different from the old one in that it may have some things in common with the old body.[19]

In addition to the above is Kenneth Sayre's argument that "consciousness is a form of information processing, which can be brought within the capacity of machines."[20] He believes that: "consciousness is a sort of patterned response on the part of an organism's information processing systems to stimulation of sensory receptors."[21]

With the information processing capacity of intelligent machines, they are capable of self consciousness, since they can easily process information through the help of their data base. With this type of

argument, Sayre believes that he has succeeded in convincing us that: "Self Consciousness is not the exclusive prerogative of biologically generated systems",[22] thereby justifies the equating of machines with men.

In showing that the attempts made by philosophers like Pollock and Syare in equating machines with men are mistaken (because machines are not capable of possessing that irreducible quality in men, that is, self consciousness). I want to start by saying that Pollock's conception of the mind - body problem is too narrow. The mind-body problem is not just a problem, but a cluster of problems. What Pollock has done is to transform the traditional mind-body problem of how mind, an immaterial entity can interact with a body, a material entity, into a purely materialistic view. What mind-body problems meant to man (a self conscious being) is more than Pollock's analysis: Kwasi Wiredu has this to say on the cluster of mind-body problems.

He opines:

> *There is the metaphysical problem, of how mind, conceived as a non material entity is related to the body, a material entity... There is also the question of how the concept of mind is related to the concept of thought... The question naturally arises: What is the basis of this Permanent possibility of thought?" As explained already, no serious philosophy of mind can evade this problem. It concerns the relation between what we call the ideational and dispositional senses of mind... But given all that can be learnt about the correlation between thought and brain process, there still remains a conceptual problem of how the category of brain process is related to the category of thought.*[23]

With the above, quotation, one can see that what mind-body problems meant for man (a self conscious being) is more than the traditional mind-body problem which Pollock transformed into pure materialistic term. No matter the complexity of machines, the other mind-body problems like the problem of how the concept mind (mental events) is related to the concept of thought, the problem of the basis permanent possibility of thought and the problem of how the category of brain process is related to the category of thought, which arise for man cannot arise for them. This is so because machines lack self consciousness and deeper reflection which would have made them to realise that these mind-body problems exist and need to be tackled. Hence main-body problems do not arise for machines in the same way they arose for man.

Also, Pollock distinction between first order sensor (physical), second order sensor (mental) and the third order sensor (introspection) is

untenable because if the first order sensor is perceived by the second order sensor and the second order sensor is perceived by the third order sensor, the question is: which one will perceive the third order sensor? Otherwise, it will amount to a postulation of third order sensor to another category which is not susceptible to any perception by any other sensor, which will amount to a category mistake. The point is being made is that for a machine to be aware of any mind-body problems, it must have another sensor which will enable it to perceive the operation of the third order sensor, so as to equip it with the ability of looking into its thought and its feeling. Once this is absent, as Pollock could not even provide a case for this, no machine will be capable of looking into its thought and its feeling in order to find out their real meaning and the reasons for having them.

As a result of this, machines cannot engage in any serious reflection that will make them aware that all these mind-body problems exist.

I want to argue that Pollock's view that both man and machine are physical objects that supervene on bodies is mistaken. He argues that when a person dies, it is only his person that is no longer there, but that is not say that the body does not belong to him, just like when a machine is crushed into metal, it ceases to exist but the metal will continue to be in existence. The analogy drawn here does not hold. In the case of a man who is dead, even though one may say that the body belongs to him, such a case is entirely different from that of the machine because life is no longer in the body; such a body can never be rebuilt to become a real man. In the case of a machine or automobile, however, such metal can still be rebuilt anytime to become an automobile or machine. Thus Pollock's analogy in support of his attempt to equate machine with man is mistaken. The analogy is predicated on a false assumption, in that while it is possible to speak of the death of a human being, it is not possible to speak of the death of a machine. Scriven quickly recognizes this category mistake when he asserts that "robots are machines that are composed only of mechanical and electrical parts and cannot be alive. The fact that there may occur in machines as in living organism the same feature of directive organic unity is not enough to show that they both live."[24] To my mind, it is nonsensical to talk of a machine being dead and its being alive; machines do not belong to the category of things which can be dead or alive.

Furthermore, Pollock is of the opinion that the equation of machine with man is possible because we can now replace most of the parts of the body with mechanical contriviances, but with central nervous system remaining intact. The question is: Why with central nervous system intact? I think that central nervous system should be replaced with

mechanical contriviance so as to get rid of death in man. Until the central nervous system, the most essential part of man that has been linked with self-consciousness, can be replaced by any artificial nervous system, any equation of machine with man would be a mirage. Perhaps, if we can get rid of the problem of death in man, then we will be able to compare or equate both machine and human successfully. In addition to this, is his believe that a time is coming when almost three-fourth of one's body will be replaced with mechanical contriviances and such body will no longer be old body but only has something in common with the old body. This argument is fallacious, in that we can only talk of new body, after the most essential part of the old body (central nervous system which is connected with consciousness) might have been well replaced with mechanical contriviance. Otherwise, it will still be the old body with some amendments.

Having pointed out that the attempts made by philosophers like Pollock to equate machines with men are mistaken, I want to argue that machine cannot be equated with man because it does not possess the irreducible quality of man, that is, self consciousness. It must be noted that machines are not able to formulate intentions, and to formulate intentions, an entity must have an irreducible first person perspective, which an agent that is self conscious must has, therefore they are not capable of the irreducible quality in man, that is, self consciousness. Lynne Rudder Baker puts it better, when he opines:

> *In order to be an agent, an entity must be able to formulate intentions. In order to formulate intentions, an entity must have an irreducible first person perspective. Machines lack an irreducible first person perspective. Therefore machines are not agents.*

A number of condition must be met before we can ascribe to a thing a first person perspective. First, that thing must be self conscious. And to be self conscious, it must be capable of making first person reference in a language, including the ability to use pronouns like 'I', 'Me', 'My', etc. Such indicators are not our names nor any other description of ourselves, but refers to the thinker uniquely without characterizing him in any other way. This differs from a case where one thinks of someone who fits a given third person description and such description may apply to himself without entering into the first person perspective. "Thus thinking about oneself in the first person way does not appear reducible to thinking about oneself in any other way".[27]

Coupled with the above fact, is that an agent who is self conscious must be capable of conceiving himself in the first person perspective, and must have the ability to conceive his thought as his own. Also his ability

to make irreducible first person reference is another necessary condition for the agent to be self conscious. In the word of Baker: "If X can conceive of himself from the first person perspective, then he can be conscious that his thought are his own. Therefore, an entity which can think of any proportion at all enjoys self consciousness, if and only if, he makes irreducible first person reference."[28] Until an entity is capable of doing this, such entity may only be conscious of his thought, but will not be conscious that they are his own. In other words, for anything to have this irreducible quality, that is, self consciousness, then it must have internal states with irreducible first person propositional content, such as, I am wounded, and must also have the capacity to have thought which have propositional content. This, perhaps, is the reason why John Locke, in his "**Essay Concerning Human Understanding,**" defines "self consciousness as the perception of what passes in a man's own mind, consciousness or reflection is in a person who is observing or noticing "internal operation of his mind." For Locke, it is by means of consciousness that one acquires mental state ideas like perceiving, doubting, reasoning, thinking, knowing, willing and learning of one's own mental state at a given time.[30] All these are not possible in machines just because they lack self consciousness.

All the arguments of philosophers like Sayre that machines are capable if self consciousness are unconvincing, because machines lack the first person perspective which is integral to self consciousness. Baker puts it better when he says that:

> *Computers cannot make the same kind of reference to themselves that self conscious beings make and this differentiate points to a fundamental difference between humans and computers - namely that humans, but not computers have an irreducible first person perspective.*[31]

Taking the nature of intelligent machines into consideration, one will know that computers do not share this irreducible first person perspective because even though they may be programmed to use 'I' in the grammatical sentences, such 'I' is not self referential, and cannot be evidence that it is capable of first person perspective just as its production of the word "pain" is not the evidence of any feeling on the part of machines.

Machines cannot be programmed to have any first person perspective, because it can only be programmed to perform tasks governed by formalizable rules, whereas in man, the first person perspective is displayed in our patterns of action, language and thought and in the myriad convention that regulate our common life.[32]

A critic may reply that the first person perspective can be programmed into machines through information processing and input, so as to enable them to be capable of this perspective. This is far from reality in that it is not possible for all the facts of this world to be represented by formalizable rules. As Dreyfus has argued "the world we dwell in cannot be represented as some number of independent facts ordered by formalizable rule."[33] This is because of the difficulty of finding appropriate data for input on which rules would have to operate. Moreover, the isolation of such first person perspective facts and data from the context in which it occurs will make it to become irrelevant, if at all such facts and data are able to find their way into the intelligent machines. More importantly, it is difficult to discover the heuristic rules according to which the first person perspective might be achieved, yet without this heuristic rues, intelligent machines cannot be programmed to have this perspective. As Baker has observed.

> ... *The first person perspective is not the result of any ruled governed process ... A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for programming a first person perspective would be the discovery of heuristic rules according to which the first person perspective is achieved, but there are no heuristics for attainment of the first person perspective.* [34]

There is no amount of third person information about oneself that can be reduced to the first person perspective. Any kind of information in the first person pespective passed into the machine will become a third person account of the person, so far the machine itself is not capable of making such account on its own. In fact the ability to see oneself from the first person perspective is not the sort of thing that can be arrived at by following instructions. In other words, the ability to have first person episodes is what Gunderson would call a program resistant feature of mentality. [35]

There are some fundamental differences between man (a self conscious being) the machines which make any equation of machine with a mirage. There is a kind of referential error which man cannot make, while on the other hand machines are logically and physically liable to such error. For example when a self conscious being uses 'I' in the first person perspective, he does not refer to any other thing than himself, whereas when 'I' is used in a grammatical form by a computer there is something to which 'I' refers This implies that it is possible for a machine to use 'I' to refer to another computer as if it is referring to itself. Thus in issuing first person English sentences, computers are liable to a kind of error in reference, whereas first person pronoun, in their typical use by

conscious being are immuned to a kind of referential error to which names are susceptiable.[36] In short, the crucial difference between machines and self conscious beings like man can be seen in the word of Baker when he says that:

> *For a self conscious being there is an irreducible distinction genuine self consciousness and consciousness of someone who is in fact oneself; for machines on the other hand, there is no corresponding distinction between genuine self consciousness and consciousness of someone who is in fact oneself; for machines on the other hand, there is no corresponding distinction between genuine self scanning and scanning a unit which is in fact itself...* [37]

With the above analysis, one can see clearly that machines lack a first person perspective and this is essential for a self conscious being in order to be aware of his inner states and his own thoughts. According to Horace B. English, "self consciousness is the totality of the process of being aware at a given moment, perceiving remembering imagining, thinking, wishing, willing, fearing or striving," [38] but since all these are absent in machines, they cannot be said to possess that irreducible quality in man, that is, self consciousness. It is this fact that makes machines not to be capable of any intentional behaviour; the ability to formulate intentions also requires the ability to make first person statements like 'I' shall do C" or "I am going to do C".

Since the genuine first person point of view as we find it in man is irreducible, it logically follows that beings which lack the first person perspective, like machines, are not capable of intending and hence they are not agents. Thus one could see that the equation of machine with man is not realistic. A computer can never have will of its own; it is not self conscious. This difference is a fundamental one and that is why Jerome Shaffer in the introduction of his book **Philosophy of Mind**, opines that: "one things we can say about consciousness is this" It is something which distinguishes man from a good deal of the world around him", [39] that is, it helps to distinguish man (a self conscious being) from other non-self conscious organism like machines. We can rightly conclude that any equation of machine with man cannot be justified. Thus, contrary to what Pollock would have us believe, this machine is not my brother.

Having attempted to point out that machines lack that irreducible quality in man which is self consciousness, I want to argue furthermore that any attempt to equate machine with man is unrealistic since machines lack such human attributes like religion, society, culture and ethics which are all vital to the development, growth and uniqueness of man.

Religion is one of the most important aspect of human life. Religion is the belief in power not ourselves which makes for righteousness and a desire to come into harmonions relations with the power.[40] Religion entails a belief in supreme being or a deity and such deity is normally worshipped by man, even though the object of worship may not necessarily be a supernatural God as in Christian religion, it may be a sacred object like cow as in Hinduism. Religion touches the most secret place of human life, their emotions and their conscience.theseare,places which no law or decree can touch. This explains why various religions are embraced by men.

It must be noted that intelligent machines lack religion because they have no emotions, feelings and curiosity to know the force behind the wonders in their environment. Mitchell Waldrop recognises this when he asserts:

> *The essence of humanity is not reason or logic or any of the other things that computers do. It is intuition, sensuality and emotion. So how can a computer think if it does not feel; How can it feel, if it knows nothing of love, anguish, exhilaration and loneliness and all what it means to be a living human being?*[41]

Thus, it can be seen that because machines do not feel, love, and experience anguish, it will be nonsensical to talk about the religiousity of any machine, hence machines cannot be equated with men.

Men have and live in society of their own. They always live together in a defended area to pursue common social life. To achieve their goal, they share common culture and some ethical norms in order to forster the spirit of togetherness. Culture relates to the traditional life pattern of a people, that is, the total way of life of a group of people. It includes man's belief, their works of arts, their language they speak and their way of dressing. Andah explains it better when he asserts:

> *Culture embraces all the material and non-material expressions of a people as well the processes with which the expressions are communicated. It has to do with all the social, ethical, intellectual, scientific, artistic and technological expressions and processes of a people usually ethnically and/or nationally or supranationally related and usually living on a geographically contiguous area; what they pass on to their successors and how they are passed on.*[42]

From the above definition, it can be seen that some aspects of culture like the material aspect are learnt (for example the Language and the way it is spoken) without any great effort on the part of the learner. The

learning of a culture is continuous for life. In fact, it is through the language of a particular group that their culture can be properly explained.

Culture also includes the norms of society, that is, it entails the idea of what is morally right and wrong in a society. Morality is essential for any harmonious living in a society, it is a system involving the evaluation of human actions through their rationality. This explains why in some societies, some actions are classified as morally right while some as morally wrong. Hence men are expected to pursue the actions that are morally right and refrain from those that are morally wrong.

Unlike men, machines have no society and culture of their own, rather they are societally or culturally procured and as a result of which they lack ethical norms. Machines cannot lean because they do not have native language of their own. In fact for machines to have society and culture, they must be capable of communication in all their complexity, but the question is: Can intelligent machines use Artificial Language in understanding poetry and drama, all which are part of the knowledge of the world which humans understand and acquire their culture? At this junction, one can say that Artificial Language is deficient when it comes to understanding poetry and drama. Human Language in actual use is infinitely more problematic than those aspects of it that are amenable to treatment by information theory. Human Language involves the history of those using it, that is, the history of a people that are amenable to treatment by information theory. Human Language involves the history of those using it, that is, the history of society in particular and human in general, [43] this Artificial Language is capable of giving us the type of knowledge, human languages will afford us when it comes to the area of poetry, drama and so on.

Similarly, machines lack the biological constitution which is common to all humans, most of human knowledge is grounded in a biological constitution which is common to all human which is modified by culture. As a result of this, the type of knowledge man is capable of acquiring through his culture by virtue of suckling his mother's milk and through the whole process of socialization cannot be exhibited by any intelligent machines. This is because such knowledge cannot be learnt from books or be programme into anyone, but can only be explicated in life itself. Perhaps, this is the reason why Micheal Scriven has argued: Until we have robots on their native planet, growing up like children, Learning to speak and think; in some way becoming parents and dying... [44] That is they cannot offer such knowledge that is co-extensive like that of human knowledge thus, any equation of machine with man will be unrealistic.

Moreover, ethical norms and values cannot be associated with machines because unlike human beings who do not accept arbitrarily the values imposed to them by their environment but only those that foster development and harmony in their society, machines have to swallow everything that the programmers give to them, hence it is nonsensical to talk about machines being morally upright or wrong, since they cannot be held responsible for their actions like men do.

I have argued that man cannot be equated with machines because of the irreducibility of human consciousness. Human consciousness is distinct, peculiar and incomparable to that if the machines. Furthermore, I have pointed out that machines lack such human attributes like religion, society, culture and ethics which are all vital to the development, growth and uniqueness of man. This is the main reason why I want to emphasize that in spite of revolutions in information technology and recent developments in Artificial Intelligence, we should not be too pre-occupied with the development of intelligent machines at the expense of human beings, because human beings shall continue to be the most crucial factor in social development. It is also necessary that we guide against dehumanization of social and individual life, a situation in which a person is seen as a function rather than a human being. Yet this may be one of the consequences of the overzealous development of Artificial Intelligence. We should also avoid a situation in which companies and factories now prefer to use experts system (Artificial Intelligence) in their fields rather than training more human experts or using the available ones, thereby alienating them from their labour and exacerbating the problem of unemployment in our society.

Coupled with this is the fact that our generation is now being referred to as a computer generation and the functions of parents and teachers have been increasingly taken over by the machine, hence the spiritual, social and moral aspects of man which are all necessary for progress, orderliness and development of any society are jettisoned.

It is important to emphasize this message, particularly in the context of third world countries, like Nigeria, which are likely to be bewildered by these developments and are likely to invest huge sums of money on these new inventions at the risk of underplaying human factors in development. Whatever may be the epistemological significance of Artificial Intelligence and the improvement it might have brought to humanity, the main field of discovery and social development remains, as before, human reason.

END NOTES

1. There are other Philosophers who have argued for equation of men with machines, but in this paper, the views of Pollock, K. Sayre and Rapaport will be considered but much emphasis will be laid on Pollock's view.
2. John Pollock, "My Brother, The Machine" **Nous,** Volume 22, No 2, June 1988: 173-210.
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4. Kenneth M. Sayre, **Consciousness: A Philosophic Study of Minds and Machines,** (New York: Random House, 1976) PP. 12-13.
5 William J. Rapapport "A review of John Searle's **Mind Brain and Science", Nous,** Volume 22, No. 4, December 1988: 585-609.
6. Jack D. Cowan and David H. Shap, "Neural nets and Artificial Intelligence". **Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of the Arts and Science.** Volume 117, No.1 Winter, 1988: 13.
7. Joseph Weizenbaum, **Computer power and Human Reason** (San Fransico W. H. Freeman, 1976), pp.202-203.
8. Topic, Issue No. 175, 1988:45
9. Ibid.
10. **Machine Intelligence:** Infotech State of the Art Report, Series 9, Number 3, 1981: 7.
11. **Newsweek,** "Robort with a Soft Touch", August 9, 1982: 4 and 34.
12. Machine Intelligence, op.cit., : 65-66.
13. J.C. Pollock, op.cit.,: 179-180
14. Ibid.,
15. The full explanation can be seen in: Ibid.,: 186-187.
16. Ibid., p.190
17. Ibid., p. 192
18. Ibid., pp. 194-195.
19. Ibid., p. 198.
20. Kenneth. M. Sayre, op. cit., p.12.
21. Ibid., p.169.
22. Ibid., p.170.
23. Kwasi Wiredu, "Akan Concept of Mind", **Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies,** No. 3 October 1983, p.124-125.
24. Micheal Scriven, "The Mechanical Concept of Mind", **Mind,** volume LXII, 1953, p.233.
25. Some Mind-Brain identity theorists like U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart have argued in their articles, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" and "Sensation and Brain Processes" that the central nervous system has something to do with consciousness. The articles can be seen in: C.V. Borst (ed), **The Mind/Brain Identity** Theory, (London: Macmillan Press 1975) p.42-66.

26 Lynne Rudder Banker, "Why Computers can't Act", **American Philosophical** Quarterly, Volume 18, Number 2, April 1981: 157.
27. Ibid., p. 158.
28. Ibid.
29. John Locke, **An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,** Chapter 2, p. 19, but this quotation is from the Encyclopedia of philosophy, (New York: Macmillan Publisher, 1972).
30. Ibid.
31. L.R. Baker, op. cit., p. 159.
32. Ibid., p. 160.
33. Dreyfus quoted in L.R. Baker's article "Why Computers can't act" Ibid., p.160.
34. Ibid.,
35. Ibid., p.161.
36. This type of argument is well expantiated by L.R. Baker Ibid., pp.160-161.
37. Ibid., p. 162.
38. Culled from **Collier Encyclopedia,** New York: Macmillan Company, 1981, Volume 5, p. 195.
39. Jerome A.Shaffer, **Philosophy of Mind,** (Englewood Cliffs: Parentice Hall, 1977), p.8.
40. See G.T.W. Patrick: **Introduction to Philosophy** (New Delhi: Surjeet, 1978) p.37.
41. Mitchell Waldrop, "Can Computers Think?" In **Sunday Guardian,** January 5th, 1992; C4
42. B.W. Andah, **African Development in Cultural Perspective.** Occasional Publications of the Department of Archealogy and Anthropology, University of Ibadan, 1982: 4-5.
43. See Joseph Weizenbaum, **Computer Power and Human Reason,** (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976), p.209.
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UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT

By

S. Iniobong Udoidem

ABSTRACT

There is probably no area of organisational management which causes more difficulties, more friction, more conflicts and more confusion than the authority relationship of members of the organisation.

This paper undertakes an indepth analysis of the nature and structure of authority in an organisational situation with the aim of highlighting an authority relationship that will eschew friction and conflicts.

It begins with an analysis of the notion of authority where a distinction is made between authority and power on the one hand, and executive and non-executive on the other. Under the rubrics of these distinctions, the paper examines the pragmatic and structure of authority in a democratic system of organisational management. IT notes the dyadic nature of the authority relationship and argues that since every employee is an authority in his own area of competence, this dyadic relationship will not only enhance shared responsibility and respectability but will foster and generate a sense of self-worth in the employees. thus giving room for creative initiative and cooperative spirit within the organisation.

UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITY IN ORGANISATION MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of personnel management as a district field of study is a challenging phenomenon. More people are recognising, and more and more work is being done on the role of management as both an art and as a science. At the same time, the changing paradigms of organization system and structure raise new challenges to organizational management strategies. Roberts Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt noted the changing situation and the attendant problem when they wrote:

> *The problem of how the modern manager can be "democratic" in his relations with subordinates at the same time maintains the necessary authority and control in the organization for which he is responsible has come*

into focus increasingly in recent years. Earlier in the century this problem was not so accutely felt. The successful executive was generally pictured as possessing intelligence, immagination, (and generally wise) decisions, and the ability to inspire subordinates. People tended to think of the world as being divided into "leaders" and "followers".[1]

There is probably no area of organizational management which causes more difficulties, more friction and more confusion than the authority relationship of members of the organisation. This problem has been universally acknowledge but the solution to it is what has remained a perennial problem.[2] It is the challenge of this paper therefore to attempt an analysis of the structure of authority in an organizational system and to propose a conception that will help clarify the pragmatics of authority in an organizational system. Such clarification it is hoped will help introduce new understanding and new dimensions in the development of organizational management strategies.

There are two main organizational management system in contemporary business or governmental or even non profit bodies. One is the "Boss" (authoritarian) system and the other is the "democratic system".

Continue of Authority Relations[3]

Boss-centered System Democratic System



Manager makes decision and announces it	Manager presents ideas and invites questions	Manager defines limits, asks group to make decision	Manager permits subordinates to function within limits defined by superior.
TYPE1	TYPE2	TYPE3	TYPE4

The "Boss" or authoritarian system (types 1 and 2) is the type that the "Boss" at the different managerial levels provides leadership by dictating policies and the line of action to the surbodiante whose function and responsibility it is to obey and carry out the orders as instructed. This approach came to be widely used by the turn of the century when J.D. Money propounded a theory of the line of authority which came to be known as "scalar principle"[4]. He argued that in every organisation, the only workable line of authority is that which runs from superior to subordinate. Thus, for him, the more clear the line of authority from ultimate authority for management in an enterprise to every surbodinate position, the more effective will be responsible decision making and organised communication. This system definitely emphasized the role of the "Boss" in the success of the enterprise. Authority in this kind of system is understood as the power to command and to be obeyed and the line of authority is unidirectional. It is the position of this paper that this approach does not only dehumanize but robotizes subordinate. It gives them no sense of self-worth and they do not feel that they are part of the organisation or business. This feeling on the part of the workers often leads to the development of a lackadaisical attitude to work or the development of obstinacy and non- cooperative spirit. Even when they are doing the work, they do so out of the fear of the Boss and not out of the sense of commitment to duty. These often leads to unproductivity and failure in most organisation to achieve the set or desired goals. It is perhaps due to this problem that more and more organizational managers are adopting the democratic approach in their management strategies.

The democratic system (type 3 and 4) of organizational management, unlike the authoritarian recognises the role of the subordinate in the organisation. It emphasizes individual freedom, right, autonomy and creative capacity of the individuals in the organization. It is this understanding that underlies the constant consultations and discussions at the various managerial levels in contemporary business and organisational structures. In this system, the individual manager, in the provision of leadership does not see itself as a "know all" whose function is to dispense orders, rather he sees his role as that of coordinating and harnessing the various creative capacities that exist in the employee of the organization toward the attainment of the designed or desired objectives of the organization. Most of the time, the Manager passes to the group the right to make decision. But before doing so, he normally defines the problem to be so solved and the boundaries within which the decision is to be made.

Since the "Boss" approach is gradually giving way to the democratic approach, it is the purpose of this paper to analyse the notion of authority

with the hope of showing in what sense authority is applicable in a democratic system of management. The paper will begin first by analyzing and proposing a working definition of authority and then it will proceed to examine the pragmatics of authority in a democratic system of organisational management.

Toward a Theory of Authority

The word authority has its roots from the latin word **auctoritas** and is related to **auctor**. An equivalent of auctor in English is a **actor** or author. It designates not only an author of a book but also includes an originator, a parent, a policy maker, a patron or a giver of advice.

E.D. Watt, in a recent publication has traced the history of **auctoritas** in Roman Republic government showing how its meaning developed to include concepts like **potestas, imperium** and **scientia**. Today the word authority like **auctoritas** has a range of meanings. The Webster Dictionary has listed some of these varied meanings. Authority as:

1. *(a) The power or right to give commands, enforce obedience, take action or make final decisions, jurisdiction;*
   (b) The position of one having such power;
2. *The citation of a written decision, in support of an opinion or action; Reliability on witness.*
3. *A person or persons in government having power or right to enforce laws.*
4. *A person with much knowledge or experience in some field etc.*

Because of the varied etymological references, and the consequent polymorphous character of authority, scholars in social sciences and political philosophy have arrived at different definitions, some of which include the proper meaning of authority. For the purpose of our discussion, definitions 1 & 4 above will receive closer analysis. Definition 1 points to the nature of authority as the power to command and right to command, and also as the position of having such power.

The confusion that has developed from definition 1 is that people have tended to see and understand authority only in terms of power to command. One such attitude is that of Bernard Lonergan who defines authority as "a legitimate power" [6]. Lonergan's definition is interesting in that it indicates immediately that there is also a possibility for the exercise of power that is not legitimate. The problem is that the issue of legitimacy of power is problematic. How does one determine a legitimate power? Is any power ever legitimate? It seems that one could only validly talk of a legitimate authority which employs power to achieve its goals. Power in my own estimation is a non-moral agent and therefore cannot be talked of

in a moral sense as either legitimate or illegitimate. What could be legitimate or illegitimate is the authority that employs power. Without going into the problem of legitimacy which is not the subject of our concern here, I would like to remark that Lonergan's definition as well as others who see authority as a form of power, seem to make authority subordinate to power. The position of this paper is that power is only a capacity to do in which case it is an instrument of authority.

Unlike Lonergan, there are those who hold that authority and power are distinct and mutually exclusive concepts. Thomas Hobbes is an example of an exponent of this ideas. For Hobbes, the people who authorize the sovereign have authority but no power in the commonwealth. For him, power resides exclusively in the sovereign.[7] Robert P. Woff's anarchist doctrine is similar to the idea of authority as power only. Woff defines authority as "the rght to command and correlatively, the right to be obeyed".[8] According to his view, the exrcise of authority is an infringement on individual liberty, there is nothing like "legitimate authority".

There are others who, while not holding that the concept of authority and power are interchangeable, hold that they are nonetheless related in the sense of power being an instrument of authority. Thomas Aquinas, Jacques Maritain and Bertrand de Jouvenel belong to this group. Bertrand de Jouvenel in his own definition and distinction says:

> *Power is something different from authority. The distinguishing mark of the latter is that it is exercised only over those who voluntarily accept it.*[10]

Jacques Maritain in his own definition which he draws richly from St. Thomas Aquinas says:

> *Authority and power are two different things. Power is the force by means of which you can oblige another to obey you. Authority is the right to direct and command, to be listened to or obeyed by others.*[11]

The significant thing about the two definitions and distinctions is that they all agree that authority is different from power. At the same time, they do acknowledge that the difference does not entail mutual exclusion but that power is an element of authority. But Maritain and de Jouvenel's definitions complement each other. For Maritain, authority is the right of one who commands or directs to be obeyed while for de Jouvenel, authority is exercised only over those who voluntarily accept it. Maritain does not spell out how the right is attained, but de Jouvenel explains that such right is legitimate only if the people voluntarily accept it. In other words, if the people do not accept the right of command of an authority, such command is not authoritative.

Other definitions of authority refer to persons having the right to command and persons with knowledge in some field as an authority. For example definition 7 of the Webster Dictionary definitions describes authority as a person with much knowledge or experience in some field. This definition of authority points to the fact that authority is not so much the right to command as a right which an individual or group possesses either by nature or as an acquired endowment. This kind of authority does not necessarily involve the power and the right to command.

In a recently published book[12], Richard De George makes several distinctions regarding the different types of authority. But the one that is of particular interest is the distinction between an executive and a non-executive authority. It is this distinction that will serve as the matrix for explicating the type of authority that involves power and the type that does not. Such explication will help us to understand the authority relationship that would make for an effective management and productivity in an organisational system.

Sometimes when someone is said to be an authority as in the case of an executive authority, it means that one has both the right and power to command. But where one has only the right (as in the case of authority of knowledge), he is said to possess a non executive authority. Similarly, where one has only the power to command and that power is not backed by the right to do so, that power is not authoritative, The result of such a situation is tyranny. A typical example is that of a gunman who commands his victim to surrender his wallet. Even though the command is obeyed, it is not because the gunman has any right, rather it is obeyed out of fear of the gun.

Authority therefore, within the context of our discussion will be understood as a right which a person possesses by virtue of his natural or acquired endowments. Such right can be executive (as in the case of parental authority or political authority or authority of office, or religious authority) or non executive (as in the case of authority of knowledge). Where it is executive, it involves the right and the power to command and to be obeyed or to act for or on behalf of another. Where it is non executive, the right remains as a private and personal disposition. A careful analysis here of how these different notions of authority operate is crucial for understanding the nuances of authority relations in an organisational system.

Structure and Pragmatics of Authority in an Organisational System

The structure of authority in any given system depends on the institution in which it is found. In the case of the family the authority is parental or paternal. And in the case of church or religious body, we have what is normally referred to as religious authority. In the two cases, the

line of authority is unidirectional and for the most part takes the "Boss - subordinate" form. What makes the authority of the parent or religious leader authoritative is the general belief in the natural order and divine mandate. However the parental authority though unidirectional must always be for the sake of the common good, that is, the good of the child, family and the larger society.[13] Where it does not aim at the common good, it is nothing but tyranny.

In an organisational system, the structure of authority is different. The difference stems from the fact that the authority relationship instead of being unidirectional is dyadic. Dyadic in the sense that all the employees in the organisation possess some degree of authority in their own right which must be recognised by the management. Management possess authority by virtue of their position and this authority must be recognised and accepted by the employees or subordinates for there to be an organisation. Thus the authority relationship is contractual and it oscillates between the executive and the non executive authority.

Executive Authority

An executive authority on the one hand refers to a **person** who has the right and power to act for or on someone else, and on the other hand it refers to the **right** and power to act for or command another and be obeyed. While the right to act in a certain way over or on behalf of a person say x or y stems from one's knowledge of the subject or situation, the power to act stems from the authority of office or position to which one has been designated or assigned. Within the context of our discussion therefore, executive authority can be defined as the right and power to exercise discretion in making decisions without which the various departments cannot become smoothly working units harmonized for the accomplishment of enterprise's objectives. Such rights also include the right to act on behalf of the organisation.

Executive authority as discussed here falls into two broad classes: imperative and performatory.[14] Imperative executive authority involves the right and power of some person say A to command another say B who is subject to A's authority. Such right to command and be obeyed as noted earlier stems from authority of office. Performatory executive authority on the other hand involves the right of A to perform some action on behalf of another. A frequent case of performatory authority in an organisation is one in which an officer has the authority to perform some actions for an organisation because of the position he holds in the organised structure. Normally, positions of authority defined within the organisation carry with them both imperative and performatory authority. For example, the Bursar of an organisation has the right to pay the bills for the organisation and the chief executive has the right to speak on

behalf of the organisation. Performatory authority for the most part (as will be seen in the section on no-executive authority) has its roots in the epistemic authority (authority of knowledge) of one who exercises it.

From the analysis of the nature of executive authority it seems consistent to conclude that in an organisational context, a person say x has or is a **de facto** executive authority if x, by virtue of his occupying some position within a system or organisation is mandated or given the power to exercise the right that he possesses by virtue of his knowledge, for the general good of the organisation. This type of executive authority x has is a function of the organisation.

However, it must be noted at this point that the range of any type of executive authority depends on the kind of authority the bearer has, the source, the position he occupies, the circumstances and other similar considerations. For example, the range of the authority of the Chief executive of any given organisation is wider than that which the lower ranking managers exercise over their subordinates in their departments. Also someone can be an executive authority for one person without being for the other in same organisation. For example an executive authority in unit A of an organisation may not be an executive authority for unit B of the same organisation. Thus it is important that executive authorities or managers recognise their area of jurisdiction and authority. Sometimes, it is the case of overstepping boundaries that brings conflict of authority.

Non- Executive Authority

A non-executive authority can be defined in two senses. First, with reference to a person that has certain rights by virtue of his natural or acquired endowments. Second, with reference to the right itself irrespective of the person who possesses it. What constitutes the non-executive nature of the authority is that neither the person nor the right is backed by the power to execute on the behalf of others or command obedience. By the same reasoning, the non-executive authority possessed by the employee who do not also posses any kind of authority of office does not involve any right to command or to act on behalf of others. Such none executive authority is found in epistemic authority and authority stemming from competence.

An epistemic authority is an authority in a field of knowledge and competence is the ability to perform certain tasks. The two are related since the person who is competent to perform a certain task must necessarily posses the knowledge that is required for the performance. Epistemic authority is involved when a person is said to be an authority on some subject, when a person is an authority over others on account of his knowledge, and when a person is the other's authority for saying or doing something. This type of authority, because it is non-executive in

nature has no right to command or to act on or for another. However it does play an important role in the authority relations in an organisational system. According to De George, it makes possible the transfer of knowledge, skills and culture.[15] In fact, it is the basis for constituting an executive authority on an individual whether by appointment to an office or by delegation for the purpose of performing certain functions. For example, a chief engineer of an establishment has an executive authority by virtue of his office. However, the executiveness of his authority has to be matched by his knowledge on engineering matter otherwise he will not be in a position to inspect, dictate irregularities and harness the appropriate resources for the good of the establishment that has been entrusted to him.

The role of the executive authority though often neglected is an important authority relation that should be properly understood. Perhaps Helge's analysis of the master/servant relationship will be of value for explicating the authority relationship between a manager (executive authority) and the subordinate (non-executive authority). The master has authority over the servant and commands him to perform a desired act which the servant learns how to do. In time the master is in fact dependant on the servant since the servant knows how to do that which the master cannot do himself. In this situation, the servant has a non-executive authority which the master must recognise. In fact, there is a sense that the servant can be said to be the real authority, since, in Hegel's analysis, the master's livelihood depends on the servant.

There is a parallel situation in an organisation context where the smooth running and success of the organisation depends so much on the activities of the non-executive authorities. The managers themselves cannot perform the specialised duties of the organisation. They have to rely on the expertise of those who were hired for those specific dutied. the authority of knowledge and competence of the hired experts though non-executive is an essential authority relation which must be recognised and respected by the managers. There is another line of reasoning which can help clarify authority in an organisation. When for example, the committee of interviewers for appointment recommends someone for employment, it does so for the good of the organisation. By accepting the contract, the employee is obligated to use and exercise his expertise or knowledge for the good of the organisation. The knowledge that he has, though personal and private to him now becomes a "good" that is commonly owned by the organisation.[16] This explains why management sometimes, if it finds it expedient, arrogates to itself the right to re-organise and re-shuffle functions in the organisation. The moral justification for such action is that the talents of the employee have now

become the common assets of the organisation. Thus the management can re-organise the functionability of the various authorities for optimum productivity the employee now have a moral obligation as members of the organisation to exercise their knowledge and competence for the good of the organisation.

In tracing the line of authority in this type of authority relationship, one finds that authority instead of being undirectional is dyadic - a two way traffic. Just as the employees recognise their immediate "Boss" or managers as having authority of office to direct, the managers must also recognise the employees as authorities in their respective areas of competence and seek to consult them in such matters.

This dyadic authority relations is not only vertical, that is, between managers and subordinates, it is also horizontal, that is between employees themselves. Each member of the organisation is an authority in his own area of competence.

Another area of authority worthy of note under the rubrics of relationship between executive authority and non- executive authority is that often referred to as "delegation of authority".

Delegation of Authority

The expression "delegation of authority" refers to a transaction where in a decision-making power is vested in a subordinate by a superior. It is a process by which one who possesses an executive authority de- legalize his power of exercise either by word of mouth or in a written form such that another non-executive authority becomes legalized or empowered for executive action. By such de- legalization process, he (the superior) invariably recognises the right of any person that he designates to exercise his authority on behalf of the organisation. De George summarized the situation well when he wrote:

> *In the delegation of authority, x who may be n imperative authority for y, authorizes y to perform actions for z which y has the right or the authority to perform. If x authorizes y to do(a), y may be an authority for someone else with respect to that (a) where this means that the other person recognises x as being authorised to do that (a)."* [17]

However, it has to be pointed out here that the expression "delegation of authority" is somehow a misleading expression.[18] Authority is never delegated in the sense that the expression popularly understood as a giving of authority to another. As Koontz noted,"if managers should delegate their authority, their status as managers would cease, their position would be eliminated".[19] He further argues that since all delegations of authority are subject to recovery by the grantor, it follows

that the delegator never disposses himself of his authority.[20] It is on the basis of this residual authority which is non transferable that the delegator can withdraw from the delegatee the power to act for or on behalf of another. This means that, that which is delegated in the so called delegation of authority transaction is the power to exercise the authority (non executive which one already possesses by virtue of either his knowledge of the subject, issue, situation or natural capacity) for and on behalf of another. Authority is a right that belongs to the individual or group. It is never delegated in the sense of giving it to another. The transaction that is operative is the recognition accorded another by one who has the authority and power of execution. What the delegator does is that he recognizes the ability or authority of knowledge in the delegatee who inturn by virtue of this recognition is empowered to exercise his natural or acquired rights on behalf of the delegator for the good of the organization. By this phenomenon of "authority by delegation" the interplay of the relationship between executive authority and non executive authorities in an organization is made manifest.

Conclusion

In this essay, authority has been defined as a right which an individual or group possesses either as a natural or acquired endowment. Such right could be executive or non executive. Where it is executive it entails the right and power to act for or on behalf of another or to command another and be obeyed. Where it is non executive, it remains as a personal disposition and can become executive through recognition by the community or organization, of the person's right to act for or on behalf of others for the good of the organization.

Within the matrix of the distinction between executive and non executive authorities, authority has been shown to be distinct from power. Authority has been argued to be a function of all the individuals in any given organisation. Each personnel in the organisation is shown to be an authority in his own area of competence. When for example a business organization advertises for the position of say an accountant or engineer, the understanding is that it is in search of one that has authority of knowledge in any of these areas. When such a person is interviewed and employed, he is employed as a specialist or an authority in his areas of competence.

What any manager does therefore at any level of organizational management is to lead, measure, control and Co-ordinate the various authorities within his area of jurisdiction. The employees are seen and consulted as authorities within their areas of competence while the chief executive and the managers are seen and recognised as having both the authority of office and authority of knowledge in managerial

responsibilities. The effect of the dyadic relationship is that it democratizes authority. This type of understanding of the place and function of authority the paper contains will not only enhance shared responsibility and respectability among members but will foster and generate a sense of self-worth in the employees, thus giving room for creative initiative and cooperative spirit within the organization.

From all this subtle distinctions and analyses of the status of authority in an organizational context, and the envisioned advantages of the new understanding, the paper finally concludes that the whole enterprise of personnel management in any organization or business enterprise is a programme of organizing and coordinating authorities in the organization for the attainment of set objectives. Authority therefore properly understood and managed can be an asset instead of a source of conflict.

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14. I am indebted to Richard De George for the distinction between imperative and performatory executive authority. See Richard T. De George, **The nature and Limits of Authority,** p. 63.
15. **Ibid.,** p. 26
16. For further discussion on how a private good can become a communal good, see Udoidem, Authority and the Common Good ....., pp. 100 - 103.
17. De George, Nature and Limits of Authority, pp. 66
18. When we use the expression "delegation of authority", it has to be understood that it is used in the way that the expression "the rising of th sun" is often used. Science has demonstratively shown that if heliocentrism is accepted it is ridiculous to talk of the rising and setting of the sun, yet for convenience of language and convention, the expression "delegation of authority" it is for convenience of language. Authority is never delegated. Authority can only be recognised and that recognition empowers or gives one the right to act for another.
19. Koontz, **Management,** p. 421.
20. **Ibid.,** p. 235.

ON THE "USE" OR "USES" OF "EXIST"

By

J. O. Fasoro

Introduction

There is a sizeable number of philosophers who have argued that the word 'exist' can be used only in one sense, that is, to say, these philosophers hold a univocalist view on the 'use' or 'uses' of 'exist' or 'exists'. Their argument is connected with the view that, by postulating two or more senses or uses or use of exist, we are unnecessarily overpopulating our world of discourse. Secondly, it has also been argued that through this way of using 'exist', we tend to assign ontological status (or statuses) to various unreal (perhaps imaginary) abstract entities. In Bradley's metaphor, we may be said to assign reality to mere appearances.

The position of this school of thought has not however remained unchallenged. There are, on the other hand, philosophers who argue that 'exist' can be (and of course is) used in more than one sense. That this is so does not however commit these philosophers to Platonism that is, to a view that what we perceive as tangible objects in our day-to-day living are said to 'exist' in another world (of forms) other than this one inhabited by humans.

In this paper, I intend to pitch my tent with this latter school of thought and argue that the word 'exist' can be used in more than one senses. That is to say, rather than believing that there is only one 'use' of exist, there are even more than two 'uses' of this same word. In saying this however, I shall not be understood as dismissing our opponents or critics with a wave of the hand as if to argue that they do not adduce plausible or even convincing reasons for their views. Far from that. We want to determine what implication or bearing, if any, this controversy has as regards Bradley's metaphysics.

Some Preliminary Remarks Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas has generated more problems in Philosophy than perhaps, Plato himself anticipated. We shall not concern ourselves with that problem here. Suffice it to say that this theory received the attention of medieval philosophers and philosophers cum theologians. Then, some philosophers argued that universals have two modes of being - or existence - in reality and in thought. In reality they 'exist' as sensible bodies, while in thought they 'exist' as Ideas. For Thomas Aquinas (1223-1274), 'exist' has three 'uses' as follows:

(a)X exists ante rem = (X existed before we know it - in the mind of God from all ages)
(b)X exists in rem = (X exists as a concrete entity perceivable through or by the senses) [(c)X exists post rem = (X exists after it ceased to be perceived by us, i.e. as an abstract concept, as an idea).

Quine, for instance, would frown at the exaggerated or utra-realism of medieval philosophers like Fredegisius (c. 810), Remigius of Auxerre (c. 841-908), and Odo of Tournai (d. 1113) in which it was argued that our generic and specific concepts (universals in our minds) correspond to a reality existing extramentally in objects, a subsistent reality in which the individuals share. This type of argument, it had been claimed, led (or misled?) many philosophers to the conclusion that there are more than one 'use' of exist. On the other hand, for philosophers like Ryle, to conflate these 'uses' of exist would amount to a category mistake. That is, X exists in the mind, and X exists in reality will be two 'uses' of exist. It only means two different senses or uses of exist, not that a particular X has both physical and mental 'existences'.

The 'Use' or 'Uses' of Exist Consider the following passages Ryle:

> *"... It is perfectly proper to say in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like coloured' or 'sexed'. They indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has different senses in 'the tide is rising' 'hopes are rising' and 'the average age of death is rising', A man would be thought to be making a poor joke who said that three things are now rising, namely the tide, hopes and the average age of death. It would be just as good or bad a joke to say that there exist prime numbers and Wednesdays and public opinions and navies; or that there exist both bodies and minds"* [1]
>
> *And Quine:"... Why not say that chairs and questions, however unlike, are* **hard** *in a single inclusive sense of the word? There is an air of zeugma about 'The chair and the question were hard' but is it not due merely to the dissimilarity of chairs and questions? Are we not in effect calling 'hard' amiguous if at all, just because it is true of some very unlike things ...."* [2]

The first passage above may be said to represent the views of the duevocalists as well as the multivocalists - (equivocation), that is, those who argue that 'exist' can be used in more than one sense, while the

second passage represents the view of the univocalists - that is, those who argue that there is only one sense or use of exist. Theoretically, one can make sense of Quine's view (second passage) as stated above. The ambiguity noticed in the use of 'hard' for both chair and question as above emanates from combining the two entities together and using 'hard' for both as if to argue that they are 'hard' in the same sense. But when we separate them and say 'The chair is hard' and 'The question is hard, almost always unnoticed, both senses of the use of 'hard' convey a meaning that is always synonymous to 'difficult' - 'the chair is difficult to break' and 'the question is difficult to answer'. I believe Quine's rejection of equivocation here, as he himself argues elsewhere, stems from his distaste for overpopulating the world by ways of propounding different senses or uses of a particular word, more so when it can be sensibly used univocally. If we move further to apply Quine's principle of univocity to the word 'exist', the same result will emerge, namely, properly speaking, 'exist' can be used in only one sense.

Since Quine's position (and of course that of Bradley and Professor Edward Erwin and others like them) is an antithesis of our own thesis concerning the 'use' or 'uses' of exist, it will be better to give him a fair hearing. Quine dismisses any contention that X (or Pegasus as used by Quine's hypothetical philosopher - MCX) exists, otherwise we can not be talking of it. He equally dismisses Wyman's contention that Pegasus exists as an idea in the mind, that is, as an unactualized possible[3] Personally, I do not think the concept of unactualized possible will be of any help when it comes to the question of the 'uses' or 'uses' of exist. For instance, what type of ontological status would the so-called unactualized possibles have? If an unactualized possible is not ultimately actualized, does it still exist?

> *"Whyman, by the way, is one of those philosophers who have united in running the good old word 'exist' Despite his espousal of unactualized possibles, he limits the word 'existence' to actuality - thus preserving an illusion of ontological agreement between himself and us who repudiate the rest of his bloated universe".*[4]

For Quine therefore, the statement. "Pegasus does not 'exist'," simply means that there is no such entity at all. If Pegasus existed he would indeed be in space and time, but only because the word 'Pegasus' has spatio-temporal connotations and not because 'exists' has spatio-temporal connotations. Quine also contends that confusion of meaning with naming not only made MCX think he could not meaningfully repudiate Pegasus; a continuing confusion of meaning with naming, (e.g. Morning Star and evening star are two namings, but one object or referent), no

doubt helped engender his absurd (Quine's word) notion that Pegasus is an idea, a mental entity[5] MCX is therefore accused of confusing the alleged named object Pegasus with the meaning of the word 'Pegasus'; therefore concluding that Pegasus must be in order that the word have meaning. Similar argument is adduced against universals - attributes, relations, classes, numbers, etc-do not, according to Quine, 'exist' in any sense of that word - 'exist'. For Quine, there are no such things as 'common qualities' e.g redness predicated of red entities. He is not denying that there are red houses, red roses, red sunsets, "but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word' 'redness', not for that matter, by the word, (household; 'rosehood'; sunsethood"[6]

Quine's argument may therefore be summarized thus:

(a) That we can use singular terms significantly in sentences without presupposing that there are the entities which those terms purport to name;

(b) That we can use general terms, for example, predicates, without conceding them to be names of abstract entities;

(c) That we can view utterances as significant, and as synoymous or heteronnymous with one another, without countenancing a realm of entities called meaning[7].

It follows therefore, so we must argue, that the only sense in which we can use 'exist' is in reference to empirical data or physical entities. This is univocalism with a vengeance'. We cannot talk of universals as existing even as concepts or ideas. The only way we can use 'exist' here, following Bradley, will be in regard to the Absolute - that is using Quine's version of Ockam's razor.

Illusions, just like Pegasus, do not 'exist' either in reality or as an idea. Much as I tried to understand why Quine believes that equivocation is an ambiguous way of expressing ourselves in natural language, I found it difficult to agree with his view. The only way one can 'peep' into the validity of his argument is to say that, once we say that something (X) 'exists', we already know what it means to say that thing exists. Whether this 'use' of exist is extended to cover the totality of what 'there is' in the world, or is restricted to cover only one entity, yet 'exist' still carries the same meaning on both occasions. Therefore, whether we say the Absolute 'exists' or illusions 'exist' the word 'exist' in both is still univocal. This seems to me how far I can go with Quine. That we overpopulate the world with 'uses' of a particular word or concept is not enough to rule out the possibility, even the actuality, of using that concept duovocally or multivocally. This line of argument, of course, will not convince him. He argues, **inter alia**

"... There are philosophers who stoutly maintain that 'exists' said of number, classes, and the like, and 'exist' said of material objects are two usages of an ambiguous term 'exist'. What mainly baffles me is the stoutness of their maintenance. What can they possibly count as evidence8? Why not view "rue' ['true' said of logical or mathematical laws and ('true' said of weather predictions or suspects' confessions as unambiguous but very general, and recognise the difference between true logical laws and true confessions) as a difference merely between logical laws and confessions? And correspondingly for existence?"[9]

It may however be observed that having ruled out the transitivity rule as method for enforcing a judgement of ambiguity, Quine finds 'no evidence' for calling 'existence' and 'true' and 'hard' ambiguous when predicated of things of different types. As argued by Dr. Makinde, Quine's request or demand for evidence does not in any way debunk Russell's and Ryle's contention as far as the 'use' or 'uses' of exist it concerned. That is to say Russell's and Ryle's argument that there are more than one 'use' of exist is not undermined by the quoted passage above where Quine is demanding for the **evidence** for saying there are two or more 'uses' of exist. Dr Makinde is of the view (and I quite agree with him) that a demand for 'evidence' or 'justification' is a rather cheap way of refuting an opponent's thesis especially when the critic knows very well that no such evidence is available, hence none can be produced. The possibility of producing such evidence is even made more difficult in a situation where the critic does not specify the type or colour of the evidence he wants. [11]

Similarly, Nicholas Rescher has argued that it is anomalous to hinge the entire theory of existence primarily or largely upon only one of its philosophical implications. And this is especially inadmissable when it happens to be what is, after all, the most remote, abtruse, and metaphysical of the problems here involved.[12]

According to Quine, to believe that there is a "reality behind linguistic forms" is the thin end of the Platonic wedge, which we must be prepared to extrude if we wish to "renounce abstract entities" [13]. Such statement as "There is an X (Pegasus) such that X is mythological" will be unmeaning to philosophers like Quine because this will amount to saying 'There is no X'. This, it may be observed, is because X here does not refer to any existent, not even an idea of an existent, if we follow Quine's rejection of Wyman's conception of a 'Pegasus - idea' thesis.

This is because to be is be the value of bound variables - something, someone, anything, nothing, etc.

But as Warnock has argued, "something" by itself is more obviously a device for avoiding, perforce or deliberately, the use of specific (or rather specifying) word or phrase; it is used, so to speak, to fill grammatical blanks without giving anything away, or committing the user [14]. Any formalistic philosopher who maintains that existence is univocal, Sommers argues, is forced to reject transitivity and face the consequences of being unable to account even for obvious zeugmas. A striking and belligerent case, he says, is Quine [15]. By zeugmas here, Sommers is refering to those interesting and sometimes funny sorts of Ryleans sentences such as "she came home in a Sedan Chair and a flood of tear', (The chair and question are hard', 'Some periods are punctuation marks while others are vacations" [16]. In the second example of the zeugmas above - that is, 'The chair and question are hard', one would like to argue that the word "hard" must have two senses, that is, if we do not intend to violate transivity rule No one, except Quine and his allies would argue that in 'The chair is hard' and 'The question is hard' :hard conveys the same meaning or that 'hard' is used in one sense. Anyone who argues along this line would be guilty of Ryle's category mistake, and this is where I think Quine becomes a victim of such a mistake. Again, as we hear from Sommers, "The formalist like Quine, Erwin is faced with the type of the dilemma which confronted Russell: accept the transitivity rule and you generate ambiguity where you don't want it, or reject transitivity and you fail to account for it where you ought to.."[17]

I think what actually led some philosophers into rejecting equivocation is their insistence on the objective existential status of any entity said to be 'there is'. This position, as we argued in paper one (An Understanding of Bradley's Metaphysics") is not far from the Eleatic conception what 'there is' - that is Parmenides' conception of reality as 'isness'. The argument which Quine, as a leading representative of Univocalism, seems to be denying may be put thus: whenever something of the form 'FX' is asserted, then the corresponding statement of the explicitly existential form, (Ex) Fx', can be inferred [18]. Here, let represent Pegasus then, 'Ex) Fx' would mean: 'There is Pegasus or 'Pegasus exists'; or 'There is something X such that X is Pegasus. We observed earlier on that Quine makes a distinction between naming and meaning (morning star and evening star), that programme is meant to clear any confusion associated with the belief that the mere mention of something does not mean that X exists. But Quine is mistaken. If my ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which I interprete all experiences, even the most common place ones, as himself seems to believe, it does not

follow that when I use the word 'exist' for myself, and when I assert that Pegasus exists, I am using 'exists' in only one sense. According to Warnock, "There are such things as tigers" would be most appropriate for the purpose of denying that tigers are fictions or mythological beasts, of contrasting them with Phoenixes and Unicorns. But it might have other uses.

> *"Now it is no doubt the case that the seriously made statement 'There are tigers in Africa' would not be true unless. (a) tigers still existed, were not extinct, and (b) there were such things as tigers, non-fictitious, non-mythological. But it is equally clear that to say that there are tigers in Africa is not to say that tigers still exist, not is it to say that there really are such animals. Of course there are connections, but there are also marked differences, between these three statements; the situations, questions, counter-assertions, etc., which would naturally call for their utterance are quite distinct" Univocalists had better listen.*

"USE" OR "USES" OF EXIST AND BRADLEY'S METAPHYSISCS

One may ask: What connection do the arguments on the preceeding pages have with Bradley's metaphysics? The arguments, so far as one can see, says the critic, appear to border on the controversy between the univocalist on the one hand and the duovocalist or multivocalist on the other hand; but how does Bradley come in here? We shall answer these questions very shortly. We must however acknowledge the fact that our answer, due to the scope of this paper, will be very brief indeed.

Multivocalists like Ryle may be seen to be arguing thus: If and when 'exist' is predicable of two things, X and Y, then, it shows that we can use 'exist' for both X and Y. That is to say, there are two (or more) senses or uses of 'exist' - e.g. the gate post 'exists' is one sense, while Gilbert Ryle exists is another sense [20]. Following this, we would then say, Gilbert Ryle belongs to one category, while the gate post belongs to another category. Using 'exists' to cover both Ryle and the gate post as if to say that they both belong to the same category, is according to Ryle, a category mistake. What this means, as I understand it, is that using the word 'exist' zeugmatically to cover both Ryle and the gate post tends to conflate two "use" of 'exist', e.g. "Gilbert Ryle and the gate post exist". And now to Bradley's metaphysics.

Neither Ryle not the gate post constitutes reality for Bradley. It does not however matter if, after all, none of them exists, but we use the word 'exist' in two different senses as our above example shows.

But are we, on that basis, denying that 'Gilbert Ryle exists' and 'The gate post exists' are two 'uses' of exist? For Bradley, both Ryle and the gate post are two appearances. They both drop their distinctiveness when they merge into the Absolute and become a single reality. But if appearances exist, and reality exists separately from appearances then, it may be argued that using 'exist' for both appearances and reality will amount to two 'uses' of exist. Both Ryle and the gate post lost their identities when they became part of the Absolute. This is fine enough, It follows then that we are using 'exist' in three senses when we assert 'The Absolute exists? 'Gilbert Ryle exists; and 'The gate post exists' If this fact is not denied, (and perhaps it is undeniable), then, there must be more than one 'use' of exist. This, again, is where, I think, multivocalists score a decisive point against univocalists like Quine, Erwin, and their allies.

Some philosophers have however argued that it is very difficult, if not impossible to categorise Bradley as either Univocalist or Duovocalist, or even multivocalist. It is further argued that Quine may not after all be taken as defending Bradley's notion of Absolute. It is Hold Croft's contention that Quine's holism is presumably epistemological. One interesting question, he observes, is whether Quine's type of holism has any ontological implications (p.205). He argues; ".... epistemological holism itself does not entail a unique ontology. Bradley, for instance, would not have agreed" with Quine's dictum that scientific method is the highest court of appeal"[22]. Of course a world which "consists of a number, perhaps finite, perhaps infinite, of entities which have various relations to each other, and perhaps also various qualities"[23] will also consist of various existents, and the way or sense in which we use 'exist' here will be equally diverse. On the other hand, if truly, the task of metaphysics is "to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal, but somehow as a whole then Bradley's holistic conception of reality and Quine's conception of existence may be seen as consistent with the theoretical framework of avoiding the division of what is supposedly indivisible except in thought, but not in reality. But, as Sprigge has observed, quite what we are to make of unrealities which 'exist' had always been a problem for Bradley's readers.

CONCLUSION

"When two terms belong to the same category, it is proper to construct conjunctive proposition embodying them. Thus a purchaser may say that he bought a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove, but not that he bought a left-hand glove, and a right-hand glove and a pair gloves"[26] Equally, whenever we use the word 'exist' for different categories of referents, effort must be made to differentiate the senses in which it is being used. Even if we grant Bradley's contention that thought

divides what in fact is not divided, the 'that' from the "what" is nevertheless follows that when we assert that the "that" 'exists', and when we assert that the ''what'' 'exists', these are two uses of the same word -'exists'. It appears obvious that only the naive skeptic will deny these ''uses'', and perhaps argue that 'exists' is used here in one and the same sense. We do not deny the fact that,after all, the ''that'' and the ''What'' may turn out to be one and the same entity, or that both of them are mere illusions, but when we refer to them separately as existing,we are using 'exist' in more than one sense. We may try to avoid separating and something. Like the ''that'' and ''What'' exist', but here again we meet Ryle on his own ground. What that means is that we have already committed a category mistake. In conclusion therefore, we maintain, as it should by now be obvious, that there are 'uses' of exist. That is to say, we join other non-univocalists and say that 'exist' is used in more than one sense[27].

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26. I am very grateful to Dr M.A. Makinde for his comments on this paper.

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PROBLEMS OF PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: A CRITIQUE OF C. S. MOMOH

By

G. E. Azenabor

INTRODUCTION

C.S. MOMOH, in his articles,[1] identifies five "canons of discourse in studying African philosophy", which are really methodological recommendations for studying African philosophy. We shall raise issues in and objections to the canons as a answer to the question, "what is African philosophy"? We begin with a preliminary objection against the term "canon", this is necessary because it will help us understand the nature of the subject in question.

The term "canon", as used by Momoh is, in a way, a misnomer. This is because the term "Canon" literally means an accepted law, principle, rule criterian or standard. The "canons of discourse" in African philosophy, are not any of these Rather, the canons proposed by Momoh are mere methodological approaches in African philosophy. As methodology, the canons identify different perspectives within the general study of African philosophy. To therefore use the term "canons" as if they bind every scholar to some positions or that "canons" are generally accepted by all and sundry, is in-appropriate and a terminological in-exactitude.

We make a distinction between "Principles" (i.e. Canons) and 'methodology'. This distinction has become necessary because Momoh uses the term 'canon', 'principle' and 'parameters' interchangeably and only for us to discover, in the final analysis, that his 'canons' are mere parameters or methodological recommendations for studying African philosophy. As principles, the purported canons of Momoh become general, binding and axiomatic but as methodology they are not general but particular, not binding but perspectival, because there are no generally accepted method of philosophy. A principle or canon is always a standard for determining what X is. So, the canon of Momoh as principles can serve as criteria for evaluation but as methodology they cannot. This is partly because there are no objective method for deriving a philosophy from a value of a given experience. A methodology is just an orderly procedure of accomplishing an end; a technique. Furthermore, every method will formulate its own Principles and given the same principles

the results will always be the same, if correctly applied. But this is not the case with Momoh's Canons, because , if applied we shall come out with dirfferent results or theories. In other words, if any of us accepts any of the five approaches by Momoh in his "Canons of discourse", the result may not be the same, precisely because the principles may differ.

Finally, the fact that Momoh uses the terms "Principle", "Canons" "Parameters" or "Methodology" interchangeably is evidence that he is either deliberately playing down the distinction between them or mistaking them for the same thing.

Dr. K.C. Anyanwu is one of those who particularly thinks that the question of methodology in African philosophy ought not to be an issue in the first place. This is because, for him "Philosophical insight and creative vision do not depend on methods but on several factors, like personal sensitivity and commitment to certain problems of experience. And furthermore, it is the subject mater that determines its own methods"[2] What really matters, to Anyanwu, is the formulation of the problem. This is because if the problem is ill-formulated or in-appropriate, the methodology will not save us from erroneous and invalid conclusions.[3]

Anyanwu's position is really not a criticism of Momoh, rather, Anyanwu is merely shifting the issue and placing more emphasis on the area he finds more expedient i.e. the formulation of the problem. What eludes Anyanwu is that in formulating a problem, a particular methodology would evetually be used in analysing or in solving the problem. So, we can not run away from the question of methodology.

Momoh, on his part, finds the question of methodology very important and chooses the term 'canon' in particular, because the principles "are now accepted in one form or the other, implicitly or explicitly, by philosophers who have actually initiated some of them and those who have devoted their academic careers to the promotion of the positive study of African philosophy"[4]. The point Momoh is making is that if some group of scholars have already accepted the principles as criteria of evaluation for any scholarly undertaking or work in African philosophy, then the principles become canons for those who believe in them.

But even then, this argument does not in any way make the "canon of discourse" principles. If some group of scholars believe and accept them they then become a world view (not canons or principles), because they are now being shared by others, and they are collective.

MOMOH'S CANONS OF DISCOURSE

(1)

The first "canon of discourse", according to Momoh, is Paul Radin's position of existence of an autochthonous intellectual class in traditional society. This position could be found in Radin's book **Primitive Man As Philosopher.**

In his book, Momoh point out, Radin talks of primitive philosophies. In this respect, Radin means that in every human group, there are individuals who occupy themselves with basic problems of what we normally call philosophy. Furthermore, Momoh argues that members of this intellectual elite group, contrary to popular opinion, do not hold uniform views. They were and still are as individualistic in their views and actions as scholars and thinkers are. Radin therefore advises any scholar researching into any area of African philosophy to look out for individual's view instead of communal beliefs.

In evaluating this first methodology, Anyanwu observed that the recommendation is a "self-evident fact, and it is even doubtful whether it is desirable that philosophers should have the same view on the same subject"[5] To buttress the point that African elders do not hold uniform views on the same subject, We note the case of the concept of ancestral worship and the theory of reincarnation among the Esan of Edo State.

In a research into the metaphysical area of African philosophy in its ancient setting,[6] Alojie Azenabor and Ojie Okosun (our informants) manifested this trait, with admirable critical and reflective powers, when confronted with the problem of how an ancestor who is said to be an object of worship, invocation, and who is residing indefinitely in the spirit world, watching over his descendants and demanding their attention can at the same time be said to have returned to his descendants through reincarnation. Alojie Azenabor on his part, argued that it is not strictly the ancestral spirit that is re-born but it is the child that is supposed to have come under the particular influence of an ancestor and receive part of his vitality and qualities.

Okosun was, however, of a different persuasion. According to him, the puzzle could be resolved if we understand the fact that man reincarnates fourteen number of times, after which the spirit resides permanently in the spirit world. So, when a family worships the ancestor, it is the spirit of her great ancestor - is now residing permanently in the spirit world. Those spirit that have not yet completed their fourteen number of times of reincarnating processes are the ones that are continually re-born as reincarnated ancestors. So, there is no contradiction in the two beliefs or theories, he affirmed.

Radin's recommendation assumes that African philosophy exists in its traditional setting. This conclusion is based on the axiom that every human being responds to experience, which is the beginning of philosophy and for which the written tradition is not a pre-requisite. In fact, the main problem with this methodology is that of undocumented knowledge. The fact that we have no books written by 'primitive' people as regards their philosophies, in the manner of the West, sometimes make scholars to ask whether we can really talk of 'primitive' philosophy. For instance, Professor P.O. Bodunrin has argued that "Philosophy cannot progress adequately, without writing."[7] The case of Socrates who never wrote and is still an acclaimed philosopher was used as a counter case in point. To this, Bodunrin argued that "had other not written down the sayings of Socrates and Buddha we would today not regard them as philosophers, for their thoughts would have been lost in the mythological world of proverbs and pithy saying".[8] Again, it is quiet inconceivable that a purely oral tradition could have formed, preserved and transmitted across generations a written tradition could, especially in modern time. This is the reason why, in modern time, writing is regarded as an indispensable condition for philosophy.

But then, this is not to say that writing is a pre-condition for philosophy.[9] It is only that written tradition is, perhaps, a better way of transmitting thought in modern time. So the absence of writing in the 'primitive' societies cannot prevent us from talking of their philosophies. After all, if we accept the fact that philosophy begins with wonder as Plato wants us to believe, and that philosophy still wallows in the quagmire of wonder as Momoh succinctly added, then we would also agree that this wonder is not limited to only a literate society. In a 'primitive' or non-literate society, some elders have also wondered about the nature of God, man, society, life and death, etc. The only thing, perhaps, is for us to put their thoughts into writing in this modern time for better transmission of knowledge. This is the basis of Momoh's stimulating plea that African philosophers should go out into the field, as they go into the library to study Ayer's work for example, and hold discussions with African elders on philosophical matters, documenting their findings for posterity.[10]

(2)

The second "canon of discourse" in African philosophy is that of Prof. Gordon Hunnings. This is the method of "synthesis."[11] According to Momoh, Hunnings advises African philosophers to put synthesis before critical analysis. Hunnings draws the attention of African philosophers to Plato. "In Plato", writes Hunnings, "what began as criticism ended as synthesis. This is where philosophy ceases to be second-order activity ---

and becomes a first-order activity --- African philosophers studying traditional culture will need to be practitioners of the skill of interior reconstruction, comparative criticism and synthesis."[12]

By Hunnings methodology, Momoh argues, we can see that "a devastating criticism that does not end on a salutory synthetical note is nothing but negativism and recidivision and at the best a sign of intellectual stagnation." Prof. Kwesi Wiredu, Momoh points out, lent some weight to Hunnings' Method of synthesis, when he (Wiredu) writes to confirm that "the logical Neo-positivists in African philosophy are doing what he calls "meta-African philosophy", but advises also that they should not just stop at this."[14] The impression one gathers here", writes Momoh, "is that African logical Neo-Positivists should also be concerned with systematic, synthetical and substantive philosophy."[15]

The value of Hunnings' methodology is incontrovertible - that there should be - synthesis after analysis is saying the obvious- for there really cannot be analysis without synthesis. Embedded in analysis is synthesis, we must bring out components of synthesis from analysis in order to synthesize rationally or we may leave out some important aspect. But even then, we cannot end up with first synthesis. This is because if we take the laws of dialectics into consideration, we discover that to every thesis there is always an anti-thesis and both can later be put together as a synthesis. The synthesis then becomes thesis again and the whole process continues.

Thus, one might argue that the correct approach or issue is not whether to put analysis before synthesis or vice-versa. Rather, in practice, they take place simultaneously. While we engage in one, we also be conscious of the other.

(3)

The third "canon of discourse" is that of Prof. Robin Horton. This is the method of departmentalization.[16] Horton's methodology according to Momoh, enjoins African philosophers to be more specific in their claims about the existence or non-existence of African philosophy. The point is that instead of the blanket denial or assertion of the existence of African philosophy we should be more exact in talking or writing about ethics, metaphysics, epistemology or logic in African philosophy.

Following Horton's methodology, Momoh points out, Horton himself examines the 'logic question' in African philosophy and denies its existence. That denial notwithstanding, Momoh observes that Horton has added an important dimension to the study of African philosophy. The dimension has made Bodunrin to talk positively of "the moral sphere" in African traditional culture, even while he (Bodunrin) in general speaks negatively of African philosophy.[17] Horton's methodology, Momoh also

notes, has challenged African philosophers to solve particular problem(s) and discuss issue(s) in Africa philosophy,instead of making a general and nebulous assertion about them. "This effort". Anyanwu observes, "is a fruitful one." The brighter side of Horton's methodology, not-withstanding, Anyanwu remarks that the Hortonian approach has shifted the question of the existence of African philosophy from general denial to particular denial. The distinction of philosophy into ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, logic, etc., according to Anyanwu, "are more formal than real, they are mere mental distinctions which do not exist in reality." [20] There is unitary relationship among the various branches of philosophy which is so important that one can not rightly discuss the ethical or political sphere without having recourse to basic assumptions which are metaphysical and espistemological. Anyanwu puts it in another form when he argues that "if we know what a philosophy assumes reality to be and the method which the mind follows in arriving at what is considered to be a trust worthy knowledge of that reality we can deduce its ethical, aesthetic, political and theological doctrines"[21] The point here is that we cannot isolate the branches of philosophy rigidly.

Horton's denial of the existence of logic in African philosophy is an unfortunate one. He fails to realise that there are different standard or types of logic, each with its own nature and significance. African philosophy is governed by the logic in ordinary language not formal logic. "Prof. Horton", Anyanwu points out, "may argue that African philosophy lacks "formal logic," but he cannot conclude that it has "no logic." All philosophies have "logics", but whether one accepts the "logics' of their arguments is a separate question".[22]

Momoh also examines in detail the "logic question in African philosophy."[23] Momoh distinguished two sense of logic. These are:

(a) natural logic; by which is meant critical, discriminating, rational and reasonable discussion and discourse in natural language. So logic here is concerned with clarity of expression.

(b) artificial logic; by which is meant the setting up constants, variables, sentence connectives, deduction and transformation rules for deriving the formal validity of arguments in symbolic logic. Symbolic logic deals with the structure and from of propositions and arguments on a very general level. Momoh argues that there are individuals in any society who are logical in the first sense. As regards the second sense, an individual can be logical only when he is a logician by training, that is trained in the techniques of modern symbolic logic. Most professional philosophers, Momoh argues, are not logical in this second sense. Prof. Horton must have used the

word logic in the second sense only, especially since he is a logical positivist.[24]

(4)

The fourth Cannon is the one attributed to Prof. William Abraham. This Canon entails two methodologies;

(a) A distinction between private and public aspects of African philosophy.

(b) The discussion of issues within the context of a spatio-temporal paradigm.[25]

On Abraham's first methodology, Momoh observes that:

> *The private aspect is intimately synonymous with Radin's notion of an intellectual elite group in the traditional society, wherein it would be discovered that some elders hold individualistic and even critical views from what is generally believed to be the uniform world view of the community. The public aspects of African philosophy is what Abraham says is the world view of the community which is public property, which is supposed to be known by every Tom, Dick and Harry in the Community.*[27]

The second aspect of Abraham's Canon Cautions against over - generalization in African philosophy and advises that "Scholars, in order to avoid mis-representation and over-generalization should always discuss matters within the context of cultural spatio-temporal paradigm."[28]

Momoh further argues:

> *It is less misleading if a scholar indicates the epoch and the paradigm of the African culture he is talking about of which African people --- This guideline is without prejudice to the fact that there are common and perennial themes in African philosophy. But it helps further to highlight the fact that Africans do not by any means hold uniform views on philosophical themes.*[29]

The second aspect of Abraham's canon also entails the method of identification. The method of identification requires that African elders who are interviewed on any topic in African philosophy or studies should be identified by names and their views credited to them. From this method, Momoh argues that "it is not enough, and it could be misleading, at any rate, for a researcher to report simply that "according to my informant(s) such-and such-African people hold this view". The name of the informant(s) should be given when it is thought that the discussion centered only on the public aspect of the community's philosophy.[30]

The point Abraham is making is that the discussion of issues within the scope of a particular culture or people is necessary because objection has been raised against the free way in which 'African' has generally been used. It has been argued that:

> *Africa is such a large continent, composed of hundreds of people of several races and ethnic groups and it would be misleading to make general statements about 'African' beliefs and practices. Those who raise the objections point and justly do so, to the great differences that exist among Africans.*[31]

Again, and more importantly, every philosophy is based on a particular culture, history and experience. That is, philosophy is culture-bound.

It may be instructive at this juncture, to see whether or not we can really make a distinction between "world-view" and "philosophy" the way Abraham wants us to believe, by his distinction between private and puclic philosophies. Robert Refield sees world-view as "the outlook upon the universe that is characteristics of people".[32] To Grahay, "a world view is not explicit, not systematic, it is not compared critically to other philosophies and does not include attempts to prove".[33] Philosophy, on the other hand, is said to be an individual's rational, critical and conscious reflections on things generally.

Momoh is of a different persuasion in respect of the distinction between world-view and philosophy. Hear him:

> *Even though a world view may be characteristic of a people's communal outlook upon the universe, it does not follow that the origin or formulation of that world view was communal. A world-view definitely was initially propounded by one individual in the distant past, has an overriding power and influence over private philosophy.*[36]

Furthermore, Momoh, points out that "There are individuals in every culture who critically examine their cultural world-views. And a doctrine does not have to be comparative, critical and deductive before it can pass muster as philosophy.[35] It is against the above background that Momoh, on his part, finds it difficult to draw a sharp line between world view and philosophy. We agree with him. A further point to add is that philosophy can easily become a world view. This is because even where philosophy begins with an individual it can end up as a world-view, when shared by some scholars or school of thought. So in spite of its individualistic nature, philosophy also has its communal nature.

It is against this background, perhaps, that we understand Anyanwu's remarks that Abraham's distinction between private and public philosophies is an unhappy one, because a clear-cut distinction between private and public philosophies is impossible to draw; for individualized philosophies still stem from general experience and problem facing a given culture. Hear him:

> *The philosophies of individuals are still subordinate to public philosophy, and in the ultimate analysis public philosophy.*[36]

Prof. Kwesi Wiredu also in line with Anyanwu's submission finds a relationship between private and public philosophies. But unlike Anyanwu, Wiredu finds a difference, though subtle, between private and public philosophies. Hear him:

> *There is an ultimate relation between the thought of the individual traditional sage-philosophers and the communal world out look of their people. It is the communal philosophy which provides the point of departure of the sage-philosopher - On the other hand, a little reflection must show that the communal thought itself is the pooling together of these elements of thought of the community that remain stuck in the common imagination.*[37]

The line between private and public philosophies may be possible to draw in Western culture, especially because the frame work of their culture and world view are essentially individualistic, but in African culture, the line between private and public is impossible to draw and in fact unnecessary, because the individual and the whole are fused together. Consequently, one would find it difficult, if not impossible, to present and individual philosophy, without relating it to the whole. "Though, we can speak of African individualism, just as we can speak of Western individualism, but there is still a difference. While the latter looks at the individual as self-sufficient, autonomous, a free agent, who should assert himself and be independent, the former will affirm himself, strengthen his personality, not by isolating himself but by having contacts with others, relating with others.[38]

Paulin Hountondji denies completely the existence of African philosophy in its public or communal aspect. He maintains that some professional philosophers who defend the existence of African philosophy in this realm, are only substituting myth for philosophy.[39]

All the above problems, objections and criticisms put forward on Abraham's distinction between 'public' and 'private' philosophies become unnecessary once we realise that Abraham's distinction is not to

be taken as a rigid one; for it is obvious that private and public philosophies shade one into the other by insensible degrees.

Hountondji's own objection seems to be motivated by his ignorance of what philosophy in its public or communal aspect is all about. Philosophy in its public aspect simply means that very people or "cultural group have their own philosophy, widely interpreted to mean a system of beliefs around which their daily lives rotate. For it would be impossible for a group of people to live without Common idea of the world in which they live, move and have their being, so to speak, more or less consistent ideas about God, man, spirits, nature for example.[40] As for Hountondji's claim that myths are being presented as philosophy in communal or public aspect of philosophy, Momoh addressed this issue extensively,[41] arguing that within the ancient period of any philosophy, philosophy is mythology and that there are ethical, moral, metaphysical, logical and epistemological dimensions to African mythologies which should interest any professional African philosopher.

The problem with the second aspect of Abraham's "Canon" which cautions against over-generalization is seen by Anyawu as artificially restricting the scope of philosophy, experience and knowledge. Any knowledge of immense significant, writes Anyanwu, "has arisen through bold generalizations and convictions that there are intimate relationships among events that others look upon as isolated facts."[42] On Abraham's method of identification, Anyanwu comments that "the Canon seems to suggest that philosophy is an empirical science which requires empirical research and method that is, public opinion poll and statistical judgement."[43] And lending weight to Anyanwu's criticism of Abraham's methodology, Professor M.A. Makinde argues that "in some cases the individuals may be unknown or unidentified. What is more important philosophically speaking, is the idea or thought and its relation to a particular language as used to depict the picture of reality."[44]

The above argument or point of Anyanwu against Abraham's guideline and the need for bold generalization has relevance only in the sciences, which is deterministic, not in philosophy which is normative, in which consensus of opinion to warrant generalizations, is seldom and in fact undesirable. Furthermore, the point that seems to elude Anyanwu in criticising Abraham's methodology is that there are no laid down rules or fixed methods on how to philosophize. Abraham, like others, has only suggested one method - there are obviously inexhaustible others. Moreover, Abraham's methodology is quite a familiar one - this is the socratic method, which has received little attention in our time. Socrates had identified some of the people he held discussions with, for example,

there is Meno's lad in the **Meno**, Gorgias in the **symposium** and Theaetetus in **Theaetetus**.

With regards to Makinde's objection, one just needs to remind him that since there is no thought without a thinker, it becomes imperative to identify the thinker. It must be pointed out however, that although philosophers are saturated with their culture as Abraham's principle argues, that is not to say that they (i.e philosophers) cannot be transcultural. A philosophy can have meaning or value to the members of other cultures.

The fifth "Canon" is postulated by (5) Momoh himself. This is the method of classification.[45] This method entails "the clear-out reconstitution of African philosophy", into the Ancient period, the Transitional and the Modern period.[46]

Momoh refuses to endorse the locution "African Traditional Philosophy" or "African Traditional Thought" and prefers instead to talk of "Ancient African philosophy" is offensive and carries the implications that Africans have not been trying, or worse still, ought not to try to philosophize. Moreover, the word 'Traditional' according to Momoh, " ____ drips with the images of naivate, low intellect, stagnation and crudity. It is also not 'thought', because comprising this gamunt of knowledge is African science - physical, chemical and biological."[47]

The term "Ancient African Philosophy", which Momoh finds more appropriate,deals with the substantive doctrines and reflections that can be extracted from African philosophy in its ancient settings, about strenuous attempts of African elders to ponder over, ask and answer fundamental questions about the universe. The period Momoh designate as the 'Traditional' is the entry of scholars from different disciplines into African studies. "Modern African philosophy". according to Momoh,deals with the theories of professional philosophers or scholars on African philosophy.

Lending weight to Momoh's principle of periodization,Anyanwu argues that this distinction may be necessitated by" the fact African cultural experiences are dynamic processes,that require interpretation and re-interpretation".[48] It is in this light that the term "African Traditional philosophy "may be seen as stagnatory and unprogressive, while the terms "Ancient", "Traditional" and "modern" are dynamic processes in any cultural experience.

Apart from this, Anyanwu points out that Momoh's principle of classification has the problem of fixed demarcation. "Life". according to Anyanwu,"is not 'traditional', ancients 'traditional', modern contemporary etc. There is no fixed demarcation here. Rather, life manifests itself simultaneously under all these categories--philosophy

should look for unity in diversity and continuity in change. "[49] It is from this standpoint that posits that Momoh's methodology has to be modified.

In critising Momoh's methodology. Anyanwu has diffused his own criticism himself,perhaps into a synthesis, by pointing out that "there is something constant and enduring inspite of the mutation of time ".[51] It is this constancy, perhaps,that Momoh has brought out in his principle of clarification.

CONCLUSION

From the above exposition and analysis, we see that the " Canons of discourse in African philosophy" are more of approaches or methodologies to the study of African philosophy than canons or principles. They are also attempts to postulate what African philosophy should be or the direction African philosophy should follows. These attempts are viewed from the bias of a school of thought. Momoh's approaches have no doubt been able to give us a positive insight into the direction and study of African philosophy, unlike those scholars who just chat and fret interminably, about African philosophy, dissipating energy on the peripherals. Momoh's only error in this respect, perhaps,is that of nomenclature; his calling what he did another name,thereby,distracting from the value of his work.

Furthermore, Momoh's methodological approaches leaves out the question of what really makes a philosophy African or the "Africanness" of a philosophy,[52] which has recently been the subject of a multi-dimensional controversy. The answer to this question cannot be found in Momoh's methodology but elsewhere; It is in fact anchored on the premises of three types of schools of thought in African philosophy.[53] Be it as it may,we make bold to say that the Africanness of a philosophy can be found in the type of questions raised, meaning and understanding sought within the bias and context of the African cultural setting, basic assumptions and goal, which usually are humanistic and metaphysical.

From the above position on the concept of African philosophy we can argue and conclude that:

(I) African philosophy can be done by an African or non-African, so long as the spirit of African philosophy cited above taken into cognisance.

(II) Geographical origin of the author or writer does not determine African philosophy. After - all, Tempels a foreigner, a Belgian to be precise, produced African philosophy. Also Wittgentein, a German, produced English philosophy.

(III) The language or medium of communication need not be African, but we must however avoid foreign categories and models.

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KANT TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC COGNITION.

By

Akinyemi Onigbinde

To many contemporary philosophers of science, the philosophy of Kant is a necessary starting point. His thesis on epistemology is a sure reference point for modern minds of the likes of Hans Reicheback, T.S. Kuhn, Karl Popper, D. Shapere. This should not be a matter for disputation, more so when it is recongnized that the fertile mind of Kant traversed the vast field of Reconstruct of his day. Thus it is just normal that the result of his conclusions should be sure legacy and reference-point for whoever is interested in the philosophy of science. And many really have drunk from the Kantian resource fountain. As the German Scholar, W,K. Essler puts it, within the foundation upon which he was able to answer "how synthetic a priori judgements are possible", the major question discussed in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, two hypotheses were established.

(1) That empirical sciences exist;
(2) That every empirical science contain true synthetic a priori statement.

It is thus certain that, in Kant's theory the discussions of "pure" reason were never isolated from the problems of experience. while experience, in his theory, often referred to knowledge about empirical natural sciences.

Today nobody completely agrees with Kant's position. His views are often adapted for criticism, for the aim of elucidating a view-point. However, in terms of Kant's own philosophy - due to the limitation of his times, he based himself mainly on the paradigm of Newtonian mechanics - what were the major aspects of his philosophic views on the theory of empirical natural sciences and cognition therein? The present work is an attempt to profer an answer to this question.

What are contained in sensation and their function in Scientific cognition are not of prime importance in Kant's philosophy. This is not to say that the contents of sensations does not form part of his discussion. Indeed his substantial views on epistemology deal greatly with sensations and scientific cognition.

It is of note that Kant's transcendental idealist[2] philosophy as derived from rationalistic tradition, is identical with the propositions of empiricists on the beginning of scientific cognition. As he put it:

> *There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience.*[3]

It is the opinion of Kant that it is only through sensible intuition that the presupposition for the existence of scientific truth can be provided and materials supplied for functioning in which thinking transforms itself into knowledge. He called sensibility "the capacity for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects" and held that sensation, "as far as we are affected by it (the object) "is the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation".[4] Thus it is evident that Kant did not deny the fact that sensation is born of passive sensibility being stimulated by external objects. We can see it from the preceding position that what Kant attempted to do was to co-ordinate the proposition of traditional empiricism with that of rationalism.[5] Such efforts are typically reflected in his statement about the relationship between sensation and thought: "Thought without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind".[6] This does not lead to the conclusion that Kant uncritically adopts the principles of empiricism. He accepted them only after he has effected what he thought were principled changes and modifications.[7]

Kant distinguished the formation of sensible experience into two parts - a posteriori matter and the a priori forms. According to him, all our external representations of sensation are followed by the representatives of time and space therefore treating time and space as forms of sensible matter and attributed a priori origins to them.

Thus Kant is able to explain how synthetic a priori propositions of pure mathematics and geometry can exist.

It also establish the prerequisites for explaining how empirical natural sciences can tolerate strict forms, of mathematics being applied to them.

By suggesting the a prori forms of time and space, Kant raised the question of the organization of sensible matter. Unlike John Locke who devoted himself to the analysis of sensory perceptions and regarded perception as an assemblage of sensible and distinguishable characteristics,[8] Kant emphasized that sensible matter exists in a certain

structure of time and space, and in the form of a priori intuition the sensible contents become orderly rather than disorderly fragments.

In Kant's theory the processing and organisation of the sensible manifold in the form of time and space was considered to result from the participation of human thought. By such participation the sensible manifold can reach a certain unity.

He says:

> *For each representation, insofar as it is contained in a single movement can never be any but absolute unity... This act I name the synthesis of Apprehension, because it is directed upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can never be represented as a manifold, and as contained in a single representation, save in virtue of such synthesis.*[9]

Furthermore, Kant is of the view that thinking operations of conception need to be applied to recognize the content of the synthesis of sensation as the object of science. In this way, he emphasized that even activities of passive apprehension have spontaneous and active operations of thought running through them. He thus repudiates the viewpoint of traditional empiricists who regards the pure experience of sensation as the foundation of knowledge. This position is not dissimilar to the criticism in modern philosophy of science of the contemporary narrow empiricists, i.e. the logical positivists, by the schools of critical rationalism, historicism and neo-historicism; they all maintain that in sensible experience there is some kind of "predetermined" content not deriving from it .[10]

However, Kant's theory of sensation meant a repudiation of materialism. One, Kant largely accepted Locke's view about the subjectivity of a "secondary quality", which was acknowledged rather widely at that time. He thought smell colourand those sorts of things were not objective determinations of objects but, rather subjective alteration in the observer.[11] Two, (and this is very important), he thought only time and space in the root cause of sensible representation were the a priori modes of intuition, and they, as conditions, contained such relations as the intuited position (extension) and its changes, succession, concurrence, and the continuation of succession and coexistence.

Therefore, time and space by no means expressed qualities of the things-in-itself. In this way, Kant denied Locke's materialistic view of "primary qualities", thereby removing an important cornerstone of the mechanical materialists explanation of the object of science. This was just the first step he underwent in the so-called demonstration of agnosticism, which says all objects are related to the subjective forms of

cognition, therefore they are merely phenomenal and cannot represent the qualities of things-in-themselves.

The structure of thought, its origin in scientific knowledge and the role it plays in the process of cognition may well be said to be the central issues in Kant's theory of category. Kant insisted that the fundamental propositions in the natural sciences should be "synthetic a priori propositions". Such propositions do not use empirical induction derived from the a posteriori as the foundations of their universal and necessary validity, and, at the same time, are not constrained forever within logical necessity itself as tautological analytical propositions are. They possess universal validity for objects. It was through clarifying the structure of thought in cognition that Kant arrived at the explanation of how a synthetic a priori proposition is possible.

On the objectives of science and the criteria of knowledge evaluation related to it, Kant still followed the traditional view that knowledge needs to establish a universally necessary and objective validity about objects. This, consequently,determined the subtle relationship between Hume and him: while agreeing with Hume on the difficulties of exposing the stand of inductivism ' he devoted himself to relieving scientific knowledge from the consequences of Hume's critique. Thus, he began by focusing attention on the conceptual capacities that already exist in the cognitive subject in order to provide new epistemological grounds clarifying why scientific theories possess universally necessary and objective application to objects of experience. But, this new focus of attention also led Kant to alter the traditional objectives of science. Traditionally, philosophy had explained science by equating the objectivity of scientific knowledge with its universally necessary applicability to objects, whereas Kant's propositions represented a "hardening" of the viewpoint of universal necessity but showed a "softening" tendency on objectivity. Kantian explanations retained the term, the "objectivity" of knowledge, but this was only used to refer to its universally necessary applicability to the object of science. As he put it: "objective validity and necessary universality are equivalent terms".[12]

As to whether or not the object of science is really an "objective" existence independent of the cognitive subject, Kant reached a negative conclusion. He held that empirical knowledge cannot extend to things-in-themselves, and the object of knowledge can only be phenomenal. As a result, there arose an objective theory of scientific knowledge embodying the dualistic modes of explanation in Kant's philosophy, i.e. with the characteristics of agnosticism and subjective idealism.

The exposition Kant made of his overall theory of categories can be regarded as kind of "deduction", the furnishing of reasons and grounds which extend from the sense of law. In Kant's view, "categories are not primary predicates or kinds of being, but rules for judging about beings, not forms of objects but form of the thought of objects".[13] His whole explanation of this involved three fundamental ideas:
(a) self-consciousness (b) categories or a priori forms of understanding as possible conditions for experience viz, knowledge of the object: (c) application of categories to possible objects of experience. In keeping with his "copernican revolution", Kant did not explain the contents of categories by empirical objects. On the contrary, he explained the possibility of empirical, namely, scientific objects by the categories. In the course of doing so he elaborated the role of understanding in the human capacity for thought and he emphasized that understanding is a kind of priori capacity for thought in the active synthetic matter of sensibility. In order to explain the foundation of this capacity for a priori understanding, which is prior to and determines the objects of the sciences, Kant advanced the idea of transcendental self-consciousness (also called "transcendental apperception"). This was pure and abstract. Kant did not regard it as a substance but stressed that it was an activity. "This is the self which operates in judgement rather than the self which interests the psychologist... That such a self must be thought of as unitary is not a piece of metaphysical speculation, but a mere tautology"[14] That is to say, in itself it was only unity in form, while its nature lay in the "original synthetic unity", which determined and made clear the identity of consciousness in cognition. He goes on to say:

> *It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.* [15]

It was through the activity of understanding itself that transcedental self-consciousness ("I think"), taken as the first principle and basis synthesized and united the intuitive manifold in the ways determined by the categories and made it into the unitary consciousness of objects. "The synthetic unity of consciousness is... a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me".[16] Categories were the internal formal structures by which transcedental self-consciousness realized its own function. With the aid of categories, representations of the intuitive manifold in thinking acquire various determinations of universal necessity and become objective knowledge of experience or objects. As to how categories ap-perceive the intuitive

manifold, Kant focused on raising two questions. One was the sensible conditions under which categories could realise their application, the other was the analysis, given conditions of how each fundamental category achieved different universal and necessary determinations about possible experience.[17] The elucidation of the former question was his transcedental scheme, and that of the latter was a series of pure synthetic a priori judgements he put forward, i.e, principle or system of pure understanding. A key point here was how the two functions, sensibility and understanding, were combined together in knowledge. Kant himself opened a new road by suggesting that "time" in the intuitive form of internal senses was the intermediary function of this combination. In a private correspondence to K.L. Reinhold, sometime in 1789 Kant wrote:

> *All synthetic judgements of theoretical cognition are possible only by the relating of a given concept of an intuition. If synthetic judgement is a priori synthetic, there must be a pure intuition to ground it.*[18]

This is to say, it is through a priori determination of time (every sensible material exist in the form of time) that the logical function of thought realizes the determination of every possible object of experience. In this way, Kant attempts an explanation of the relationship between the thought of understanding and experience (knowledge) in general.

A sound scientific theory is always established with the aid of logical, universal conceptual terms, axioms, theorems, laws and the like. However, what it deals with is directly (e.g. physics) or indirectly (e.g. mathematics) related to real matters of the empirical world. From this, there has always existed an unavoidable philosophical question of the foundation of scientific theory on the level on the level of "metascience". As the philosopher of science. M.W. Qartofsky put it, what is the connection between logical and reality, between formal identification on deduction and the form of demonstration on one hand, and the truth of the matter as on the other? In other words, in science what connects a linguistic system, or conceptual system, or theoretical model, and this system or model with the matter referred to beyond language?[19] To this question Kant's theory of category is very clear (a) "Understanding does not derive its (a priori) laws from, but prescribes them to nature".[20] The modes of human subjective thought make possible the objects and laws of scientific experience; (b) The objects determined by pure categories are not things-in-themselves, but only phenomena. So the whole world of nature in terms of the objects of scientific knowledge, is merely a world of phenomena.

If the "induction problem" as understood in modern philosophy of science can be called the Humean problem", then it is only appropriate to

call another question with which it is concerned, the "demarcation" as Karl Popper put it, the "Kantian problem". Kant's philosophy not only, as A.J. Ayer pointed out, refuted the metaphysics which provided the sense of knowledge of transcendental reality, but also explicitly contained an important criterion distinguishing the natural science from non-sciences: Scientific knowledge can only be empirical rather than transcendental. He pointed that nature is "the sense-world with exclusion of all objects that are not sensible".[21] Knowledge or experience, of course, does not deal with transcedental objects. This is, at the same time, determined by the relationship between the categories and experience; and as far as the production of knowledge is concerned, according to Kant:

> *The pure concepts of understanding can never admit of transcedental but always only of empirical employment, and that the principles of pure understanding can apply only to objects of the senses under the universal conditions of possible experience, never to things in general without regard to the mode in which we are able to intuit them.*

This Kantian position was of significance in that, having defined the objects of science, it was contraposed with the confusion of supraphysical as spirit and "ego" with science in an unprincipled manner. But this criterion is also meaningful to the extent that it propounds that the objects of knowledge or of experience are only phenomena rather than things-in-themselves. It was, therefore a negation of traditional native materialism, in line with which (as Newton maintained, for instance), the objects of science had indubitable objective existence independent of human beings. This agnostic aspect of Kant's view, in one respect, reflected his contradictory characteristic of both supporting and depreciating science.

But in Kant's view, the dividing line between science and philosophy does not mean that the two are not complimentary. Indeed, they permeate each other. Science is based on the explanations of philosophy, while the course of scientific cognition itself cannot be independent of the act of philosophic thought. As he pointed out in his **Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences:**

> *All natural philosophers who wanted to proceed mathematically in their work had therefore always, and had to make use of them, even though they otherwise solemnly repudiate any claim of metaphysics on their science.... All true metaphysics is taken from the essential nature of the thinking faculty itself and therefore is by no means (invented. This is because metaphysics is not*

borrowed from experience but contains the pure operations of thought, and hence contains concepts and principles a priori, which first of all bring the manifold of empirical representations into legitimate connection, whereby such a manifold can become empirical cognition, i.e. experience.[23]

Generally speaking, one aspect of Kant's philosophy is structurally related with empirical natural science. Reason as the "regulator" of scientific knowledge. And as he pointed out.

All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and end with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought.[24]

In terms of the nature of human cognition, man not only pursues experimental knowledge, but also tries to go beyond the bounds of experience to find the absolute, complete, ultimate, unconditional unified type. The result of the latter cognition is reason, "by reason.... I mean necessary concepts, whose object cannot be given in any experience"[25] Reason is transcedent; it transcends every bound of experience.

Kant maintained, however, that reason, apart from its transcedent application, has another "immanent" use; its application is necessary for science.

He noted:

Transcedental ideas have an excellent, and indeed indispensably necessary, regulative employment, namely that of direction the understanding towards a certain goal....[26]

In Kant's view, science should be regarded as a system, a whole body of various concepts and laws. "Every doctrine, if it is to be a system, i.e., a whole of cognition ordered according to principles, is called science"[27] Such unity, different from that of understanding of sensible matter is a kind of unity of reason", or a kind of higher" unity of system of knowledge about understanding".

Thus Kant offered a new explanation of the relationship between the empirical knowledge of science and such metaphysical questions as the world's general prospect, ultimate cause, final boundaries of time and space. He held that the latter could become truth in a scientific sense, but instead that they could play a role in standardizing, guiding and regulating the establishment of a scientific system. This role which was later vigorously denied by various schools of positivism, gradually came to be thought of highly following the rise of historicism. For instance, T.S.

Kuhn admitted that in scientific "Paradigms" there is a "quasi-metaphysical commitment"[28]. Generally speaking, philosophers of science in the West are not as enthusiastic as they were before about "rejecting and rebuking metaphysics" when discussing scientific cognition. It is unnecessary, of course, to deny that Kant also tried in this way to blend natural and teleological causality, science and God, and thus to leave a certain domain for theology.

In summary, Kant's philosophic explanation of science touched upon many questions of concern to contemporary philosophy and a number of his viewpoints have valuable components. However, it cannot be said that the model Kant elucidated was a success. The characteristics and problems in Kant's explanation were all connected to the a priori principles he used. He used the idea of a priori origins to explain the production of the general form of thought in knowledge, namely, the category, and he considered the most important judgements in science to be synthetic a priori judgements. He elucidated the possibility of experience and even of its object itself on the basis of the concepts and principles of pure a priori understanding, with which he expounded and proved the absolutely universal necessity of the basic concepts and laws of science. But because a priori elements intervened in knowledge Kant came to the conclusion that the objects of cognition were only phenomenal and could not be things-in-themselves. In the view of science he established on the ground of transcendental idealism, the fundamental concepts and laws of science are undoubtable and unalterable.

In order to emphasize the transcedental basis of scientific knowledge Kant went beyond the metaphysical construct to some elements of the field of science itself, thus unavoidably over depreciating the systematic position of experience in science so that his philosophy would retain its rather pronounce rationalism.

The heaviest blow against Kant's philosophy of science came from the development of science itself H. Reichenbach pointed out that Kant

> *regarded the physics of Newton as the ultimate stage of knowledge of nature and idealized it into a philosophical system. In deriving from pure reason the principles of Newtonian physics he believed he had achieved the complete rationalization of knowledge, had attained the goal which his predecessors had been unable to reach.*[29]

However, the revolution in physics represented by the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics at the beginning of this century altered many of the concepts of classical physics which had been thought to be unalterable. What replaced them were new ideas and concepts which Kant had neither expected nor, to a lesser extent, incorporated into his

own system. Newtonian mechanics was no longer considered to be the paramount and only effective frame of scientific theory. The revolution of science exposed the intrinsic weakness in the Kantian model of transcedental explanation of science.

Almost all contemporary philosophies have got rid of the frame of scientific thinking derived from the "a priori", and, corresponding to this explanation of the absolutely universal and necessary validity of scientific theory have "softened", as have explanations of the objectivity of scientific theories. Logical empiricists, basing themselves upon modern induction, link the truth of scientific theories with probability, critical rationalists stress the falsifiability of scientific propositions; while historicists tend to stress the relativity of scientific theories and of their criteria of evaluation. On the one hand, this shows that the development of science no longer accepts that there can be only one paradigm for scientific cognition and only fundamentally conceptual language of science. But on the other hand, it gives prominence to the fact that quite a few modern philosophers of science hesitate on question of scientific truth. This latter is deserving of notice.

However, we must concede to the fact that the "a priori" is related not only to the vital weaknesses of Kant's philosophy, but also to its value. Kant, proceeding from this, revealed more profoundly than his predecessors the active subjective role of human thought in the formation of scientific knowledge, elucidated the functions and interrelations of such key elements of sensiblitity and logic as concepts and judgement in scientific cognition. Marx once distinguished two methods of scientific research: narration and research. After collecting, analysis and synthesizing materials during research," if this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before a mere a priori construction".[30]

Moreover, the actual process of science makes it clear that scientific cognition, at its very beginning, is certain specific operations of thinking upon materials of sensation and perception; that is to say, the application of modes of thinking existing prior to immediate experience to arrange and synthesize sensible matter. Such synthesis and arrangement mean the deeping of knowledge. Judged by the fact that objects of the objective world of nature are established in scientific theories, it may be said that the objects of cognition become possible through the subjectively cognizable operation described above. However, the problem still remains that a system of scientific theory has the validity it possess because, to a certain extent, it has universal validity for objects in the objective world. This is what Kant, on the ground of transcendental principles, tried hard to explain and prove. But, to Marxists the universal

validity of scientific concepts and laws is an expression of its objective truth. This universal validity, of course, is not absolute and unalterable. It should also be restricted by the historical level of human practice, and by the level of human cognition determined by the former.

Thus, the key lies in providing grounds to explain the production, use, restriction and even development and replacement of scientific theories. Otherwise, if we simply negate the "transcendental" principle, it will be hard to avoid falling into the obverse, the positivism, instrumentalism and conventionalism of relativism and pragmatism. It is for this reason that we must insist that an epistemological explanation of this question must ultimately be based on an important principle in the epistemology of dialectical materialism the praxis of mankind and its history. What is noteworthy is that some philosophers of science have begun to apply this principle consciously in their research. M.W. Wartosfsky, argues that on the one hand, the formation of knowledge contains creative activities to produce reality with normative models; and on the other hand, there does not exist any a priori and eternally unchangeable foundation of reason. The models of human thought come into being through the productive praxis of mankind and the development of science itself and registers changes along with them. "The origins of our concepts and theories are in action, in praxis and necessary for human life". [31]

That Kant explained the features of scientific knowledge proceeding from pure reason virtually distorted the fundamental nature of science, which comes from and changes along with praxis. D. Shapere, philosopher of science, also made much headway in investigating the question of the objectivity and rationality of science. He criticized positivists who oppose any presuppositions and base their explanations of subjectivity upon the foundation of facts which are "pure givens" or have not been contaminated by theories [32]

He also disagreed with historicists who admit to presuppositions but thereby deny the objectivity and rationality of scientific knowledge. He did attempt to bring to light" how the necessity of presupposition-of interpretation-in science is consistent with the idea of an objective, rational science" [33] .

He argues that the achievements and progress of science itself provide the conviction that plays the part of background knowledge in scientific action and its theoretical explanation. As scientific knowledge continuously accumulates and develops, the background knowledge is also becoming more and more capable of rendering full basis for scientific work. It is just this specific conviction of background that plays the role of a legitimate "presupposition" on occasions of specific problems of science and serves as a criterion of scientific rationality.

However, this criterion itself is not fixed; it constantly evolves with the feedback of the scientific theories it explains. Therefore, such criteria "have been internalized into the scientific process"[34]. Science achieves its steady progress in such interactions. There is no doubt that his explanation, in the context of the more extensive praxis of mankind, can provide many constructive suggestions.

The greatness of a philosopher lies in the questions he raises, if they are vital questions and he can provide later generations with insights into solving them, then he is a great philosopher. Immanuel Kant was one.

Notes and References

1. W.K. Edsler,"fundamentals of Semi- Kantian Metaphysics" **The Monist,** Vol.65. Jan., 1982.
2. A theory or proposition is transcendental if the basis of its cognition goes beyond the purview of empirical inquiry. The difference between **transcedental** and empirical theory lies in the fact that, while transcendental leads to knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects, but with the mode of knowledge empirical is **basically** concerned with such objects that are or can be empirically deduced.
3. Immanuel Kant, **Critique of Pure Reason,** Bl, English translation by N.K. Smith (Macmillan, 1965),p.41.
4. **Ibid.,** p.65
5. Earlier rationalists, for instance, Leibniz tended to excluding sensible experiences from the scope of knowledge of reliable truth.
6. Immanuel Kant, **op.cit.,** p.44.
7. Kant, for instance, rejected the traditional empiricist position, regarding sensible experience and its relation to the truth of scientific knowledge is founded and from that ultimately derives itself. **Ibid.,** p.44.
8. John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human understanding" in **Great Books of Western World** (William Benton, Publisher, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inco, 1984) Vol.35 p.121
9. Immanuel Kant, **op.cit.,** p. 131
10. There are some differences, of course, between Kant's views and those of contemporary philosophers of science. One fundamental point is that the latter frequently use it to prove the relativity and mutability of scientific theories while Kant used it to show that scientific knowledge possesses undoubted universality and necessity.
11. Immanuel Kant, **op.cit.,** p. 73
12. P. Carus, ed., **Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,** (Chicago,1912) p.56.

13. R.B. Pippin, **Kant's Theory of Form** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) p.50
14. W.H. Walsh, **Kant's Criticisms of Metaphysics** (Edinburgh University Press), p.50.
15. Immanuel Kant, **op. cit., pp. 152-53**
16. **Ibid.**; 156
17. **Ibid.**; P.160
18. A. Zwig, **Kant: Philosophical Correspondence** 1755-99 (Chicago;University of Chicago 1967), p.141.
19. **Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought** (Qiushi Chubanshe, 1982) p.20.
20. **Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.** p.82
21. P. Carus, ed., **Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences** (Chicago; 1921), P, 56.
22. Immanuel Kant, **op. cit.**, 9.264
23. **Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences**, p9
24. Immanuel Kant, **op. cit., p**,533
25. **Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics**, p.92
26. Immanuel Kant, op.cit., p.533
27. **Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences**, p92
28. T.S Kuhn, **The Structure of Scientific Revolutions** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.) p.41.
29. H. Reinhenbach, **The Rise of Scientific Philosophy** (Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1983), pp.37-38.
30. Karl Marx, **Capital** (Chicago: Charles 4. Kerr and Company, 1919), Vol.1,p.25
31. M.W. Wartofsky, **Models: Representation and the Scientific Understanding** (D. Riedel,1979), pp.140-48, 154-73
32. This very dogma of the positivists,as he puts it, is itself a kind of presupposition.
33. Dudley Shapere, "Objectivity,Rationality and Scientific Change" in **PSA;** 1984, Vol.2.
34. **Ibid.**

BOOK REVIEW

COLONIAL AMALGAM

FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION.

(Ikeja, Pumark Educational Publishers, 1994)

KOLAWOLE OGUNDOWOLE,

pp. 134 + xiii

By

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The excesses of the Babangida dictatorship, in particular, the annulment of the June 12 Presidential Elections, provided the immediate environment for Dr. Ogundowole's work. The book is therefore one of the numerous and increasing number of publications that attempt to analyse Nigeria's troubled recent past and its equally distressing present. However, unlike other authors who confined themselves to specific aspects of that regime's policies or in the allegedly more 'lucrative business' of writing the biographies of its leading men, Dr. Ogundowole concerns himself with the major issues of the day, the national question, power sharing, federal character, political self - determination, secession democracy, the annuled June 12 election and the constitutional conference. "Certainly, these are, sensitive and controversial issues in Nigerian politics.

The title of the book, **Colonial Amalgam, Federalism and the National Question,** gives a ready indication to both its subject matter and methodology. Stated simply, the question which the author examines is this: "should and can the Nigerian Federation, as presently constituted be allowed to survive?' His answer is 'No'. And to prove his point he uses a wide range of theoretical arguments and factual data demonstrating his expertise not only as a philosopher, but also as a social scientist. He eschews polemics or exaggeration and concentrates on providing a dispassionate and critical view of what he describes as "misconstrued federalism" in Nigeria.

Dr. Ogundowole's book is remarkable not only because of the salience and timeliness of his theme but also because of the level of candour and courage displayed by the author. At the risk of

oversimplification, there seems to emerge a number of conclusions that may be of interest to Nigerians. I have no doubt that many will disagree with some of his views, but it will be difficult for even his most trenchant critic not to admire or respect his courage. This is particularly true given the spate of indiscriminate arrest and indefinite detention of pro-democracy activists and social critics, that we have witnessed in the past few months. It can only take true conviction for one to take the risk that the writer has run in publishing this book in the present circumstances. I believe he deserves to be congratulated and emulated by all.

Coming to the 'heart of the matter', the author contends that federalism in Nigeria suffers from a variety of serious conceptual and operational defects. It is his view that the Nigerian notion of federalism is ' perforated with ignorance and lack of understanding of all that is fundamental in a federal system; of what should be its foundation, and of the political philosophy that must inform our type of federation' (p.14). This misconception, according to him, is predicated on the, often unstated assumption that Nigeria's headache' is how to share power among its geographical units (p. 11). The result, he says, is that we have 'federalism without a federal purpose' (p. 30). Not surprisingly, therefore, individuals and groups within the country are preoccupied with power sharing or 'national cake' sharing. There is , he says. 'no national cake baking attitude anywhere, no nation - building or understanding of any kind' (p. 11).

In terms of historical evolution, it is noted that the Nigerian Federation is not an arrangement based on the voluntary decisions of participating units. Instead, it was, as the author states, a 'forced, colonial and mechanically imposed' federation.(p.14). One of its debilitating features is that it was based on the principle of 'denationalization' defined as a 'deliberate policy of the colonial authorities not to allow a full concentration of a single large nationality within a territory so as to reduce the cohesiveness of the people'. Consequences of this policy, as the author notes, were to 'remove' the ingredients of nationhood' and effect 'the emasculation of the nationality and the annihilation of its individual members' (p. viii).

According to Dr. Ogundowole, the amalgamation of the peoples of Nigeria into a federation is 'denationalization per excellence' which amounted to taking away the very souls of the peoples of the nationalities that constitute Nigeria, while the federation represents nothing more than the amalgamation of the lifeless ghosts of the 'nationalities' (p.ix). In his view, the creation of more states has aggravated this trend. Rather than lay the foundation for national unity, it has, he maintains 'exacerbated

sectionalism.. ethnic allegiance and places further emphasis on dissimilarity since there is no compelling common goal (p. 8).

Given these circumstances, the writer posits that, 'the peoples of Nigeria shall never accomplish anything tangible in the spheres of economic, technological, cultural etc, development, including the sphere of nation-building and political management, until they get rid of the artificial union imposed on them by colonial rule' (p. 65).

The operation of the federal principle in Nigeria is believed to be particularly burdensome on many ethnic nationalities. This, the author attributes to discrimination in the allocation of federal resources and the domination of leadership positions by certain groups in the country. With respect to bias in the distribution of resources, the author points out that while projects earmarked for a particular part of the country are pursued with vigour, those meant for some other parts are pursued 'half-heatedly and starved of funds'. He cites the example of the river basin projects and notes that whereas those in the north are already completed and put to agricultural use, those in the south are yet to reach that stage' (p. xi). He notes further that the reason why the bitumen in Ondo State is not mined is because, 'importers of bitumen products are largely from a particular area of the country' (p. xii).

With respect to leadership positions, it is observed that the people of the south are alleged to have certain advantages, especially in educational attainment, over the North and for which reason the southerners are 'restrained by organisations and instruments of power from getting hold of core federal institutions and the highest political office in the land' (p. 16). Citing an address at a book launched by Alhaji Maitama Sule, the author sought to show that Northern elites have systematically shemed to dominate power in Nigeria." According to the author,

> *the Hausa - Fulani domination is not only apparent but also real. The balance of forces tilts ridiculously, as it has always been, in favour of the political North. Whether we like it or not, this bitter truth of the struggle for power is the hidden essence behind the political appearance of the June 12/23 military/political chess game".*

The effect of such manoeuvres, is as he puts it, 'today we have the human order, the Nigerian order, bifurcated into Northern life and southern life, whereby the former is made superior, sacred and an end in itself, while the later is made inferior, profane and a tool for the former' (p. 19). This has been possible because of what the author characterises as the 'Hausa - Fulani domination of core institution and states apparatus' - including the Armed Forces which, he claims,'serve fundamentally the

parochial interest of the feudal oligarchy of the Hausa - Fulani coalition' (p.64).

What does the writer propose as a way out of this situation? What is required, according to the author, is to 'search and discover a more enduring foundation for an effective solid political union of a new type' (p. 14). Among other things, this requires articulation of a relevant political ideology. According to him, the possibility of all the people coming together to think out an ideology is very remote. This , can, however, be done by an individual mind acting the historical needs of the people. The resultant philosophical ideas are bound to become a material force once they reflect the fundamental needs of the people' (p. 8).

With respect to the reorganisational of the component units of the federation, the writer calls for the recognition of the right of each units to pull out of the present federation and establish afresh its own national state as a starting point. He emphasised the need to acknowledge the right of each national group to 'secession, to self-determination and to independence (p. 60). However, after the separation, there may come a genuine amalgamation into a political and economic union (p. 64). A sovereign National Conference, according to the author, should supervise this transformation.

Some of Dr. Ogundowole's theses are no doubt disputable. For instance, he assumes a level of coherence and solidarity both in the North and the South that is nowhere near reality. None of the areas is a single monolithic unit. Each contains within its territory very significant class, religious and ethnic differences which the author has not given adequate attention. It is true that many nationalities in the federation are dissatisfied with the allocative inequity in the Nigerian system. But it is doubtful whether the status of independent nation - states which the author advocates for all of them will solve their problems. How many of these ethnic groups have the resources to survive as modern states? The answer is of course that it is only very few.

Again, although the benefits of the union have been inequitably shared, no segment of the collective can claim not to have benefitted at all. I believe that the challenge is for us to devise a more equitable allocative arrangement for sharing the burdens and benefits of membership of the federation and not to break up into inconsequential mini-states. The mini independent sovereign states, advocated by the author, may not be free from the same ills which bedevilled the present artificial union. A more practicable approach to the resolution of the identified problems should have been a critical examination of the factors which have hitherto sustained the present federation in spite of the strains

and tensions encountered over the years. He should have discussed how such factors could be strengthened.

Having made the foregoing observation, I still remain convinced that **Colonial Amalgam, Federalism and the National Question: A Philosophical Examination,** is an important book. It provides a holistic and comprehensive view of the Nigerian crisis and it is only possible in a brief review such as this one to highlight handful of the issues it raises. It is an important and provocative book, written in an intellectually uncompromising and lucid manner. It does not have all the answers to Nigeria's problems but it certainly assists in understanding the genesis of the political instability which has faced Nigeria since independence.

The author should not be dismissed as a primordialist who reifies ethnicity since it is not difficult for the reader to conclude that his ethnic bias in the book is not hidden. However the unbiased reader will equally convince himself that Ogundowole has taken a serious and penetrating look at those problems that have vexed Nigeria for long time. They are issues that need to be resolved in order to have an enduring polity.

The best compliment that can be paid to the author is that he has succeeded in publishing a book of this nature at an opportuned time. The publication coincides with the National Constitutional Conference which is re-examining the present political amalgam in order to re-define Nigeria's Federalism and consequently to device a better option for Nigeria. The author believes that it is only a sovereign national conference and not the present National Constitutional Conference that can provide solution to the national question problem.

The only way to get acquianted with the controversial issues raised by the author is to obtain a copy of **Colonial Amalgam: Federalism and the National Question,** read and digest. The volume captures the mood, sentiments and aspirations of a very vital segment of the Nigeria populace. It deserves to be read by all democratic innovators and constitutional engineers. The book is therefore strongly recommended to all persons in position of authority in the public and private sectors. The on-going Constitutional Conference delegates, the academia, the press and, indeed, the general public, will find it an invaluable source book. I recommend it enthusiastically without reservations.

BOOK REVIEW

POST- ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

edited by John Rajchman and Cornell West
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990)

XXX + 275PP.

By

Dipo Irele

Philosophy now inhabits a turbulent and agitated terrain. What is philosophy has become a controversial question. Some have proclaimed the demise of the discipline. Some have gone beyond the proclamation of the demise of the discipline to announce that we are now in a Post-philosophy era or culture. This book under review is another addition to that voice which has proclaimed the end of philosophy.

This book is specifically concerned about the end of analytic-philosophy which has been the dominant philosophy in Anglo-American philosophical circles. For sometime now, we have heard that the project of analytic philosophy has come to a dead-end and that it has been replaced by a new philosophy - Post Analytic Philosophy. But the nature of this new post-analytic philosophy is not known properly. This book provides an insight into the nature of this newly, emergent philosophical activity.

The book's structure and organisation is centered around the figure of Richard Rorty. It is not unfair to say that Richard Rorty is the main architect of the deconstruction of the analytic philosophy as well as the principal figure that made it possible for the emergence of post-analytic philosophy. His book **Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature** is a sustained attack against foundationally based philosophy and analytic philosophy.

The book is grouped under four main headings. First, there is the first section which comprises the introduction by one of the editors, J. Rajchman and the head paper by Rorty entitled "Solidarity or Objectivity."

Following the two papers are contributions by Hilary Putnam, Thomas Nagel and Richard Berstein. Then comes Part II, entitled Literary Culture, and papers in this part are contributed by Arthur Danto, Stanley Cavell, and Harold Bloom. Part III, Science, has a reprint of

Donald Davidson's well-known paper, "On the very Idea of Conceptual Scheme", and this, in turn, is followed by contributions from Ian Hacking, Thomas Kuhu. Finally Part IV, moral Theory has papers of John Rawls, Thomas Scalon, and Sheldon Wolin.

The introduction by John Rajchman chronicles the life trajectory of analytic philosophy in America. According to him, analytic philosophy became the dominant and institutionalised philosophical activity in America after the German emigres (Carnap, Riechenbach, Feigl, and Hempel) came to America. It overtook and survived pragmatism which was specifically America philosophy. Rajchman contends that analytic philosophy produced brilliant techincal work and enjoyed a stunning institutional success. It was, according to him, perhaps, the dominant philosophy in capitalist countries. Despite its success, analytic philosophy was engulfed with difficulties brought about by its technical work. This made many professional analytic philosophers to doubt whether it could carry out its programme of logical analysis. This doubt led to the questioning of this way of philosophizing, and eventually the deconstruction of it.

Rorty's paper is a vintage Rortyan. Rorty's position is that the idea of objectivity should give way to solidarity. He contends that there is no objective truth and the idea of looking for a cross-cultural criteria for rationality is a misguided one. He believes that philosophy should give up the search for absolute truths, rationality that cut across all cultures. Instead, we should recognise that the purpose of all our invented conceptual schemes and worldviews is only to make us to be in solidarity with uorselves and others in our same culture. Rorty's neopragmatism shows when he say that truth is "what it is good for us to believe." He takes issues with the realists by claiming that we should not worry whether our conceptual schemes corresponds with facts or not, so long as it works in the way of effecting cultural solidarity, we can simply shove aside all issues whether it is objectively true or not. He argues that philosophers should not worry whether it is possible to attain any knowledge of the world as it is in itself, or even whether there is any world "out there" to attain to a knowledge in the first place. He writes off realism as an untenable philosophical doctrine. I cannot expantiate on his attack on realism in this review since there is no much space and time to do that but suffice it to say. that Rorty strictures Putnam for being a backslider in this matter of anti-realism.

Putnam's contribution, "After Empiricism" is a review of A.J. Ayer's book, **Philosophy in The Twentieth Century**. What Putnam claims in his own contribution is that logical positivism and its twin sister analytic philosophy has come to a dead-end since it cannot carry out the

programmed it sets for itself. Despite the high level of technical works produced by analytic philosophers most of the problems it set out to resolve are still unresolved.

Nagel in his article dwells on the "Problems of philosophy" which are, according to him, perennial ones and these have always been grappled with by reflective thought. He does not believe that formal techniques as employed by the analytic philosophers can resolve these perennial problems. He discusses the question of subjectivity and objectivity and comes to the conclusion that the question cannot be resolved neatly. I shall discuss Nagel more in the third section.

The second section, opens with Danto's paper, "Philosophy as/and/of Literature." It should be noted that certain philosophical traditions which analytic philosophers disowned survived in literature departments. Post-analytic philosophers have not responded to issues raised by literary theorists. Danto's paper specifically addresses a particular issue - Does a literary text have any reference to objective world or refer only to other texts. Danto argues against intertextuality. He claims that texts refer to the objective world through the readers since any text has meaning only to readers if it refers to familiar things they are aware of in their surroundings. Danto, as a matter of fact, contest intextuality.

Bloom's contribution to this book adopts pragmatism of mortal vocabularies. His definition of poetry as "a loving conflict with previous poetry rather than a conflict with the world" is a version of the intertextuality which Danto rejects. Bloom rejects the Kantian view of Culture as a member of great works that refers to something timeless or objective in the human imagination. He sees Emerson as embodying an American literary "religion", a religion which has no fixed language.

Cavell's paper also takes Emerson as "the largest precusor" of philosophy in America. In the work of Emerson Cavell finds a scepticism which has affinity with Heidegger's return to everyday life world and Wittgenstein's return to ordinary language and form of life.

The papers that comprise the third section are Donald Davidson's article (which is reprinted here) Ian Hacking's and Kuhn's articles. Davidson's paper is an attack on conceptual scheme/content distinction.

Davidson argues that the idea of an alternative conceptual scheme is not thinkable, and neither therefore is the idea of a conceptual scheme itself. For to understand an alien scheme is to translate it into what one knows. One can never completely disagree with another since one must attribute some true beliefs to him in order to attribute some false ones. Ian Hacking's paper discusses the issue of incommensurability. He disputes Davidson's contention in his paper, "On the very Idea of Conceptual Scheme." Hacking proposes to redefine incommensurability in another

vay. He contends Davidson's assumption that to understand is to ranslate into what one knows. Rather, to understand is to learn how to eason. To learn how to reason is to see how a domain of objective liscourse is possible.

Hacking thinks the philosophy of meanings and language has had a nisleading influence on the philosophy of science. He revives Comte's erm "Positivity" to refer to the domains of objective discourse he ıssociates with styles of reasoning.

Kuhn challenges the positivist philosophy of science which sees science as the hallmark of rationality. This has generated a lot of debate about the nature of rationality. I shall not reherse Kuhn's position here since it is well known.

An area which has generated debate in post-analytic philosophy has been the issue of rationality in moral theory. The third section discusses this issue in moral theory. Central in this debate is the Kantian theory of equality which Rawls advances in his contribution to this book. Rawls argues for the independence of moral theory from the linguistic and epistemological preoccupations in analytic philosophy. Rawls proposes to justify a qualified egalitarian principle on the basis of a contractualist thought experiment in which people are imagined to make choices from behind a veil of ignorance or on the assumption that they might be anyone in society.

Nagel raises the question of why such a choice would justify the principle or make it right. Those who reject the idea of egalitarian distribution on principled grounds, he suggests, are in effect appealing to other conceptions of equality. Scanlon's analysis of contractualism and utilitarianism in this volume is that these two moralities are seen not simply as competing moral principles, but as different accounts or pictures of what moral are and of what motivates people to adopt them. Scanlon thus moves contractualism away from a Kantian appeal to humanity in general to particular historical tradition.

Sandel's contribution also objects to Rawl's position arguing that no choice could be made from behind the veil of ignorance.

It is incoherent to ask us to imagine choosing a life plan when we are ignorant of who we are. Without the traditions and communities which supply us with our identities, we cannot choose anything at all.

Berstein's paper advances a pragmatism which combines an analysis of the social production of our self-conceptions with an attempt to create new communities in which they would no longer have any constitutive role. Bernstein proposes to associate such a community-oriented politics with a Deweyan conception which finds the roots of democracy not in our nature as Kantian agents, but in our capacity to create such communities.

In his own contribution to this book, Wolin argues that the reduction of government to the adjudication and participation in interest group politics has led to an erosion in civic action and public space. Wolin thinks that we have to 'reinvent' the forms and practices that will express a democratic conception of collective life. That would be a revolution, if revolution were to mean the right to invent new forms when those who rule have perverted the old ones. For this invention from within our traditions, we need a new kind of political and philosophical theory.

The concluding paper entitled, "Afterword" and written by the other editor Cornell West, urges that Rorty's project be politicised and be made an engine for further deconstruction of Rorty's own "Bourgeois humanism" as well as his ideological preference for the basic practices of bourgeois capitalist societies. West's paper is written in a fervent and lucid prose.

The book is skillfully edited and the contributions therein are of high standard. The papers in the book do not argue the same position.

The book's importance for us in Africa resides in the facts that it makes us aware of what is going on in philosophy in other parts of the world and could help us to define what kind, or method, of philosophy we should adopt in the continent. African philosophers can ill - afford to be ignorant of what is going on in the philosophical circles in other parts of the world, more especially that philosophy in our continent is trying to carve a niche for itself. This book belongs essentially to post- modernist thought which distrusts absolute foundationalism, absolute truth, and universal rationality. I recommend it to philosophers in Africa to get hold of it even though one might disagree with some position in some of the paper that are included in the book.

APPENDIX

GENERAL STUDIES COURSES OUTLINE

(i) GST 102: Philosophy and Logic – 2 credits

A brief survey of the scope, notions, branches and problems of philosophy. Symbolic Logic. Special symbols in Svmbolic Logic. Conjunction, affirmation, negation; disjunction, Equivalence and conditional statements. Laws of thought. The method of deduction, using rules of influence and biconditionals. Quantification theory.

(ii) GST 104. History and Philosophy of Science – 2 credits

Man – his origin and nature: man and his cosmic environment; scientific methodology; science and technology in the society and service of man; renewable and non-renewable resources – man and his energy resources Environmental effects of chemicals, plastics, textiles, wastes and other materials. Chemical and radio chemical hazards. Introduction to the various areas of science and technology.