DR. Ofbinaka

ISBN 978-2872-03-4

THE NIGERIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Journal of the Department of Philosophy University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria.

Vol. 19 Nos. 1&2 2000/2001

ISBN 978-2872-03-4

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CONTENT

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LANGUAGE AND REALITY- PERSPECTIVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

BY

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INTRODUCTION

This is somewhat old fashioned way to talk. I use it to sound the difference between the Philosopher's concern with reality-which I want to show in this paper, and the scientist's, which is very obvious.

The encounter between language and philosophy is as old as philosophy itself. In the antiquities, language was taken by theSophists as a matter of arbitrary convention of a given people (Semantical Relativism). Against this view, the Stoics took language merely as a natural phenomenon (Semantical Naturalism). Plato and Aristotle took a mediatory role between these two positions.

Today language still remains a very actual topic in philosophy. This is evident in the various disciplines of philosophy: in epistemology, there is a turn from the critique of reason (Kant) to the critique of language (Neopositivism). in logic to construct an artificial language as a way of avoiding the unclarities and ambiguities of ordinary language and its interest in the logical analysis of natural languages, in anthropology- language now features as a preeminent achievement of man- that which reveals the 'human essence'. Through language it has been established that there is a correlation between language and people's orientation in life. In ethics, there is now emphasis on the linguistic form/forms of ethical propositions and this is delineated from mere descriptive sentences. Evidence of the philosophical turn to language is in the way modern philosophical questions are formulated: Today, instead of asking for the definition of 'causality' one now asks-What does one mean when one says that an event affects another event B?" In contemporary philosophy, the connection

between language and philosophy became so stressed, that some philosophers identified philosphy simply as critique of language. B. R.ussell, R.Carnap, N.N. N. N. N. Goodman. W.V.O. Quine have tried to give a precise of terms and propositions of a given language using moden logic[1]. Against this, G.Ryle, J.L.Austin, L. Wittgenstein explain language through the analysis of its day-to-day use? In line with this second standpoint, it is the claim of this paper, that linguistic expressions, words, objects etc, do not have meanings on their own, - otherwise we would be able to understand strange languages without first needing to learn them. We know the meanings of words and expressions first in the context of a system of rules, which tells us how they can be used in certain situations and for definite applications. Language imposes meaning on objects-the words and concepts and categories we use are ways of dividing the world, and things are what they are to us,depending on the concepts and categories we impose on them, - categories and concepts through which we so to speak have a some what access to reality. The major functions of the philososophy of language are its attempts to establish the relationship between thought and speech. propositions and their objects.In all these,the role of the individual, the community and its conventions are very fundamental in the meanings which objects assure.In what follows we shall examine the functions and achievements of language. This will be treated in the subheadings: problem of the meaning of linguistic expressions and the place of language in experience. This includes also the relation between language and object. All these mean to one fundamental question: what is the meaning of truth? what is the relation between language and truth?

2. THE MEANING OF LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS AND THE PLACE OF LANGUAGE IN EXPERIENCE

The problem of how an expression gets its meaning was first posited by Plato in the Dialogue-*Cratylus* (288Bc). In this Dialogue. two positions are presented on how words, names and expressions get their meanimgs: (i) objects and words acquire their meaning as a result of a natural affinity betweensuch objects and words and their phonetic representations.(ii)Words acquire their meaning arbitrarily through convention and

agreement.[3] Plato held strongly to the first position, generally referred to in Semantics as (Naturalism), on ground that we can achieve the meaning of a word through the analysis of the word itself, (Etymology) or through the phenomenon of Onomatopoeic words.Another strong reason for his inclination to naturalism is the characteristic that sentences can be true and false: the sentence, 'Dogs miaw' is false. This seems to suggest that for all things there are descriptions, which are objectively correct and vice versa. In the process of the Dialogue, Plato was led to the realization, that a name or word could have a double meaning for the same object (polyonymy). Aristotle rejects Plato's position on the origin of meaning on the ground that word-forms are not symbols of things, but representations of our mental affections, that is to say, representations of the content of our consciousness[4], orsymbolic representations of human experience.Meaning is. therefore a function of the encounter and experience we have with objects.In what follows, we shall see that discussion on meaning revolve around the ambient: do expressions have natural or conventional meanings or are there some non-empirical (transcendental elements) which bring about meaning?. These positions constitute the two major aesearch areas of philosophy of language, characterized now as analytic and non-analytic of philosophy of language.

(i) ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (Logical analysis)

This position sees language as an empirical data. As logical analysis, it goes back to Ludwig Wittgenstein and is strongly expressed through the *Vienna Circle*. Typical of this position is its distrust of the day-to-day language we speak as capable of communicating meaning.. The ordinary language is imprecise and is full of ambiguities and is thus inadequate for the communication of meaning. In the book, *Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus*[5] the Magna Charta of this group, language is said to have a purely descriptive function.Propositions

are said to be pictures of reality, such that there is an isomorphic relation between the picture and the object,if the relationship must be true; but this is not possible, because from the picture alone no one can establish the truth or falsity of other facts to represent. This means, then, that ***synthetic a priori*** knowledge is false. For Kant, synthetic a priori knowledge is not false, because the reasoning subject, what he refers to as (Transcendental subject) is a space-time category. This is to say that what we usually regard as human knowledge is not simply dictated to us by the facts we enconter. There is in the determining of meaning a human conventional contribution: in looking at the world we are always involved in interpreting it. This interpretation is influenced by the categories-especially of time and space-categories in terms of which we see the world and interpret experience, and the frame woks within which we organize our observation are contributed by us.[6] We shall come back to this issue. meantime lets look at the next position on the status of meaning and the way language relates to it.

2 (ii) Ordinary Language Philosophy (Linguistic Analysis)

In this second position which equally goes back to Ludwig Wittgenstein, meaning is taken not as something which can be handled in terms of the structural properties of language considered as an abstract and self- contained system of 'signs', words or even sentences . Every word is seen as a sign whose meaning can be intentionally within a given convention[8] Every word or 'sign' seems alone dead. It is in use that a word or 'sign' has meaning. The use of a word in the language has had alot of influence in determining the mood of the so-called Geisteswissenshaften (Sociology. Psychology. Anthropology etc.). The interesting feature of this perspective of language and the way it relates to reality, is the recognition that it is not the mind that creates reality. What we call "Truth" depends both on what there is -i.e. some "objective" data and the contribution made by the knower.- where by in this sense, the knower is not to be

understood in an individualistic sense, but rather in a social manner,-embracing a convention. Thischaracteristic of language in the way it relates to reality, is evident in the very structures of language itself, especially when seen as means of communication.

2 **(iii) The Three Dimensional Aspect of Language**

Philosophers of language are now almost generally agreed that the speaker has something to contribute in speech. This is usually expressed in the form: Subject-Subject- Object-i.e. the subject who speaks, the one who is being spoken to and the object being spoken about. Awareness presupposes an object. When I say that I am conscious or thinking, I imply that I am conscious of, thinking about something and 'this thing' that constitutes the object of my consciousness is the thing known, not to me alone, but has objective dimension. This implies that anging out there, a view that is contrary to the primitive essentialism well represented by Plato. In the Dialogue-***Hippias***, the doctrine of ideal meaning is thuspresented between Socratess and Hippias:

> Socrates: Are not the just, just through Justice?
> Hippias: Of course through Justice
> Socrates: So then, there is thus something like Justice?
> Hippias: Of course
> Socrates: And the wise through wisdom and
> everything good through Goodness
> Hippias: How else?
> Socrates: So these are something and not Nothing?
> Hippias: Of course.etc.

According to this view, there is a level of ideal meaning which is intuitively discoverable by the mind. In its more modern sense, this essentialist doctrine features among rationalist philosophers like Rene Descartes Leibniz and Spinoza. For these philosophers knowledge is achieved through the direct and immediate subjective consciousness of the knower alone. The

direct consequence are one and same thing. This position bases itself on the belief that all knowledge comes from the activities of the intellect and aims at a comprehensive description of the world that is independent of experience. The intellect has some innate principles,though which it necessarily arrives at truth. We can have objective knowledge of the world that is independent of the stand point of any observer. In other words, there can be 'perspective-free' knowledge. Contrary to the rationalist viewpoint, the empiricists especially David Hume see in knowledge as always involving some definite context. There is thus no objective knowlodge at all. My experiences are, as they apear and appear as they are, because what appears is all there is (Phenomenalism), knowledge of reality is merely my perspective of it. We have seen two basic standpoints regarding knowledge (i) All knowledge is 'perspective free' and (ii) All knowledge always involves some perspective and there is nothing objective in knowledge at all. These views, it seems to me. present a onesided understanding of knowledge- knowledge cannot be totally absolute or totally relative; because the knowledge I have now of something could be just my own present apprehensions and reminiscences of some particular event,which may be diffirent from the way some others look and appreciate that same event. Kant's Transcendental Philosophy is an attempt to show that knowledge is based on experience by the subject, who knows.

2 **(IV) Transcendental Idealism**

Kant points out two different levels of truth: analytic and synthetic truths.Analytic statments are statements, whos predicates are contained in the concept of their subjects, for instance, in the statement:" " all Bachelors are unmarried". The predicate " unmarried" is implied in the concept " Bachelor". Synthetic statements are on the contrary, statements whose predicates are not contained in the subject of the expression, but require experience to justify their validity-for example: " all Bachelors are unhappy people".

This distinction means to point out that in knowledge, there is a level of objective data-namely-that which is to be known and a level of judgment, involving the subject who knows. This is to saythat pure reason on its own cannot know anything without reference to experience, because the knowing subject always is situated in time and space. The mind has a **priori** forms of thinking- the categories,and it is these that enable us divide and comprehend the world the way we do.To make this point clearer, let us see how we use the categories to look at the world.

In traditional metaphysics, distinction was made between the categories of substance and accidents.Asubstance is said to be that which can exist on its own as carrier of accidents. The concept "stool", is a special empirical detemination of the common substance category. The concept."stool", is a symbol imposed conventionally on the object itself stool, and it is only the symbol alone that has meaning and not the object itsself. All our knowledge comes to us in symbolic forms, and meaning is meaning of symbols. We can define the word "stool", since it has a meaning; but although we can sit on it, point it, burn it, or describe it, we cannot define a stool itself: for a stool is an article of furniture, not a symbol that has a meaning for us to explain. Our knowledge of reality is a function of the concepts and categories which we ourselves impose on things. These categories and concepts have, as we have seen, objective, that is, social and not merely individualistic application, and these concepts and symbols, though objective, express themselves within the context of time and history. There is always some perspective of judgment any time we look at the world and this is responsible for the various models or paradigms of judgment : in the antiquities the stoics based their knowledge on the physical analysis of nature, in the medieval stage, especially with the influence of Christianity the world was understood from the perspective of kinship relationship, for the 17th c, use of legal modes was made,hence the phenomenon of the social contract theories as basis of social bond etc. In the moden time, the adopted model of truth is the scientific model. In other

words, there is some perspective form which judgment is made, and truth conceptualized.

From our analysis so far, especially from the light of Kant's transcendental philosophical contributions, we can conclude as follows.[9]

(a) The world is full of normal temporal and spatial objects, and this the philosophical proof of objectivity confirms the existence not of abstract perspective free world - as the rationalists think,of a world in which objective knowledge is impossible as the empiricists say, but a world in which reality is comprehensible to the extent that is within human capability, through thecombined activities of the mind (the subject)and the data of xperience.

(b) The way we see and understand the world is a function of the concepts and categories, which we impose on things.

2 (v) Influence of Kant's Transcendental Philosophy in the Philosophy of language and in the humanities and in the social sciences(Geisteswissenschaften).

Although Kant did not dedicate much consideration to languageas as such in his philosophy, yet the infiuence of his critical philosophy in the development of the philosophy of language and the Social Sciences cannot be overestimated This is evident in the writingss of Edmund Husserl, from whom Schutz and Weber heavily draw and in the writings of Gadamer and Wittgenstein, especially in his *Philosophical Investigations*. Let us begin with Wittgenstein.

2(vi) Wittgenstein's Philosophy-Transcendental lingualism

That knowledge is not an empirical issue, is taken up anew in the manner of Kant's regarding the presuppositions of

knowledge, by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later philosophy. In the famous private language argument, Wittgenstein argues against the incoherence at the head of Cartesian theories of perception. This and all such theories start from an original position in which the subject is supposed to be able to sort out and classify the different types of sense data that he receives without making any use of any information about the physical world. Wittgenstein saw this as incoherent. His reason was that a classification can be set up only where there is a detectable difference between a thing's merely seeming to belong to a certain type and its actually belonging to that type[10] But unfortunately there is no such difference detectable in the original position specified by the Cartesian theories.

In this argument, Wittgenstein says that there can be no knowledge of experience without a world - such as we have it. I can directly and without fear of contradiction know about my experience simply because I have concepts which I can apply to it, which owe their meaning to common use. And the objective use describes a reality, which is observable by others outside of me alone. This commonly applied word and meaning guarantees the objectivity of its reference. This argument which has been severally accepted as very convicing shares the view of Kant's Transcendental Deduction - its premises and conclusion- namely: that in all knowledge the knowing subject has much to contribute. Besides, this argument justifies the objectivity of the world and serves as a strong argument against skepticism regarding the existence and objectivity of the external world - a trend which as we have already observed featured in the Meditations of Rene Descartes. So as we have arrived at the following conclusions.

a) There is nothing like ideal meaning or knowledge. All knowledge represents some definite perspective
b) There is an objective knowable world, but knowledge about it results from a combined activity of the mind and the data of experience
c) This objective world is knowable in the sense that the

perspective from which we look at it , is to a large extent constitutive of what we ultimately regard as truth. These points represent the major trend in the philosophy of language today, and equally much of the approach adopted today by existentialist phenomenologists, hermeneutic philosophers and ethnomethodologists, and even linguists, with the exception of those who see in language nothing but an analyzable empirical phenomenon.

2 **(vii) Further Reception of Kant's Philosophy in Language**

Further influence of Kant's transcendental philosophy in the sense we have seen, is evident in modern hermeneutics, especially, in Gadamer: He formulates the problem of hermeneutics so: Philosophical Hermeneutics has shown that understanding is only possible, if the one who understands, brings his own presuppositions into play. The productive contribution of the interpreter, belongs inseparably to the sense of the understanding itsself.[11] All understanding is said to demand some measure of preunderstanding i.e some non-empirical presuppositions, which serve as basis for the understanding of the data of experience. There can, so to speak, be no type of enquiry from the most casual conversation to the most complicated natural science theory, that is free from certain presuppositions, presuppositions, which express the frame work of the tradition, within which alone such thought is possible. In a word, this means, as Gadamer expresses it, that language is an expression of the human mode of" being in the world"[12] That language involves more than empirical data is equally evident in the very essentials of the grammer of every language: every grammar presupposes a metaphysics, to the extent that it would be inadequate to source for meanings of words in lexica and dictionaries is. Let us illustrate this point using the words-cross, suffering, sacrifice, etc. These words stand at the very heart of some versions of Christianity. We won't understand the meanings of these words, the influence they have had, and still

have on the lives of people simply, by looking up their meanings in dictionaries or lexica. To use Wittgenstein's expression, the right attitude to words, is not to look for their meaning, but for their use[14]. In modern linguistics, the presuppositions of knowledge are extremely relativised to the extent that objective knowledge is hardly possible. This is the case in the so - called *Sapir-Whorf- Relativity principle.*

2 **(vii) Presuppositions of Knowledge and Modern Linguistics**

Modern linguistics owes much to the researches of Noam Chomsky and he himself speaks in line with the classical rationalists(especially Rene Descartes etc). Chomsky's theory talks about in-born ideas, ideas that do not depend on experience. Such innate ideas constitute a biologically determined a priori system or languistic universals (i.e common general language forms; which make up a universal grammar and from which all other specific grammars of other languages derive. According to him, this is the basis of the similarities we see in all human languages. This intimate genetic capability makes it possible for a child to transform the universal grammar, a facility which he already possesses at birth, into specific grammar of his own mother tongue. Chomsky's theory is an empirical theory and thus requires confirmation It evidently takes after Kant's trascendental philosophy, even though, contrary to Kant's, Chomsk's a priori language determinants are purely biologically determined. This means, therefore, that this theory is not very relevant here,our position that language is not purely an empirical phenomenon and its connection with reality not physically determinable. We have introduced this theory here, not because it has relevance in the philosophy of language as such, but because even as an empirical theory, it points out clearly the overáll importance of the role played by language in the perspective from which reality is seen at a given time. Similar views are represented by E.Sapir and L.Whorf.According to Sapir, the real world is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. Language is taken in this sense as not constituting a mere systematic inventory of the various items

of experience. It is rather seen as a self -contained creative symbolic organization, which helps us organize our experience by reason of its formal completeness. In a similar vein, Whorf thinks that language enables us to dissect nature along lines laid down by our native intersujective language.According to him, we cut nature up, organize it into concepts and ascribe significances to it as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way- an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language[15].What this theory does, is to relativise knowledge, to the extent that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of things, unless their linguistic backgrounds and foundations are similar[16]. It is evident that this theory embodies very relevant points, especially in the relation which it points out exists between word and reality, as often something conventional, since in talking about things, we usually use symbols and when we define things, the meaning we have is that convetionally imposed on such symbols. However, rather than see the differences in world views as coming from language alone the way and manner Whorf thinks, it is useful to point out that what leads to different perspectives of judgement are more often than not, individual prejudices, and idiosyncracies, rather than structures of the grammar that people speak .In our discussion so far, we have been able to point out that since Kant, all researches on language and the way it relates to reality acknowledge that in issues regarding meaning the knowing subject has alot to offer.What these presuppositions agree and differ to some extent with Kant's transcendental philosophy are as follows:

a) For existential phenomenology, hermeneutics and transcendental philosophy, there is a noesis-noema link between the knowing subject and the object,- a relation which Husserl refers to as intentionality.[b] Both stress the existence of an intersubjective world, which serves as the precondition for what the particular subject knowns. [c] Kant's transcendental philosophy stresses the existence of a prior conditions necessary for knowledge which

are naturally present in every individual, but the hermeneutical understanding of such proconditions of knowledge are merely social and historical predeterminants of knowledge etc.Understanding is related to language as the medium of intersubjectivity and as the concrete expression of "form of life" or what Gadamer calls "traditions". We now conclude this excurs by stating in a summary form the way language relity and consequently the meaning of truth as expressible in language.

3) Language, Reality and Truth/Conclusion

What we know and our relation to the world is codified in language. We are able to talk about reality at all because we posses verbal categories that enable us put into words ideas we have of the world. Language itself does not create reality, but it is through the language we use, and the categories we impose on things that enable us divide the world the way we do. In other words, the words we use, stand in a representative relationship between us and the objects. Meaning has always to do with the symbol used in representing a concrete object, as has been generally accepted in some given convention. To know, therefore is to judge and the judgment we make about objects and reality stems from a combined activity of the mind and the concepts we apply in expressing the reality in question .Even in cases of imaginary objects- like Unicorn, Mannaid, Winged Horse etc, the same process is involved, and in this case, what the mind does is to bring together concepts or elements that are themselves identifiable in reality. The concepts we have determine for us the form of the world.This is evident in the fact that when we are speaking about the world, we are merely speaking about what we understand by the "world". When we define things, what we define are representative symbols of those things, because objects themselves cannot be defined or even known, except in relation to the way they have come to be accepted and applied in some context.

CONCLUSION

What has been done here is a presentation of the relation between language and philosophy- a relationship which expresses itself in the act of ratiocination. Thinking itself is impossible without words and concepts which are ways of coming to the knowledge of reality, and words themselves have intersubjective validity. All these go to show that meaning comes about through the combined activity of the mind, experience and convention Though Kant did not thematise in his philosophy, nevertheless, his efforts have been of immense usefulness in subsequent researches regarding the way language and reality relate..

REFERENCES

1. B.Russell writes that the main job of Philosophy is critical analysis of people's beliefs and assumptions.: 'The job of philosophy consists in criticizing and clarifing notions, which are apt to be regarded as fundamental and accepted uncritically. As instances, mention is made of matter, mind,consciousness, knowledge, experience, causality, will, time- B. Russell (1989) *The Analysis of Mind,* London: Unwin,244.

2. G.E.M. Anscombe (ed) (1998) L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* Oxford: Blackwell, 109- "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use"

3. Ernesto Grassi (ed) (1980), Plato's *Cratylus* Hamburg: Rowoult, (435-b).

4. This standpoint is strongly presented by Aristotle in the Interpretations and in the other logic books of the *Organon*

5. Gunther Busch (ed) 1960, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,* Oxford: Blackwell, 4.05f.

6. Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Philosophy is largely an attempt to show that there are some non-empirical conditions, which serve as preconditions for knowledge. These include such a priori concepts as, space, time the categories. See for instance: Wilhelm Weischedel (ed) (1980), *Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vermunft,* Frankfurt amiw: Suhrkamp, A.22.B.26f.A.12,etc.

7. This is obviously a contrary view to the one in the *Tractatus.* At the level of the *Tractatus*, he was in agreement with the theory of Definite Descriptions of Bertrand Russell and with Rudolf Carnap's ambition to represent the whole of reality as a universe of logical structures.

8. Accorrding to Wittgenstein, there are innumerable instances in which a well known expression can be used differently: See G.E.M. Anscombee (1989) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford: Black well-Nr.454.

9. Immanuel Kant, *Op.cit:* A6-10.

10. L. Wittgenstein, *Op. cit.* 1.258.

11. For more on the doubt regarding the correspondence Theory of truth, see for instance Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*,A.307, B. 364 etc.

12. H.G.Gadamer (1975) *Wahrheit und Methode,* Tubingen: Paul Siebeck P. 218. Language is seen as embodying more than a mere collection of signs and symbols,- and the essence of thinking and knowing can be reflected in language. We dont't just speak a language, our personality goes along with it.

13. Gadamer, *op.cit. Ibid.*This preunderstanding, Gadamer says, is many sided: (i) Preknowledge affecting an entire society.

This arises from a common historical situation of a given society,- this includes its period in history, culture race etc. These are beyond the subjective understanding of any given individual (ii) Individual historicity- this involves the individual's life, history, education etc of the individual person.

14. L. Wittgenstein, *Op.cit* Nr.454.

15. E.Sapir (1929),"*The status of Linguistics as a Science" Language* 5,207-214

16. John B. Cassel (ed) (1956): B. L. Whorf *Language, thought, Reality,* New York,P.212f..

Kuhn on Normal and Scientific Revolution

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Introduction

What a scientist does, in his daily enterprise, according to Kuhu, amounts to 'normal science" Any scientist that does not pre-occupy himself with purious scientific research must meet up to thc requirements of 'normal science'. To Kuhn, 'normal science' means the research that is firmly rooted upon one or more past scientific community, for a given point in time, and it is such that provides the basis for further scientific enterprises. This kind of achievement, he urges, is today recounted (though not often in its original form) by science textbooks; elementary and advanced. Such books expound the body of accepted theory. Illustrate many or all of its success applications and compare these applications with exemplary observations and experiments.

Some accepted instances of actual practices, according to Kuhn, which include law, theory, application and instrumentation give models from which emanate particular coherent tradition of scientific research. Scientists possess two *essentials attricutrs.* "Their achievements are *successful recently unprededented* to attract an enduring group of deaerates away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, they are sufficiently open-ended to have all sorts of problems for the refined group of practitioners to resolve." [1]

Achievements that share these characteristics . Kuhn calls, paradigms' a term which he says relates closely to 'normal science'. These constitute the tradition that the historian describes under

such rubrues as 'Phonemic astronomy' or 'Corpernican' or Aristotelian dynamics of 'Newtarian Corpuscular optics' or 'wave optics'

This study or paradigms *many that are for more specialised than those already stated above,* is what fundamentally prepares the students for memberships in a given scientific community in which he will later practice.

> Man whose research is based on shared paradigms is committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisite for normal science i.e. for the genesis and continuation of a particular tradition. [2]

The ability to be acquainted with a paradigm, in addition to the more esoteric type of research it permits, signify maturity and advancement in the development of any scientific field, for instance, the wave theory that is embraced by almost all the practitioners of optical science. In the 18th century, however, the paradigm for this field was provided by Newton's optics which taught that light was material corpuscles. "These transformations of the paradigms of physical optics are scientific revolutions, and the successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual development pattern of mature science". [3]

In biology, for instance, part of its study centres on the study of heredity which is a most universally received paradigm. *The essence of having paradigms in the view of Kuhn is essential because history reveals that the road to a firm research consensus is extraordinary arduous.*

Where there are no paradigms all the facts that relate to the development of a given science may seem equally relevant.

We cannot interpret any natural history in the absence of a *least some implict body interwined theoretical and mythological belief that permits selections,* revelations and criticisms. If it is the case that the body of such belief is not already implicit in the collection of facts in which case more than 'mere facts; are at hard-it must be externally supplied, perhaps by a current metaphysics, by another science, or by personal and historical accident. It is basically for this reason that in the early stags of the development of any science different men confronting the same range of Phebineba (but not usually, all same particular phenomena) describe and interpret them in different ways. Before a theory is to be accepted as a paradigm it simply has to be seen to be better than its rivals; but it does not explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.

In the development of a natural science, once a new school of thought emerges which is strong enough to attract members of the scientific community the elder schools gradually file out. This is partly as a result of the conversion of the members to the new paradigm. This does not mean that there are no such men that stubbornly stick to the older methodology. But the outcome of such strong-headedness is that such men are no longer recommended with in the profession as they have lost touch with the present realities and the new trends. This view is informed by *Kuhu's* belief, as Keita points out, that "progress in science is often punctuated by revolutions in the theoretical assumption of the particular sciences themselves". [4] The emergence of a new paradigm serves as a new and more rigid definition of the field. Whoever that is not prepared to accommodate his work to it must proceed in isolation or alternatively attach himself to some other group. *Kuhu* asserts that going by the record of history this set of people have often stayed in the departments of philosophy from which so many of the special sciences have been spawned. A group that is merely interested in the study of nature is suddenly transformed into a

profession or Discipline *its members reception or paradigm;*

> In the sciences (though not in fields like medicine, technology, and law of which the principal raison d'etre is an external social need) the formation of specialised journal, the foundations of specialist societies, and the claim for a special place in the curriculum have usually been associated with a group's first reception of a single paradigm. [5]

Kuhn argues that this was the stage of affairs between a century an a half ago, when the institutional patterns of scientific specialization first developed and the very recent time when a paraphernalia or specialization acquired a prestige of their own.

Specialization

There are other consequences of a rigid definition of the scientific group. It makes an individual scientist take a paradigm for granted. As a result, he has no further need in his major works to attempt to build his field from the scratch, starting from the first principles and justifying the *sue* of each concept introduced. Works of this nature could be left to the writers of textbooks according to *Kuhu.* With the availability of such textbooks, a creative scientist can begin his research where it leaves off and thus concentrate exclusively upon the *subslest* and most esoteric aspects of the natural phenomena that concerns his group. *In the process of this, his research communiques will begin to change in ways those evolution has been too little studied but whose modern and products are obvious to all and oppressive to many.* His research will henceforth appear as brief articles addressed only to professional colleagues, the men whose knowledge of a sharp paradigm can be assumed and who prove to be the only ones able to read the paper

addressed to them.

Kuhu says that in science today, book are usually either tests or respectiveness reflections upon one aspects or another or the scientific life. Only in those fields that still retain the book with or without the articles as a vehicle for research communication are the lines of proffesionalisation still so loosely drawn that the layman may hope to follow progress, by reading the practitioners original report. Both in the field of mathematics and astronomy research reports had ceased already in antiquity to be intelligible to a generally educated audience.

Kuhu does not believe that there can be a progressive, and infact, successful practice of a given science in the absence of a paradigm. As a matter of fact, as Newton-Smith points out, *Kuhu's* talk of a paradigm is meant to direct our attention to those common factors, reference to which is required in explaining the behavior of the scientist". [7] By the ability to focus attention upon a small range of relatively esoteric problems the paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a detailed form which otherwise would have been unthinkable. And normal science processes a build-in mechanism, a nut that ensures the relaxation of the restriction that bound research whenever the paradigm from which they derive 'ceases to function effectively. 'Given this situation scientists begin to behave differently and the nature of their research problems changes. In the interim, however, during the period when the paradigm is successful, the profession would have solved the problem that its members could scarcely have imagined and would never have undertaken without commitment to the paradigm. At least part of that achievement always proves to be permanent.

Revolution

As regards scientific revolution, *Kuhu* sees it in terms of a widening sense but often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific

community. And a sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is necessary for any such revolution in scientific development. Thus to *Kuhu,* as Fayerbend points out

> ... a revolution occurs whenever a new research programme has accumulated a sufficient number of successes and the orthodox progamme suffered a sufficient number of failures for both to be considered as serious rivals, and when protagonists of the new programme proclaim the demise of the orthodox view. [8]

Besides, scientists' revolution seem revolutionary only to those whose paradigm are affected by them. To outsiders, they may seem normal parts of the developmental process; astronomers, for instance, could accept X-rays as a mere addition to knowledge, for their paradigm were unaffected by the existence of the new relation. But for men like theory or with cathode raytubes, the emergence of x-rays necessarily violated one paradigm as it created another; which explain why these rays could be discovered only through something first going wrong with normal research.

In Kuhu's methodology, as we have seen, paradigm plays a key role in scientific research. For a discipline to be worthy of being classified as a science, it must have a paradigm as *Tornebohm, po... out, that are "... factors which direct and control work done w...hin a field of research"*

Ou... pe... methodology

Kuhu's opinion about popper's theses is very straight fo... Besides making his stance clear in his work entitled The Structu... Scientific Revolution, as we have already seen, he contributed an Essay in a collection of Essays on Popper's Philosophy edited by Paul Schlipp entitled "Logic of Discovery of

Psychology of Research." In this paper he confesses his admiration for Popper's work, points out areas where he shares his ideas; and moreover stresses where he differs from him. He believes there is the need for him to have this kind of critical outlook for Popper's theses so that scholars and Pepperonis that have hitherto tried to pigeonhole his ideas into Popper's will be able to have a clearer picture of what his stance on the methodology of science is all about. He did not fail to remark, however, that there are substantial areas of agreement between the two of them. He writes:

> We are both concerned with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is acquired rather than the logical structure of the products of scientific research. Given that concern both of us emphasise as legitimate data facts and also the spirit of actual scientific life, and both of us turn of them into history to find them." [10]

He remarks also that Popper and himself were similarly opposed to the classical thesis of the positivist which centres on their (Positivists) principle of verification. He points out too that he shares with Proper "the intimate and inevitable entanglement of scientific observation with scientific theory" [11]. "The two too, *Kuhu* stresses were skeptical of efforts to produce any neutered observations language; in that scientists should carefully aim to invent theories that explain phenomena. The most fundamental agreement, says *Kuhu,* which he shares with Popper is "their insistence that an analysis of the development of scientific knowledge must take account of the ways science has actually been practiced".[12]

Outside the above areas of agreement, *Kuhu* raises objections in other areas of Popper's works. He does not see himself agreeing with Popper that,

> A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts

forward statements or systems of statements and tests them step by step. In the field of the empirical sciences, more particularly, he constructs hypotheses or systems of theories and tests them against experience by observations and experiment. [13]

Kuhu sees this assertion by Popper as ambiguous. He sees it this way in so far as there is no clarity as to which of the two sorts of 'statements' (guesses) or theories are being tested. *Kuhu* argues further that the generalization inherent in the statement is historically faulty. He reasons too that assertion lacks the essentials features of scientific practice, that almost make a world of differences between the sciences and other creative practice. He believes that there is just one sort of statement or hypothesis that scientists do really and repeatedly subject to systematic test. There are "statement of an individual's best guesses about the proper way to connect his own research problem with the corpus of accepted scientific knowledge". [14]

On Conjective

A scientist, according to Kuhn may, for instance, conjecture on variety of things. For instance he could over that a given chemical unknown, contain the salt of a rare earth, that the rate he uses for experiment are fat due to a specified component in their diet, or that a newly found sectorial pattern is to be understood as an effect of nuclear spin. In each of the stated instances the next stage of his research is specifically to test the conjecture of the hypothesis. If there is a positive outcome from the tests - that is, if his conjecture service reasonable tests - it will then be deduced that he had made a discovery or at least resoled a puzzle. If in contrast the outcome of the test is negative he can then abadon the whole thing or try another hypotheis in his reolute attempt o resolve the puzzle. *Kuhu* is not insisting by this that all research procedures take this form,

but that tests of this nature is what he calls 'normal science' or 'normal research', an enterprise that accounts for the substantial' work done in the basic sciences.

> In no usual, however, are such test directed to current theory. On the contrary when engaged with a normal research problem the scientists must premiss current theory as the rules of his game. His object is to solve a puzzle preferably one at which other have failed, and current theory is required to define that puzzle and to guarantee that given sufficient brilliance it can be solved. [15]

Whoever that is involved with this enterprise has to test often the conjectural puzzle solution that his *ingemity* suggests. Whatever is tested represents only his personal conjecture. If there is a failure, it is only his ability that has failed and not the 'corpus' of current science.

It is the belief of *Kuhu* that the above procedural test identifiable with his thesis is quite different from the kind of test that popper advocates*. popper, he argues, was more interested in the procedure that enhances the growth of science and such growth in popper's view is achieved not by accretion but by ''the repeated overthrow of scientific theories and their replacement by better or more satisfactory ones''. [16] From this popper's assertion kuhn concludes that by tests he {proper} had in mind those performed for the purpose of carrying out an exploration of the limitations of accepted theory *or the subject a current theory to maximum strain.*

Popper also, according to *Kuhu,* tends to characteristise the totality or scientific enterpsie in respect of its occasional revolutionary parts like the eclipse expedition of 1919. *Kuhu* sees such episodes as very rare in the development of science. At any

point in time they occur, they are generally called forth either by a period crisis in the relevant field or by the existence of a theory that competes with the existing cannons of research. Instances include the exploits of Coperincus or Einsterins theory of relavity. Kuhu sees this as 'extraordinary' research, an enterprise where science do display many of the features Popper talks about. "Normal Science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and when successful finds none" [17]. *Kuhu* reasons further that neither science nor the development of knowledge is likely to be comprehended if research is seen exclusively through the revolutions it occasionally produces. Testing of basic commitments, he argues, occurs only in extra-ordinary sciences; it is normal science that discover both the points to test and the manner of testing. It is equally for the normal sciences to ensure that professionals are trained. This is not one of the features of extraordinary science. *Kuhu* believes that the kind of testing that Popper talks about does not exist in the field of normal science. Such can only be found in the extraordinary science which most nearly distinguishes science from other enterprises.

Kuhu also dissents against Popper's recommendation of a critical attitude to science. He *(Kuhu)* traces the origin of this ideas (critical attitude) to the Greek philosopher, between Thalses and Plato. He rejects this as he believes that by

> the Hellenistic period, mathematics, astronomy statistics and the geometric parts of optics had abandoned this mode of discourse in favour of puzzle solving. Other sciences in increasing numbers have undergone the same transition since. [18]

He believes that it is the abandonment of critical attitude that has informed the path of science rather than its cultivation. And once there in this transition for a field of study,

> it is ... in periods of acknowledged crisis that scientists have turned *to philosopher analysis as* a device for unlocking the riddles of their fields. Scientists have not generally needed or wanted to be philosopher. Indeed normal science usually held creative philosophy at arms length. [19]

Scientists only *believe* like philosophers when the need arises from them to choose between theories.

Popper's *demacration critetisen* by which he sees astrology as a non-science also attracted *Kuhu's* critical attentions. He disagrees with Popper's assertion that astrologers by making their interpretations and prophecies sifficiently vague, they were able to explain away anything this might have been a refutation ofthe thoery, had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of their thoery. [20]

In spite of whatever he thinks about Popper's *democration criterisen* as it affects matrology, *Kuhu* still sees the above assertion of Popper as actually capturing something, of the spirit of enterpsies of astrology; but taken all literally as they must be if they are to support. *The history or astrology during the impossible when it was intellectutal reputable records many prodictions that categorically failed.*[21]

Thus *Kuhu* does not see why astrology shouldbe barred fromthe field of science basically forthe form in which its production were cast, They (astrologers) cannot be barred too from scientific enterpise becuase of the way its practitoners explained ther failures.

They (Astrologers) point out, for instance, *that the predict the feature of any gien individual,* is an uphill task which recommends care and extreme *sensivetness to miner erros in rlevant data.* The reasons for this are varied. One of which is the fact that there are always changes in configuration of stars as well as the eight planets. Besides, the astronomical tables that are used for the computation of individual births are quite imperfect. It is only very few men that are aware of the exact date of their birth. It is partly for this reason that forecast failed. Similar arguments, according to *Kuhu,* are still used today to explain failures even in medicines or meteorology. In periods of upheaval they are also deployed in the exact sciences such as physics and chemistry. *It is time the stance of Kuhu that there is nothing unscientific about test astrologers explanation of failure.*

Despite the position already taken by *Kuhu,* he sill goes onto reason along with Popper that astrology is not a science. He sees it rather as "... a craft of one of the practical arts with close resemblances to engineering, meteorology and medicine, *as these failed were practiced until little more than a century age"* [22]

Astrology can thus be likened very instillment to the old medicine or pasyho-analysis. An astrologer is incapable of carrying out research in spite of the fact that he has rules to apply, he lacks puzzle to solve and invariably no science to practise. And in the absence of puzzle, sufficient, astrology could not have become a science even if the stars are infact in full control of human destiny. Thus,

> though astrologers made testable predictions and recognized that the predictions sometimes failed, they did not and could not engage in the sorts of activities that normally characterise all recognised sciences. Gir Karl is right to excluded astrology from the sciences: but his over concentration on sciences occasional revelations prevents his seeing

the surest reasons for doing so. [23]

Another area of Popper's thesis where *Kuhu* joins issues with him was on his positions that tests precede the replacement of a theory. *Kuhu* consents that in some instances tests are not requisite to the revolution through which science advances. The situation differs, however, when puzzle are involved. In this, 'with or without tests a puzzle solving tradition can prepare they way for its displacement. To rely on testing as the mark of science *is it miss what scientists do and with it, the most characteristic feature of their enterprises".* [24]

Kuhu also opposes Popper's thesis that we can learn from our mistakes. *His rejection of this thing on his reasoning that the kind of mistake that Popper's imperative most obviously applies are individuals failures of understanding or of recognition within an activity governed by pre-established rules.* In the science such mistakes take place most frequently and perhaps excessively within the practice of normal puzzle solving research, *Kuhu however believes that is it not in this direction that Popper seeks the mistakes.*

For his concept of science obscures even the existence or normal research. Instead, he looks to the extraordinary or revolutionary episodes in scientific development. [25]

Kuhu also accuses Popper of often citing obsolete theories such as the Potolemanic astronomy, and the phlogistic theory (as examples of mistakes) and by learning from our mistakes he meant what takes place when a scientific community rejects one of these theories and replaces it with another. *Kuhu* dismisses this as old usage; he believes that no mistake was made in arriving at the Pyromaniac systems, which goes to confuse him on what he (Popper) meant when he calls that system or any other outdated system a mistake. *Granted there were mistakes they are the*

normal ones which a Ptolemaic (or a Copernican) astronomer makes within his systems could be isolate and corrected immediately, and by so doing leaving the original systems intact.

In Sir Karl's sense, on the other hand, a mistake that infects an venture systems can be corrected only by replacing the systems as a whole. [26]

Kuhu believes this is not the case in scientific, investigation.

Popper's falsifications theory was also negatively received by *Kuhu.* He sees it as antonyms of proofs. His *objectives* was not with the fact that all experiments can be challenged, either to ascertain their relevances or their accuracy. His *container* is that there is the possibility of modifying any theory by a variety of ad hoc adjustments without ceasing to be *neither main lines the same theories.* There is the need for the situation to be this way, as it is often by challenging observation or adjusting theories that the growth of scientific knowledge can be achieved. *Kuhu* sees challenges and adjustments as standard part of normal research in empirical science. Even *informal* mathematics, he believes adjustments play a significant role. *Kuhu* accuses Popper of baring conclusive disproof, and yet failed to provide substitute for it. The much he could provide according to him *(Kuhu)* was a native falsification. Kuhu thus asserts that "though he (Popper) is not a native falsification, Sir Karl may, I suggest legitimately be treated as one." [27]

It is the view of *Kuhu* that the criterion applied by scientists to determine the validity as an articulation or an application *or* existing theory are not by themselves sufficient to determine the choice between competing theories. As a result he concluded that Popper,

has barred *by transferring go selected characteristic if everyday research to the*

occasional revolutionary episodes in which scientific advance is most obvious and by thereafter ignoring the everyday enterprise entirely. In particular he has sought to solve the problem of theory choice during revolutions by logical criteria that are applicable in fully only when a theory can already be presupposed. 28

Our methodology must agree with the routine activities of scientists. Such activities must agree with what he called normal science.

Appraisal

Kuhn, as we witnessed was very much interested in the activities of normal scientists. His conviction was that Popper's thesis was a complete failure as far as the practice of day to day activities or normal scientists are concerned. He sees Popper's recommendation of testability as a criterion for accepting or rejecting a theory as necessary which he posits is not a usual practice in normal science. He does not even believe Popper's thesis on a purposeful attempt to overthrow or refute a theory.

One seems to sympathize with *Kuhu's* view *that attempts to are not primarily the seam of a normal scientist.* Efforts to refute theories obviously cannot be seen as part of day to day activities of a scientist. *It could happen that a scientist may have a strong case no then authenticity of a given theory;* such conviction may motivate him into attempts to picture the weak basis of such a theory. Apart from this, one cannot accept the fact that it is the pro-occupation of a scientist to always attempt to refute theories. Moreso if there is at all the need for him (a scientist) to refute theories his own theory will *obliviously* not be his target. *It is simply a fact that scientists apply all weapons to defend to the*

Kuhu's refusal to accept the existence of contact changes in the development of scientific knowledge without qualification is

also understandable. This is on his conviction that in science, there is the need for some kind of stability as theories and systems of studies in science are not what should be changed without a very fundamental cause. In real fact, it does not seem a feature of normal science to change theories at very short intervals. A scientist's theory could last a life time before the need for change arises. And as *Kuhu* points out, a revolution sets in only when a major crisis that is capable of rocking the foundations of an accepted system sets in. Admits this crisis, a more suitable theory that is to serve given scientific community emerges to replace the old one.

Kuhu's operation to constant *charges* in science goes pari-passu with his rejection of a critical approach to it. It is difficult to agree with *Kuhu* that science is a conservative enterprise that abhors critical outlook. Science is an open system. It is open by its readiness to welcome new and innovative ideas. This underlines the dynamism of scientific adveturism. At any point in time, science is preclose from critical inquiry then the existing features that make it versatile would have been killed. It look like an undisputable fact that criticism remains an available quality of this all-important enterprise that probes to the search of nature which have significant impact on the life of man. At any point in time, criticism ceases to be a factor in scientific enquiry, it is from them that knowledge and progress in it will stagnate.

Popper did not dispute the fact that in science there is an edifice, a kind of an organised structure that equips a scientist with a generally accepted problem situation into which his own work can fit like those of his counterpart. But Popper does not see the emphasis *Kuhu* laid on normal science as being in conformity with this. He (Popper) rather sees his thesis on normal science as a recommendation of dogmatism to the study of science. It is only in this sense, says Popper, can one view *Kuhu's* agreement on the existence of normal science; and Popper rightly points out:

> normal science in *Kuhu's* sense exists. It is the activity of the non-revolutionary or more precisely the not-too-critical professional of the science students who accept the ruling dogma of the day; who does not wish; and who accepts a new revolutionary theory only if almost everybody else is ready to accept it - if it becomes fashionable by a kind of bandwagon effect. To resist a new fashion needs perhaps as much courage as was needed to bring it about. [29]

Popper posits further that the normal scientist, *Kuhu* presents to us is a person one ought to be sorry for. [30] He opens his brain to accept but not his mind to ask questions. The normal scientist, according to Popper, is like a robot who views without being given the opportunity to ask questions, to add his own view or to make an amendment. We can only see the normal scientist as one who had imbied bad orientation and torturing, one who was been patterned in a most conservative and primitive way. He needs nothing but our total sympathy according to Popper, One cannot but see the situation in this way as we know, teaching, especially at a higher level is done in such a way the individuals are given the chance to ask questions and possibly aid their own knowledge which may invariably be of immense benefit at the issue to stake. Popper rightly puts the issue this way,

> ... all teaching at the university level and if possible below should be training and encouragement in critical thinking. The 'normal scientist as described by *Kuhu* has been badly taught . He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit: he is a victim of incoordination. [31]

It is a *tourism* that a teacher is more enthusiastic most of the times with his students when there are visible signs of their participation in the lectures through very critical questions of the topic at hand. As Popper reveals in his discussion with an Engineering teacher, Philip Frank in 1933, (the Engineering teacher) expressed his deacidification with his students thus:

> they (his students) merely wanted to 'know the facts. Theories or hypothesis which were not generally accepted but problems were unwanted: they made the students uneasy. These students wanted to know only those things, those facts which they might apply with a good conscience without heart-searching. [32]

This Engineering teacher as reported above was obviously suppressing his frustration with his students. His method of teaching as noted in his tone was to make the students critical and be self-reasoning, but unfortunately such approach made them uneasy which he regrets anyway. This testimony acquences Popper's assertion that all processes of imparting knowledge especially at the university levels aim to cultivate critical mind. We agree entirely with this position.

> Obviously, in line with his rejection of critical approach to science, *Kuhu* stated that one theory - or a paradigm - predominates a given scientific community over a reasonable period of time. He favours "the domination of a ruling dogma over considerable periods and ... does not believe that the method of science is normally that bold conjectures and criticism". [33]

This position is not acceptable to us. Science cannot be accepted as a pure method of indoctrination. It is equally not a cult where

one imbines doctrines unreflective. In theology and religion, this mannerism could be rational but in science, it is an aberration and its acceptance can only deal a devastating blow on it. As proper points out, we accept that "... in science, as distinct from theology a critical comparison of the competing theories of the competing frameworks is always possible, And the denial of this possibly is a m istake." [34]

One is also at a loss at *Kuhu's* opposition to Popper's view that tests precede the replacement of a theory. Science as a practical discipline, we know; and that testing or experimentation is invariably linked to its studies, we also know. It seems rational that before any theory is accepted or rejected that such should be exposed to crucial testing. If we say, for instance, that oxygen (o2) enhances combustion, *and in turn reduces the Oxygen (o2) content of an enclosed environment increases instead of decreeing then we are bound to reject this hypothesis.* This is the only rational way to reject or accept a theory so far as we desire to eliminate arbitrariness. It is only in a secret cult that a *prebeailing* mode of behavior or a principle is rejected or accepted by a decree. There is no such authoritarism practice in science.

Kuhu's rejection of Popper's falsification thesis which gives little or no attention to the routine activities of a scientist seems to enjoy a reasonable basis. It is obvious that Popper was more keen on the factors that lead to the growth of scientific knowledge than the issue of day-to day activities of a scientist. That Popper did not bother so much with what a scientist does daily can only find explanation in his interests in science - the conditions that enhance its growth.

Kuhu's other *talent* point in his philosophy of science was his assertion that the acceptance of single paradigm enhances specialization *that scientist are by the adoption of this mythology able to avoid first-principles.* This view is not tenable. Specialization does not come by limiting people knowledge, The

basic principles of science are already known, that distinguish it from the creative or liberal Arts. If a scientific enterprise: where otherwise he is embarking on projects other than science. We also cannot accept the attempt by Kuhu to characterise scientific enquiries as estoteric. A scientist can write a specialized paper; one who is not trained to be a scientist can also write a paper that can contribute to the growth of scientific knowledge.Both papers could be compressible to both scientists and those not trained in science, but who are interested in scientific enterprise. In the same line of though, there is always a change for the new ideas of framework of science to be evaluated. And in the view of Popper, being tied to a framework is like a prison and as Asike points out" Enemies of scientific framework will always welcome discussions with patterns or even opponents from other framework."[35] There is an opportunity by this, for them to discover their so far unfelt chains, to break them and by so doing transcend themselves[36] Such attitudes grease with a dynamic and positive attitude to science which ensures its advancement.

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EXPLANATION,OBJECTIVITY AND THEORY CHOICE IN SCIENCE

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1.1 BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

Since the ancient Greek philosophers began speculating on the nature (or even the possibility) of certain knowledge, philosophers interested in such matters have continued to distinguish reliable (or, for some, scientific) knowledge from nonscientific or pseudo knowledge. In contemporary philosophy of science, the debate has centred around what Karl Popper christened " the demarcation problem". This problem, according to some philosophers, has deological undertones also, because any proposed solution to it reflects a particular ideological orentation on societal questions in general.

It is necessary to point out that the demarcation problem which was alluded to earlier has been critically discussed by philosophers within the backdrop of certain key elements in scientific activity. Topics such as scientific explanation, theory justification and objectivity, foe example, have formed the loci of sharp disagreements between proponents of theories as diverse as the verificationist inductivism of the positivists, the falsificationist methodology of Popper and the nomal science/ extraordinary science model of Kuhn. Even the Dadaist theory of the iconoclast of methodology, Paul Feyerabend, has engendered robust debates on the traditionaal notions of scientific objectivity and unequivocal progress associated with science.

In this paper, I distil some of the keynotes of current debates about scientific explanation, theory choice and objectivity in the hope that certain misconceptions about them would be dispelled.

1.2 SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION

Let us begin our inquiry proper from the problem of scientific explanation. Now, logical positivism, one of the most

influential schools of thought in contemporary philosophy had posited a theory about scientific explanation which has an unmistakable platonic flovour[1]. Generally speaking, hard core positivists considered philosophy of science as an analogue of formal logic for the sciences[2]. Philosophy of science, interpreted in this way, is concerned with he characterization which any possible scientific theory has to possess to count as truly scientific. Therefore, the aim to the philosopher of science is to articulate a model of scientific theories, *sub specie etenitatis;* that is, those essential features which make such theories count as genuine scientific explanations.

Leading exponents of positivism, such as Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel have posited such models[3]. Using Hempel's theory as an illustration, the positivists distinguished between deductive-nomological explanation and probabilistic explanation[4]. A deductive-nomological explanation is a deductive subsumption of the *explanandum* (that which requires explanation) under principles which have the character of general laws. It answer the question: why did the *explanandum* occur? by showing that the event resulted from particular circumstances in accordance with certain laws. This procedure can be shematized thus:

$$\begin{array}{ll} & C_1, C_2 \ldots\ldots C_n \\ (D) & L_1, L_2, \ldots\ldots L_n \\ \hline & E \end{array}$$

$C_1, C_2,\ldots\ldots Cn$ above are statements describing particular facts; $L_1, L_2,\ldots\ldots Ln$ are general laws ;together these statements from the *explanans*. The conclusion E is a statement describing the event. The covering law or deductive model of explanation, as the shema we have just described is sometimes called, is causal in character. It reflects the relation between casual factors and effects. In the covering law model, the truth of the *explanans* makes the truth of the *explanandum certain, meaning that once*

the necessary and sufficient conditions (particular facts, background knowledge and general laws) are given, the *explanandum* necessarily follows.

The second type of explanations, the probabilistic or statistical type, typically contain assertions to the effect that if certain specified conditions are realised , then an occurrence of such and such a kind will come about with such and such a statistical probability. Hempel illustrated this sort of explanation with a situation in which a violent attack of hay fever is suppressed after the administration of a specified drug on the patient. This type of situation, he asseverated, does not instantiate a universal law because we can never be certain that the administration of that particular drug would invariably suppress an attack of hay fever. Instead, what obtains is " only a generalization to the effect that adsministration of the drug will be followed by relief with high statistical probability...". Probabilistic model of explanation looks something like this:

$$\begin{array}{ll} & \overset{pi}{} \\ (P) & P(O.P) \text{ is very high} \\ & \overset{}{O_i} \end{array}$$

Notice that the schema above is a condensed description of how probabilistic arguments work in science. In it the *explanandum*, Oi, consists in the fact that in the particular instance in question (X's hay fever attack) an outcome of the kind O (suppression of the attack) occurred. This is accounted for by two *explanans*- statements. The first of these, 'P_i' coincides with $C_1, C_2,...C_n$ in (D); it states that in case i, the factors F (which may be more or less complex) were realised. The second expresses a law of probability to the effect that the statistical probability for outcome O to occur in cases where F is realised is very high (close to 1). The double line separating the *explanandum* from the *explanans* indicate that, in contrast to

the case of deductive-nomological explanation, the *explanans* does not logically entail the *explanandum but only* provides some support for it. 'P' may be characterized as the strength of the inductive support or the degree of rational probability which the *explanans* confers on the *explanandum*, or in Carnpa's terminology, as the " logical or inductive probability which the *explanandum possesses relative to the explanans*" [6]. Deductive-nomological explanations differ from probabilistic ones in some essential respects. To begin with, although both are nomological in that they presuppose general laws, in probabilistic explanations, the *explanans* may confer on the *explanandum* a more or less high degree of inductive support (in that case, a probabilistic explanation admits of degrees) whereas a deductive-nomological explanation appears in a disjunctive from in the exclusive sense: a given set of universal laws and particular statements either imply or do not imply a given *explanadum.*

The problem with Hempel's theory of scientific explanation articulated here is that it is too dependent on the concept of "efficient cause", and does not account for the increasing mathematization (similar to Aristotle's formal cause) of explanations found in science itself. Secondly, it is a carry over of the positivist platonic portraiture of the philosophy of science in general, reflecting as it does the theoretical and practical difficulties that rear up in the notion of pure observation language[7]. Most contemporary philosophers of science[8] now consider the quest for "a natural language of pure percepts" a red herring; there is no scientifically or empirically neutraal system of language for scientific research. Therefore, explanations in science are theory- impregnated and they proceed from within one or another tradition of scientific research comprising of individuals licensed by education and practice to expand and consolidate our knowledge in a particular scientific field.

Thomas Kuhn's theory on the nature of scientific explanations is consistent with his rejection of the formalistic approach of the positivists to the issues and problems in the

philosophy of science[9]. He argues that explanatory canons differ from one scientific tradition to another, inspite of the generalizations which philosophical investigations and extrapolations may reveal. In otherwords, explanatory canons differ from one tradition of scientific research to another especially in the event of a scientific revolution. When a new theory emerges, although some of the concepts and instruments based on existing theory are still employed by scientists, they are rearranged in a new framework which might require putting on "a new thinking cap", so to speak. Kuhn cited the Copernican revolution, Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory, and the transition from Newtonian physics to the Einsteinian to buttress his argument that explanatory criteria change as a result of revolutuons in science.

But if that is so, if there is no enduring once-and-for-all explanatory mode in science, how can one rationally reconstruct theory choice in science? According to Kuhn, historical investigations into scientific development suggest that the usual approach to theory choice must be altered. Our concern, he maintains, should not be with the arguments that in fact convert one or another scientist to a new tradition of research, but instead with the sort of community that always sooner or later converges again as a single group. This does not imply that concern with the former is irrelevant. As a matter of fact there are some arguments that many prove effective in convincing scientists to choose theory T_2 rather than T_1

In articulating the factors that many influence theory choice amongst scientists, philosophers of science usually underscore five characteristics of what is usually referred to as a good scientific theory[10]. First, a good theory should be accurate: within its domain, the consequences deducible from it should agree with the results of scientific experiments. Second, such a theory should be consistent with itself and also with other previously s well established theories applicable to related aspects of nature. Third, it should have wide scope: its consequences should

extend beyond the particular observations, laws and sub-theories it was meant to explain. As a corollary, a good theory should be fecund in terms of new research findings: it should disclose new phenomena or hitherto unrecognized relationships among those known already. Finally, scientists prefer theories that are simple, that is, theories that bring order to apparently unconnected phenomena.

Epistemologists generally agree entirely with the traditional view that these characteristics play a significant role when scientists have to choose between an established theory and a new rival. Yet, there are intractable problems that crop up in the application of the above criteria. To start with, the criteria, individually, are too inexact to be interpreted in an algorithmic way and, as a result, cannot invariably and unequivocally determine theory choice: scientists may legitimately fail to agree on their applicability to concrete cases. Also, when used in tandem, they repeatedly conflict with one another: for example, the criterion of accuracy may suggest, say, the choice of theory t_1, fruitfulness the choice of t_2. Indeed accuracy, which is one of the favourite paradigms of choice for scientists and epistemologists, seems to be a strong candidate for unequivocal theory choice especially because predictive and explanatory powers which depend on it are characteristics that scientists are particularly unwilling to jettison. Nevertheless, rival theories in the same field of research are very difficult to distinguish on the basis of accuracy, or on any other criterion for that matter. From the history of planetary astronomy, for instance, we learn that on the basis of available evidence then , the heliocentric theory of Copernicus was really not more accurate than Ptolemy's geocentric theory-at any rate not before Johannes Kepler had drastically modified the former several decades after it was posited. Several astronomers had already decided to work with the heliocentric theory for reasons which were traditionally excluded from objective criteria for theory-choice[11]

The decision problems entailed by the application of such a

modes of scientific activity. Still, quasi-subjective factors play some role also, as adumbrated by such expressions as the new theory is "better", "more suitable" or "simpler" than the old.

Kuhn uses a number of locutions which, when interpreted out of context, marks him out as an irrationalist. For example, he talks about "conversionto a new theoty", incommensurability and the resultant breakdown of communication across the revolutionary divide. Philosophers of science of the positivist orientation have argued that these features of scientific research and the "subjective" factors belong to the psychology and sociology of science proper, not to be logical or rational reconstruction which is the genuine enterprise of the epistemologist. For Kuhn, there can be no "logical" or "natural" dividing line between "the context of discovery" and the "context of justification" because the so-called subjective factors which are traditionally held to be relevant to theory invention also manifest in theory justification. Thus, the individually variable factors in the selection of theories, by distributing the risk which novelty in science entails, ensures the long-term success of the scientific enterprise. From a different but related perspective, the application of objective criteria in actual research situations is very problematic in more profound ways than positivists were willing to accept. Yet, these criteria, when construed as values shared by members of a scientific community, are indispensable, but not absolutely determinative, for the scientists in deciding which theory to conduct his research with from amongst those available.

1.3 OBJECTIVITY AND THEORY CHOICE

Now that we have broached the issue of objectivity, we might as well open the Pandora box completely. The problem of objectivity as a benchmark for scientific knowledge has worried philosophers right from antiquity. In recent philosophy of science, the logical positivists prided themselves as staunch proponents of objectivity in science. However, the entire programme of positivism premised on objectivity with a capital "O" has proved very disappointing indeed. Kari Popper seems to have learnt

powerful criterion of objectivity as accuracy suggest that other standard criteria of theory choice articulated by philosophers of science are not anodyne. Thus, it follows that difficulties about theory choice are typical in all scientiific disciplines and there is no mathematical or formal "context of justification" or "algorithm of theory acceptance" which will always determine univocally the outcome of controversies involved in theory choice.

Paul Hoyningen-Huene has provided an insightful approach to the question of what sorts of reasonsn scientists consider in choosing the theory to work with for research purposes[12]. These include (a) reasons relevant to the first adherents of a new theory (b) reasons generated while the theory is being fleshed out (c) reasons which prove decisive in the choice of an entire scientific community and (d) the argumentative weight of the reasons canvassed. Scientists have always differed on these, although eventually they usually reach a consensus on which of the competing theories is the better one for future research. Regarding the chances of a new theory being accepted by scientists inspite of the fact the problem-solutions achieved through it are insufficient to compel the kind of consensus expected amongst members of the scientific community, they are bolstered by the fact that the theory's earliest supporters must"...have faith that the new [theory] will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older theory has failed with a few[13]. Thus, key issues about theory choice and the decisive factors that are determinative recur repeatedly in the context of scientific revolutions. The empirical conditions that favour a new theory on such accasions include the ability of the theory to resolve the problem that precipitated the crisis, its capacity to solve a significam number of the problems solved by the older theory with equal or preferably greater accuracy, and its ability to predict novel phenomena that, from the perspective of the older theory, are either unexpected or explainable on an ad hoc basis. Considerations of this kind are the objective reasons marshalled by researchers when a decision is called for between competing

from the errors of the positivists in this respect, and has presented a theory of scientific objectivity hinged on the deductive testing of theories. A lot has been written on Popper's falsificationist approach to science by Popper himself and others[14]. For the epistemologist, the incontrovertible point that emerges from the discussion is that objectivity is not as straightforward as hitherto supposed. It is more like a complicated exacting trialogue between the scientist, his theory and nature. Objectivity so construed involves trade-offs, give-and-take and compromises. Scientific objectivity is not an event or attainment, it is, instead, a process[15]. Therefore, when we say that a scientist ought to be objective in his research, that very demand should not be understood as implying that the scientist has to "bracket" his preconceptions *in toto*, rather it is a reminder for him to carry out his research programme in strict compliance with the principles of intersubjective testing available for himself and his professional colleagues. Proponents of theory-independent objectivity are right in stressing that the information flow from the ontologically independent physical world (independent in the sense of existing independently of the scientist and his theory) is a decisive constraint in the selection of the theory that adequately accounts for a given phenomenon. They erred in thinking that ontological independence must entail complete epistemological determination of the actual results of observation. This erroneous belief is traceable to the backneyed *tabular rasa* theory of the mind posited by John Locke which relegated the contributions of the epistemic subject in the knowledge-situation to the back burner. The belief that the mind can gain knowledge of the objective world by remaining passive while external objects stamp impressions on it is a relic of the naive empiricist ideal of objective knowledge. As suggested earlier, the ideal rests on a mistaken theory of scientific method. The research situation itself in which the scientist carries out his work is theory-impregnated. This does not imply that the demand for some reasonable degree of objectivity is totally pointless. For

sure, there is evidence both in actual scientific practice and in its rational reconstruction to justify the claim of anti-objectivists that there is no sharp distinction between theory and observation. But in responding to a tradition which rested the entire argumentative weight of scientific knowledge on perception, anti-objectivists have tended to overstress the role of theory in determining observation, and have ignored the critical role the physical world, acting on the scientist through his senses and instruments, plays in determining what the scientist can observe. And inspite of the problems created by the theory-ladenness of scientific observation, objectivity conceived as intersubjective testing of scientific claims in which nature plays the decisive role during theory-selection is preserved because the researcher must, if science is to continue expanding the frontiers of knowledge, wrest interpretable facts from an"... unyielding nature who knows so well how to meet our theories with a decisive *No*-or with an inaudible *Yes*"[16].

If the above argument is granted, then the time-honoured interpretation of objectivity must be recast. This standard criteria of relevance, accuracy etc which have been paraded by philosophers and scientists as the benchmarks of scientific objectivity should henceforward be understood as values about whose application in actual research situation scientists can legitimately disagree, and still must reckon with nonetheless. Scientific objectivity is a process; it cannot be rigidified or straitjacketed with the various algorithms invented by philosophers who cherish formalization. In practical terms, the epistemological ambience of research which legitimizes certain consensus-building techniques transcends the strictures of strict formalization. Scientific objectivity, or intersubjective testing of theories, is one of the cardinal value requirements of scientific research. It guarantees neither the truth of scientific theories nor the success of the scientific enterprises as a whole. But experience has demonstrated that the intersubjective testing of theories, the situation in which scientists put definite questions to

nature for answers, remains the best way of acquiring detailed knowledge of nature itself. No other method has yielded comparable results thus far.

1.4 CONCLUSION

Like everything the scientist does, scientific explanation is not linear, it is rather labrynthine, and sometimes leads to detours and blind alleys. Still, over the years members of the scientific community have learnt how to avoid some of the blind alleys, and can make good educated guesses about which explanatory models have better potentials to guide future research and which do not. The formalizations or regimentation of scientific explanation by positivists sometimes yield interesting results. But they lose much of their plaaausibility when compared with the actual process of explanation in the mature sciences. Futhermore, the explanatory models of the formalists do not even touch the heart of scientific explanation as a dynamic process, a process which is heavilly influenced by the nature of the theory accepted in a particular scientific community at a given point in time.

Consequently, a philosopher interested in understanding the intricacies of scientific explanation must pay close attention not just to the so-called "logic of explanation" but also to the actual process which the "logic" is supposed to clarify.

Concerning objectivity and theory selection in science, it is clear from our analysis that the old philosophical tradition with construed scientific objectivity as completely independent of the contributions of the scientist can not pass muster. Scientific observation, and therewith the tools for carrying it out is theory-impregnated. The scientist observes nature within the backdrop of expectations which were shaped by his education and the standards of intersubjective research available to the scientific community of which he is a member, with the hierarchy of dispositions and capacities inherited from the ziz-zag evolutionary history of the human species serving as a substrate. Thus, as we suggested, the lens of objectivity is not transparent but translucent, because it is selective and does not allow

hundred percent information flow from the world to the scientist. It is absurd to deny the fundamental role information flow from the ontologically independent world plays in shaping our knowledge of that very world. In the context of scientific research, however, this information flow must be processed, interpreted, assimilated and understood within theoretical frameworks in order to be an item of knowledge for the inquiring human mind. Clearly, the objective factors articulated by epistemologists function as values whose appliation as theory selection criteria in concrete research situations is highly problematic. Yet scientists, after a lot of hardwork and compromises, usually succeed in arriving at a consensus on, for example, when a particular experimental finding is a definite falsification of a given scientific hypothesis. At all events, it must be stressed that even the degree of consensus on the falsification of a theory (or its tentative corroboration) might be a matter of interpretation, negotiation and settlement. From the standpoint of the constructivist studies of boundary work in science, the spectre of "hard nosed" objectivity has been laid to rest for good, since consensus within a given scientific community is always a contextually contingent product of scientists' variable interpretative procedures[17] I cannot agree more with this position.

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2. As an instantiation, see Rudolf Carnap, "The Aim of Inductive Logic" in E. Nagel *et al* (eds), Logic, *Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press, 1962,pp.303-318.
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'ORI' IN YORUBA PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

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INTRODUCTION

The pluralistic conception of the Yoruba concept of 'Ori' reveals itself in the various meanings and uses of the word. The 'Ori' can be the physical head, the power of agency charted by the spirit of the individual i.e. inner head, (ori-inu) the custodian of the vital functional attributes' of life or character. In the world of the gods the 'Ori' is supreme .The main focus of this paper is on the inner-head 'Ori'-'inu' this according toYoruba is the 'King'. 'Ori' in Yoruba philosophy as explicated by their proverbs and ' Ifa' literary corpus is one and the same with the concept of destiny. The 'Ori' is a complex symbol of the Yoruba belief in predestination or destiny. The Yoruba believe that when God was creating heaven before the creation of earth that Orunmila was there. 'Orunmila' was the primordial witness when God was creating heaven and when man made his primordial choice. 'Orunmila' was charged with wisdom and acted as an adviser to "Olodumare' (Yoruba name for God). When earth was about to be created 'Orumila' came to earth with other deities. So he also was there when the earth was being created. He witnessed the individual choice of 'Ori' that is why he is referred to as 'eleri-Ipin' (i.e. the one who was there when the individual was making his choice or choosing his lots).

The Choice of Ori.

The Yoruba believe that whatever existed on earth existed formerly in heaven. This conceptions is similar to Plato's world of ideas. For them, plants, animals, and human beings have existed in heaven in the spirit world and have primodial names even up to medicinal powers. This is why our forefathers cured diseases

through the powers of words which is called incantations. These words are based on the stories of how the particular disease came to the world. For example, the case of Head-ache. It is believed Head-ache existed in 'Orun' (i.e. heaven, what the Yoruba regarded as the 'Orun' is world in Heaven; an area that is indefinite, indefinable, which exist high out side the present world). The Yoruba believe that you come into the world and take the physical form which represents the one you chose at the heavenly gate. So here goes the story of Headache: when he was coming in the spirit world and go to the heavenly gate (Bode) he met 'Orisa nla' (the deity of creation). Orisa-nla then had a conversation with him thus:

Orisa-nla:	Nibo lo nlo?
Head-ache:	Mo lo si Isalu-aye?
Orisa-nla:	Ki ni o nlo se ni Isalu-aye?
Head-ache:	Mo nlo se ise agbede
Orisa-nla:	Nibo ni waa fi agbede re si?
Head-ache:	Ninu ori omo eniyan ni
Orisa-nla:	Kinla? Ba wo ni won ti ma se ikawo re, nitori ininilara ti oje, fun omo eniyanHead-ache: Eni-keni ti o ba ti jewo wi pe omo re ni ohun, emi ko ni fi owo kan

Meaning:

Orisa-nla:	Where are you going?
`Head-ache:	I am going into the world
Orisa-nla:	What are you going to do in the world?
Head-ache:	I am going to be a black smith.
Orisa-nla:	Where will your smithy be?
Head-ache	The head of human beings.
Orisa-ache:	What? How can you be con trolled because it is going to be painful to human beings?
Head-acche	Anybody who declares himself your son will be spared.

What the 'Babalawo' says when a person has head-ache is simply "The person you are troubling now is the child of Orisa-nla. So leave according to your promise" and the

head-ache would obey because he has pledged to do so.

In the same way 'Ori' which is the symbolic representation of destiny, fashions the lots of the individual. According to Ifa literary corpus, the spirit of a human being on deciding to take the physical form and come to earth, makes a promise at heaven's gate. He will then make a proposal of his life's plan. This is what is referred to as "Akunleyan". The Yoruba proverb says "Akunleyan oun ni adaye ba' Meaning; That which is chosen kneeling is that which is found on getting to the World. The complete form is " Akunle a yan eda, a daye tan oju n kan ni"

Meaning:-We knelt down and made a primordial choice,
on getting into the world we become hasty.

Usually' when the spirit chooses its 'Ori' it does so consciously. This is buttressed by the fact that the spirit being recounts at the heavenly gate what he is coming to do on earth. The choice of 'Ori and the event of seeking permission for exit at heaven's gate are witnessed by 'Orunmila'. Like the Platonic theoty, the 'Yoruba' hold that when the spirit being takes on the physical body, he forgets everything he has proposed to do. This aspect of forgetting everythingis explained as divine. This does not rule out recollection if it comes across familiar reminders.

The story was told of how 'Oriseku', and 'Afuwape' decided to leave the Isalu-orun' to 'Isalu-aye' (heaven to earth). They all decided to consult 'Ifa'. When 'Orunmila' cast the divination chain (Opele) he said there is the need for them to offer sacrifice. They were to sacrifice 'Iyo' (salt) 'egbaa' (five kobo) and 'bowo' (respect elders) on their way. 'Oriilemere', and 'Oriseku' left hurriedly habit of 'Orunmila's' divination to ask for sacrifice. It was only Afuwape who heard and heeded this instruction. When Afuwape got Isulu-aye he became wealthy. One day he met his two friends i.e. 'Oriseku' and 'Oriilemere' and they all recognised each other. These other two were poor and living miserable lives. They then regretted and said that if they had known,

where 'Afuwape' chose his destiny they would have chosen same. That is why the saying goes thus:

Won ni awon ko mo ibi olori gbe yan ri o
Awon o ba lo yan ti awon
Awon o mo ibi Afuwape gbe yan ri o
Awon o ba lo yan ti won

Meaning
They regretted that they do not know where 'Oloori' chose 'ori', they would have gone there for theirs.
They do not know where Afuwape chose his, they would have chosen theirs.

Afuwape responded:- Ibikan naa la ti gbe yan 'Ori' o
Kadara ko papo ni.

Meaning:- We chose our 'Ori' in the same place
but our destinies differs.

From the foregoing story, 'Olodumare' allows the individual the right to exercise his freedom both in the choice of 'Ori and the actualisation of its potential. The character of the person involved also affects his fate. The fact that on arriving at Isalu-aye an individual forgets what he has charted for himself does not prevent the fulfilment. The question of consciousness of the state of the individual when choosing the 'Ori' can be conceptualised. An entity is a person regardless of its corporeality if, it has the attributes of a person. Since the spirit being has the attribute of consciousness, that is why it can be given instructions to offer sacrifice. The case of 'Afuwape' readily comes to mind 'Afuwape' in his primordial from on his journey from 'Isalu-orun' decided to offer the prescribed sacrifice. The first person he met on his way was an old woman pounding yam with a needle. He stopped and assisted the woman. He then asked for the direction to 'Ajala's' house. 'Ajala' is the deity in charge of 'Ori' (Alamo to nino ipin)

The woman helped him half way and pointed the house to him. He continued his journey and met another woman cooking soup. He asked the woman what she was going to use to sweeten the soup and the woman brought out ashes. 'Afuwape' told her to use his own salt 'iyo' the woman did and the taste was marvellous. She thanked him, and helped 'Afuwape' to a reasonable distance from 'Ajala's' house. 'Ajala' was a debtor. When his creditors ask him to pay up his debts 'Ajala' climbed up to the roof to hide himself. When 'Afuwape' got there, he asked how much 'Ajala' owed. They told him 'egbaa' five kobo. He brought out his 'egbaa' and gave it to them. 'Ajala' came out well pleased that he has saved him from harassment. He educated 'Afuwape' on the choice of 'Ori' and thus 'Afuwape' was guided to choose a good one. This accounted for the difference between him and the other two who left 'Isalu-orun' hurriedly without listening to the dictate of 'Orunmila' concerning sacrifice. The fact that 'Afuwape' can engage in all these activities in his primordial form suggests his consciousness as a person/being. He demonstrated knowledge of things and facts, feelings and the will to decide on his own towards all that he met on his way to making his exit from 'Isalu-orun' to 'Isalu-aye' It is also indicative of the fact that character pre-determines destiny. 'Afuwape' as the name suggests is a patient and obedient character that heeds good counsel. The other are of a hurried and hasty character. Barry Hallen in his analysis of the Yoruba concepts of person also made submission similar to the above epistemic conciousness of 'ori'. In this respect he affirms that the claim that ori "appears to be deification of intelligence and prudence "[3] is germane to the interest of his paper. Choice is inevitable both in the primordial form and in the physical. The availability of choice is an indication that the concept of freedom and destiny are complementary. Once a choice is made, the destiny is fixed until that individual chooses otherwise. We shall consider more of that later.

Freedom and Determinism

The philosophical presentation of freedom and determinism in the Yoruba sense is such that both term are complementary

rather than contradictory. The problem of freewill in the concept of 'ori' present itself as involving determinism without which the concept is inconceivable. Various people have defined the concept of Freedom and Determinism at different times to mean diffrent things.

Some philosophers have defined it to the exclusion of freedom and vice-verse,[4] Some others have attempted a possible reconciliation of both concepts.[5]

Some others, the likes of Richard Taylor defined determinism as antecedent condition known or unknown given which that thing could not be other than it os[6] Freedom has been defined by Jean Paul Sartre as involving determinism.

His verdict is "Man is condemned to be free ... Man is free to choose what he wants, but he is not free not to choose, since refusal to choose is already a choice made."[7] Freedom is also conceived as presupposing that there is no obstacle or impediment on the way to achieving one's goal. On the contrary, it is conceived as the will to over come obstacles and impedients on the way to achievin one's goal.

From the metaphysical thesis of Determinism, we have learnt that reality is itself determined, and stands unquestionably determined. Taylor says "there are antecedent conditions, known or unknown, given which that thing could not be othat than it is."[8] In essence there is no blame nor merit in any man who can not help what he does. The act of man is never deliberate or up to him. The demonstration of man's free will in the choice of 'Ori' is very obvious. The Yoruba concepts of metaphysical determinism is such that it entails freedom and with freedom comes responsibility.

Man can decide to rush out of 'Isalu-orun' to 'Isalu-aye'. He is free to obey instructions given to him or behave oterwise. the consequences of his actions are fixed. Man in the Yoruba conception is not like the Buridian ass, placed half-way between a bucket of water and a bundle of hay. The Buridan ass[9] equally

hungry and thirsty would die of hunger and thirst. Why so? Because unlike man it has no free will to decide either to take water or eat maize. Man in the Yoruba conception is more akin to the kind of freedom demonstrated by Descartes. Descartes proved the ability of man and his free will by refusing to stop in his use of scepticism until he broke through into the realm of pure mind. He was therefore able to discover the fullness of spiritual freedom, the certainity of intellectual truth and the reality of the infinite God. He attempted to erase and efface all the inscriptions that had ever been made upon his mind by a simple act of his will. He discovered that he could not successfully doubt the reality that he thinks. his doubt was engineered and sustained by reason.

The Yoruba determinism theory is pluralistic. They have a procedure for averting a bad 'Ori' from being fulfilled. To discover your destiny, the 'Orunmila' is consulted . Once it is established that the 'Ori' is bad as is the case in Ola Rotimi's play: The gods are not to blame[10], the procedure to avert it is usually spelt out by the 'Ifa' priest. In the case demonstrated in the play, the instruction of 'Ifa' priest, which is to be strictly adhered to was floated; therefore, the inevitable happened. When the Yoruba tread the part of the determinist by saying "Ayan mo mi ko si eni to le pa ada " meaning " my destiny can not be changed by anyone" What he is saying is that no one apart from himself and the deities can chande his destiny. ("himself" in this context means his inner-head). Sacrifice is meant to achieve three things:-

(a) To pacify the deities
(b) To pacify the 'Ori'
(c) To change ons's character.

The beauty of this can be illustrated by the story of Akapo.[11] ' Akapo' considerded that this relationship to "Orunmila' should have resulted into a good fortune for him. When it became obvious that his relationship with 'Orunmila' did not affect him positively he decided to inform 'Olodumare'. 'Akapo'

complained to 'Orunmila' before ' Olodumare' . The suit was that he 'Akapo' had worshipped and served 'Orunmila' all the days of his life. He has offered scrifices to 'Orunmila' to change his destiny but 'Orunmila' refused. 'Olodumare' summoned 'Orunmila' and questioned him. 'Orunmila' retorted that he had tried to help the man but his 'Ori' had refused to grant a change of his destiny. In essence, if a man's 'Ori' is pacified it will be well with him. That is why these following proverbs and adage are in common use.

1. "Sa ori,
   Ma sa oogun
   Oogun lojo iponju
   Ori eni lonijo gbogbo"

   Meaning: Invoke your 'ori'
   and not the power of medicine,
   medicine is for the day of trouble
   but the 'ori' for all times.

2. Oo bere lowo 'Ori'
   Ibi oja gbe n ta, lo n bere,
   Too 'ba' de be
   Bo ja ba tu n' ko?

Meaning: You did not inquire from your 'Ori'
You busy yourself asking for a market place
where goods are in high demand,
what if you get there, and the market has
dispersed?

3. Ayanmo ko gbo ogun
   Ipin eni ko gba ebo
   Ohun 'Ori' wa se
   Ko ma ni S'alaise.

Meaning: Antan's destiny cannot be changed by medicine

A man's lot does not accept sacrifice
What a man's 'Ori' has come to accomplish must be done.

4. Eni to lori nfo

Meaning: Only the man with 'Ori'
suffers from head-ache.

This explains the individuality of a man's 'Ori' (i.e. destiny and predicaments.) The number 4 adage is illustrated by Professor Oluwole[12] in her book relating to the 'Akapo' saga. All the troubles of 'Akapo' is not the trouble of 'Ifa'. 'Akapo' reported his case to 'Orunmila' and was futher directed to 'Esu' and 'Esu' discerned 'Akapo's' problem as his 'Ori'.

'Akapo' was told to consult his 'Ori' when 'Akapo' consulted with his 'Ori' his mourning was turned into dancing and all his problems solved so he ('Akapo') resolved:

"Nje ohun gbogbo to ba n dun mi
Ori mi ni no maa ro fun
Ori mi la mi o
Iwo la lan gbonran dun."

(Now, in all my problems and travails
I will always consult my inner head
My inner self
You are the only reliable consultant[13]")

Professor Oluwole's analysis shows that consulting the 'inner self ,' in this case, meant 'Akapo' was advised to reconsider his ways and amend them accordingly, if he wanted to succeed in life[14]. She has put the ethical dimension into the metaphysical explanation of the ' inner-head' the obvious is that the 'Ori' is supreme in the manifestation of a man's life or even his

character.

Epistemologically, the 'Ori' is the all knowing personal deity in an individual. This is expressed as 'Ori' ma lade'. The Yoruba therefore suggest that before an individual ventures into any worth while activity he should inquire from his 'Ori'. The 'Ifa' literary corpus also has an exciting rendering of the inseparability of a man's 'Ori' from the man:

Orunm ila lo dede ni bere
'Ifa' mo ni ta 'lo' to Alaasan ba r'okun?
'Ori' nikan lo to Alaasan ba r'okun[15]

('Orunmila' says If you want to enter into a corridor you have to bends down.
Orunmila asks Ifa,' " who is capable of traversing the deep sea with Alaasan?'
'Ifa' answers, ' it is only 'Ori' only"Ori' can endeav our to go all the length with with Alaasan).

All the other deities who responded admitted that they will go back at certain point. The sum total of this saying is that a man's 'Ori' follows him all through life and beyond the grave. The Yoruba concept of 'ori' is not fatalistic. Fatalism is the strong version of hard determinism or better put, the conclusion which follows logically if hard determinism is true. The Yoruba concept of 'Ori' as explicated permits freedom and guarantees change. The change is usually transcendental and cannot be done without the consent of the particular "Ori'. This is evidence in the story of Akapo' This is evidence in the story of 'Akapo' . Whe he consulted his 'Ori' his needs were met.

The Yoruba take into congnizance the existence of forces, they are, the benevolent (ajogun rere) and malevolent spirits (ajogun buburu) that could be above man, such as witchcraft, 'Esu' and the ultimate creator i.e. 'Olodumare'. These transcendental forces have to be consulted in conjunction with a man's

'Ori' before any change can be effected. This is what informs them on how to make sacrifices to avert the changing of a good destiny into a bad one, or pacify the deities to change a bad destiny into a good one. The change is usually and always transcendental never physical. It is done in adherence to the dictate of the 'Ifa' priest. Once the transaction is concluded at the transcendental level the physical manifestation follows.

The malevolent or benevolent spirit cannot change a man's destiny without due consultation with his 'Ori'

The Yoruba appease and appeal to their 'Ori' because there is the strong belief in the deity of the 'Ori' as the individual god or personal god. The following saying express this view.

'Ori' mi temi ni ose
'Ori' lo se Oba
Oba dade owo
Ori lo se Agbe
Agbe Joba Ilu Ikosun

Ori ni se oun gbogbo
Eniyan ko fe kareru ka so
Ori eni nii so ni,'
.....
Ko si Orisa ti da nii gbe lehin Ori eni.

My 'Ori' kindly support me
It is the 'Ori' of the King who made
the King to wear a crown of coins
The King used a beaded walking stick
It is the Ori of the 'agbe' bird who made him
King of the city of camwood
It is Ori who makes everything to happen
Human beings do not wish a person to be relieved
of his burden.

It is a person's Ori who gives him relief no one blesses
A man without the knowledge of 'Ori'[16]

'Ori' inu iwo lo ba
Jowo ko ma ba to de je"

Meaning: Inner head you are Supreme
Please do not destroy the outer one

From the foregoing, the Yoruba belief in the 'Ori' as symbol of determinism is apparent. What shall we say to this:-

"Eni to gbon
Ori e e lo ni o gbon
Eeyan ti o gbon
Ori re lo ni o go jusu lo

Meaning: He who is wise
Is made wise by his 'Ori'
He who is not wise
Is made more foolish than a piece of yam by his 'Ori'.[16]

Their prescribed way-out from fatalism is that the 'Ori' should be worshipped, and sacrifices should be made to the 'Ori.' The 'Ori' in Yoruba pantheon is the greatest god.

The Yoruba have found for themselves reasons in reasons in their philosophy not to be idle or resign to their fate i.e. 'Ori'. They must work hard to ensure their good 'Ori' is fulfilled and labour to avert the bad. 'Ori'. "Not to do something is to be crippled fast".[18] This is a further explication that their conception of 'Ori' is not fatalistic. the 'Ori' as the bearer of predestination or destiny means:-

(a) That the 'ori' of the individual cannot be changed by man once the choice is made in heaven.

(b) That the deities and/or evil forces can change a man's destiny only if his 'Ori' gives consent.

(c) That a man does not have to resign to his destiny as unalterable but must make effort to live the good life through cultivating good character.

The allusion to Ola Rotimi's The gods are not to blame is ment to disprove the argument of some scholars that the Yoruba concept of destiny is fatalistic. When an alteration of on's destiny is sought for in form of a correction, or as an appendix, those concerned should obey the oracle's dictates. Twice, the oracle's dictates were disobeyed in the play.

The synopsis of the play is as follows:-

It was predicted that the child born into the family of King Adetusa will kill the father and marry the mother. To avert this, the Oracle told them to sacrifice the child to the gods through death. Gbonka, the King's messenger was ordered to carry out this instruction but he did otherwise. The child's life was preserved in another environment. When he grew up and was insulted as a bastard in that household, he sought his identity through consulting an Oracle. The oracle informed him of his destiny and told him to stay where he was. The child disobeyed and the inevitable happened. The gods would have been appeased if the child was put to death at birth and the bad 'Ori' completely averted from being fulfilled. If he had stayed where he was, he would not have married his mother nor kill is father who resided outside his current abode, obedience is the greatest price for an effective sacrifice to avert a bad 'Ori' this has been demonstrated in the 'Akapo' 'saga'.

The community in that play did not exonerate Odewale (the child) on the grounds of being destined to do what he did. Their reaction alone, show that inspite of their belief in 'Ori'; a

man is responsible for his action. Their conception of 'Ori' and morality is an exhibition of a co-operate system. A man is punished for any immoral act and rewarded for good acts. The 'Ori' has no protective covering for law breakers. Punishment and rewards are the inevitable consequences of violating or obeying moral laws.

The concept of free-will in the Yoruba concept of 'Ori' involves determination. The individual is expected to bring his good 'Ori' to pass. His good 'Ori' is perceived as a potentiality that needs determination to be actualised. An individual with a bad 'Ori' can offer sacrifice to pacify the deities and his 'Ori' to avert his bad 'Ori'. They believe that the individual has all the available resources to effect this. A good 'ori' does not automatically come to pass, it is earned through determination, hard work and the excrcise of the individual's freedom positively. A bad 'Ori' can only be averted if the individual's 'Ori' is in sympathy with the individual's choice. The gods or supernatural powers (i.e. benevolent and malevolent spirits) cannot actualise any thing the individual 'Ori' refuses to approve. Even the gods have their own 'Ori'. The functionality of the 'Ori' is that it gives direction to the course of an individual life. The explication of Yoruba concept of 'Ori' make healing possible. An example is to found in the mythology of how head-ache came to earth. When 'Orunmila' asked him at the gate what his mission was; he told him that he was going to be a black smith..... What the 'Ifa' priest does whenever he is approached to heal a man is to recount the primordial promise of that particular sickness at heaven's gate and proclaim " the person under attack is 'Orunmila's' child. So you have to leave." The sickness usually takes its exit and the individual feels better instantly. In the same way healing also comes through affirming an individual's good 'Ori' This Yoruba conception has an undertone of Biblical allusion. The Christian actualises the promises of God by professing and standing on the confession of his faith in the never failing power of God's word. The 'Ori' i.e. physical is also significant because it houses seven

holes in the human body. These holes are fundamental to human existence and perform complementary role in the actualization of the inner head i.e. destiny.

THE 'ORI' AND SEVEN VITAL HOLES.

The vital holes are the eyes, ears, nose and the mouth. In western science as well as in the African thought the 'eye' is the source of illumination. It is regarded as the light of the body .The eye is the door to perceptual thought, knowledge and understanding. The eyes when it is culturally trained transcends the realm of sensation in its operation. The kind of insight provided by the eye in Yoruba thought can be classified into physical, rational, social and spiritual. The eye can perform all of these functions at the same time. That is why the Yoruba says that the strangers eye is unlike that of the original natives or resident.

Oju alejo ko jo oju onile
(The strangers eyes is unlike the resident').

The above proverb explains the environmental factor as a pre-condition that affect the insight of an individual.

Eni lo ju l'oju nti
Meaning: It is the man with eyes that experiences shame

This points out the individuality of perceptual knowledge and the subjective nature of its effects.

The eye can also be used to show respect or honour.

Eni to loju laa ti fun

Meaning: It is a man with eye that one
can use the eye as a signal to.
You recipocrate respect to a man of honour.

Oloju o ni laju e sile, ki talube ko wa a.
Meaning: A man with eyes will not open it wide for

talubo to enter into it.

The eye also act as a protective guard. The eye is very sensitive that it closes up when it senses any danger

'Oju' I'agba n'ya, agba ki I yanu
Meaning: The adult can be quick to see but slow to speak.

The 'eye' in the immediate above proverb refers to the insight of an adult that he/she gained through experience over the years. This experience makes the elder more sensitive to things and prescribes Swiftness in perceptual ability but caution in exercise his/her verbal competence. The expected norm from an elder is to be a reliable, confident, and an intelligent counsellor.

The 'eye' is also protective. It helps to locate danger and send out the warning signal viz:-

Oju I'al'akan fi n sori
Meaning;- The crab protect its head through the eye.

The eye serves as a powerful and necessary witness but there is the need for caution. The following proverbs provide these two perspective.

(1) Oju ti oo ba ni kale
Ki i ti aaro yo ipin.
Meaning: The eyes that will endure till old age will not show seeds in the eyes early in childhood

(2) Ara ile re ko moju lo si oja oko
Meaning: The individual did not look well in deciding on her choice of husband

(3) A kin i fi oju oloju sowo ka jere
Meaning: We do not profit by proxy

(4) "Maa mojuu mi de be lo npa won nile ibikan"
Meaning:- I shall witness it with my eye killed them in one area

(5) "Oju lo mo ohun to yonu,...."
Meaning;- It is the eyes that determine what will satisfy the stomach.

It is apt to conclude that the eye must be inevitably functional for the individual to receive anything. However, it cautioned on the immanent danger in having a personal witness all of the time.

(6) " Oju oloju o oju eni"

Meaning:- Somebody else's eye is unlike one's own.

The above proverbs 1-4.5 & 6 are strong indications of the necessity to have an individual witness of an event as well as a warning that to desire a personal wiitness all of the time is to experience danger at some time.

It is apt to conclude that the proverbs 1-6 are illustrative of the functionlity of the eyes.It points out the use of the eyes and character. It also determines profitability in ventures because of the difference that personal initiative can add to the advancement of one's course. However, the eyes must be used discreetly. There is the philosophical services provided by the eyes. The Yoruba will say:-

"Oro sunukun 'ni afi wo"

Meanihg:- " A matter of grave dimension requires an analytical eye"

In essence the eye provides insight, enlightenment, differentiation and environmental interpretations of phenomena and allows for individuality on issue and it is also used to cherish objects.

The eye is also symbolic of deep insight or philosophical exposition. That may explain why the 'Ifa' tray is symbolically represented with human head and two prominent eyes. The 'Ori' is a symbol of divinity because it's the highest divinity among the gods or human. Such feeling can be supported by these sayings:-

i. " 'Ori' la bo ka fi orisa sile.

Meaning:- " 'Ori' is to be worship instead of Orisa"

'Ori' is supreme among the gods. It is also the supreme requirement for a successful endeavour among mortals.

Ti a ba de ibi ti o gbe omo eniyan
Mori lo ma mu ewa lo
Oojo lewa nbo
'Ori' eni ni ba ni gbe ile dko.

Meaning:- If you get to a place of affluence
Go with your 'Ori' and not beauty

Beauty will return in a day but
'Ori' go with you to your husband's house.

For the Yoruba, your destiny is explicated in character. This view is expressed by Professor Oluwole.[19] She considered that 'Akapo's' destiny before he consulted with'Ori' was bad and so was his character. The moment 'Akapo' changed his character things changed for him.

The concept of charater is entwined with that of destiny and it is inseparable. Though it should be mentioned that this is regarded as being and morality.In the above saying also the individual is encouraged to ensure that when he gets to a place of affluence he exhibit good characters. Such complementary inter-relatedness is found in the relation of the holes one to another as explicated in these proverbs. The eye in the 'Ifa' tray' is illustrative of deep insight. 'Orunmila' is the custodian of all foundational knowledge because he is regarded as the primordial witness and 'Ifa' tray is a corpus of this wisdom.

Other proverbs such as the following show the inter-relatedness of the 'eye' as holes to other hole in the head viz:-

Ope lope imu ti o joju mejo o 'san kanra.
Meaning:- We should appreciate the nose that prevent two eyes from running into each other.

The above saying on the surface is indicative of the physical nose to the eyes. It also tells us about the fact that the functioning of the eyes as double aspect. Which will complementarily produce insight with that of the nose.

The ears also function complementarily in the whole body.
B' eti o gbo yinkin, inu ko ibaje
Meaning:- If the ear does not perceive the bad omen
the inner being will not experience sorrow.

The above saying demonstrate in practical terms the link between the deliverance of the ears and the expression of the human person. This is a caution to persons who love to be well informed about the on goings. The ears can make or mar a man's enthusiasm to life. You cannot divorce a person easily from what he/she hears. The example that readily comes to mind is that of Odewale in Ola Rotimi's play already cited.

Eti ni Awoko fi n gbe' yawo oro
Meaning:- "The Bird awoko marries words
through its ears"

The significant of this adage is that as potent as words are it takes the ear to receive the massage.

1. The mouth and the eye also functions in a complementary way.

That is why the Yoruba say: "Benu baje oojuaati"

Meaning:- Once the mouth is satisfied, the eye's perception will be distorted.

The moral perspective can be corrupted through gift or such act that distort clarity of vision or value judgement. If this is so the adage " Aki i pa ohun mo agago lenu"meaning-The bell cannot be stopped from ringing,(or the 'mouth' of the bell cannot be stopped) tells us that the running of the bell however can be controlled if not stopped. In essence these holes have their distinctive roles as well as their complementary functioning. The beauty of their functionality is that they blend into one to make the individual.

The 'Ori' houses the human brain, the mouth speaks words. The words, according to Yoruba is either proceeding from wisdom, knowledge or understanding. The lack of the three can make a man's speech that of folly. The authoritative source of communication is the mouth. You revoke your bad 'Ori' if any with the mouth. It is with the mouth that the 'Ori' recounts at the 'bode' (i.e. heaven's gate) his mission on earth. The mouth is also used in communicating with the god's and one's 'Ori'. The power of words and its potency is also very paramount. The Babalawo also uses his mouth to commend the sacrifices offered to the 'Ori'. the gods and the spiritual entities. It is with the mouth that words are spoken to create and recreate favourable/unfavourable situations. The 'Ori' is the symbol of freedom as well as that of determinism.

The beauty of the Yoruba philosophy is that even the 'Ori' functions complementarily which other features of man. Such as the legs. The 'Ori' gives direction to the destination of the legs. But the legs could make a non-sense of the mission [20] except the co-operation of such is solicited. So the concept of 'Ori' is not fatalistic it is complementary. It cannot be over emphasized that the Yoruba conception of 'Ori' as demonstrated in this paper is not fatalistic in this context of the western interpretation. Fatalism in the west does not have alternative modality".[21] Whereas the conception of 'Ori' in Yoruba complements other concepts such as "Iwa" (good character) and friendship, patience etc to mention but a few. A proper appreciation of all these give us a more healthy attitude towards ourselves and the fulfilment of our destiny in a pluralistic society.

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LOGIC AND ARGUMENTATION IN DEFENCE OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC

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INTRODUCTION

The desire to suppiy precise canons of vaiidity, sort out logical from other features of good argument, and to give rules which would permit only the logically good argument and exclude the bad, have been the main focus of logic.In this connection logic is contrived as an entireiy deductive system. it is infact unarguable that from Aristotle through Leibniz and George Boole to Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Whitehead, logic has concentrated on and tremendously developed along, deductive logic.One striking impetus about this deveiopment is that 20th century logic is notable chiefly for meta-theory in which, however, some astonishing results concerning the nature of logical systems have been established. It is also remarkable and compelling to note that since mid-century, with the advent of large electronic machines, and recently computers, deductive logic has been put to important practical use in their design.

On the contrary, inductive logic is currently in a less developed state; much so that some philosophers argue that inductive reasoning belongs to the philosophy of science than to logic. For philosophers of this persuasion induction is interested in the material truth and content of propositions, that is , whether our propositions conform to fact or not. But deductive reasoning is interested in formal truth. In other words, whereas induction is concerned with the truth of propositions, deduction is concerned with the logical nature of propositions; and it is the latter that is both fundamentally and legitimately said to be the subject-matter of logic.

However, our main argument in this essay is that inductive reasoning is more consistent with the subject matter of logic-argumentation than deductive reasoning. In this connection the essay rejects the widely accepted thesis that logical is purely formal and deductive in character. It is infact the contention of this essay that notwithstanding the lopsided development of logic in favour of deductive logic, the process of argumentation in general, the reasoning of the experimental scientist like that of the lawyer, philosophers, historian and the detective is, in diferring degrees, inductive. It is also instructive to realise that ultimately the purpose of logic is the attainment of truth. and in this connection inductive logic is more appropriate than deductive logic. Inductive reasoning is thus both a legitimate procedure of logic and perforce the end result of argumentation.

THE PROBLEM SITUATED

The attempt to reduce logic to formal truth from antiquity has made it such that inductive logic has been assigned a peripheral position and attracts both a contentious and an almost patronising mention in studies in logic. It is nonetheless true that Aristotle who reputedly is supposed to captain the world's team of logicians[1] dealt with inductive logic, but his remarks are notoriously said to be scattered. As a matter of fact, it was not until the emergence of the English philosopher and scientist Francis Bacon that inductive logic received attention as a systematic and rigorous discipline. For him (Bacon), induction was the logic of the emerging modern science. Infact, for Bacon and Galileo, the history of logic was to be determined mainly by the endeavour to secure what seemed to be a great reformation in science namely, the abandonment of all pre-occupation with deductive inference from premises accepted on authority, and concentration on the facts of experience. Logic was no longer to be "the instrument of a consistent elaboration of dogma, but the instrument of the true explanation of nature"[2]. Bacon advocated this principle of investigation with prophetic fervour. The facts were to be allowed to speak for themselves,

while they maintained a purely passive or receptive attitude. No conjectures or hypotheses were to be made; we were to wait until our systematic records of the fact revealed the general principle embodied in them.

It is undeniable that Bacon and Galileo stimulated and powered profound insights into studies on induction but their efforts were not channelled to address issues environing around the legitimacy of induction as a procedure and subject matter of logic. To aptly capture the purpose of this essay, we consider it necessary to begin by asking this critical question: what reasons are there for reliance upon inductive procedure? In other words, are there grounds for inductive reasoning? This question is very pertinent particularly in the context of the claim of formal logicians that only the deductive procedure conduces to the method of logic. P.F. Strawson [3] in this connection urge us to suppose that a man is brought up to regard formal logic as the study of the science and art of reasoning. According to him, the man observes that all inductive processes are, by deductive standards, invalid, the premises never entail the conclusion.

Inductive processes, he said are notoriously important in the formation of beliefs and expectations about everything which lies beyond the observation of available witnesses. But an invalid argument, Strawson reminds us, is an unsound argument, in the sense that an unsound argument is one which no good reason is produced for accepting the conclusion. What this comes to is that

> *if inductive processes are invalid, if all the arguments we should produce, if challenged, in support of our beliefs about what lies beyond the observation of available witness are unsound, then we have no good reason for any of these beliefs*

This conclusion, Strawson, remarks is repugnant. So there arises the demand for a justification, not of this or that particular belief which goes beyond what is entailed by our evidence, but a justification of induction in general.

We intend here to restrict our justification to answering the claims of the formal logician that logic has nothing to do with the contents or material truths of propositions; and in this David Mitchell[5] offers an apropos launching pad when he piqued us with the question: when we have examined the forms of argument in which the premises entail conclusion and these kind of propositions which are logically necessary, have we exhausted the scope of logic? Assuredly, and Mitchell avers thus, the scope of logic is not exhausted in formal truth. This, as it were, means that material truth is a legitimate subject-matter of logic. Using the proposition "if all men are mortal and all Greeks are men, then all Greeks are mortal", Mitchell argues that the proposition does not prove that all men are infact mortal. But most of us he said, are "so skeptical as to deny that we can be said, for all practical purposes to know that they are"[6]

So if there is a class of non-necessary universal propositions which as rational men, we are prepared to accept, it is reasonable to assume that there is some form of reasoning, not necessarily deductive, by which we can justifiably arrive at them. Even if generalising is only a convenience, and not an absolute requirement, of our day-to-day lives, the very purpose of knowledge seems to be to establish such propositions. It would be paradoxical to the point of absurdity to dismiss all such generalisation as unjustified simply on the grounds that their truth could not be proved by deductive methods. Here we have the strongest incentive to accept the possibility of a kind of inference called induction, whereby we may legitimately pass from the recognition of the truth of a number of non-necessary propositions to the formulation of propositions of unrestricted generality or to other particular propositions. J.S. Mill's

more elaborate and highly plausible argument for the justification of inductive logic here courts our attention.

J.S. MILL'S JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC

Formal logicians, as already adumbrated, insist that logic has nothing to do with whether or not contents of propositions are really true or conform to fact or not; it is the business of experience or the special sciences. In other words, the scope and business of logic is limited to logical forms of thought.

But Logic, we know, sets out to establish the rules of reasoning while its general purpose is the attainment of truth. To limit attainment of truth to formal truth is to restrict the scope of logic and this is exactly what formal logicians are doing. J.S.Mill is one scholar who exercised capacious and strident desire to tear this straitjacket and thereby both widen the scope of logic and extend logical method to the testing of material truth of propositions, hence treat inductive logic as a *de jure* method of logic. The importance of Mill's effort is captured by Makinde when he said that

> *Mill's strategy for his defence of a system of inductive logic was based on his awareness of the controversy over a proper definition of logic and his own conviction that logic, if it must be of any use, must not be confined to the narrow conception of it as formal, pure and simple*[7]

Mill's programme, it must be noted, aims at reversing the general scope of logic from the purely formal conception to the view that logic is primarily concerned with the matter of propositions. This for Mill and also for Makinde, is no moot point because "it is the matter and not the form that can conform to a fact of experience"[8]. The upshot of this obviously is that formal logic plays a discernible role in the ascertainment of truth; if its role is only the logical appraisal of reasoning, then logic would

lead to intellectual sterility rather than a higher degree of rationality.

Formal logicians accept this, and Mill remarks that one of the cardinal points of formal logic is the claim that logic is conversant with the form of thought to the exclusion of matter. Them meaning being that logic is not concerned with the actual contents of knowledge, such as particular objects of truth known to us, but only with our mode of knowing them, or with what the mind does when it knows, or thinks irrespective of the particular things which it thinks about to the extent that logic is at last fully and finally defined as "the science of the necessary forms of thought"[9]

To the question, that arises from this; what are thoughts about? Mill's answer is that certainly thoughts are not about the thinking act, but rather of something-an objective presentation in experience. Makinde calls the question "about what thoughts are" a crucial question[10], and there is every reason to associate with him in this respect, because if formal logic is concerned with the thinking process alone, either it is sterile, as pointed out, or the thinking must be of something: in that case it cannot be form *qua* form. It is indeed in this point that the real issues come to bear. For, as Makinde both appositely and piquantly points out, going by the tenets of formal logic only one level of valid thinking or reasoning, that is, formal reasoning, is recognised; while following inductive logic two levels: formal and material, with greater emphasis on the latter, are recognised. This Mill argues, is because "the end of thinking is the attainment of truth, and at all events the first and most essential constituent of valid thought is that its result is true"[11] Mill's recognition of the relevance of truth to valid thinking, it is observed[12], makes the law of logic to be the laws of evidence, while the strait-jacket presented by formal logicians make the laws of formal logic the laws of excluded middle.

Inductive logic, in dealing with the material contents of arguments, Mill avers, is meant to provide a theory of evidence whose

justification according to formal logicians is logically impossible. But for him, if by logic is meant a formal deductive inference whose arguments are only formally valid, as opposed to inductive logic, then so much the worse for formal logic. This according to him, is so because if any general theory of the sufficiency of evidence and the legitimacy of generalisation is possible, this must be logic in the real and fuller sense, and anything else called by the name can only be ancillary to it. Mill is so much committed to this position that he persuasively argues that to think that formal logic is the only logic is to think that

> *all the rest of philosophy and evidence were merely an adaptation of this to something else, which is to ignore the end to which all rules laid down for our thinking operations are meant to be subservient, when as a matter of fact, the purpose of them all is to enable us decide whether anything, and what, is proved true*[13]

INDUCTIVE LOGIC AS "LARGER LOGIC"

Whereas formal logicians would banish the inductive process to the philosophy of science, apologists of inductive logic, notably Mill, accept deductive reasoning as a legitimate process of doing logic hence include formal logic as part of logic. Mill's attack on formal logic is to the effect that it is not the whole of what logic is: "Mill's criticism of formal logic is not a total denunciation of formal logic. He does not ignore its importance, especially for deduction.[14]

More than the ordinary recognition of matter Mill subsumes logic (called smaller logic) under inductive logic (called larger logic). While we do not subscribe to this reductionist idea the important issue for us is that both inductive and deductive processes of reasoning are recognised as legitimate methods in logic. This recognition provides relief from formal logician's drunkenness with the monastic prejudice of trying to reduce reality to one realm, in

this case restricting reality to forms; and thereby delimiting the scope of logic. On the other hand, by accepting both deduction and induction as legitimate logical methods we, and to a large extent Mill, accept(s) that reality could be multifaceted. Formal logic is only an aspect, not the whole, of logic.

Ryle's distinction between formal and informal logic; and what he characterises as the latter is also illuminating. According to Ryle formal logic consists in the study and manipulation of formal symbolised calculi and their elements, whereas informal logic consists in the quite different enterprise of plotting the logical geography of concepts, "an enterprise often, if not always, conducted in the jungles and on the wild frontiers of thought where the neat, straight railway tracks of formal logic have not yet reached or where they cannot reach"[15]. The kernel of Ryle's description of informal logic shows that the logic deals with material truth. The upshot of this being that in informal logic, as with inductive logic, the material contents of an argument are recognised as contributing to the process of reasoning. In effect, informal logic is co-existensive with inductive logic and unlike formal logic, both provide a field of intellectual study unsurpassed in richness, complexity and the power to absorb.

Mill and Ryle did not only show that formal logic delimits the scope of logic but also that inductive logic, by virtue of its recognition of the material contents of argument as contributing to the process of reasoning, both enriches and widens the scope of logic. In induction as indeed logic in this proper and creative sense, truth is the purpose of reasoning and the logician is no less restricted to material truth than he is to formal truth; it deals with implications that are explained as arising from the meanings of content or subject matter hence the larger logic.

INDUCTION AND INFERENCE

In the fore going we have established that induction is a legitimate and appropriate procedue of logic which provides an enriched and profound dimension of the subject. Here we intend to

indicate and defend that the inductive process is more in conformity with what is involved in inference. The import of this is that since inference is the name given to the process that allows us to establish the conclusion of an argument from the premises and the step which carries from the original observation to the theories is said to be inductive, the two terms come to the same thing. Inferences are statements that we make about the unknown using the known as foundation [16] The deductive process of reasoning, it is well known is demonstrative; it does not give new knowledge, as the conclusion does not say thing not already contained in the premises. It is little wonder therefore that the syllogistic is charged with committing the fallacy of *petitio principii.*

On the other hand, because it is common knowledge that inductive process is non-demonstrative, that is, the truth of the conclusion does not follow necessarily from the truth of the premises; we can go outside of what is already stated in the premises, its conclusion has content not present, even implicitly, in the premises. It is also said to be ampliative in the sense that the conclusion expands upon the contents of the premises. In this connection, the process (inductive) like inference involves making statements about the unknown using the known as their foundation, and this is what we mean by saying that the inductive process function by expansion of knowledge. For instance, Kepler's first law of planetary motion made in clear nights but he expands this to assert that the planet follow these paths at all times, day and night, clear or cloudy. This clearly is also what is involved in inference; from available evidence we make conclusions that are not already given in experience.

It is therefore misleading and wantonly incorrect to recognise only the deductive process of reasoning as a logical method. Infact to quote Mill "to reason is simply to infer an assertions already admitted, and in this sense induction is as

much entitled to be called reasoning..."[17]

In reaction to the exaltation of deductive reasoning, the question has been asked to the effect of how actually we do arrive at the generalisations with which the deductivist work. Assuming we are to accept that science never draws any inference from any sense-data except when the latter are viewed as already embodying or illustrating certain universals, and assuming also we agree with Popper that we cannot verify all instances hence the unintelligibility of induction, the point cannot be dismissed that generalisations are not arrived at deductively.

Science, Albert Einstein would say, must start with facts and end with facts, no matter what theoretical structures in builds in-between. First of all. the scientist is an observation. Next he tries to describe in complete generality what he saw, and what he experts to see in the future. Next he makes predictions on the basis of his theories, which he checks against facts again. The first step which carries from the original observations to the theories is nothing but induction - the formation of theories on the basis of factual knowledge. After formulating his theory, the scientist then asks himself: Is this really what I want? And he is forced to go back to the world of facts to check his construction. But, as John Kemeny rightly points out, because you cannot check a general law directly, you must first ask what it tells you about particular facts.

> *You cannot observe that the sun rises everyday throughout eternity; what you can observe is that it rises today, and that is rises tomorrow, and the next day, etc. Any (finite) number of these can be checked*[18]

The aim of the scientist is to make the universe intelligible, and his success is marked by the extent to which he displays what is, or can be, observed, as exemplifying the operation of interrelated laws or principles, constituting a single interrelated

system. He is concerned with the provision of systematic explanations of nature; scientific hypotheses are not thereby said to be completely verifiable. But our analysis shows that to make nature intelligible for the scientist, induction cannot, never, be done away with. It is in fact a very crucial element. The generalisations of the scientist are not intuited, they bear some reference to our contact with the external objective world. Particular facts are what can be checked, not generalisations themselves. Even assuming, for logical purposes, that we decide not to be interested in the truth or falsity of the propositions of an argument, that does not mean that in arriving at the generalisations, which the argument is based on, induction played no role just because induction deals with the material truth of propositions, and logic for the formal logician is only interested in formal truth.

FORMAL AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC ARGUMENTATION

To reinforce our thesis and capture the main focus of this essay, it is imperative and impelling to indicate the basic tenets of formal logic and those of inductive logic with the view to determining which set is more consistent with the goals of argumentation, the subject matter to logic.

Preliminary, the point to the effect that formal logic, as with classical philosophy, was inspired by the search for certainty-a certainty that could be found only in form or more specifically, in the ideal form; readily comes to mind. Perfect reasoning in this circumstance has to be restricted to form only. Thus, formal logic is reasoning in the ideal form; its validity is absolute truth in form only. Accordingly the end sought by formal logicians, is a perfect system of thought capable of producing truths. On the other hand, inductive logic, or following Smith *"scientific philosophy"*[19] as we could see, is inspired by men interested in investigating the world in which they live with a desire to controlling their environment. It is clear that in formal logic (perfect form), when discovered, has no practical value and this palpably makes logic

intrinsically incapable of dealing with the problem making explicit the growth of knowledge. But inductive logic is interested in a logic of use and believes that such a logic must be creative to achieve this, they contend that we must deal in probabilities; when we argue we deal not with absolutes but with probabilities. To be of any value to society, an argument must be realistic, it must be constructive and aimed at affecting our judgment. Which means that an argument in the final analysis must deal with people, their problems and solutions to these problems. Philosophy has long given up the pursuit of abstract truth. It has to show its relevance to man, his organisation of reality. Philosophy is exactly for a more meaningful purpose; it is not for starry-eyed truths.

Secondly, formal logicians find perfection possible only by restricting logic to form and validity, or truth to formal validity or formal truth. But logic in its creative and practical sense is useful both to human culture and the acquisition of knowledge only when material validity is the ultimate test. The imperative question here is: which formal validity and material validity is more important in arguments? In other words, does a formal fallacy negate a realistic conclusion, or does a realistic conclusion negate a formal fallacy? Pedagogy and modern debate[20], it has been pointed out, has come to accept the principle that a fallacy in reasoning is only a sign suggesting an investigation into the truth of the conclusion, not complete proof that the conclusion is false. By beginning with false premises, it is possible to reason falsely to an acceptable conclusion.

Thirdly, formal logic is based on the assumption that ignores change and insists that all matter and things can be classified in independent and exclusive categories. Inductive logic based on the assumption that reality is in a state of flux, postulates that all matter is continuous and denies the possibility of exclusive classification. Using formal logic as the only technique of argumentation, this assumption, it must be recognised, will hinder

rather than facilitate the arguing of timely and important issues. On the other hand, the assumption underlying inductive logic makes for adaptation and reconstruction of ideas.

Another assumption underlying formal logic is that reason is the test of truth. This makes reason the test of reality. For inductive logic, the assumption is that verification is the test of truth. In arguments this means a choice between reason or verification as ultimate proof. It needs be remarked here that save for convenience in the use of terms one cannot talk of verification without reason as one cannot talk of reason without verification. If we keep to convenience, no doubt the position of the formal logician would favour an argumentator who could reason from acceptable assumptions without contradiction to conclusions he would have us accept. While the other position (the inductive logician's) would favour the argumentator who presented conclusions that has been tested and found satisfactory. If not for mere elegance in argumentation the usefulness of the former is very much limited in addressing issues that are of immediate importance to man. Smith thus piqued us to answer the question "which would be worse for a debatr, to advance an undistributed middie term, or to give bad advice on foreign poiicy"

What we notice is that formal logic is based on the assumption that a form of thought can be abstracted from the context in which it takes place, manipulated, and then applied to another place and time. While inductive logic springs from the assumption that the form or reasoning abstracted from the situation in which the reasoning is used makes it meaningless, and that there is no assurance that reasoning abstracted to form and manipulated (even within the rules of formal logic) will apply in the new situation in which it applied. To quote Schiller

> *it is not possible to abstract from actual use of logical material and consider 'form of thought' in*

themselves without incurring thereby a total loss, not only of the truth but also of meaning[22]

In sum, the problem of formal and inductive logic in argumentation is a question of speaker's responsibility. If argumentation is an exercise in formal logic, then an argumentator's obligation does not include the justification of his assumption nor the verification of his conclusion. This position is consistent with the assumption underlying formal logic. If the other position is taken, then an argumentator's prime obligation is to justify his assumptions and verify his conclusion within the realms of experience. Here, since the ultimate purpose of logic is the attainment of truth it is imperative that arguments tend to be judged in keeping with the philosophy of inductive logic. There is therefore no compelling reason to restrict logic to formal truth. Induction is both a legitimate method and an enriched dimension of logic.

NOTES AND REFERENCE

1. Aristotle is supposed to captain the world's team of logicians because he was the first philosopher to develop a general theory about arguments. For details see I.M. Bochenski *Ancient Formal Logic* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co 1963) p.31. But Smiley pointed out in his article "Syllogism and Quantification" in *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 27 No. 1 (March 1962), p. 71, that Aristotle should be a non-playing captain because his syllogistic is narrow, and of course the logic of the Stoics in much more important than all the *syllogisms of Aristotle*. This fact is elaborated in Jan Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic From the Stand point of Formal Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p.131.
2. S.H. Mellone, *Elements of Modern Logic (London:* University Tutorial Press, 1952), p.26
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7. M.A. Makinde, "In defence of a theory of inductive logic: John Stuart Mill's strategy". In *The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 3, Nos. 1&2 (1983), p.28

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9 J.S. Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 4th ed. (London: Longmans Green, Reader and Dyer, 1872), p.457-468

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11. Ibid.

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14. Ibid.

15. Gilbert Ryle "Formal and Informal Logic." In *Dilemmas* (London: Hutchison Unversity Library, (1996), c/f. A.C. Grayling, *Introduction to Philosophical Logic* (New Jersey: Barness and Nobles Books, 1982), p.14

16. Frank R. Harrison, *Deductive Logic and Descriptive Language* (USA: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1969), p.13

17. J.S Mill , *A System of Logic: Rationcinative and*

Inductive, 8th ed (Toronto: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1974), p.2

18. Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p.238

19. The term *"Scientific Philosophy"* is W.S. Smith's, see W.S. Smith "Formal Logic in Debate". In Jerry M. Anderson and Paul J. Dover (eds) *Readings in Argumentation* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc. 1968), p.94 The is not the same as logical positivism but is meant to stand for that branch of philosophy that admits induction as a legitimate method of doing philosophy. For him (Smith) induction is the method of science.

20. Ibid, p.94

21. Ibid, p.95

22. F.C.S. Schiller, *Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem*, 2nd ed.(London: Macmillian and Co, 1931), p.14.

HOW DO AGNOSTICS PHILOSOPHISE?
Using Russell's and Copleston's Debate as a Case Study

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Agnosticism (Greek, *agnostos,* unknowing) is an epistemological position. It is arrived at, most often, after its advocates seem to hold that neither the affirmative nor the denial of a position is adequately justifiable. Hence its neutral non-committal knowledge-claim or the suspension of knowledge and holding to the view of 'I don't know'. Using Bertrand Russell's agnostic position, we have argued that there is an intellectual dishonesty involved in agnosticism. The agnostic holds agnosticism on the basis of some philosophical grounds that are in want of rational justification. Agnosticism has its implicit method of argumentation. We have there fore shown thatagnosticism is not so much of a sceptical epistemology. It is rather,a critical epistemology on existing epistemological knowledge-claims.

WHAT IS AGNOSTICISM?

In the wide meaning of the term, agnosticism is "that theory of knowledge which asserts that 'it is impossible for man to attain knowledge of certain subject matter"[1]. In philosophy of religion, it is often confined to the knowledge of God's existence/being and other religious experiences such as miracle, revelation, ets. T.H. Huxley coined this term in the 19th century. Though it emerged out of philosophical debates concerning matters of religious inquiries, its roots in epistemology is basically Kantian in dept, especially in the "Transcending Dialectics" of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.*

Initially, agnosticism was held by 19th century Christian philosophers who believed that their religious life and belief was one guaranteed by faith and authority. To them, Christianity was a practical way of life. These philosophers were religious not on the

basis of their having certain knowledge of either the existence or non-existence of being of the God. If anything, they held that they were agnostics.[2] This position was based on the ground of the limit of the capacity of the human mind to know reality in its most diverse form.

As Roland Hepbun indicated, it was not only the human mind that provided the sources of 19th century agnosticism. Three others include (i) the variance that existed between the claims of the Bible and scientific knowledge and data. "There was a new time scale of geology, the personal and amoral Darwinian evolutionary theory, and the radical textual, historical criticism of the Bible itself."[3] (ii) A few philosophers were soon to start questioning Christian morality in the light of what suggested, albeit anachronistically, Leibniz's theodicy (i.e. the righteousness of God). For example, "J.S. Mill declared [that] it was impossible for a thoughtful person to ascribe "absoulte perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily made and capriciously governed a creation as this planet...[Mill] found "moral difficulties" also in "the recognition... of the object of highest worship, in a being who could make a hell and create creatures whom he foreknew to be destined of suffer in it eternally"[4] (iii) There was also the question of epistemology. It bothers on the validity of the "standards of evidence and reasoning in normal theology, and as contrasted to the severe, and dispassionate criteria of the sciences."[5] According to John Passmore, "Science was gaining ground rapidly, and the scientist had new and fascinating facts at his disposal, facts which seemed to make it more and more difficult to believe in God, freedom and immortality - at least in their popular acceptation"[6].

The early 19th century's root of agnostism was therefore largely clearly Kantian, or if we are to go backwards, Humean. But what makes agnosticism a suspicious way of philosophising is also largely its elusiveness. We, on this score, follow Passmore's account thus: "This philosophical impasse delighted Huxley, who in his book on Hume (1879), warmly recommended Hume's

'mitigated scepticism'. It gave him all the more reason for being an 'agnostic' - a word of his own coinage. The problem of the ultimate causes of existence is one which seems to be absolutely out of reach of my poor powers'-that is Huxley's regular reply to those who accuse him of atheism and materialism."[7]

So much on the theorical roots and cognition of agnosticism. In the section that follows, we shall go into the debate between an agnostic (Russell) and a theist (Copleston) in order to glean out traits of how contemporary agnostics philosophise. The debate by both Russell and Copleston is floated on philosophical categories of religion and metaphysics. Nevertheless, the spine of their arguments is largely epistemological. We commence our analysis by first, briefly stating the philosophers' summary of their positions in the debate. This is to show the views they intend to defend and the philosophical background against which they so did.

Copleston argued that the existence of God could be philosophically proved by a metaphysical argument. And the existence of God could make sense of man's moral religious experience. He held that the world is metaphysically made up of (contingent) beings. No contingent being can singularly account for its own existence unless there is a necessary being to so ultimately account for "the infinity of the series of contingent beings, even if proved, would be irrelevant. Something does exist; therefore there must be something which accounts for this fact, a being which is outside the series of contingent beings"[8] can be taken to be the kernel of Copleston's statement of the metaphysical (otherwise called the argument from contingency) proof of God's existence.

His argument of religious experience assumes that religious experience is caused by something objective. Religious experience is a type of pure unexplainable love the experiencer feels: "when you get what one might call the pure type, say St.

Francis of Assisi, when you get an experience that result in an ou flow of dynamic and creative love the explanation of that *it seems to me is the actual existence of an objective cause of the experience*"[9] says Copleston.

Copleston 'moral aurgument' follows: "that all goodness reflects God in some way and proceeds from Him, so that in a sense, the man who loves what is truly good, loves God even if he doesn't advert to God... the validity of such an interpretation of a man's conduct depends on the recognition of God's existence."[10] Copleston therefore adopted a positive epistemological attitude to argue for the existence of God. This puts him in a position where he was on the defensive, since Russell would be out to point out the weaknesses, flaws, counter analogies to/of copleston's positions. Can (Russell's) philosophical agnosticism be said to be a product of this disposition?

From the out set, Russell's judgement, as to whether it is philosophically possible to know or prove whether God exists or not,was agnostic, thereby leaving Copleston with task of proffering a proof. The world, he says, is made up of beings. And it is superfluous to describe them as 'contingent', since to do so would provide grounds for an unnecessary category of another being called "necessary". The series of *being* in the universe, according to Russell, is not in need of explanation, "existing beings are simply there, and that (there is) no justification for raising the question of the explanation of their existence."[11]

Russell thereby adopted the method of 'logical' and 'language' analysis to rebut the claims of Copleston. Russell depended on the new modern method of logic as against the orthodox method of Aristotle's logic. He held that it is necessary for the *meaning* of specific terms used in arguments to be well spelt out first before being engaged in the propositions that constitute any argument. In the words of Russell, "Its not a general position that all words that

are used in metaphysics are nonsense, or anything like that which I don't really hold."[12] In Russell's logic, strees should be placed on finding the meaning of this or that word first before going on to find the validity or otherwise of arguments based on form as in the logic of Aristotle.[13]

On the basis of the above method, Russell points out the prerequisite of the true logical analysis of the word 'existence', which he notes is not a direct predicate of object (i.e. subjects). He stated the epistemic conditions under which the concepts of 'cause and effect' can be validly engaged. On the moral argument, Russell would argue that, we do not need a Divine God as a guarantor of moral obligation. He also, in a similar way, waived off the notion of religious experience. Let us go into this in some details.

THE DEBATES[14]

(i) The argument from contingency

F.C. Copleston affirms that the existence of God is provable. God, he says, 'means' "a supreme personal being-distinct from the world". God is a pragmatically significant Deity to man's social existence. "If God does not exist, human beings and human history can have no other purpose than the purpose they choose to give themselves, which -in practice-is likely to mean the purpose which those impose who have power to impose it. "[15] Russell accepts Copleston's difinition, even though he would not commit himself to any possible proof of God's existence. Yet, he denies being an atheist. Russell says, "my position is agnostic". On the heuristic importance of the notion of the existence of God, Russell accepts that human values would be affected if it were ultimately shown that God does not exist. However, he says there is no logical ground to defend the position that the notion of good and other values are not 'logically distinct' from belief in God. "I think these questions are logically distinct... G.E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* ...maintains that there is a distinction of good and evil, that both of these are definite

concepts. But he does not bring in the idea of God to support that contention". Copleston took on the burden to defend a position, but Russell sat on the fence, claiming to be neither an atheist nor a theist. He is simply one *who does not know* (an agnostic). Nevertheless, he relies on logic to pursue his case. Copleston thereby spells out the lines on which he would debate (and to which Russell conceded). And the fact that he used the terms *prove philosophically* and 'Leibniz's argument' shows that Copleston would rely on tradition and history in order to pursue his case.

There are two strands to Copleston's position in the metaphisical argument. Copleston upheld the metaphysical argument from contingent to neccesary being "because it seems to be a brief and clear formulation of what is.." The argument is based on the notion of cause and effect. It addressess the question of the capacity of objects to *causes themselves* or to sufficiently explain their existence "...since objects or events exist, and since no object of experience contains within self the reason of itself existence, thus reason, the totality of objects, must have reason external to itself. The reason must be an existent being. Well this being is either itself the reason of its own existence, or it is not, if it is, well and good. If it is not, then we must proceed further. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there is no explanation of existence at all. So I should say, in order to explain existence; we must come to a being which contain within itself the reason for its own existence, that is to say, which cannot but exist."[16]

Consequent upon Russell's observation, Copleston agreed that the argument makes a cognitive ontological demand on us. It also has implication on logic: especially on the *notion of a proposition.* The argument from contingency of Copleston proffers the fact of a being that has *peculiar type of essence.* "A being the essence of which is to exist."[17] What is epistemologically required for the cognition of this being? How can we come to know God's essence? Let us turn to Copleston's answer: "... I should not be

willing to argue the existence of God simply from the idea of His essence, *I don't think we have any clear intuition of God's essence as yet. I think we have to argue from the world of experience to God."*[18] It follows that Copleston relies on the *things of experience*-i.e. empiricism-in order to *infer*-i.e. inferential knowledge-the essential nature of God. Nevertheless, Copleston's inference is deductively derived, not a scientific inductive type because for Copleston, God is not a summary of the things of nature. God is not a law or theory about nature. God is simply an entity 'assumed into being' in order to justify human values and probably to justify why other things exist or how they came-into-being. "...Certainly if anybody saw God, he would see that God must exist. ...We don't know the essence *a priori,* it is only *a posteriori* through our experience of the world that we come to acknowledge of the existence of that being. And then one argues (that) the essence and existence must be identical. Because if God's essence and God's existence was not identical, then some sufficient reason for His existence would have to be found beyond God."[19] This position introduces the notion of 'sufficient reason.' Copleston argued that 'sufficient reason' does not entirely mean 'cause'. Cause is a kind of sufficient reason, only contingent beings can have cause. God is his own sufficient reason; and he is not the cause of Himself. By sufficient reason in the full sense I mean an explanation adequate for the existence of some particular beings."

It can be observed that a ground on whichCopleston inferred the existence of God is on the basis of 'cause'. Exactly when can we apply the concept of 'cause' to a thing or things in general? Copleston's location of the notion of cause as an epistemic category,-along with his view on the notions of *existence* and *propositions* were mainly a reaction to Russell's-we shall therefore discuss them under Russell's observations which follows.

Russell objected to Copleston's argument from contingency Firstly, on the ground of logic, that a mistaken meaning is ascribed to the terms 'sufficient reason' and 'universe'. Accordingly, Russell states: "The difficulty of this argument is that I don't admit the idea of a necessary being and I don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling other beings 'contingent'. These phrase don't for me have a significance except within a logic that I reject."[20] The word 'necessary', it seems to me is a useless word, except as applied to analytic proposition, not to things.[21] Secondly, the term 'existence' is used wrongly, as aplied to God, by Copleston. If we say 'God exists' it follows that 'God' is being used as a proper name. Consequently, the statement would be an analytic proposition. Thirdly, Russell faulted Copleston's engagement of the notion of cause'. He buttressed this point analogously. "I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, that's different logical sphere."[22] How did Copleston come to the view that the world *have a cause?* It is based on the reasoning that what the world is is intrisically unintelligible if its being is conceived aparts from the existence of God. He says the horizontal 'infinity series of events' can only be intelligently proved on the bases of being caused by another event that is outside, external to the event. "If you add up chocolates you get chocolates after all and not a sheep. If you add up chocolates to infinity, you presumably get an infinite number of chocolates. So if you add up contigent being to infinity, you still get contigent beings not a necessary being. An infinite series of contingent beings will be, to my way of thinking, as unable to cause itself as one contingent being."[23]

Whereas Copleston felt that 'cause' (being applicable to particular individual finite things) can be legitimately inferred for all things taken together as having an ultimate cause, Russell considers such a step fallacious. An inquiry can be made about the cause of a particular object, but not into the caause of all objects. Categories

such as 'sufficient reason' that guarantee the existence of all 'contingent beings' are therefore illegitimately created, Russell argues. But Copleston says, "cause is a kind of sufficient reason. Only contingent beings can have a cause. God is His own sufficient reason: and He is not cause of Himself. By sufficient reason, in the full sense I mean an explanation adequate for the existence of some particular beings."[24]

A shift in meaning exists between (i) 'sufficient reason' as an 'explanation' for the existence of a being on its own or of other beings, and (ii) 'sufficient cause' as meaning that is 'causal' of itself or of other things. The first meaning of sufficient reason (as an explanation), Russell held, is a difficult thing to achieve, or show. When is an explanation adequate? He asks. Copleston says: "An adequate explanation must ultimately be a total explanation, to which nothing further can be added."[25] But Russell adds "one thing can only be explained in terms of another, and so forth. Given the fact that the newe thing would be in want of its own explanation, you have to grasp this sorry scheme of things entirely to do what you want, and that we can't do."[26]

Existence is an important category in the argument from contingency. What is the philosophical analysis of this term? This is how Russell would express his *rejection* of Copleston's engagement of the term. "...What you have been saying brings me back ...to the ontological argument that there is a being whose essence involves existence, so that his existence is analytic. This seems to me to be impossible, and it raises of course, the question of what one means by existence and as to this *I think a subject named can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described. And that existence, in fact, quite differently is not a predicate."*

The point Russell brings home is Kantian. And that is, existence is applicable only where after predicates have been

assigned to a thing. After giving the description of a thing (that it has so and so x, or it is x, y, z, etc.), we can then go on to say that such an object exists, but only as a consequence of the assigned predicates. Otherwise, existence is not *in se* directly predicated on things. It follows that if *God exists,* the onus falls on the affirmer to proffer the existential predicates, or qualities or properties that qualifies it as such. Hence, Russell's claim that (a) 'a subject named can never be significally said to exist.' (b) 'only a subject described' can be significally said to exist. Existence therefore is strictly a predicate we ought to use to qualify 'a given set' of predicates assigned to a thing. Ontologically, we do not look out for anything called 'existence' which is attached to object(s) the way we have 'tallness', 'shortness', 'solid', 'yellow', talking', etc. (We look for the latter, not the former), the basis of which the former is the case. If existence is a predicate, then to what form of objects is 'inexistence' or non-existence a predicate?

This is not a point Copleston would accept. He holds that it is neither 'bad grammar' nor a 'bad syntax' to say that 'T.S.Eliot exist:' That is, the subject do not affect the meaningfulness or otherwise of the predicate 'existence'. "I fail to see how you can say that the proposition that 'the cause of the world exists' is meaningless."[28] Even when Russell concedes that it is a meaningful statement, he adds that God, being the cause, exists; then the truth or falsity of such a proposition rendering God to be a proper name would be a cognitive matter. "Then 'God exists' will not be a statement that has meaning ...Because, therefore, it will follow that it cannot be an analytic proposition ever to say that this or that exist."[29] The opposing views of the two philosophers is based on their different conceptions of the meaning and ontological (espistemic) status of a 'proposition'. So for a better understanding of their arguments we should turn to the logical perspective of this argument, i.e. what ought to be valid *propositions* of metaphysics.

Russell gives the logical status of the proposition from the out

set. Of course, the analytic philosophy he pioneered puts great recognition of this. Copleston not only proferred his argument from contingency he also believed that: "the word 'necessary' can only be applied significantly to only analytic propositions. Such as it is self-contradictory to deny."[30] Even though Copleston's used Leibniz's argument to promote his proof, Russell ironically unleashed Leibniz's dual typology of a proposition against him. In his epistemology, Leibniz divided propositions as leading to either any of these two types of truth: (a) truths of reason and (b) truths of fact. The certainty of the former is analytic. Its truth is necessary. To refute propositions that have the character of (a) leads to self-contradiction. Propositions of type (b) are ascertained by resorting to empirically cognitive procedures. Russsell held that necessary propositions are analytic and complex. To use his example: (i) 'Irrational animals are animals' is an analytic propositions; and (ii) "This is an animal' is not analytic. For Russell, analytic propositions depend on factual propositions whose truth should be ostentive for them to be meaningful. This is what he means by "all the propositions that can be analytic are somewhat late in the build-up of proposition." He says, "a necessary proposition has got to be analytic". So, having stated that 'Irrational animals are animals', it would be contradictory to deny that irrational animals are not animal - being a necessary proposition. The denial of the proposition is 'late' since it depends on our earlier knowledge of the meaning of the terms: animal, irrational, etc.

Copleston however, rightly point out with a good example that it does not follow that all necessary propositions are tautological. He states "if there is a contingent being then there is a necessary being"[31] is hypothetically a necessary proposition. Even though it may be analytic, it is not a tautological proposition. Russell agress with Copleston on this score. but not on the meaning of the terms involved. So long as Russell considers the term 'necessary' as meaningless, the term 'contingent' he says is

definitely a 'luxury'. All beings therefore, according to Russell, are finite beings and finite beings are contingent in character. This is a nature that we cognitively know them to possess, but it is not good enough ground for us to proffer another type of being now called necessary being. More so, when this so called necessary being lacks cognitive grounds, and except within a logic that Russell says he does not accept. "I don't admit the idea of a necessary being and I don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling other beings 'contingent'. These phrase don't for me have significance except within a logic that I reject. ...The word 'necessary', it seems to me is a useless word, except as applied to analytic proposition, not to things."

The point of Russell is that the existence of things is a question of *'factual' investigation,* and thus philosophising. Ontologically, things also have given, known features. Based on such features we can epistemologically analyse them as finite, or if we like, contingent. However, it would be a wrong logical shift in reasoning *to infer* the existence of another type of being called 'necessary' being. The category of 'existence' was employed by Russell to reject Copleston's argument. What is the correct or the *'true status'* of existence since the ontological argument engages the question of existence? We quote Russell again: "...it seems to me, to the ontological argument that there is a logical argument that there is a being whose essence involves existence, so that his existence is analytic. That seems to me to be imposiible, and *it raises, of course, the question what one means by existence, and as to this, I think a subject named can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described. And that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a predicate."*[2]

So, for Russell, existence is not a quality that is attached to objects. Rather, some other qualities are attached to (or predicated on) objects. Existence is a function of these qualities. Take for example object A; for us to say that A exists, we have to identify

some known properties, qualities of A which are directly A's predicates. In other words, it is not existence *in se* that is the direct predicate of object A. Based on this analysis, Russell would wish to conclude that directly predicating existence to God (rather than via some other properties) is wrong. It is to the properties of God (if there are such) to which we ought to predicate the word existence.

(ii) The argument from religious experience

Copleston says religious experience is not a strict proof of the existence of God. Experience is a good and loving feeling: "a loving... awareness of some object which irresistibly seems to the experiencers as something transcending the self, *something transcending all the normal objects of experience,* something which cannot be pictured or conceptualised, but of the reality of which doubt is impossible."[33] For Copleston, religious experience is quite a difficult, abnormal experience to relate to others. It is close to a 'mystical experience proper'. It is a subjective one to the experiencer. In reaction, Russell counter-argues that it is an 'argument from one's own mental state to something outside us.' Also, it is 'too private.' But the underlying point in Copleston's religious experience is *love.* And he seems to strike at this point thus: "I remember Julian Huxley in some lecture saying that religious experience, or mystical experience, is as much a real experience as falling in love or appreciating poetry and art.. when we appreciate poetry and art we appreciate definite poems or a definite work of art. If we fall in love, we fall in love with somebody and not with nobody."[34]

For Russell, the doubts this argument raises are many. Apart from being subjective and mental, one could for example love a phantom. The love could even lead to negative results, e.g.be suicide, for it to be perfect. And exactly when do one ascribe an external object to be the source of an experience that we have, or exactly when is our character influenced by an object to be

taken as an object of our love? Russell, and in fact Copleston, gave examples both from the experiences of others, and from their own personal experiences to demonstrate such negative aspects of what one would otherwise call religious experience. But Copleston would insist on the 'good effect' as the proper evidence in favour of the mystics varacity and sanity rather than as a proof of the truth of his beliefs. [35]

(iii) The moral argument

The moral argument is an extension of the argument from religious experience. It underlines the fact that "all goodness reflects God in some way and proceeds from Him, so that in a sense, the man who loves what is truly good, loves God even if he doesn't advert to God ... the validity of such an interpretation of a man's conduct depends on the recognition of God's existence."[36]

Whereas Copleston feels that the good and the "moral" are explainable from God, Russell feels that this is possible without any recourse to God. Central to the moral argument is a question Copleston asks: "What is your justification for distinguishing between good and bad or how do you view the distinction between them? Copleston proffers his answer that: "the perception of values and the consciousnes of moral law and obligation are best explained through the hypothesis of a transcendent ground of value and of an author of the moral law. I do not mean by 'author of the moral law' an arbitrary author of the moral law. I think, in fact, that those modern atheists who have argued that in the converse way 'there is no God; therefore there are no absolute values and no absolute law; are quite logical."[37] The existence of God makes the moral order bearing upon the human conscience intelligible. God provides grounds for the justification for an eternal 'objective standard' of morality. God is the 'real', or the 'ought' or as in Kant, the 'categorical imperative' of morality.

Bertrand Russell would not follow Copleston in this direction.

He believes that such factors as one's parents, environment, education, etc. are responsible for the moral order. They provide the basis of morality. He does not believe in such notions as 'absolute standard' in morality. The good and the bad is known not by recourse to God, but through the ways we get to know the differences between blue and yellow. Whereas the *faculty of perception* guarantees us the latter, the former, Russell holds, is known through *feeling*. And some conducts are objected to because they are generally not popular among a people. Russell believes that "you've got to take account of the effects of actions and your feeling towards those effects."[38] This, in Russell's view, is the basis of or morality. In other words, God's role in human moral order is not an indispensable matter of crucial importance.

Conclusion

Using Russell on God's existence as a model, let us attempt to answer the question, how do agnostics philosophise? Even though the roots of agnosticism is Humean-Kantian at the beginning, in Russell, there is evidently a departure. Western philosophers of the Modern period, to be specific - and as Kant rightly classified them - the rationalists and the empiricists were in their epistemology mainly concerned with investigating the scope of the human mind in the quest for knowledge. What epistemic objects can the human mind validly know? The way this was answered by these philosophers was most expressed even in the title of their books. For example, the classical British empiricists, John Locke (1632-1704) wrote *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, George Berkeley wrote in 1713, the *Principles of Human Understanding* and David Hume (1711-1776) wrote in 1739, *Treatise of Human Nature* which was later rewritten and published under the title, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

No doubt, David Hume drew this thinking to its logical conclusion. But it was first of all a product of what Hume

conceived to be the 'furniture of the mind.' According to A.C. Grayling, "Hume begins by describing the contents of the mind. All our perception, says Hume, are of two kinds, impressions and ideas... The key point for Hume: "all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. Simple impressions come first in experience, and one only has an idea if it derives from that original impression."

In what Grayling calls Hume's basic 'ingredients of mind', Hume goes on to adopt it as a parameter of what the mind is capable of knowing with validity or other wise. Hence he came to the conclusion that is generally regarded as sceptical, especially on concepts such as causation and induction. Hume was ready to replace notions as 'necessary connection' with 'regular association', Earlier, for Hume, understanding in the widest sense is a venture that is a function of the 'science of MAN' thus: "It is evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even *Mathematics, Natural Philosophy,* and *Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognisance of* men, *and are judge of by their powers and faculties."* This Humean spirit instigated the programme of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). And Kant brought about the basic position that constituted the plank for the 19th century agnosticism. Hence in the 'Dialectics', to quote Scruton, Kant held that: "While reason, circumscribed by the concepts of the understanding, yields genuine knowledge, it also contains a temptation to illusion. The Dialectic presents a diagnosis of this illusion, by exploring the common views of rationalist philosophers, and showing that each incorporates a fallacy"

Accordingly, Kant argues that any attempt to go beyond experience in order to describe objects that are not subject of space

and time, i.e. 'to give a description of such entity' is an attempt aimed at obtaining 'unconditioned knowledge' that ultimately ends in contradictions, as in traditional metaphysics. Consequently, Kant identifies the ideas of God, freedom and immortality of the soul to be epistemic victims of this type of knowledge. For Kant, what lies at the other side of the gulf cannot simply be known. They are not objects for human knowledge so to say. They are not within the confines of human intellect that is constituted by the *a priori* categories of space and time.

Now, Russell's agnosticism on God's existence goes beyond this approach. It is one that adopts the logical method of rebuttals. He was clearly a knowledgeable agnostic. A few examples, as already shown in the debate analysed above, would justify our claim. Russell provides us with matters of critical and crucial philosophical importance. He proffered analysis on categories such as 'existence', 'contingent' and 'necessary' beings and 'causality'. He also argued that moral values need not ultimately depend on the existence of God. Nevertheless, Russell agrees that God greatly influences our moral values and beliefs. For him, the qualities that could make existence a meaningful notion of God are attributes, direct predicates, and the basis of which we can thereby ascribe Him existence. And on causality, to use Russell's analogy, 'every man' and not humanity, is what is capable of having been caused into existence by a mother. So even if finite things in the world have 'causes', it does not logically follow that the universe itself has a cause. The universe could have been, without a creator, Russell will answer. Hence, in Russell, there is no need to postulate a superfluous 'necessary being' that accounts for the cause of other finite beings.

Now, these examples portrays Bertrand Russell's agnosticism as not devoid of basic philosophical positions having epistemological and metaphysical imputations. He tends to operate in a way that rebuts the categories/arguments proffered to

buttress the existence of God. This is done to the effect that 'such categories and arguments are either illegitimately used or they are not strong enough for the purpose they are put'. Therefore, if Russell is an agnostic, it is not in the Humean-Kantian sense that puts a bar across which the mind cannot scale . Rather, Russell's agnosticism is based on the ground that: while he finds the evidences proffered for the existence of God weak and inadequate, he does in on his own have stronger evidence to make him either a theist or an atheist. He is simply an agnostic!

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THE MEANING OF HUMAN EXISTENCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD

By
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Arthur Schopenhauer, in a sombre comment on human existence sombre, wrote:

It is really incredible how meaningless and void of significance when looked at from without, how dull and unenlightened by intellect when felt from within, is the course of the life of the great majority of men.It is a weary longing and complaining, a dream like staggering thought the four stages for life to death, accompanied by a series of trivial thoughts. Such men are like clockwork, which is wound up, and it knows not why; and every time a man isbegotten and born, the clock of human life is wound anew, to repeat the same old piece it has played innumerable times before, passage afterpassage, measure after measure, with significant variation. Every individual, every human being and his course of life, is but another short dream of the endless spirit of nature, of the persistent will to live, is only another fleeting from, which it carelessly sketches on its infinite page, space and time; allows to remain for a time so short that it vanishes into nothing in comparison with these, and then obliterates to new room. And yet, and here lies the serious side of life, every one of these fleeting forms, these empty fancies, must be paid for by the whole will to live, in all its activity, with many and deep sufferings, and finally with a bitter death, long feared and coming at last. This is why the sight of corpse makes us so suddenly so serious.[1]

What Schopenhauer was not calling attention to some malady that might be corrected by modifying the structure of government, or by a new economic order, or even by philosophical enlightenment. He was not claiming that human existence cannot be, at least in some cases, happy. He was' not calling attention to the familiar evils the beset life. These themes belong to political and economic theory, and ethics. Schopenhauer, was suggesting that this meaninglessness of our existence is metaphysical, una voidable, or part of the very nature of life. He accordingly offered no programme for over coming it. I am going to pursue this Schopenhauerian claim, but without any special reference to Schopenhauer.His perception

but without any special reference to Schopenhauer. His perceception was basically correct, that human life, in spite of its joy and the tenacity with which we cling to it, does have the character that led Schopenhauer to deem it meaningless. However, this is not the final verdict of life. Having conceded to pessimism the facts that it's claims are there, we can find another, to which both philosophy and religion have hitherto given little attention, that will at least partly redeem the otherwise forlorn description.

Life and Meaning

Life is not self-authenticating, any more in a person than in an animal. That a given thing-a housefly, a house, a man, whatever-should be living is a fact, but not as such a meaningful one: for a life just considered by itself can be quite devoid of significance. Meaningfulness does not follow automatically on the mere occurrence of a heartbeat. Thus the efforts, so commonly made, to sustain a facing and flickering life at all costs are entirely misguides. Here the pontentiality for meaning has usually evaporated, and the effort at a mere prolongation of bodily processes can only rest upon the absurd idea that life itself, as a mere fact, is something precious. The life of a breathing but comatose and dying person has no more value than does that of an expiring insect. Its meaning is gone, and, more important, its potentiality of achieving meaning is gone. Nor does the fact that given life is *human* automatically invest it with meaning. To be a living person may-and, indeed, certainly does-enhance the possibility of meaningfulness; but it is still only a possibility. Being human, as distinct from being something else, such as canine, ursine, or whatever, is not by itself a quality possessed of worth. Life's meaning for a dying person lies entirely in the life that has been lived, not in anything that exists any longer, even though that person is undeniably still possessed of his or her humanity. And the same, alas, is true of many whose mundane lives are still far from over and even, sometimes, only just beginning.

For, while they have the gift of life, and even the quality of personality, that is, of being *person*, circumstance still will never allow them to give their lives the slightest meaning or, at least, any meaning that is not as easily possessed by any animal. A person's life can be long, quite free from pain, and even enjoyed and clung to, yet bereft of meaning; for the life of any animal can have all these characteristics.[2] Still the *extinction* of that life can be without the slightest significance anywhere in the world, as meaningless as the autumn withering and falling of a leaf from a tree.

People want to deny this, to claim that the life of every person has exactly the same values as that of any other, as though one needed only to be born and to draw breath from one day to another to have a meaningful existence. There is a challenge in the claim that a person's life can be meaningless-the challenge, namely, to

make it otherwise-and not everyone feels that he or she can rise to it.

Indeed, few persons have a very clear idea of what they would need to do to meet that challenge. They accordingly reject the challenge by declaring, in effect, that it has already been met-met by the simple expedient of being born and continuing to draw breath! There is, moreover, a threat in what has been said, the threat of discovering, too late, that one's own life is quite meaningless. We can all recognise the utter insignificance in the fact that a leaf withers and falls from a tree, or that a housefly perishes. It is not so easy to view our own existence in the same light, to think of our own decay as the culmination of a life that never had any significance to begin with. Our conceit forbids it.

Thus we are tempted to say, in desperation, that every individual's life is meaningful to *him or her*, quite regardless of any other consideration, thinking that we have thereby made some sort of point. All what this actually means, however, is that people normally cling to their lives, no matter what. Which is certainly true. There are exceptions, as in the case of suicide, or sometimes a weariness with life that comes with very advance age, but normally, the threat to life is regarded by anyone as supremely terrible.[3]

The Image Of Meaninglessness

We need, then, to get before us some clear idea of meaningfulness, to avoid entanglement in epigrams having to do with human worth and the quality of personality that are nothing more than slogans. A way to do this will be by creating a picture of meaninglessness. Thus, if we can portray a kind of existence that is clearly meaningless: and then see just what makes it so, we can certainly give content to the claim that human life is meaningless-for we can say that it such, to just the extent that it resembles that picture. And then we can proceed to say what a meaningful life is just to the extent that these ingredients of meaninglessness are abolished. By going about things in this way, we will, it is hoped, avoid the kind of banality that characterizes so much of the discussions of questions such as these. We will not, for example, think of meaningful existence in terms of the mere attainment of ambitions and goals: for if those should happen to be of only illusory value, then whatever meaning they would appear to give to one's life would be no less illusory.Probably no clearer image of meaninglessness can be found in literature than in the ancient myth of Sisyphus. Sisyphus, it will be recalled, was condemned by the gods to this fate: that he should roll a stone to the top of a hill, whereupon it would at once roll back down, and Sisyphus would then have the task of again rolling it to the top, and it would one more roll to the bottom, and so on, and so on throughout his life

time.

This myth has always haunted men, like a bad dream that we cannot be awaken from. We are moved by pity for the condemned Sisyphus. There is even something deeper to it than his suffering, the stupidity of what he is doing (moving a stone, the commonest and least worthwhile object on the face of the earth)and his inability ever to stop. If it were a jewel that he were moving, or perhaps a lovely picture that he was condemned endlessly to be painting, or the infinite stars that he was to try counting, then his existence would not be quite so pathetic.Besides this is the element of a rhythmic recurrence of what he does, as though his life were divided into uniform cycles of rising and falling, with nothing ever becoming finally settled, either for good or for bad.

A more important thing to note now is Sisyphus's labours are purposeless and endlessly repetitive. It is this combination that is unique to the picture, and haunting. The pathos of it does not lie the thought that Sisyphus is condemned to great toil but, rather, that nothing ever comes of his efforts that must, nevertheless, be repeated, forever. Not even the minimal achievement that the picture warrants, the mere coming to rest of the stone, is ever reached. It has always to be moved once again, endlessly, pointlessly, meaninglessly. These elements of pointlessness and repetitiveness would remain even if we were to suppose that the stone was not even heavy, that it could be transported almost effortlessly. Toilsome or not, the work would still fit the pattern or endless pointlessness.

But we need not go to mythology or even to fiction to find exactly the same image. There is, for example, a convent in Quebec in which the following scene is enacted every day. About a dozen nuns enter a barren room and, standing in a circle, chant prayers, in Latin and in perfect unison, for several hours. Having finished, they are replaced by another similar group of nuns who do exactly the same thing for several hours, these to be replaced by still another group. Thus does the chant rise from this bleak and dreary room, without variation, day after day and year after year, unendingly. The nuns who participate in this repetitive ritual have no other life: they are either in their places, chanting in unison, or resting, to resume exactly that behaviour when their turn comes around again, very shortly. They go on ard off in shifts. Nightfall brings no rest, nor do any holy days, nor does anything whatsoever except ultimately of course, death. But even then a replacement, trained for the role, step into it. The prayers chanted being in Latin and delivered in a fixed highly ritualized manner, are vitally meaningless to any hearer, aesthetically worthless, and probably without meaning any longer to the nuns who pronounce them.

Here, in the life of such a nun, is precisely the image contained in the myth of Sisyphus. Nothing ever gets completed, for a prayer is utters, at length and at considerable speed, only to be commenced again, from the same beginning as before. Nor does anything count as bringing the agent of this labour closer to achieving her purpose, for that purpose simply is to repeat over and over, what has already been done, ever and ever.

Consider now another picture, an imaginative one this time, but sufficiently like what is common to be recognisable. Imagine, that is, a man, totally innocent of any wrongdoing, who is nevertheless, by an appalling miscarriage of justice, condemned to a lifetime of hard labour. Suppose further that his sentence is beyond appeal and irrevocable, and beyond all hope of mitigation. And suppose further that the labour contrived for him, to engage all his remaining days, is this: that he shall start by digging an immense hole in the barren prison yard, this to occupy him for an entire day. On the text day after that he will dig another huge hole, this one to be filled up again like the first, on the day following. An so on, for every day-he shall be bending his back to the shovel, either in creating a large hole in the ground or in refilling the very such hole that he made the day before, this work to continue without rest or modification through every day of his life. Thus looking back, at the end of his life, to assess his life's work, he will find that it consists either of a large and meaningless hole in the ground or of a hole just filled in, nothing more. The resemblance of this picture to the image of Sisyphus, or of the chanting nuns, is obvious. And that element is not simply that of gross injustice, or onerous toil, or frustration, or plain, or hope dashed, even though all these things are clearly contained in the pictures. It is not hard, for example, to find instances of injustice that, however evil, do not convert the lives of their victims to meaninglessness.

And it is similarly not in fact very easy, to find in typical life examples of lifelong toil onerous than what has been portrayed here: yet lives in which such toil is an ingredient are not thereby made meanigless. Indeed, the most seemingly meanigful lives may sometimes be the hardest, in terms of the sheer work that is exacted from their possessors. Similarly, the picture we have before us, though they are obviously not portrayals of pleasure, are also not strong images of pain, either. If our purpose were to illustrate a life of pain, we could easily do much better than this, by depicting almost any slum, for example, or terminal ward of a hospital. Nor again do we have before us the clearest images of frustrated hope.

Meaning And Contentment

To what extent does life itself resembles the pictures of meaninglessness that have just been sketched. Are those pictures

aberrations? Do they express the rare, exceptional, the somewhat bizarre deviations from the normal course of life? Or do they, on the contrary, typify it?

We cannot in a straight forward manner answer this question with respect to human life, for we are too close to it, and we tend. Moreover, we tend, to interpret it through the reflection of hope and optimism. So we are in danger of not seeing what is really there. This is sometimes clear enough with respect to certain individuals lives. Thus we sometimes see someone whose life so perfectly resembles the picture just drawn, and is so patently without meaning, that this verdict is forced upon us-yet that very individual may rejoice in his or her meaningless existence. Consider, for example, the employee of the slaughterhouse whose lifelong work is to wield a huge sledgehammer against the skulls of beef cattle as they are conveyed before him, hanging terrified by their hind legs. One after another, in a steady procession, for a full working day, day in and day out, through the weeks, years, through the major part of a lifetime, the work goes on, blow after blow after blow, never varying.Of course this portrayal is revolting and filled with horror, but that is not the point. The agent of this endless infliction of suffering and death has long since ceased to be troubled by the nature of his work. Like anyone else, he delights after the day's work in playing with his dog or his kitten, putting his children to bed, listening to soft music, whatever. And that is just the point: namely, that he rejoices in life, in spite of its meaninglessness. And it is especially that this point that one must suppress the impulse to say, "Then how can anyone say that his life is without meaning?" True, the individual rejoices. And true, the slaughterer's work is by normal standard valuable to humanity, possibly even necessary. And true, he does it well. Yet it would be difficult to find a life that more exactly resembles these pictures of meaninglessness. So the lesson we learn from this, that even a meaningless life can be filled with contentment. And that is, of course, the great danger-that the inner satisfaction of our lives can blind us to their meaninglessness.

We may all be like the slaughterer, not in the sense that our lived in the ambience of horror and death, but in the sense that they are ultimately without meaning and that we are blinded to this by our inner satisfaction.

The Meaninglessness of Animal Life

Instead then, of looking directly at human existence at this point, we will have a much better chance of seeing things as they are first upon the life that surrounds us, at the whole of living nature excepting human beings. We shall thereby avoid not only the misrepresentation of things arising from our own contentment, as

the life we describe is not our own, but also the kind of fatuous investment of life with such qualities as dignity, nobility, and inherent worth that philosophers so delight in when humanity is the object of their inquiry.[4] Whatever else one might say about insects and rodents, for example, the temptation is never to ascribe to them inherent worth.

Consider, then, the life of any animal whatever, and note its perfect resemblance to the pictures of a meaningless life that have been sketched. We can begin anywhere, with whatever living next catches our attention. Consider the ground mole. This pathetic and innocuous little animal has settled into the most forbidding environment imaginable, into the dark and abrasive earth itself, and there each generation lives out its life in unredeeming toil. This animal has vestigial eyes, capable only of distinguishing light from darkness, and it instinctively knows that the moment light appears, it is vulnerable to whatever preying animal is about. Its huge shovel-like claws get it incredible labour from one point to another, and this is how it spend its life, digging. And to what end? Only that it may find a worm or grub, and then on to still another, day after day, endlessly.

The resemblance to Sisyphus is perfect. And is there no further purpose to all this? There is, of course-but that is where the irony of this animal's existence becomes complete. For its purpose is simply and solely to beget others exactly like itself, and having exactly the same destiny, to inch along through the hard ground in search of a worm, and then another, and another-throughout the ages. Nothing ever comes of this pointless endeavour, except more pointless endeavour that is its exact replication.This animal epitomizes all animal life. An insect spends it whole existence feeding, for no other end then that another generation of insects may do the same thing again.

The Birds that move north and south, back and forth, with the cycles of the seasons, often over unbelievable distances, do so only that the same pointless behaviour will be repeated again and again. At no point is a signal ever given to stop. At no point can one find that even the slightest beginning has been made in anything at all, beyond the sheer perpetuation of repetitive toil. What, one wants to ask is it all *for?* And the answer is perfectly obvious: it is all for nothing, it just goes on and on, to no end whatever.

The Meaninglessness Of Human Life

Do we, then, find ourselves at a new level when we move from animal to human existence? Can we accept the obvious meaninglessness of all the life that surrounds us, assured that our lives are essentially different, that there is some unique meaning to human life that is denied to everything else?

Most people simply take for granted that there is, without feeling the least need to support that conviction. They assumed that a human life is precious just because it is human and that no matter how closely its pattern may resemble the pictures of meaninglessness we have drawn, we are nevertheless spared the obvious inference. Philosophers and theologians add their own comforting assurances, as though what is here in question should be perfectly obvious to all. Thus theologians and clergy claims man to be the very image of God, and their hearers nod their automatic assent, without even knowing what might be meant by this, beyond the implication that human life is without meaning. It is the comfort conveyed by these words, and not their truth, that elicits assent. Philosophers, for their part, speak of the human dignity, absolute worth, and autonomy that are shared by no other living things.[5] Again, the declarations are comforting, however meaningless to the mind.Some have turned with great hope to man's supposed rational nature, even calling this the divine element after the manner of Plato and Aristotle.

It is all very well to proclaim that human nature has some unique value and meaning, but to give that declaration credibility, one must somehow show that human life is not like the image of meaninglessness that we have before us. If we actually look at mankind, at human history or at the typical life of an individual, what we find is every ingredient of meaninglessness that was carefully inserted into the pictures of Sisyphus, the nuns, or the hole-digging convict. Schopenhauer's description is apt. Our lives are lived out live clockwork, accompanied by trivial thought and impulses. Their whole meaning, by whatever lofty words we may choose to describe it, appears to arise solely from the intensity with which we cling to this clockwork existence forever vainly supposing that what seems to be of the very essence of life is instead some sort of accident, a temporary aberration, that will surely disappear in another day or so. We are like aging parents who nourish the hope that their child, long since lost, is still living after all and will come back any day, or someone who still lives in the fantasy of a love long dead, imagining that it will now be revived and go on as before, yet inwardly knowing that it really is dead. We hope that the banality of our lives and the speciousness of our satisfaction will at any moment be converted to lasting triumphs and that we will be able to say, finally, that it really was worth it after all. But inwardly we know better. We partially hope; and in this we are again assisted by philosophers, who declare that our very humanity is enough to make our existence utterly goodand meaningful. We need not, they say, in effect, look any further; what we seek has already been conferred.

It is a pleasant notion. It may even be a necessary one, once

the alternatives are seriously considered.

Consider the life of any individual person-someone who says, with the utmost sincerity, that he or she is happy, someone filled with the best for life-for the question is not whether anyone is happy, but rather, whether human existence, in an individual or in the race as a whole, has any meaning. We find that each day simply duplicates the one that went before, with only insignificant variations. The person you meet after a year is the same, doing what he or she was doing then, responding to the same things in the same ways, saying much the same things, and thinking much the same things, most of them unworthy of thought to begin with. Hardly a thing has changed. A child has been born, a business venture undertaken, some purchases made, a trip completed, a few games watched or played-all about the same as the year before, and the year forthcoming. And what, besides the pleasure of the moment or, more likely, the momentary escape from boredom, is the purpose of it all? Rarely is it anything beyond the accumulation of possessions. The similarity to Sisyphus is still inescapable.

Human Animality

It is the destiny of every animal simply to beget more of its kind, these is turn struggling against all odds to achieve the very same thing again, a succession of identical generations never ceasing. Is mankind different? Superficially, yes. The world changes at our hands and a human history unfolds, the chapter of which are not all exactly alike, as they are in the case of other living things. Yet basically, we are the same. In our case as in theirs, a blind and irrational urge, not a goal. Many living things never see their offspring, and it is not really for them that they copulate and bring them forth. They do this because they are impelled to, by an irrational force.

We are not basically different. Though our inventive intellects have imposed varations that distinguish the expression of this urge from that of our creatures and superficially lead us to think that it is something quite different. For we have found way to avoid the natural outcome of this impulse in its primary expression, namely, the begetting of children, and we have also found numberless ways of diverting it into totally novel modes of expression.[6] That we go through all the motions of begetting children and yet avoid that result by numerous clever mean, show clearly enough that we have no goal other than the sheer indulgence of an appetite, imposed on us by nature and never intellectually chosen at all. Moreover, we differ from the animals in that we have a culture. We are not merely the product of external nature; we are also the product of human acculturation. And an enormous part of that acculturation, what in fact seems sometimes

to lie at the very basis of it, is the suppression of the sexual impulse. Everywhere it is hedged about by rules, imposed at such a tender age that they seem eventually to be part of our natures. The result is that we seek "other outlets" as it is aptly expressed. That is, people throw themselves into careers, the persuit of glory, office-seeking, honours. Every bit of this behaviour belongs in the same genre as that of a bird, spreading and preening itself before an intended mate, making itself glorious. In the case of the bird, the point of it all is copulation-not to create offspring, for it really cares nothing for these things, perhaps never to be seen anyway, but simply for its own sake-in response to the promptings of nature. We are not that different. We feel *alive* when we are doing things, especially when we are preening ourselves and making ourselves, as it seems to us, glorious. The most natural way of doing this, the way that more than anything else makes us feel alive, is in sexual intimacy. It is the only thing for which nothing is too great to sacrifice. With it goes the passion of loving and the total sense of fulfilment that comes from feeling loved, the only thing that the world offers that comes even close to being truly good. But when the barriers erected by culture and custom, reinforced by religion and law and every instrument on which humans can lay their hands, stand in the way of this most obvious expression of *eros*, then we find other things to do that is, other ways of glorifying ourselves and seeming, even if only for a while, to come alive.

Because they are substitutes, we have to hurl ourselves into them with that much more energy, to get anything resembling the intended result. And thereby do we escape boredom. To be barred from sexual intimacy and genuine, deeply felt affection is indeed hard, but not impossible if we are still allowed to come alive otherwise. But to the denied this to be so placed that we have nothing to do, to be placed in unremitting boredom and allowed no hope of escape, is to suffer the ultimate evil. Better to be simply running in circles, which is what the lives of most persons consist in, than languishing in inaction, that is, in utter boredom. Behold, then, the life of any individual. If you select someone who is happy and by every ordinary measure successful, so much the better, for you will then not need to ask whether he is happy or successful. You can ask instead whether his existence has any meaning. His life, you will find, consists of a perpetual running in circles, with periods of rest that serve only to revitalize him for more of exactly the same running in circles. These circles are defined by things undertaken and done a business venture consummated here, a love affair there, a trip to this place or that for novel sights and sounds, an occasional victory for some trivial reward, a little

applause here, praise there, reassuring words, and bits of self-glorification. These circles, instead of leading on to something different and perhaps nobler, for the most part overlap, such that the creator of them tends very much to be recreating the same circle over and over. Viewed from within, that is, from the standpoint of the person himself, his existence can quite truly be happy. At least it is not one either of pain or boredom-which is quite enough to satisfy the demands of happiness. Viewed from without, it has exactly the pattern of Sisyphus.

The Concept of Meaning

So far we have dwelt only on life's meaninglessness, construing this as the repetitive pointlessness that was illustrated at the outset. It is time now to consider the more positive side of life, if there is one, to determine what a positive meaningful existence would be, and whether it is attainable.

To do this we must revert to the pictures of meaninglessness with which we began, to see how they might be modified in order for a conception of meaningful existence to emerge. Consider once more, then, the nuns, whose whole lives are spent repeating exactly the same chanted prayers and adorations, over and over. That all life, human as well as animal, bears a resemblance to this is, I think, unquestionable. Yet our own lives, as we live them, do not seem to us like that-otherwise we could not declare ourselves to be happy, while at the same time pitying the nuns. There are differences, and we need to see first what these are, and then see whether any of the nuns, we can consider four possibilities, each of which, while leaving the picture exactly what it was insofar as it is a picture, nevertheless alters its significance.

For the first possibility, let us suppose, with rather cruel imagination, that the nuns are in effect enslaved persons and that their vocation was in no way chosen by them. We can imagine, for example, that arrangements have been made with some orphanage to deliver over infant female children from time and that these childen are then raised up, more or less as animals might be, to perform this strange role throughout their lives, no attempt at explanation or justification being offered to them or to anyone. We are not, in other words, supposing now that the nuns are motivated by religious zeal or by any conviction at all; rather we are saying that they are virtual automata, simply trained and brainwashed, like so much clockwork, to behave in the way that they do, and never to stop. Their behaviour is in no sense voluntary, for they are, due to the conditions if their lives from infancy on, psychologically so degenerate that they have no power of choice, no purpose or goals of their own.

Second, varying this extreme image a bit, we can suppose that these nuns have in fact chosen this vocation but their choice

was essentially irrational. We can suppose, for example, that they were simply subjected to severe and constant indoctrination during childhood, the effect of which was to plant in their minds the conviction that such a life was the finest and noblest that could be offered to anyone. Thus coming to value such a life above any other that they could envisage, they vied with others to be chosen for it , and rejoiced when they were chosen. Eventually, we can imagine, they began to have doubts and misgivings, but by then it was too late, their vows were irrevocabble, and in any case they still take pride in having been chosen and in being able to fulfill their deepest wish, born in them, at a tender age. We are not, by this second supposition, imagining that these nuns are motivated by faith in any significant way; rather, they are driven by a desire that was implanted in them by others, and their religious faith, which is of course unquestionable by them, is the product, rather than the source, of that desire.

Third, we can significantly modify this last image by supposing that the nuns are in fact moved by religious faith, that they are deeply and unshakably convinced of the reality of God and of the truth of the religion that they received, and that they completely believe that by their life prayer, lived in exactly the way in which it is lived, they glorify God in the noblest way possible. We need not here suppose that these religious convictions are in fact true; what we are supposing is; rather, that they are unshakably held and it is because of those convictions that the nuns have embarked upon the severe and demanding vocations we have described. Unlike our second supposition, then, we here suppose that the nuns' religious faith is the source not the mere product, of their behaviour.

And finally, for our fourth and final image, let us make the same supposition as we just did, but with the qualification that (we are supposing) the religious beliefs of these nuns are in fact true; that is, that God does exist, that He created even and earth, that the creed of nuns is true in every detail, and most important of all, that the nuns do in fact glorify God by their prayers or, this is unclear, that they do without doubt thus carry out His will, and that their lives are accordingly, not just in their eyes but in the eyes of God as well, noble beyond measure'.

Meaning And Purpose

Now let look at this image of the chanting nuns in these four quite different contexts, to see what distinguishes a meaningless from a meaningful existence.

That the picture of the nuns within the first context is a picture of total meaninglessness is obvious. The most fertile imagination could not construct a better image of meaninglessness. Here we have not only the elements of pointlessness and

endlessness, but also the absence of anything that could in any way redeem the life portrayed. There is no 'hint that this endless toil either accomplishes anything but is meant to do so, and the nuns themselves are deprived even of the personal satisfaction, however illusory it would be, that they are engaged in a noble or even worthwhile vocation. All they do is chant, meaninglessly, forever, and to no purpose. Then what of the second image, wherein we suppose that the nuns have, however irrationally, at least chosen this life for themselves? Does the presence of choice confer meaning on their lives? Hardly, for what they have chosen is precisely a meaningless existence, and the choice is irrational in just the sense that no justification can be given to it. Their desire for it was planted in their minds by others, and their choice was nothing more than a response to study desire. If we were to suppose that their desire to chant endlessly, and to do nothing else, were nothing but the effect of some hormonal imbalance in their endocrinal systems, to emphasize its irrational source, than the failure of this to confer meaningfulness on their lives would be perfectly manifest. It is hardly less obvious on the supposition we have made. The lives of the nuns, considered in either of the first two contexts that we have imagined, are as meaningless as the behaviour of a clock running on and on, but without hands.

What, then, of our third contexts? Here we supposed that the nuns have chosen their extraordinary vocations, their choice being not simply the effects of some groundless conditioning but, instead, a deliberate and considered commitment of their faith. Do we finally have here the element that gives their lives meaning?

Not really, for those beliefs that governed their choice might, however firmly held, be illusory. Mere strength of convictions do not convert an illusion to truth, even though the things believed might be lofty and inspiring. To suppose otherwise would be to beg the very question we are raising by saying, in effect, that any life is meaningful given only that it is believed to be so. The plainly meaningless lives of the nuns considered in our first imaginary context could, no doubt, be made to appear meaningful to their possessors, and, while this might make their fate seem less cruel, it would certainly not make it more genuinely meaningful. Similarly, the convict of our other example might somehow be led to believe, quite falsely, that he was gradually achieving some great purpose by his hole digging, but from this it would certainly not follow that he was. His hole digging would still be nothing but pointless hole digging, whatever might be his own distorted conception of it.

Here it is important to avoid a locution that seems almost spontaneously to rise to people's lips considering this kind of example, namely, that the lives described are meaningful "to them". For this only repeats what has been said, that is, that they do have

that conviction and that they do, in the light of it, believe their lives to be meaningful. That very belief can be totally false. Human beings are not, to be sure, a quite so much an object of pity when governed by such grand illusion, for they are thus made content with their meaningless existence. But that kind of contentment, far from implying that their existence is after all meaningful, certainty entails that it is not. And the ingredient of meaningfulness still elude our search

What, then, of our fourth context? Here, finally, we have one of the elements of meaningful existence, but only one: for we can at least say that the repetitive labour of the nuns is not utterly lacking in purpose. On the contrary, on the supposition we are making, it achieves a purpose that is the noblest imaginable: the very glorification of God. If one doubts this clain,it is only because one has not really made the supposition required by this fourth context, namely, that the religious conviction of the nuns is in fact true. If anyone's labours did in some real and unmistakable sense tend to the glorification to the earth, then no one would suggest that they were without purpose be in comparison with that of glorifying the very creator of the earth, and of everything else, assuming, as we must here, that this creator exists and that these labours do in some perhaps mysterious way achieve this purpose? This point can perhaps be made more convincingly with reference to the example of Sisyphus. Let us suppose that Sisyphus does not, as the ancient myth presents it, simply roll the same stone over and over, accomplishing nothing. Instead, suppose that he rolls a succession of stones, one after another, and that each instead of rolling back to the bottom of the hill, remains at the top, as intended. And supposed, further, that this task is unending or, in other words, that no matter how many stones Sisyphus moved to the top of the hill presumably with dreadful labour, there will always be another that must move, so that the work is never completed. So far, these modifications in the original story constitute no significant change, for if we actually contemplate what Sisyphus does his work is actually indistinguishable from that in the original story-he moves a rock over and over to top of the hill-except in this case he moves a different rock each time. But now suppose that these rocks, which we said remain on the hill, do not merely accumulate there in a meaningless pile of rubble but instead become the foundation for a vast and beautiful and indestructible temple and then, gradually, the materials for its walls and all its many parts, with this construction going on and on, endlessly, and the temple gradually becoming ever more beautiful and inspiring and capable of enduring to the end of time. Can we say that Sisyphus's existence is without meaning? Surely not! For one or two ingredients of meaningfulness now appears in this picture, Namely, his efforts are not purposeless or

pointless-something does result from them-and what results is of great and lasting significance.

Meaning And Creativity

If, then, a meaningless existence is one spent in pointless and repetitive toil, a meaningful existence simple one in which these elements are replaced by their opposites? Can we say, in other words, that a fully meaningful life will be one in which some truly worthwhile goal is sought and achieved? Or, in terms of some of our examples, if we suppose that Sisyphus's labours do culminate in the creation of a lasting and beautiful temple, or that the adoration of the nuns does in fact in some real and theologically significant sense tend to the glory of God, then can we pronounce those lives meaningful? And generalizing , can we say that if human existence has or can be given these ingredients, then human existence is to that extent meaningful after all?

Not quite, I think. For even if we suppose these conditions to be fulfilled, the pictures we have drawn can still fall short of meaningfulness. To see this, let us suppose that Sisyphus, for example, by his labours erects a beautiful and lasting temple that he had no part whatever in creating. His only role, by this supposition, was to pile stone upon stone in a preconceived way, as might be done by some mindless machine that had been programmed to such behaviour. We can, for example, suppose that Sisyphus is a slave, bereft of any autonomy or power of choice, whose work from moment to moment is entirely under the direction and within the control of someone having complete power over him. The temple he builds is, therefore, really the work of another, even though the building of it is entirely his. We can even suppose that the purpose or goal is his as well, in the sense that he does what to achieve it and sincerely proclaims it to be his life's purpose. Here we have an image wherein the ingredients of meaningfulness elicited before are clearly present. That is, Sisyphus's existence is not without purpose and, of equal significance, that purpose is of genuine significance, and it is finally and lastingly achieved. What is lacking is that the goal of his life is not of his own creation. It is simply imposed upon him from without.

The same conclusion would emerge from our image of the prisoner, condemned to a life time of hole digging. We can, with a bit of imagination, suppose that his labour results in something of lasting beauty and worth, and even that he is aware of this and can entirely comprehend it in his own mind. But still, if that goal, whatever it is, was itself conceived by someone else, so that his role is simply to be the instrument for the realization of what someone else has created, then his significantly lacking in meaningfulness. What he does, and everything that he does, could as well be done by an unthinking engine.And similarly in the case of the nuns: if

they are merely trained to do what they do, and themselves have no hand in the creation of their goal, then their lives are still essentially meaningless, even though we may suppose this goal to be of great or even supreme worth and to be actually attained by them. For whatever else can be said in justification of their existence, they are still automata, the mere tools to the realization of an end, however noble, rather than the creators of that end.

We do then now have, it seems, all the basic ingredients of meaningless existence before us' and, by their negation, all the basic ingredients of meaningful existence. Life is meaningless if it is lacking in a real, not merely illusory, purpose-one that is genuinely significant and not mererly believed to be so; capable of attainment, and not forever eluding its pursuer; created and chosen by him whose goal is to achieve it, and not imposed from without. Or, putting the whole matter positively, we can say that life is truly meaningful only if it is directed to goals of one's own creation and choice and if those goals are genuinely noble, beautiful, or otherwise lastingly worthwile and attained.

The Will To Live

Having said that, however, we must not casually dismiss the dismal portrayal of human existence with which we began and blithely declare life to be meaningful after all. For what still needs to be done is to set humanexistence, as we find it, against these standards and see whether it is meaningful after all. The conception of meaningfulness at which we have now arrived, is one thing; but the discovery of it in our lives is something else. And what we might discover instead is the mere illusion of it. That possibility cannot just be waved aside. Even a bright and totally convincing illusion is, afterall, an illusion still, and it is all the harder to banish if it is metaphysical in character rather than the mere product of prejudice or ignorance.

What is human existence. What do we actually find if we look objectively at the expression of life in any ordinary individual? We have already described it. It is what Schopenhauer described as a clockwork like thing, without purpose or meaning. Looked at from without, the typical life of an ordinary person perfectly resembles each of the images of meaninglessness that we have set forth, the main ingredient of these being repetitive routine that culminates in nothing but more of the same. Why, then do people cling to it? Why do people cherish life above everything else, consider the loss of it the ultimate calamity, and ward off any threat to their existence at any cost? Why do people rejoice in it. You look about you will find a strange paradox, namely, that the happiest people, the ones who find least to complain of in their lot, are precisely those whose lives are the most totally meaningless. The people whose days have hardly varied from an accustomed

routine through their entire lives, and who now, toward the end, pursue exactly the same routines, with no different results from before, that is to say, no more effect than the enlargement of some senseless objective that they have already reached a thousand times, nevertheless declare with total honesty that they are happy, that life has been good, and that they look with pride upon what they have brought about-some considerable accumulation of possessions, or the notice of the peers, or sometimes nothing more than a great number of years of walking a treadmill. The sheer magnitude of the labour is sometimes a source of deep contentment, even though at the end of it nothing has been changed.

Why is this what we actually find when at the same time the image of Sisyphus, or of the prisoner, filled with the zest of life, laughing and singing as they plod year in and year out at the meaningless labour, would seem to be the height of incongruity and absurdity? We can find the answer to this if we look once more at the chanting nuns in the context of the second of our four suppositions. Suppose, that is, that these nuns, instead of being reluctantly driven to their task, have been somehow conditioned to embrace it, so that their behaviour is the expression of a strong and deep urge. In this case their lives, however meaningless, will be neverthless joyous. Or consider Sisyphus once more. Suppose that the gods, when they condemned him to an eternity of stone rolling, had at the same time imbued him with an intense and insatiable desire to roll stones. Perhaps we can make this possibility seem more real if we imagine Sisyphus to have had injected into his veins some hormonal substance designed to rouse in him just that kind of intense and irrational urge. In that case, of course, Sisyphus would not have viewed his fate as a condemnation at all, but as a fulfillment, the fulfillment of his deepest and strongest desires. Or varying the image once more, consider a sensualist, whose desire for sexual indulgence is, let us suppose' constant and recurring and, moreover, so strong as to dominate every other desire and to govern his entire activity, so that he is completely undiscriminating in his choice of persons and quite heedless of the effects of his behaviour. And now let us place beside it the image of our prisoner, in the earlier example, who was condemned to a lifetime of digging holes. But let us add to it the supposition that this prisoner has exactly the same kind of intense, insatiable, and overwhelming desire to dig holes as does the sensualist's desire for eroticism. Now the convict, like Sisyphus, will view his life, not as one of hard labour, certainly not one of meaninglessness, but as good! He will be in exactly the same position as the sensualist who is surprised to discover himself " condemned" to a lifetime of erotic stimulus, where in all his fantasies and dreams find fulfillment.

Or in other words, he will find himself in a position much like that of all of us. For the impulses that govern the lives of most people are no more rational than this and have as littlie to justify them in their outcome. What is to be said for them is that they are strong, sometimes insatiable, and always recurring. So long, then, as we are free to respond to them, free to pursue our ends and goals as we imagine them, we deem our lives to be good and declare ourselves to be happy.'

Creative Existence

We should understand that really the main feature of all existence is its meaninglessness, and to see that this meaninglessness does not evaporate under the supposition that we somehow find it fulfilling. Having done that, we have hope of describing a meaningful life, without being blinded by the idea that we need not seek any futher, having already found it.If the ingredients of meaninglessness are what we have described, namely, existence that is repetitive and without purpose, or whose purposes are illusory in the sense described, then we can say what a genuinely meaningful life would be. It would be a life that has a purpose-not just any sort of purpose that we happen to find satisfying, but one that is truly noble and good. And it must be one that is in fact achieved and not just endlessly pursued; and it must be lasting; and finally, it must be our *own* rather than just something imbibed. In short, the only genuinely meaningful existence is one that is *creative*. That one word sums it up, and, if really understood, discloses entirely what is missing, not only in all the animate and inanimate existence that surrounds us but in the lives of the vast majority of human beings. It is aiso what philosophers have aiways sought as godiike or what makes man.in the ancient metaphor, the image of God. For what is godlike is not blind, or aimless knowledge, or unguided reason, but simply creative power. It is the primary attribute in the very conception of God. It is what makes the eoncept of God awesome.

To see this, let us return one last time to the image of Sisyphus, radically revising it so that it becomes the image, not of meaninglessness, but rather of genuinely meaningful life. It is not enough, as we have seen, merely to make Sisyphus an object of envy rather than of pity, by supposing him to fulfill his deepest desires, as the rest of us desire to fulfill ours. For the desire itself might be worthless.

Suppose, then, that Sisyphus, in rolling stones day after day, is not carrying out a sentence, but rather a plan. Soppose, further, that the plan is his own, totally the fruit of his creative mind rather than something that has been handed to him. And suppose that his plan is to build a great and everlasting temple, not merely

beautiful to his eyes, but truly beautiful, in the eyes of every future generation of mortals and, let us suppose, of the gods as well. And let us finally suppose thst Sisyphus succeeds in this.Here we have, finally, the perfect image of meaningfulness, albeit an extreme one. Every element of meaninglessness that we inserted into our earlier images has been replaced in this one by its opposite, so that as those conveyed, in extreme and exaggerated form, the idea of meaninglessness, this one conveys, once it is grasped, the idea of meaningfulness, though in similarly exaggerated form. If we now apply what has been said to life as we actually find it, rather than to extreme and imaginary cases we can discover the disparity between a meaningful and a meaningless life, quite unmistakably. A person who does actually succeed in creating something genuinely good, perhaps even beautiful or noble, has lived meaningfully. And we need not ask whether this person is happy, whether what he or she has done receives any acclaim or is even noticed; for we are not asking what is required to become happy or noteworthy, but rather, what is required for an individual life to have meaning. Some persons might not to, be sure, seek such a meaningful existence even if it were pointed out to them. Indeed, probably most persons would not. But that, too, is beside the point. We have been concentrating on two quite specific ideas, namely, meaninglessness and its opposite; and this has nothing to do with what the majority of persons happen to seek, or even what they would seek if the world were different.

The Meaning Of Creation

Does this mean that the only meaningful life is one devoted to the creation of some *object,* some great work of art, of whatever kind? It does not. But at the same time, a perfectly clear idea of a meaningful existence is just that. Just as not all us spend our lives digging holes, rolling rocks, or chanting meaningless words, nevertheless our lives do greatly resemble those pictures. And similarly, just as not everyone's life is that of a genuine creator, one's life *can* resemble that

For creation is not just the creation of things. Creativity is a state of mind, sometimes expresses itself in small and otherwise insignificant ways. Great or small, it is precious, and it is the only thing that finally converts life to meaning. No animal, for example, can look at nature, or at any object of nature, creatively, but a person can. A person can contemplate the simplest, and otherwise least significant, thing creatively-can thus consider a blade of grass, a hill a thunderstorm, a snowflake, virtually anything. Similarly, the creation of such a work as Plato's *Republic* is certainly meaningful. It would be laughable for anyone from whatever ideology, to suggest that Plato's life had no meaning. Yet meaningful thought need not be thought that has such a result as

this or, indeed, any result whatever beyond itself. One's very thoughts can be poems, even if unuttered, in contrast to being trivial or banal or imitative, as most thought is most of the time.Consider two persons looking, say, at a meadow. One sees it for its size, its possible value, the use to which it might be put. He sees it, in short, only in terms of his own conditioned desires, rather as an animal would see it. The other, we can suppose, considers none of these things but is instead drawn to a tiny and insignificant flower at her feet and looks at it in a way that the other person is incapable of viewing it, in a way that no animal can view it. She looks at it creatively, not merely *finding* it meaningful, but investing it with meanings, by her own creative power. This is not the creation of an object, but it is creation just the same. It is quite possible to go through life this way, more or less-more or less-more in the case of true genius, less, but in the same mode, for others, but not at all for the most forsaken of persons, who are totally bereft of creative thought and feeling and simply replicate, as animals do, what others have already thought and felt and done.[8] Thus one can be creative in his or her relationship with other persons, infusing into these much more thought and feeling than would be elicited by passive encounter; or one can simply respond, unthinkingly and uncreatively, as he or she feels prompted. Most human relationships are, of course, of this second kind. For some persons they are all that is really possible. But that more is possible is perfectly apparen to anyone of creative spirit.

And so it is with everything under the sun, with the entire earth and all it contains, and even the heavens too. God, we are taught, did not merely come upon all this and decide to make it his own through sheer power. Instead, he created it all, as we are told, and really is for this reason alone thought to be God. We are not gods, but we are not just animals either. We need not stagger dreamlike through the four stages of life to death, accompanied by a series of trivial thoughts, as Schopenhauer expressed it.We can instead or, at least, some can live meaningfully, by creating our own meanings, whether great or small, and then literally glorying in them, caring not in the least what we "get" from it all. We will already have gotten all that is meaningful.

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2000/2001

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DMODUS PUBLISHERS
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